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‘A world is precisely that in which there is room for 
everyone; but a genuine place, one in which things 
can genuinely take place (in this world). Otherwise, 
this is not a “world”: it is a “globe” or a “glome”, it is 
a “land of exile” and “a vale of tears”.’ 
 
(Jean Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World.         




It is exactly 60 years ago that the United Nations convened a conference, held 
in Geneva from 2 to 25 July 1951, on the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. The Convention was approved on 28 July 1951 and entered into force on 
22 April 1954. Initially, the Convention aimed to address the plight of refugees 
scattered throughout Europe as a consequence of the Second World War. But with 
ever increasing numbers of people driven out of their home countries and 
spreading around the world, a Protocol was adopted in 1967 that removed the 
geographical and time limits so as to expand the scope of the Refugee Convention. 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which started its 
work on 1 January 1951, estimates that at present, 16 million refugees and asylum 
seekers are spread around the world. To date, 147 countries have signed either or 
both the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol. 
The Refugee Convention is the bedrock for protecting persons who are 
vulnerable in every aspect of their lives as they no longer enjoy any form of legal 
protection. This lack of protection befalls a person who flees his home country and 
is forced to live outside the bonds of protection that connect him to the home 
government. The Refugee Convention addresses this lack of protection that comes 
into being upon fleeing. Importantly, the Refugee Convention does not cover 
persons who are no longer effectively protected by their government, and who 




supplemented the limited 1951 ref
                                                       
to escape their countries in order to seek safety elsewhere. The right to leave one’s 
own country is therefore fundamentally consequential in refugee protection. 
Tackling the lack of protection, the Refugee Convention aims to restore the 
legal person of the refugee so as to ‘assure refugees the widest possible exercise of 
their fundamental rights and freedoms.’1 The Convention spells out the kind of 
protection refugees should receive from countries in which they take refuge, as well 
as other basic rights that should be afforded to them, including the right to 
freedom of movement and religion, the right to work and the right to education. As 
protection is contingent upon refugee status, the Convention provides the 
definitional criteria that determine which persons are in need of international 
protection. The Convention is therefore the primary legal standard for identifying 
refugees, limiting protection to persons who have a well-founded fear of 
persecution because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.  
The 1967 Protocol, which acknowledged the international dimension of the 
refugee question, already evidences that the Convention is not a static document, 
but that it is, instead, responsive to an ever-changing world in which new situations 
of displacement continue to occur. Indeed, ever since its adoption, a complex 
refugee protection regime has evolved from an on-going readjustment of the scope 
of those in need of international protection. The approximation of protection to 
the rights and needs of today’s refugees took a high flight in the final decades of 
the Twentieth Century, when human rights law permeated into the international 
protection regime. In a Communication from 2000 to the Council and European 
Parliament on the legislative package that is to form a Common European Asylum 
System, the European Commission explicated: ‘The sources of international 
protection in the Member States of the European Union are, of course, the Geneva 
Convention of 1951 on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, national 
constitutional and legislative provisions and other international Conventions and 
the consequences in asylum terms of compliance with the European Human Rights 
Convention (ECHR - Article 3) and the Convention against Torture (Article 3 
again), and in certain cases the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In some 
Member States administrative practices are of considerable importance in terms of 
the general offer of protection. The role of national court and of the European 
Court of Human Rights decisions are vital in developing the law relating to asylum 
in the Member States. Generally speaking, the presence of individual persecution 
(the key element of the Geneva Convention) is not in fact the sole ground on 
which asylum is granted in Europe, even if the Geneva Convention is the central 
pillar of the edifice.’2 
Despite the wide variety of legal sources upon which, to rehearse the 
Commission, asylum is granted in the European Union, there is little reason to 
celebrate the 60th anniversary of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Tapping 
international human rights law in matters of asylum may, indeed, have 
ugee definition. But the snag is that over the 
 
1 Preamble to the Refugee Convention, consideration 2.  
2 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Towards a common asylum 
procedure and a uniform status, valid throughout the Union, for persons granted asylum (COM (2000) 755 final), p. 4. 
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number of rights, such as the rig
                                                       
course of this development, protection inadvertently came to be limited to the 
prohibition to return people to places where their lives and freedom are seriously at 
risk without, however, paying due attention to the rights of refugees that follow 
from this. James Hathaway, a leading scholar in refugee law, has pointed out that in 
the on-going legal and political debate on stretching the eligibility criteria, only 
three provisions of the Refugee Convention are taken into account, covering 
articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Convention. 3  These articles prohibit, respectively, 
penalization of a refugee’s unauthorized entry into a country of asylum, expulsion 
and refoulement. Other provisions of the Convention which afford refugees rights 
that should at least be equivalent to the rights and freedoms of other third- country 
nationals, and in many cases, to those of citizens, remained more or less undebated. 
Hathaway explains this undressing of protection by an increasingly pitiless 
unwillingness of states to view refugees as permanent residents which has taken 
root around the asylum debate at the close of the Twentieth Century. 
This lack of regard for a coherent system of rights effectively disempowers 
refugees to make a new beginning and build their lives anew, turning countries of 
‘asylum’ into waiting rooms where the lives of refugees are suspended. This 
situation forms the starting point of my thesis.  
Admittedly, in particular, non-penalization of illegal entry and non-refoulement are 
quintessential to refugee protection. Such provisions limit the right of states to 
select and exclude in their own interest non-nationals at their borders and bar them 
from access to the territory -- which is certainly a daunting limitation, with millions 
of people on the move for reasons other than persecution, violence and war. Non-
penalization and non-refoulement highlight that refugee protection fundamentally 
differs from immigration control as they prohibit the rejection at the border of 
protection seekers. Both provisions thus guarantee the right to seek asylum as 
crystallized in article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Though 
article 14 does not specify where and how the right to seek asylum must be granted, 
nor entails a right of first entry into the territory of the potential host state4, I 
proceed from the preliminary assumption that the actual opportunity to lodge an 
asylum claim is dependent upon the physical presence of the refugee at a place 
where the targeted host state has jurisdiction – in particular the jurisdiction to call it 
its territory or not in the legal sense. Indeed, there is ample support for the 
assumption that the refugee’s physical presence enhances legal protection as a 
ht to trial and meaningful legal assistance 5 , 
 
3 Cf., Hathaway, J. The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, New York: Cambridge University Press 2005, 
pp. 2, 3.  
4 Compare Noll, G., Fagerlund, J., Liebaut, F. Study on the feasibility of processing asylum Claims outside the EU 
Against the background of the Common European Asylum System and the Goal of a Common Asylum Procedure, Bruxelles: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 2002, p. 35: ‘[W]e have been compelled to 
conclude that the content of Article 14 UDHR is not legally binding upon states. On the understanding that 
Article 14 UDHR is something else than just a positive formulation of Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and exceeds the normative content of the latter, there is no basis for a different conclusion. 
Neither a homogeneous state practice nor a corresponding opinion juris can be made out to support a right to 
access territory in order to seek asylum.’ 
5 Cf., Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. & Gammeltoft-Hansen, H. ‘The Right to Seek - Revisited. On the UN Human 
Rights Declaration Article 14 and Access to Asylum Procedures in the EU’, European Journal of Migration and 




equality and rights are the outcome
                                                       
presuppose the physical contact between the refugee and the potential host state.6 
Simply put, ‘insofar as the asylum seeker is out of sight, the right to an asylum 
process is likewise out of mind.’7 
But there is reason to doubt whether the European Commission only had in 
mind the right to seek asylum when it enumerated the legal sources on the basis of 
which asylum is granted in Europe. In this respect, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (2000) which gained legal effect with the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, is worth mentioning. Noteworthy, the 
wording of article 18 of the Charter which enshrines a right to asylum8, suggests that 
asylum is not limited to the right to seek asylum. However, on the understanding 
that the Charter only reaffirms rather than elaborates existing rights, it has been 
argued that article 18, though seemingly expansive, does not refer to anything other 
than a procedural right to claim asylum. 9 From a legal point of view, the content of 
article 18 has therefore been said to be ‘linguistically vague and legislatively 
malleable’.10 As Goodwin-Gill and McAdam put the quandary: ‘In regard to asylum 
… the argument for obligation fails, both on account of the vagueness of the 
institution and of the continuing reluctance of States formally to accept such 
obligation and to accord a right of asylum enforceable at the instance of the 
individual.’11 
Yet the conceptual understanding of the notion of asylum should not, for that 
reason, be dodged. In this thesis I approach the question of asylum from a 
philosophical perspective. Two questions underlie this academic study. First, given 
what refugeeship entails, what is asylum? And second, why would we, as members 
of democratic polities care? The notion of a right to have rights, which Hannah 
Arendt was the first to invoke, manifests the interrelation between both questions. 
The right to have rights casts light on the plight that befalls refugees upon fleeing. 
Indeed, the question of asylum is to be informed by a conceptual understanding of 
the calamity refugees are facing. For this reason, the question of asylum is to be 
preceded by the question of refugeeship and urges an inquiry into the concept of 
the refugee. Though the right to have rights illuminates what, exactly, the refugee is 
claiming in claiming asylum, it is far from an easy solution to the problem. Quite 
the contrary, the right to have rights brings to awareness the complex relation 
between the refugee and the potential host state. If, in modern democracies, 
 of joint political action between the members 
 
6 Compare Noll et all 2002, p. 17: ‘But access to the territory of a potential host state is a precarious good for 
persons in need of protection. This is true in a double sense. First access to territory, even if only in the form 
of border territory, means at least temporary physical security. Second, such access also enhances legal 
protection. A number of important protective norms of international law presuppose territorial contact for 
their applicability.’ 
7 Gammeltoft-Hansen & Gammeltoft-Hansen (2008), p. 454.
8 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), article 18: ‘The right to asylum 
shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol 
of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the 
European Community.’ 
9 Cf. Goodwin-Gill, G., & McAdam, J. The Refugee in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007, 
pp. 367, 368. 
10 Noll, G., ‘Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Entry under International Law?’, International Journal of 
Refugee Law, vol. 17 (2005), p. 548.  
11 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, p. 358. 
 5 
 
first asylum, and integration and n
Refugee Convention does, in fact, r
                                                       
of a polity, how can the refugee, who does not belong, claim a right to have rights? 
The fundamental dilemma at issue here is the unavoidable asymmetry between the 
refugee and the receiving polity. Neither legal formalism nor the humanity of the 
refugee can save him from this asymmetry. Hence the question: if a people jointly 
determines and unites itself around a common interest, why would it care to 
protect refugees?  
 It is no exaggeration to say that ‘asylum’ is a pivotal concept in refugee law, if 
only because the refugee first appears as an asylum seeker who claims asylum in a 
potential host state. Seemingly, it is a self-evident notion that appears in legal 
documents and is used in academic and public debates on refugee protection. But 
the question what asylum amounts to is not, for that reason, redundant. As already 
indicated above, it appears that the international community is in complete disarray 
about the notion of asylum. This became amply clear during a conference 
convened in 1977, to decide on a draft Convention on Territorial Asylum. The 
conference failed and the Convention was not adopted, partly because agreement 
on the meaning of asylum was not forthcoming. Grahl-Madsen, who participated in 
the drafting process, explains the abortion of the Convention by pointing out that 
the ‘term ‘asylum’ has no clear or agreed meaning. However, as used in the draft 
conventions before us, the term ‘asylum’ must clearly mean something more, or 
something different, from both non-refoulement and non-extradition.’ 12  Intimating 
that asylum is something different than a positive formulation of the prohibition of 
refoulement 13 , Grahl-Madsen tacitly indicates that asylum is not exhausted by the 
right to seek asylum. But strikingly, what can genuinely be considered to be a key 
concept in refugee law, to wit, asylum, is surrounded with uncertainty and 
perplexities. This book attempts to clear the haziness and provide conceptual clarity 
on the notion of asylum. 
The question of refugeeship and asylum therefore not only engages legal issues, 
but also, it raises more fundamental conceptual questions that take us to heart of 
the international refugee protection regime. Who qualifies as a refugee and who is 
excluded of protection on the basis of the legal definition of the refugee, is not at 
issue here. Instead, the question of asylum is related to the situation the Refugee 
Convention and other legal arrangements aim to tackle. The main concern of this 
thesis is therefore not with the formal grant of refugee status, but rather targets 
refugeeship as the concrete experience of the refugee between departure and 
arrival. Obviously, the legal response to the refugee question is directed by what is 
preconceived to constitute the plight of refugees. The relevant question in this 
respect is how the predicament of refugees is conceptually grasped. A preliminary 
answer to this question is that refugees are said to constitute a class of unprotected 
persons who are offered international protection until a more durable solution 
becomes available. Three durable solutions are generally accepted: repatriation or 
return to the country of origin, resettlement in a country other than the country of 
aturalization in the host country. Though the 
ecommend states to facilitate the latter option, 
 
12 Grahl-Madsen Territorial Asylum, Stockholm/London: Almqvist &Wiksell International 1980, p.50.  
13 The reference to non-extradition in the cited passage from Grahl-Madsen makes sense within the historical 
context of asylum in which the grant of asylum corresponded to the right of states to refuse to extradite a 




permanent settlement has clearly fallen out of favour, while at the same time states 
make little effort to establish a resettlement programme to receive refugees from 
other parts of the world.  
The predominance of repatriation and/or return bears out the stubborn 
presupposition that refugees belong ‘there’, not ‘here’ with us. But I surmise that 
the referred predominance cannot simply be explained by states’ reluctance to view 
refugees as potential new citizens. States surely factored in the negative when it 
comes to matters of asylum, as they zealously watch over their sovereign right to 
determine in their own interest who their citizens are and who should be discarded 
as members. But the waning of integration is also connected, or at least so I argue, 
with some of the most fundamental presuppositions that shape current 
understanding of the refugee problem. It is my hypothesis that the very concept of 
the refugee lodges the refugee in the ‘country of origin’ where he naturally and 
properly belongs and, ultimately, should return to. I will argue that, paradoxically, 
the concept of the refugee holds the concept of asylum out of sight. 
The preliminary answer that refugees are a class of unprotected persons is, of 
course, overly hasty, as it disregards how the concept of ‘unprotected persons’ has 
developed over time. To tease out the conceptual framework of the refugee 
protection regime I will therefore track down the historical development of the 
notion of ‘unprotected persons’, going back to the years preceding and following 
the adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Consequently, this thesis not only 
focuses on the legal instruments designed to address the refugee problem. Of equal 
importance are the two conventions, adopted in 1954 and 1961, that tackle the 
issue of statelessness. The difference between refugees and stateless persons, which 
took hold in the years following the Second World War, has decisively shaped the 
understanding of the refugee dilemma. By virtue of this difference, the lack of 
protection the refugee is suffering is qualified as a factual lack. Indeed, the refugee 
problem came to be identified as a problem of de facto  statelessness, sharply 
delineated from the problem of de jure statelessness which expresses that the lack of 
protection a stateless person is suffering is a matter of law, as no single state on 
earth can be attributed a responsibility to protect the person concerned.  
In this book, I will argue that the distinction between de facto and de jure 
statelessness, around which the refugee protection regime has taken root, is at the 
origin of the perplexities that pertain to the notion of asylum. De facto statelessness 
misfires in identifying the refugee problem. Though it rightly captures the lack of 
protection the refugee is suffering, it fails to see that this lack is tantamount to the 
loss of a place the refugee can call his own and where he can be at home. The claim 
that the distinctive feature of refugeehood is the loss of an own place harks back on 
Hannah Arendt’s trenchant insight into the refugee experience. By virtue of having 
lost state protection, the refugee is forced to live outside the pale of law and is 
therefore, Arendt argues, driven outside the common world. In a legal sense, the 
refugee is, strictly speaking, nowhere in this world. The claim that the refugee 
belongs nowhere in this world is not to be taken in a metaphorical sense. On the 
contrary, the argument derives from a basic insight into the spatiality of law. On 
the understanding that legal boundaries emplace humans and human behaviour in 
terms of rights and duties, I am able to argue that the distinction between de facto 
and de jure statelessness is not as clear-cut as is commonly believed. Without a 
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country of their own, both the refugee and the stateless person face the same 
fundamental and existential dilemma: where do they have a right to live?  
Casting the plight of the refugee as the loss of an own place, which signals, 
again, that the refugee is absolutely nowhere in this world, enables me to illuminate 
what the refugee is claiming in claiming asylum. The claim to asylum is ultimately a 
claim to an own place. Drawing on the double meaning of asylum, which refers 
both to ‘protection’ and the ‘place of protection’, I will argue that if the Refugee 
Convention is still relevant today it is because the rights which it affords to 
refugee’s are contingent upon the legal emplacement of refugees within host 
communities. Taking the notion of ‘place’ back in, asylum comes to the fore as the 
anticipated possibility of becoming rooted again. 
Rethinking the basis of our asylum policies thus requires a careful and critical 
re-evaluation of the differences between refugees and stateless persons. This also 
raises the second question of my thesis: Why would we, as members of democratic 
polities, care? This question allows me to address the question what grounds a right to 
asylum at a deeper level. The different legal sources that set down criteria for 
protection are not at issue here. The legal and political problem of refugee 
protection engages a more general philosophical problem. Keeping in mind that the 
fundamental asymmetry between the refugee and receiving polity derives from a 
basic insight in modern democracies, i.e. that those who rule and those who are 
being ruled are the same, the relevant question in this respect is: how to understand 
and make sense of the sovereign right of a people to determine itself?  
The question is relevant. Though refugee protection is said to constitute a 
humanitarian exception to the sovereign right of a state to control its borders, this 
does not imply that sovereign power is fettered. On the contrary, the upshot of my 
conceptual analysis of the refugee protection regime is that refugee protection plays 
on the very spatial and existential-ontological distinctions that are ingredient to 
sovereign self-determination. Refugee protection does not, therefore, fetter 
sovereign power but instead throws it into relief. 
Thus, an inquiry into asylum cannot side-step the question of sovereignty. This 
is not to denounce refugee protection as merely an exercise in cynicism or to 
subject refugees to the whims of a sovereign people that may or may not decide to 
grant protection as it deems fit. To take a people’s sovereignty seriously is not to 
exonerate a democratic people from taking the rights of refugees seriously. The 
question at issue here is how, if at all, a democratic people can respond to a claim 
to asylum. What, if anything, may serve as an argument to grant refugees asylum 
‘here’?  
To answer this question, I will elaborate a theory of collective identity that aims 
at the self that is at issue in the sovereign right of a democratic people to determine 
and rule itself. Selfhood-in-the-plural brings sovereignty into view as a people’s 
concern for its own existence. Paradoxically as it might appear at first glance, it is 
the very concern for its own being that elucidates why a democratic people cares 
for those who have lost everything and everyone and who, for that reason, claim 
asylum.  
This book is an attempt to elucidate the dilemma that refugees and democracies 
face in facing each other and to shed a new light on the relation between them. The 






This is a thesis in philosophy of law. It aims to discover whether the international 
community adequately responds to the complex refugee problem within a 
philosophical perspective. Therefore it is necessary to first demonstrate that there is 
a reason to question the international response to the issue and, secondly, to 
determine whether the refugee dilemma is indeed a problem worthy of 
philosophical reflection. I will first identify the problem as it appears in law. Then I 
will demonstrate the philosophical issues this legal and political problem engages. I 
will articulate the refugee dilemma in terms of more general issues in legal and 
political philosophy. In the final analysis I will sketch how the international regime 
of refugee protection may profit from this philosophical inquiry into asylum. I do 
not intend, of course, to offer a solution to the refugee problem. The modest aim 
of this thesis is to open up new visions of angle that redirect the conceptual 
understanding of the dilemma. By offering an alternative conceptual framework 
wherein to articulate the refugee problem, it hopes to inspire efforts made by 
scholars in refugee law to improve refugee protection. 
The general methodology of this book is conceptual analysis. However, to steer 
away from what is sometimes called the ‘philosophers’ disease’ (caused, according 
to Wittgenstein, by a one-sided diet of a few simple examples) it is heavily informed 
by a complex set of data. To get a hold of the legal and political problems involved 
in refugee protection I draw upon the work of scholars in refugee law, such as Alte 
Grahl-Madsen, James Hathaway, Gregor Noll and Thomas Spijkerboer. The critical 
comments and reports from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles on 
asylum legislation within the European Union are an important source to sharpen 
the debate. As a considerable part of this thesis is devoted to analysing the 
difference between refugees and stateless persons, I will also draw on authors such 
as Nehemiah Robinson, Paul Weis and Laura van Waas who have investigated the 
issue of statelessness. Hence, with regard to the empirical basis of my research, I 
depend on the socio-political and legal fact-finding by these and similar authors, 
who also pointed me to the less obvious legal instruments and sources. I joined 
them, sometimes critically, in their efforts to analyse these data, and carried the 
analysis further into the direction of more pertinent philosophical issues.  
To come to an understanding of the philosophical stakes involved in refugee 
protection I turn to the famous ninth chapter of Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, entitled ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights 
of Man.’ Arendt finished The Origins in the summer of 1950, a year before the 
Geneva Refugee Convention was adopted. However, it is doubtful whether the 
adoption of a legal instrument to tackle the plight of refugees eased Arendt’s grave 
misgivings about the way the international community dealt with refugees. Her 
argument stands out against the historical development of the legal understanding 
of the international dilemma of ‘unprotected persons.’ Indeed, Arendt’s pivotal 
insight into the refugee dilemma is that the denial of statelessness with respect to 
refugees continues the balefulness of their situation. She develops her argument 
against the backdrop of what she coins as the right to have rights, which is claimed 
at the behest of people who belong nowhere in this world. Through the looking 
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glass of the right to have rights, refugees and stateless persons share in the same 
dilemma: where do they have a right to live?  
I will argue that the right to have rights only makes sense within the context of 
international displacement. It acquires a practical meaning if translated, first, as the 
right to seek asylum, and, second, as the right to asylum. We come across this 
difference in various legal sources. The right to seek asylum is formulated as a basic 
human right in article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and, also, 
the absolute prohibition of refoulement is generally considered to back up the right to 
seek asylum. In its turn, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
invokes a right to asylum. The right to have rights casts light on this two-stringed 
use of the notion of asylum. 
In order to illuminate why states would comply with international obligations to 
protect refugees, I develop a theory on popular sovereignty and collective identity, 
taking my cue from the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). 
Heidegger’s oeuvre comprises texts on subjects such as the question of Being, 
metaphysics, human existence, technology, language and art. Apart from some 
unsavoury allusions to national-socialism, Heidegger did not explicitly engage in 
political philosophy, nor did he address legal problems. Yet Heidegger’s thinking 
has exerted a great influence on contemporary political philosophers, in particular 
on Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben. These philosophers do not tease out 
Heidegger’s ‘political philosophy’, nor do I intend to do so. Instead, I will focus on 
some specific aspects of his thinking, while leaving many others aside, in order to 
trace the political problem of sovereign self-determination and inclusion and 
exclusion back to its philosophical foundations.  
 
 
Outline of the book 
 
The first chapter of this book is entirely devoted to the current state of affairs in 
refugee protection. It describes the formal elements of refugee law in order to bring 
into sight which persons are covered by the international protection regime, and 
which situations fall beyond its reach. The stretching of the eligibility criteria, which 
is reflected in EU law by a subsidiary status for ‘persons otherwise in need of 
international protection’, may not, however, hide from view that refugee protection 
is waning. In order to get an empirical purchase on the downfall of protection, I 
will discuss the repercussions of the problem of irregular immigration with which 
states are struggling today on the refugee protection regime. Refugee protection has 
suffered a tremendous set- back, as the emphasis shifted from protection to 
immigration control. Under the pretext of combating and containing ‘illegal’ 
immigration, states have resorted to the means of immigration control in order to 
prevent the unauthorized entry of asylum seekers and/or prevent the illegal stay of 
rejected asylum seekers. The corollary thereof is that refugee protection more and 
more translates as an issue of immigration control. 
As states have proven to be unable to adequately deal with mixed migration 
movements, the exploration of alternative forms of refugee protection is set high 
on the agenda of both politicians and academics. The first chapter ends with a 




amongst others, by James Hathaway. Temporary regional protection is without a 
doubt the most challenging alternative to traditional forms of refugee protection. 
Chapter Two takes the inquiry to the next stage, elaborating the concept of the 
refugee. It argues that temporary regional protection is not so much an alternative 
or a complement to traditional protection but is, rather, the ultimate consequence 
of the conceptual framing of the refugee question as a problem of de facto 
statelessness. Driven to the limit, de facto statelessness presupposes that refugees, at 
the end of the day, ought to be ‘there’, not ‘here.’ But as I will argue, de facto 
statelessness, by virtue of its strict opposition to de jure statelessness, veils the 
refugee’s displacement, which I take in the strong sense as the lack of an own place. 
De facto statelessness fails to see that the refugee is no longer there nor yet here, but 
is instead nowhere in this world. The ‘there’ where the refugee supposedly belongs 
is no longer a self-evident and qualified somewhere (a foreign state, a different 
country) determined and positioned over against a here, but instead collapses into 
the nowhere of the camp. The refugee-camp is the absolute non-place which gives 
a spatial arrangement to the refugee’s displacement. Indeed, I will argue that, by 
virtue of de facto statelessness, the camp is the fourth and hidden solution to the 
world’s refugee problem. There is a disturbing tension, therefore, between the 
conceptual framework of the refugee protection regime and the explicit aim of the 
Refugee Convention which, recall, is to assure refugees the exercise of their rights 
and freedoms. 
The binary opposition between here and there upon which the protection 
regime relies is, of course, a manifestation of the inside/outside divide that is 
constitutive for a democratic legal order. Another manifestation of the 
inside/outside divide is the distinction between the own and foreign. Drawing on 
an empirical analysis by Thomas Spijkerboer of the Dutch asylum procedure and 
the way decisions on protection are taken, this chapter also argues that refugee 
protection is heavily reliant upon the distinction between the own and foreign. 
That refugee protection plays on the here and there, the own and foreign, sets 
the stage for further inquiry. Both distinctions are, as said, manifestations of the 
inside/outside divide that is constitutive of sovereign self-determination. In order 
to rethink the basis of our asylum policies we should therefore proceed from a 
careful consideration of popular sovereignty and modern democracy. 
Chapter Three embarks upon the inquiry into popular sovereignty. To gain full 
understanding of the dilemma refugees and democracies face in facing each other, I 
will start with a discussion of the right to have rights which Hannah Arendt 
invokes in her reflection on the refugee problem Europe was facing as a 
consequence of the great wars that ravaged Europe at the beginning of the 
Twentieth Century. The right to have rights reflects the plight of refugees as it is 
the right of those who have been driven out of their countries and who belong 
absolutely nowhere in this world. The right to have rights is a claim at the behest of 
refugees to belong to a political community willing and able to grant them rights. 
However, the right to have rights is not an easy solution to the problem. Rather, it 
reflects the quandary that refugees and democracies face. If, in modern 
democracies, rights are the outcome of our joint political action, how are we able to 
respond to a right claimed by those who do not belong to us? The right to have 
rights signals the lack of political reciprocity between refugees and the polities in 
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which they claim asylum, highlighting, that is, the fundamental and unavoidable 
asymmetry between them. Absent this political reciprocity, why would a polity 
care? 
I will discuss two theories that chase down the answer to this question. Seyla 
Benhabib teases out a moral common ground between the refugee and a receiving 
polity and invokes a moral reciprocity between them on the basis of which asylum is 
to be granted. However, I will argue that in matters of asylum, recourse to moral 
universalism is inconclusive. I will explore proximity, as Bonnie Honig elaborates, as 
an alternative to moral reciprocity. Though I am surely sympathetic to Honig’s 
agonistic politics, she does not fully capture the challenge inherent in a claim to 
asylum, nor explain why this claim would register in a polity. 
In Chapter Four, I will argue that the challenge inherent in a claim to asylum is 
the experience of a polity’s own not-being. This experience, which, ultimately, is 
the experience of finitude, makes sense if we take into account what it means for a 
people to exist as a self. As will be argued, to exist as a self means to be concerned 
for one’s own being. Indeed, I will cast sovereignty as the people’s concern for its 
own being, its own existence. And I will try to make sense of this concern by way 
of rereading Heidegger’s exposition of selfhood from the perspective of the first- 
person plural. That is, I will try to make Heidegger’s understanding of human being 
as Dasein, which he expounds in Sein und Zeit, relevant for plural human being. 
Chapter Four thus offers an ontology of collective selfhood. 
In Chapter Five, I will tease out the consequences of this ontology of selfhood 
for the concepts of popular sovereignty, on the one hand, and asylum, on the 
other. Specifically, I will rethink the sovereign right of a people to determine itself, 
and the concomitant right to select and exclude non-nationals, from the viewpoint 
of selfhood, concern and finitude. I will then return to the central problem of this 
book: refugee protection and how to make sense of it. First, I will argue that, on 
account of its concern and its own finite existence, a democratic people is able to 
grant refugees a right to seek asylum. Secondly, concern and finitude serve as an 
argument, from a first-person plural perspective, to grant refugees asylum ‘here, 
among ourselves’. Discussing the first deployment of a Rapid Border Intervention 
Team under the coordination of Frontex at the Greece-Turkey land border in the 
fall of 2010, I will argue that if a democratic polity responds to refugees with 
indifference, distrust, hostility and violence, it fails its own fragile and finite 
existence as a democratic people. Finally, I will make a case to include refugees into 
the ambit of the EU Directive on Long Term Residents from which they are 
presently excluded.  
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The arrival of refugees into a community has always posed questions and has 
always been experienced as challenging. This seems particularly true for a newly 
founded community that still experiences the vulnerability and democratic fragility 
of its own recent constitution. Indeed, the unexpected and unauthorized arrival of 
refugees constitutes one of the major challenges Europe is facing today. 
Constituted as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the European Community 
now has to decide how to respond to the unauthorized border crossing of persons 
potentially in need of international protection, against the backdrop of its own 
legitimate interest to strengthen its borders so as to enhance the free movement of 
EU citizens and offer them a high level of protection.1 
Framed as a security issue, it is no exaggeration to say that Europe faces the 
challenge of irregular immigration and is experiencing an asylum crisis. There is 
disagreement, however, as to what the problem refers and who its victims are. 
Those on the lookout for refugee rights would certainly argue that the crisis is 
constituted by the downfall of protection. Refugees suffer the consequences of the 
increasingly strident position the EU takes in matters of asylum, as EU legislative 
measures consolidate restrictive asylum policies of the national authorities of the 
EU member states. Elspeth Guild, for example, critically analyzed and assessed the 
impact of the constitution of the European Community upon refugee protection. 
She expresses a widespread feeling -- one that plays on the age-old criticism that 
the international refugee protection regime ultimately protects ‘helpless states 
against the wicked refugee’2 – when she says: ‘It is difficult not to be shocked by 
                                                 
1 The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) was created to ensure the free movement of EU citizens 
and residents within the European Union and secure their rights. It covers policy areas that include 
immigration, asylum, police cooperation and the combat against terrorism, organized crime and human 
trafficking. The ASFJ derives from the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) which in article 1 (5) states that the 
European Union shall ‘maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which 
the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external 
border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.’ 
2  This was expressed by one non-governmental observer to the Conference that adopted the Refugee 
Convention, quoted in: Hathaway, J. The Law of Refugee Status, Toronto: Butterworths 1991, p. 231.  
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the current situation.’ 3  According to Guild, the EU ‘constitutes a territorial 
integration project which is hostile to refugees.’4 
Such an admonition would no doubt be opposed by those who, after pointing 
to the number of asylum applications in Europe, 5   argue that hospitality and 
generosity towards refugees are seriously obstructed by bogus economic claimants 
who impose upon the asylum system and cause it to become overstrained. The 
crisis does not concern real refugees deserving of protection, but instead refers to 
the large-scale abuse by economic immigrants who apply for asylum under false 
pretenses with a view to de facto immigration. On this account, the crisis is 
constituted by the disparity between state obligations to protect refugees and the 
interest they have in combating illegal immigration. It is against those who abuse 
our freedom and impose upon our hospitality that the EU external borders should 
be strengthened.  
Amidst these storm clouds and quarrels about what constitutes the crisis and 
who its victims are, one thing seems to be absolutely unquestionable: The 1951 
Refugee Convention continues to be considered as the central pillar of the edifice 
of refugee protection.6 
Therefore, in this chapter I will briefly discuss the scope and purpose of the 
1951 Refugee Convention, as well as recent developments in international 
protection that have arisen from the challenges the Convention has been facing. I 
will demonstrate that the EU’s readiness to fill the protection gap resulting from 
the limited 1951 refugee definition has been counteracted by the fear of abuse that 
took hold of asylum policies in the final decades of the Twentieth Century. As the 
crisis is perceived to either refer to the downfall of protection or to the asylum 
system’s liability to abuse, special attention will be given to the current exploration 
of Humanitarian Temporary (regional) Protection.7 Perceived and explored as an 
alternative form of refugee protection, it potentially meets the objection that the 
1951 Convention is no longer apt to deal with today’s refugees, while at the same 
time acceding to the interest states take in embanking floods of illegal immigrants 
without selling out the refugees.  
Dominant opinion has it that current failures in refugee protection are a matter 
of lack of observance of the 1951 Refugee Convention,8 implying that a proper 
observance and implementation of the Convention would correct these failures.9 I 
                                                 
3 Guild, E. ‘The Europeanisation of Europe’s Asylum Policy’, International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 18 (2006), 
p. 631.  
4 Ibid., p. 634.  
5 Of the 923,400 asylum applications in 2009, UNHCR has recorded on a global level, 359,400 asylum claims 
were registered in Europe. A total of 585,500 cases were adjudicated, with a 38% refugee recognition rate. 
UNHCR, however, does not report nationally calculated recognition rates. For the available statistics see 
UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2009, Chapter IV, ‘Asylum and refugee Status Determination.’ 
6 Cf. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Towards a common 
asylum procedure and a uniform status, valid throughout the Union, for persons granted asylum (COM 2000 755 final), p. 4.  
7 Cf., Hathaway 2005, p. 3. 
8 On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Refugee Convention, UNHCR issued a Note on International 
Protection. The Note informs us about difficulties and injustices refugees have to suffer due to a lack of 
observance of the Convention. It concludes by encouraging states ‘to seize the opportunity of the 50th 
anniversary to give concerted attention to addressing the various obstacles which impede implementation in 
their respective countries and to take resolute measures to strengthen implementation.’ (UNHCR, ExCom 
Reports, A/AC.96/951, 13 September 2001).  
9 Compare Harell-Bond, B. & Verdirame, G. Rights in Exile. Janus-Faced Humanitarianism, New York/Oxford: 
Berghahn Books 2005, p. xiv: ‘If the Convention were correctly applied, the situations that can be found in so 
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will gradually take issue with this view. I will argue that failures in refugee 
protection are not just attributable to reluctant states who, ever since the adoption 
of the Refugee Convention, have tried to find ways to circumvent their 
responsibilities. What is at issue is much more fundamental than that. For the 
serious defects in refugee protection are also to be explained, or so I will argue, by 
the conceptual terms that frame current understanding of the refugee problem, and 
that subsequently direct the international legal response thereto. In the present 
chapter, I will discuss the formal elements of the international refugee protection 
regime so as to open up a point of entry for those unfamiliar with refugee law. In 
the next chapter, I will focus on the concept of the refugee and try to make explicit 
the conceptual presuppositions and master frames that shape dominant 





Sources of Refugee Protection 
The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees10 is the primary 
ment of rights and protection is contingent upon refugee status, the 
Co
                                                                                                                  
source for the legal protection of refugees. To date, 147 countries are signatories to 
either or both the 1951 Convention and its additional Protocol from 1967.11 These 
countries have translated the content and scope of the Convention into their 
domestic legislations and agreed it to be the basis upon which asylum and 
protection decisions are to be made. The Refugee Convention provides the legal 
means to cope with the situation that befalls refugees as a result of persecution that 
made them flee their home countries. The most troublesome aspect of the situation 
that befalls refugees after their flight is the lack of state protection. The 1951 
Convention addresses this situation by offering international protection. Indeed, by 
offering international protection the Convention, according to its Preamble, 
endeavors to ‘assure refugees the widest possible exercise of their fundamental 
rights and freedoms’ 12  until a more durable solution is available. The publicly 
accepted durable solutions include repatriation and/or return to the country of 
origin, resettlement, or integration/naturalization in the country of asylum. Though 
these are beyond the scope of the Refugee Convention, it does make 
recommendations to this effect. Until such time, however, conferral of refugee 
status restores legal protection and entitles one to the rights enlisted in the 
Convention.13 
As the enjoy
nvention provides for the legal definition of the refugee and is, as such, the 
general and primary standard for identifying refugees. Giving a precise definition of 
the refugee, the Refugee Convention circumscribes the situations in which 
 
many countries today in which refugees are the ‘worst-treated’ aliens would never obtain.’ Cf., also Noll, G. 
‘Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit Processing Centres and 
Protection Zones’, European Journal of Migration and law, vol. 5 (2003), p. 341.  
10 Hereafter alternately referred to as Refugee Convention, or 1951 Convention. 
11 The 1967 Protocol removed the geographical and temporal limitations to the 1951 Convention which 
initially limited itself to European refugees whose flight or displacement was caused by events that occurred 
before 1951.  
12 Preamble to the 1951 Refugee Convention, recital 2.  
13 For a comprehensive analysis of refugee rights see Hathaway 2005.  
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protection is required and which situations fall beyond its reach. The predicament 
that befalls a refugee as a consequence of his fear-motivated flight is reflected in the 
refugee definition. Article 1 (A) of the Convention defines a refugee as a person 
who, ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.’ The eligibility criteria 
the Refugee Convention provides are, of course, subjected to ongoing political 
debate, legal interpretation and contestation.14 But for the purpose of showing the 
need for opening up and tapping other legal sources for protection, as the classic 
definition no longer covers some of the most persistent situations in which 
protection is required, it suffices to focus on some specific features. 
A key element in the refugee definition is alienation. That is, a person has to be 
ou
                                                
tside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence in order to qualify for 
protection on the basis of the Refugee Convention. Indeed, alienation is inherent in 
refugeehood, given the fact that the Convention addresses the lack of protection 
the individual is suffering as a consequence of his flight.15 Yet it is this element of 
alienation that has been criticized as highly unjust, as it withholds protection to 
large numbers of persons who suffer from refugee-related violence, internal or 
international conflict, and massive human rights violations, and who do not 
manage to cross international borders. 16  Importantly, protection against these 
forms of violence precipitated UNHCR’s understanding of the meaning of 
persecution that it laid down its Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status (1979): ‘From Article 33 of the Convention, it may be inferred that a 
threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, 
or membership of a particular social group is always persecution. Other serious 
violations of human rights – for the same reasons – would also constitute 
persecution.’ 17  Though UNHCR’s Handbook is clearly limited to the rules 
determining refugee status, the elaboration on the notion of ‘persecution’ no doubt 
 
14 For a comprehensive analysis of the refugee definition see: Hathaway, J. The Law of Refugee Status, Toronto: 
Butterworths 1991; Goodwin-Gill, G. The Refugee in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998; 
Spijkerboer, T.S. & Vermeulen, B.P., Vluchtelingenrecht, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri 2005.  
15 The criterion of alienation in particular made sense in the historical context of international aliens law, 
which was based on the principle of reciprocity between states to treat each other’s nationals with equality 
and fairness. As the refugee could not be afforded protection on the basis of international law, he appeared as 
an unprotected alien without a well-defined legal status and was considered to be an anomaly in international 
law. Cf., Hathaway 1991, p. 4: ‘Only persons applying from outside their country of origin were eligible for 
refugee recognition. This is consistent with the notion of the refugee as an international anomaly: While the 
unprotected individual remained within the boundaries of her home state, there was no question of another 
country being confronted with a person outside the bounds of international accountability and, accordingly, 
no need to include her within the scope of League of Nations protection.’ 
16  Andrew Shacknove has developed a conceptual argument with regard to the waning of alienation.  
Compare Shacknove,  A. ‘Who is a Refugee’, Ethics, vol. 95 (1995), p. 283: ‘Conceptually, however, 
refugeehood is unrelated to migration. It is exclusively a political relation between the citizen and the state, 
not a territorial relation between a countryman and his homeland. Refugeehood is one form of unprotected 
statelessness. Under normal conditions, state protection appends to the citizen, following him in foreign 
jurisdictions. For the refugee, state protection of basic needs is absent, even at home. Alienage should be 
considered one manifestation of a broader phenomenon: the access of the international community to 
persons deprived of their basic needs. Thus, what is essential for refugee status, distinguishing refugees from 
all other similarly deprived persons, is either the willingness of the home state to allow them access to 
international assistance or its inability to prevent such aid from being administered.’ 
17 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 1979, p. 14.  
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launched UNHCR’s willingness to play a leading role in the protection of internally 
displaced persons. 18  Indeed, as early as the 1970’s, UNHCR has provided 
assistance to IDP’s throughout the world.19 Though IDP’s are not refugees, their 
protection reflects international human rights law 20  and is based on analogous 
refugee law. 
Assistance to IDP’s mainly takes place within the context of large-scale conflict- 
rela
on of IDP’s and the OUA Convention, which UNHCR 
inc
 of the 
sco
                                                
ted displacement. 21  It is, therefore, more approximate to the reality of 
protection needs than the 1951 Refugee Convention which allegedly focuses on the 
individual aspects of persecution (I return to this issue below). The OUA Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted in1969, also much 
more accommodates large scale refugee movements than does the protection that 
has taken root around the Refugee Convention. Article 1 of the OUA Convention 
reiterates the 1951 refugee definition. Additionally, it holds that ‘the term "refugee" 
shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, 
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the 
whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of 
habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of 
origin or nationality.’ 
Both the protecti
orporated within its mandate, signal that the Refugee Convention falls short of 
offering protection in many situations of displacement and uprootedness.  
EU legislative measures also significantly contributed to the widening
pe of those in need of international protection. Over the past few years, EU law 
has established subsidiary forms of protection that may be granted to persons who 
do not satisfy the requirements for protection under the Refugee Convention.22 
Following the EU Qualification Directive23 I will differentiate between subsidiary 
protection, on the one hand, and state practice to offer temporary protection for 
 
18  Cf., UNHCR Standing Committee, UNHCR’s Role in Support of an Enhanced Humanitarian Response to 
Situations of Internal Displacement. Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy, (June 2007). Doc. 
EC/58/SC/CRP/18. 
19 Cf., Ibid., p. 4. However, it should be noted that protection of IDP’s by UNHCR causes a major dilemma. 
Whereas UNHCR was initially ascribed the task of supervising compliance of contracting states with the 1951 
Convention, UNHCR switched roles as it increasingly, itself, became responsible for the protection of IDP’s. 
Compare Hathaway 2005, pp. 995, 6: ‘[U]NHCR has been fundamentally transformed during the 1990’s from 
an agency whose job was essentially to serve as a trustee or guardian of refugee rights as implemented by 
states, to an agency that is now primarily focused on direct service delivery ... In most big refugee crises 
around the world today, UNHCR is – in law or in fact – the means by which refugee protection is delivered 
on the ground. In seeking to exercise its traditional supervisory authority, UNHCR, therefore, faces a serious 
dilemma, since it is often in the position of being responsible effectively to supervise itself.’ 
20 CF., UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 1988.  
21 Article 2 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement reads: ‘For the purposes of these Principles, 
internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to 
leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of 
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made 
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.’ 
22 Compare Hailbronner K, ‘Asylum Law in the Context of a European Migration Policy’, in Walker, N. ed., 
Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 62: ‘Subsidiary protection 
is generally understood to include complementary forms of human rights and humanitarian protection that a 
state may grant when a person does not satisfy the requirements for refugee status under the Geneva 
Convention.’ 
23 Council Directive (2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004), on minimum standards for the qualification and status 
of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection and the content of the protection granted. 
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humanitarian reasons, on the other. 24  The significance and implications of 
Temporary Humanitarian Protection will be discussed in Section 1.5.  
Subsidiary protection responds to the protection gap resulting from the limited 
195
                                                
1 refugee definition by incorporating international human rights law - most 
notably the prohibition of refoulement as integral to the prohibition of torture – into 
the EU protection regime. The EU Qualification Directive thus establishes a status 
for persons who do not qualify for Convention-based protection but who are 
‘otherwise in need of international protection.’ Simply put, subsidiary protection is 
granted to persons who are not refugees but who, nevertheless, cannot be returned 
to their home country under safe conditions and in a dignified manner. Council 
Directive 2004/83/EU, article 2 under e, understands a person eligible for 
subsidiary protection to mean ‘a third country national or a stateless person who 
does not qualify as a refugee, but in respect of whom substantial grounds have 
been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her 
country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of 
former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as 
defined in Article 15… and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of that country.’ The referred article 15 
incorporates the prohibition of refoulement, which is the corner stone of refugee 
protection,25 as an internal component of the prohibition of torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment as enshrined in article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 26  As the EU Qualification Directive grants 
subsidiary protection to persons who cannot be removed or returned home, as this 
would constitute a violation of the prohibition of refoulement, asylum law, as 
Spijkerboer puts it,  is ‘no more about just refugeehood but also about article 3, 
ECHR.’ 27 In addition, article 15, under c defines serious harm also to include a 
serious and individual threat to life and freedom for reasons of indiscriminate 
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.28  
 
24  For a discussion of granting protection on humanitarian grounds to persons who do not meet the 
requirements of the 1951 refugee definition see Hathaway 1991, pp. 21-27. 
25 Article 33 (1) refugee Convention states that ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return (" refouler ") a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.’ In its Introductory Note to the Refugee Convention from 2006, UNHCR stipulates: ‘Certain 
provisions of the Convention are considered so fundamental that no reservations may be made to them. 
These include the definition of the term “refugee,” and the so- called principle of non-refoulement, i.e., that no 
contracting state shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee, against his or her will, in any manner whatsoever, 
to a territory where he or she fears persecution.’ For an in-depth analysis of the legal grounds for the 
prohibition of refoulement see Wouters, K., International legal standards for the protection from refoulement - a legal 
analysis of the prohibitions on refoulement contained in the Refugee Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture, Antwerpen: Intersentia 2009.  
26 Article 3, European Convention on Human Rights: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.’ Article 15 of the EU Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) postulates 
that a person qualifies for subsidiary protection if he faces serious harm in his or her country of origin. 
Serious harm, according to article 15, (a) consists of ‘death penalty or execution, or (b) torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin.  
27 Spijkerboer, quoted in: J. Durieux, ‘Salah Sheekh is a Refugee. New Insights into Primary and Subsidiary 
Forms of protection’, Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper no. 49, (October 2008), p. 6.  
28Article 15 (c) (2004/83/EC): ‘serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of 
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.’ 
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Importantly, subsidiary protection also engendered a relaxation of the single-out 
criterion which allegedly inheres in the 1951 refugee definition.29 The element of 
persecution, which is quintessential to the refugee definition, is generally 
interpreted to denote individual persecution30, which is triggered by the ‘subjective 
aspects of an individual’s life, including beliefs and commitments.’31 To satisfy the 
legal criteria for protection it is therefore not enough that the claimant has a 
subjective fear of persecution. As Goodwin-Gill and McAdams explain: ‘[T]he 
heart of the question is whether that ‘subjective’ fear is well-founded; whether there 
are sufficient facts to permit the finding that this applicant, in his or her particular 
circumstances, faces a serious possibility of persecution.’32 Simply put: To qualify 
as a refugee it is not enough that the threat to the refugee’s life, freedom and 
security is general, arbitrary and of a collective nature, but is instead directed at the 
individual person who has drawn the negative attention of the authorities, for 
example because of his or her activities. That is, one has to be singled-out. For 
example, in order to qualify as a refugee it is not sufficient to belong to a 
threatened minority (be it an ethnic or social group) whose members generally 
suffer from persecution. Decisive for refugee recognition is that distinguishing 
features regarding the individual’s person exist which makes him or her an 
outstanding member of the threatened minority. 
It is in relation to subsidiary protection that the requirement of single-out is 
being eased. Protection on the basis of article 15 of the EU Qualification Directive 
becomes illusionary, it is argued, if a claimant, in addition to the fact that he 
belongs to a minority, has to prove that, with regard to his person, special features 
exist that cause his personal risk to outstand the general risk. 
The case of Salah Sheekh has been decisive in this respect. Salah Sheekh, a 
refugee from Somalia, belonging to the minority group of Ashraf that is part of the 
Reer Hamar minorities, lodged an asylum claim in the Netherlands and, in addition, 
claimed protection on the basis of article 3, ECHR. The Dutch authorities rejected 
his claim, arguing that mere membership of Reer Hamar, whose members are 
indeed exposed to severe violence, is not sufficient to qualify for protection. Albeit 
severe, the violence against Reer Hamar is general and arbitrary. The Dutch 
government referred to the requirement of single-out which the European Court of 
Human Rights had established with respect to article 3, ECHR, in Vilvarajah vs. The 
UK (1991). In Salah Sheekh vs. The Netherlands, the European Court of Human 
                                                 
29  Kay Hailbronner expresses the view that subsidiary protection does not imply that the single-out 
requirement is being eased. He first questions the surplus value of article 15 ( c ), (2004/83/EC), arguing that 
the individual threat to life and freedom in situations of generalized and arbitrary violence is the same as the 
damage enshrined in article 15 (b). The alleged superfluity of article 15 ( c) allows Hailbronner subsequently 
to argue that article 15 in its entirety relies on the requirement of single-out (Cf. Hailbronner 2004  pp. 63, 
64).  
30 Spijkerboer contests that refugee status determination is contingent upon the requirement of single-out, 
arguing that the individualistic development in refugee law and practice is an incorrect application of the 
Refugee Convention. Looking into the drafting history of the Refugee Convention, he argues that the 
Convention expresses awareness of the collective nature of refugee movements and did not intend to do 
away with the collective refugee concept which predominated in legal instruments preceding the 1951 
Refugee Convention. Cf. Spijkerboer, T. ‘Full Circle? The Personal Scope of International Protection in the 
Geneva Convention and the Draft Directive on Qualification’ in Urbano de Sousa, C. & De Bruycker, P eds., 
The Emergence of a European Asylum Policy, Brussels: Bruylant 2004, pp. 167-181.  
31 Goodwin-Gill & McAdams 2007, p. 64. 
32 Ibid., p. 64. 
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Rights reaffirmed, with reference to Vilvarajah, that specific facts and 
circumstances must exist relating to the claimant personally in order to be eligible 
for protection by article 3. But it also expressed the opinion that it was foreseeable 
that Salah Sheekh, upon return to Somalia, would be exposed to an inhumane 
treatment in breach of article 3. The Court, therefore, considered: ‘It might render 
the protection offered by that provision illusory if, in addition to the fact of his 
belonging to the Ashraf – which the Government have not disputed – the applicant 
were required to show the existence of further special distinguishing features.’33 
With respect to the relaxation of single-out, M.Elgafaji, N. Elgafaji vs. 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie (2009) is equally important. Elgafaji bestows meaning on 
the wording ‘individual threat’, showing that it is not properly understood if placed 
in opposition to ‘collective threat.’ Elgafaji and his wife, refugees from Iraq, applied 
for asylum in the Netherlands and claimed protection on the basis of the EU 
Qualification Directive article 15 ( c). The Dutch Government asked the European 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling with regard to the interpretation of article 
15, in particular with regard to the relation between article 15 (b) and ( c ). The 
Advocate-Generale already interpreted the meaning of ‘individual threat’ in the 
context of armed international conflict, arguing that the ‘requirement serves to 
make apparent the fact that indiscriminate violence must be such that it cannot fail 
to represent a likely and serious threat to the applicant for asylum. The distinction 
between a high degree of individual risk and a risk which is based on individual 
features is of defining importance. Although a person is not covered by reason of 
features concerning him particularly, that person is no less individually affected 
when indiscriminate violence substantially increases the risk of serious harm to his 
life or person, in other words to his fundamental rights.’ The ECJ affirmed the 
opinion of the Advocate-General of September 2008. It considered that ‘the word 
‘individual' must be understood as covering harm to civilians irrespective of their 
identity, where the degree of indiscriminate violence characterizing the armed 
conflict taking place … reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are 
shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant country or, as the case 
may be, to the relevant region, would, solely on account of his presence  in the 
territory of that country or region, face a real risk of being subject to the serious 
threat referred to in article 15(c) of the Directive.’34 
Clearly, then, the increasing awareness that the scope of those in need of 
international protection by far exceeds the scope of the Refugee Convention has 
evoked the willingness on the part of the international community to fill the 
protection gap. But whereas due attention has been paid to establish anew the 
requirements for protection, there is no agreement yet as to the rights and 
substance of protection to which recognition entitles.35 There is reason to believe, 
                                                 
33 Application no. 1948/04 Salah Sheekh vs. The Netherlands (2007) ECR consideration 148. In his comment on 
the European Court decision Spijkerboer argues that the court ruling is also relevant for the interpretation of 
the Refugee Convention. It would be reasonable, he argues, to consider minorities protected by article 3, 
ECHR to be refugees. Cf., Spijkerboer, T. ‘Staatsburg en het Nederlandse vluchtelingenrecht. Bij de uitspraak 
Salah Sheekh tegen Nederland’, Nederlands Juristenblad afl. 7 (2007). For a reflection on the case see Durieux 
2008. 
34 Case C-465/07 ICJ (2009), consideration 35.  
35 The same is true, albeit to a different extent, with respect to other complementary forms of protection that 
are either based on requirements of international law (for example, international obligation relating to family 
unity, health, and children) or on States’ discretionary policies (for example, the granting of protection for 
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as pointed out by Hathaway, that this is partly due to the fact that western states are 
increasingly unwilling to regard refugees as permanent residents, and are currently 
exploring alternative forms of protection. 36  Indeed, as matters stand today, 
subsidiary protection is inferior to Convention-based protection.37 As Durieux puts 
the fundamental problem that is at stake here: ‘The refugee definition is not 
intended to describe those whom we cannot deport, but, positively, those aliens 
whom we want to protect.’ 38   Moreover, the question that arises is whether 
subsidiary protection is indeed what it claims to be, i.e., a supplement to protection 
offered on the basis of the Refugee Convention, and is not, in fact, replacing it. 
Different NGO’s have expressed the concern that states, for example, may be 
tempted ‘to use article 3 more frequently so as to avoid their broader obligations to 
genuine refugees under the Refugee Convention.’39 The risk that states will assess 
an individual’s asylum claim solely against the backdrop of article 3, ECHR, thereby 
skipping an assessment on the basis of the Convention, is by no means imaginary, 
as was also shown in the case of Salah Sheekh. The Dutch government rejected his 
claim solely on the basis of article 3, ECHR, not bothering to review his claim 
against the 1951 Convention, except for the ‘minister’s observation that Salah could 
not be a refugee since he had not made himself known as an opponent to local 
rulers, nor had he been politically active.’40 
If the question whether an asylum seeker qualifies as a Convention refugee is 
passed over in silence, and if the rights and protection offered to persons 
‘otherwise in need of international protection’ are qualitatively less, then we have 
good reasons to temper any initial enthusiasm about the broadening of the scope of 
persons in need of international protection. 41  For, it might well turn out that 
subsidiary forms of protection, instead of improving the legal position of 
protection seekers, contribute to a deterioration of rights and protection. This 
should be of our concern, since in some EU Member States, persons offered 
subsidiary protection already outnumber Convention refugees.42  
 
 
                                                                                                                   
reasons of social integration). For an overview of mechanisms of complementary forms of protection in EU 
Member States see: European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Complementary Protection in Europe July 2009. 
36 Cf., Hathaway 2005, p. 3.  
37 Cf. Battjes, H. ‘Subsidiary Protection and Reduced Rights’, in Zwaan, K. Ed., Qualification Directive. Central 
Themes, Problem Issues and practice in Selected member States Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2007 pp. 49-59. Also: 
European Council On Refugees and Exiles, The Impact of the EU Qualification Directive on International Protection, 
October 2008; European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Comments on the European Commission proposal to 
Recast the Qualification Directive, March 2010.  
38 Durieux 2008, p. 17.  
39 Director of International Protection, as cited in Ibid., p. 5.  
40 Ibid., p., 12.  
41 However, this concern should be weighed against a Communication of the Commission to the Council and 
European Parliament Towards a Common Asylum Procedure and a uniform Status, valid throughout the Union, for persons 
granted asylum (Com 2000 755 final). In this Communication, the Commission recommended that the rights 
and protection granted to persons whom, upon return to their country of origin, would face a real risk of 
serious harm, should equal the rights of the Refugee Convention. Accordingly, the Commission 
recommended a uniform status for both groups of persons granted international protection. I will return to 
this issue at length in Chapter 5.  
42 Cf., European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Complementary/Subsidiary Forms of Protection in EU Member 
States: an Overview, July 2004. Cf. also Fitzpatrick. ‘Temporary Protection for Refugees. Elements of a 
Formalized regime’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 94, (2000) p. 103.  
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1.2 Abusing the System 
 
There is, however, another reason why any initial enthusiasm over the permeation 
of human rights law into the refugee protection regime should be tempered. 
Chances of improvement resulting from the revision of scope are thwarted, or even 
rendered futile, in the face of the increasingly strident position EU member states 
take with regard to refugee protection. Indeed, over the past few decades, 
increasingly restrictive admission policies came to be developed as a response to 
the problem of irregular immigration, causing an inappropriate intermingling of the 
refugee protection regime with the system of immigration control.43 In this section, 
I will reconstruct how the combat of illegal immigration 44  has recoiled upon 
refugee law, inflicting damage upon the asylum system as a whole. 
There is, of course, a close link to refugeehood and immigration, as is evidenced 
by the very definition of the refugee which holds that a refugee is outside his or her 
                                                 
43 Though the issue of irregular immigration is beyond the scope of my research, it is important to point to 
another effect of the fight against ‘illegal’ immigration. It is a well- known fact that raising barriers for legal 
immigration will not diminish immigration but will instead contribute to an increase of illegal immigration. 
Indeed, as long as there are substantial differences in life conditions, people from poor countries will 
continue to make their way to the affluent West. The examples thereof are disturbing, to say the least. In her 
study on human trafficking in Europe, Ruth Hopkins came to the unsettling conclusion that women (mainly 
from Eastern European countries) will continue to voluntarily cooperate with human traffickers as long as 
they make more money as exploited prostitutes than they do when staying in their home countries. In long –
term interviews with victims of human trafficking, Hopkins discovered that a substantial part of the women 
voluntarily contacted their ponces after they were deported to their countries of origin following massive 
round-ups of illegals in Amsterdam. (Hopkins, R. Ik laat je nooit meer gaan. Het meisje, de vrouw, de handelaar en de 
agent, Breda: De Geus, 2005). It has also been substantially documented that as long as people from the poor 
south choose a life in the illegal gutters of Europe over a life in poverty and inhumanity, they will continue to 
put their lives at risk in order to reach Europe. One of the most unsettling images of immigrants willing to 
risk their lives is provided in a documentary by Dominique Mollard.  Mollard, a French TV-reporter, spent 
almost a year in Mauritania, waiting for a chance to board a fisherman’s boat with other immigrants hoping to 
finally be able to reach the Canary Islands. His documentary shows immigrants trying and trying again to be 
shipped to Europe. With every attempt, they witness their fellow immigrants die at sea. But this doesn’t stop 
them from trying again. When Mollard finally succeeds in finding a boat that will take him to the Canary 
Islands, he is compelled, after three days, to use his satellite phone, as the boat is running out of fuel and they 
are most likely to die. Some of the immigrants with whom he shared the boat, however, violently tried to 
prevent him calling the Spanish coastguards for rescue. Their argument: They’d rather die on the high seas 
than to be returned to Africa. In this respect, it is important to note that attacking the root causes of illegal 
immigration is part and parcel of the fight against illegal immigration. Other means deployed to that end are 
intervention in migration routes, fighting smuggling and trafficking networks, intensification of off-shore 
border controls, and so forth. Ironically, however, the main factor in contributing to illegal immigration is, as 
Hein de Haas has shown, the fight against illegal immigration. The net effect of all the measures that seek to 
prevent and contain illegal immigration is that migration routes shift, and that smuggling and trafficking 
networks are becoming all the more professionalized. Instead of preventing illegal immigration, the risks of 
immigration for the immigrants themselves become all the more severe. Cf., De Haas, H. ‘The Myth of 
Invasion: The Inconvenient Realities of Migration from Africa to the European Union’, Third World Quarterly, 
vol. 7 (2008) pp. 1305 -1322. This article is a shorter version of De Haas’ Research Report for the 
International Migration Institute, available at his personal webpage: http://www.heindehaas.com 
44 The Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe Thomas Hammarberg has expressed his 
misgivings about the use of the term ‘illegal immigrants’ as it associates immigrants with illegal acts under 
criminal law. This use of language casts a negative light on immigrants and makes them suspect in the eyes of 
the public, including public officials. The image of the illegal ‘criminal’ immigrant certainly has a negative 
drawback on the rights of irregular immigrants. It is noteworthy that Hammarberg observes that all the EU 
institutions and the national authorities of Member States use the expression ‘illegal immigrant.’  
Hammarberg recommends the use of the more neutral term ‘irregular immigrant.’ Cf. Hammarberg, Th. 
Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Human Rights Implications, Council of Europe, CommDH/IssuePaper 
2010/1. If, in the pages that await us, I will nevertheless use the expression ‘illegal immigrant’ or ‘illegal 
immigration’ I intend to transmit the climate in which the debate on immigration and asylum takes place.  
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country of origin. Indeed, the right to seek asylum is dependent upon the physical 
presence of the asylum seeker on the territory of the receiving state, as is the 
subsequent protection offered in case of recognition. The right to seek asylum, 
therefore, relates to the issue of first-gate admission which, as Veit Bader rightly 
argues, is at the core of state sovereignty.45  
However, compared to the immigrant, the potential refugee is in a different and 
special position46 due to the difference in purpose of the refugee protection regime, 
on the one hand, and the system of immigration control, on the other.47 Whereas 
the latter, broadly speaking, pertains to the control and management of the inflow 
of non-nationals with a view to preserving territorial, economic, political and 
cultural unity, the refugee protection regime, as said, addresses the loss of legal 
protection the refugee is suffering upon his flight. Because of this difference, it is 
stressed time and again that ‘refugee law is not immigration law.’ 48  In her 
philosophical exploration of the rights of immigrants to seek admission and claim 
membership into communities to which they do not belong, Seyla Benhabib 
stresses this difference in position, arguing that ‘first-admission conditions for 
immigrants are of a different sort from those for refugees and asylum seekers. 
States have more discretion to stipulate conditions of entry in the case of 
immigration than they do when facing refugees and asylees. Their obligations to the 
latter group are moral and, for those states that are signatories to the Geneva 
Convention on the Status of Refugees … and its 1967 Protocol, they are legal.’49 
Indeed, with respect to the first-gate admission of refugees, two things should 
be kept in mind. As said in the previous section, the absolute prohibition of 
refoulement is a key element in refugee protection and derives from article 33 (1) of 
the refugee Convention: ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return (" refouler ") a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.’ The wording suggests 
that the prohibition of refoulement only relates to recognized refugees. Importantly, 
however, both refugees and asylum seekers are protected by the prohibition of 
                                                 
45 Cf., Bader, V. ‘The Ethics of Immigration’, Constellations, vol. 12 (2003), p. 332. 
46 The EU Return Directive considers that asylum seekers are not to be considered as illegal immigrants until 
a negative decision on their asylum claim is made (EU Directive 2008/115/EC, consideration 9).  
47 Moreno Lax explains the difference between the refugee protection regime and the regime of immigration 
control on the basis of the specific humanitarian aim of the Refugee Convention as enshrined in its preamble. 
She argues that it should be taken into account that the refugee problem is explicitly qualified as a 
humanitarian problem, comparing it to another humanitarian Convention, to wit the genocide Convention. 
With regard to the latter, the International Court of Justice ruled that ‘the Convention was manifestly adopted 
for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose’, and that therefore ‘in such a Convention, the contracting 
states do not have interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the 
accomplishment of those higher purposes which are the raison d’être of the Convention.’ Moreno Lax argues 
that the same can be said to hold for the Refugee Convention, the purpose of which being the humanitarian 
protection of refugees. As such, the difference between refugees and immigrants should be taken into 
account. Cf., Moreno Lax, V. ‘Must EU Borders have Doors for refugees? On the Compatibility of Schengen 
Visas and Carriers’ Sanctions with the EU Member States’ Obligations to Provide International Protection 
for Refugees’,  European Journal of Migration and Law,  vol. 10 (2008) p. 321. 
48 Hathaway 2005, p. 5. Cf., also: Brochmann, G. ‘Controlling Immigration in Europe’, in Brochmann, G. & 
Hammar, T. eds., Mechanisms of Immigration Control. A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies, 
Oxford/New York: Berg 1999 p. 312.  
49 Benhabib, S. The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, 
p. 137.  
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refoulement, as the prohibition not only relates to the expulsion or removal of 
refugees from the territory of the host state, but also contains the prohibition to 
reject potential refugees at the border of a state which would bar them from access 
to the asylum procedure. Indeed, the very wording of refoulement was chosen by the 
drafters of the Refugee Convention to include the prohibition of rejection at the 
borders of a state. As Moreno Lax explains: ‘Certainly, already when discussing the 
Draft Convention, the representatives of the Secretariat explained that the practice 
known as refoulement in France did not exist in the English language. In Belgium and 
France, however, there was a definite distinction between expulsion, which could 
only be carried out in pursuance of a decision of a judicial authority, and refoulement, 
which meant either deportation as a police measure or non-admittance at the 
frontier.’ Agreeing that the purpose of the Convention would be frustrated in the 
case that rejection at the border could occur to genuine refugees, it was finally 
decided to retain the wider French notions of ‘refoulement’, instead of that of return 
alone.’50 Clearly, then, the prohibition of refoulement guarantees the very right to 
seek asylum as enshrined in article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Hence, Lax argues that ‘despite claims advancing that nothing in the 
Convention can be interpreted as an obligation to admit asylum seekers’, the 
principle of non-refoulement appears to compromise not only a defence against 
expulsion, but also a right of non-rejection at the border.’51 
The special position of potential refugees in comparison with other immigrants 
further becomes clear in relation to the issue of unauthorized entry. Article 31 (1) 
of the Refugee Convention stipulates that refugees shall not be penalized for their 
illegal entry if they are able to show good cause for their illegal entry.52  James 
Hathaway holds that the simple fact of being a refugee constitutes in itself a good 
cause. Drawing on the drafting history of the Refugee Convention he argues: 
‘Clearly, “[t]he fact that a refugee was fleeing from persecution was [in and of itself] 
good cause”, as refugees seeking to escape the risk of persecution cannot be 
expected to satisfy immigration formalities before fleeing to safety.’53 Hathaway 
goes on to show that good cause for illegal entry is not limited to fleeing from 
persecution, but also includes the fear of rejection at the border of the receiving 
state. 
As refugees are not expected or required to fulfill immigration requirements, 
refugee law is generally considered to constitute a humanitarian exception to the 
sovereign right to select and exclude non-nationals at the borders of a state. 54  
Generally speaking, refugee law balances the rights and interests of those in need of 
international protection and the right of states to determine in their own interest 
                                                 
50 Moreno Lax (2008) p. 330. 
51 Ibid., p. 333. 
52 Refugee Convention article 31 (1): ‘The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their 
illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was 
threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they 
present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.’ 
53 Hathaway 2005, p. 393.  
54 Cf. Hathaway 1991, p. 4. However, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam argue: ‘The refugee in international law 
occupies a legal space characterized, on the one hand, by the principle of State sovereignty and the related 
principles of territorial supremacy and self-preservation; and, on the other hand, by competing humanitarian 
principles deriving from general international law (including the purposes and principles of the United 
nations) and from treaty.’ (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, p. 1).  
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who is to be included and excluded. According to Hathaway, refugee law is ‘a 
politically pragmatic means of reconciling the generalized commitment of states to 
self-interested control over immigration to the reality of coerced migration.’ 55  
Casting refugee law as a politically pragmatic means already foreshadows challenges 
to the protection regime in times of an increased pressure of irregular immigration. 
Indeed, in a co-authored article with Neve published six years after The Law of 
Refugee Status, the authors argue: ‘Refugee law has fallen out of favor because its 
mechanisms no longer achieve its fundamental purpose of balancing the rights of 
involuntary migrants and those of the states to which refugees flee.’56  
To get an empirical purchase on the problem at issue here, I will first consider 
the point at which the two systems of immigration control and refugee protection 
meet, which enables me to detail why the issue of irregular immigration backfires 
on asylum seekers and refugees. 
Notwithstanding the fundamental differences between immigration control and 
the asylum system, the two regimes meet, as Gregor Noll stresses,57  when the 
return of a rejected asylum seeker is at issue. If a claim to protection is dismissed 
and the asylum seeker has exhausted all possible legal means, he or she is placed 
back on the immigration track, as return to the country of origin or another third 
safe country58 is required. To the extent that the asylum procedure, at the end of 
the day, only knows of two possible outcomes, i.e., recognition of a protection 
need or rejection, it is only fair to assume that the effectiveness and credibility of 
the asylum system is contingent upon the return of rejected asylum seekers. In the 
absence of effective return policies, the integrity of the refugee protection regime 
would be damaged as a whole. 
However, it soon became clear that return of rejected asylum seekers was, more 
often than not, hindered by a lack of proper documentation on the part of the 
asylum seeker, which made it well-nigh impossible to determine the country of 
origin or persuade that country to take its national back.59  In order to address 
                                                 
55 Ibid., p. 231.  
56 Hathaway, J. & Neve, A. ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized 
and Solution-Oriented Protection’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 10 (1997), p. 116.  
57 Cf. Noll, G. ‘Rejected Asylum Seekers: the Problem of Return’, New Issues in Refugee Research,  working paper 
no. 4, May 2009, pp. 7, 8. 
58  The EU Directive (2008/115/EC) on the common standards and procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third-country nationals, specifies in article 3 that return is the process of a third- 
country national going back – whether in voluntary compliance with an obligation to return, or enforced to 
his own country, a transit country, or another third country to which the third- country national voluntary 
decides to return. 
59 It is important to note that in numerous cases, return is impossible because of a misidentification of the 
country of origin on the part of immigration authorities. Contributing to this misidentification is the use of 
language assessment tests to determine the country of origin. As Jan Blommaert has demonstrated, these 
language assessment tests play on the false assumption of a direct link between ‘language’ and ‘country of 
origin.’ Additionally, these tests only assess whether a claimant correctly uses the official language of the 
country to which he or she claims to be a national, and fail to take into account the claimant’s speech and 
repertoire that have evolved throughout the life history of the asylum seeker. If the asylum seeker does not 
speak the official language, even though he or she has good reasons for this (the claimant, for example, didn’t 
participate in the educational system of the country, has lived in different areas of the country, or lived in 
border areas, or his family history shows a long track of immigration, and so on), this is generally taken to 
indicate that the asylum seeker is lying about his or her country of origin. The language assessment tests 
subsequently determine the supposed country of origin, even if the asylum seeker is not in full possession of 
the national language of the said country (Cf. Blommaert, J. ‘Language, Asylum, and the National Order’, 
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problems relating to nationality, identity and documentation, states resorted to the 
means of immigration control with the aim of managing (and preventing) the illegal 
entry of asylum seekers. The intersection between the asylum and immigration 
system at the end of an asylum track was thus shifted towards the beginning of it. 
From then on, a disturbing and unsavory chain of assumptions and perceptions 
piled up, and the logic of abuse took hold. 
The legitimate concern for effective return policies soon came to be expressed 
in the grim tone that failure to return would make the asylum system liable to a 
large-scale abuse by economic immigrants using the asylum procedure as a 
backdoor route towards de facto immigration.60 Indeed, the asylum system (together 
with family reunification) was one of the ways to legally enter Europe after the 
closing of the legal doors for economic and labor migration in the 1990’s.61 In 
order to prevent this allegedly large-scale abuse so as to stem the flow of irregular 
immigration, return became the center of state concern. In its Green Paper on the 
Common European Asylum System (2007), the European Commission underlined the 
necessity to ‘provide national asylum administrations with adequate tools, enabling 
them to efficiently manage asylum flows and effectively prevent fraud and abuse, 
thereby preserving the integrity and credibility of the asylum system.’62 Three years 
earlier, the Dutch Government in its Memoranda on Return already expressed the 
view that return no longer constitutes the keystone of the asylum procedure, but 
should be considered to be an integral part thereof. Consequently, the memoranda 
recommends that the immigration authorities notify the asylum seeker at the start 
of his procedure that return is most likely to be the expected outcome.63  The 
emphasis on return clearly plays on the assumption of a wide abuse of the asylum 
procedure, assuming, therefore, that most asylum claims will be unfounded. As 
Guild observes: ‘[I]n most Member States, overall recognition rates declined. With 
this trend, the arguments in favor of inclusive asylum policies suffered a setback. A 
new logic took hold:  if most asylum seekers do not deserve refugee status, then 
they should be kept out of the territory. The duty of protection loses its force as 
fewer and fewer persons claiming it are determined to be entitled. The logic of 
preventing abuse takes hold.’64  
The focus on the abuse of the asylum system not only misfires at the issue of 
irregular immigration, as the majority of irregular immigrants do not lodge a 
fraudulent asylum claim to enter the EU through the legal gates, but also it is 
simply false to assume that the majority of asylum seekers are malafide claimants, as 
if there are no refugees in today’s world. Anyone who is not feeble-minded would 
normally be suspicious of the concoctions of a megalomaniacal mind like 
Mu´ammar al-Gadaffi, who said that the issue of asylum seekers ‘is a widespread 
lie.’ Yet his statement is at the apex of the logic of abuse that predominates the 
                                                                                                                   
Current Anthropology, vol. 50 (2009), pp. 415-441) I will discuss Blommaert’s article in more detail in Chapter 
Two.  
60 Compare Hailbronner, K. (2004), p. 41: ‘In spite of smaller numbers since 2000, asylum law has continued 
to provide a backdoor for illegal immigration into the European Union.’ 
61 Cf., Brochmann, G. ‘The Mechanisms of Control’, in Brochmann & Hammar eds, Mechanisms of Immigration 
Control. A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies, Oxford/New York: Berg (1999), p. 2.  
62 As quoted in Morono Lax (2008), p. 316.  
63 Cf. Directoraat-generaal Internationale aangelegenheden en vreemdelingenzaken, Terugkeer Nota. Maatregelen 
voor een effectieve uitvoering van het terugkeerbeleid/29344, no. 1, 21 november 2003, p. 6.  
64 Guild (2006), p. 639.  
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discussion on asylum. Upon his visit to Italy in June 2009, in the context of the 
‘Friendship Pact’, 65  Gadaffi stated that Africans are ‘living in the desert, in the 
forests, having no identity at all, let alone a political identity. They feel that the 
North has all the wealth, the money, and so they try to reach it … Millions of 
people are attracted by Europe, and are trying to get there. Do we really think that 
millions of people are asylum seekers? It is really a laughable matter.’66 I am not 
suggesting that all ‘boat people’, as they are called, are refugees, but it is also too 
bold a claim to say that none of them is.67 But even though Gaddafi is generally 
considered to be a megalomaniacal dictator, the fact is that the European 
Commission signed a cooperation agreement with Libya in October, 2009, which 
included 50 million euro’s for border management despite the forced closure of 
UNHCR’s office in Tripoli.68 
So the asylum procedure is no longer only perceived as a key element in refugee 
protection but it is also, and above all, perceived as a ‘trump card on the usual rules 
of immigration control.’ 69  The problem at issue here is, of course, that states 
cannot decide beforehand who is a real refugee deserving of protection, and who is 
merely a bogus claimant imposing upon the system. And once that decision is 
made, it is already too late, so to speak, because of the bogus claimant’s physical 
presence upon a state’s territory. As it turns out, refugee law has not only fallen out 
of favor, as it fails to take into account the interests states have in managing 
immigration,  but also it is incriminated for enabling irregular immigration. This 
incrimination fuelled the logic of abuse and is the driving force behind current 
restrictive, or as some even say non-admission, policies for refugees70 that cause 
them to get caught in the deadlock of immigration control. As Grete Brochmann 
puts it: ‘Whereas refugee policy in principle belongs in the realm of human rights, it 
turned out to be a border control issue where the … right for refugees to seek 
protection was discarded.’71  Indeed, as will be shown below, subjecting asylum 
seekers to the means of immigration control so as to prevent their illegal entrance 
in the broader context of the fight against illegal immigration, seriously endangers 
the very right to seek asylum. 
                                                 
65 On August 30, 2008, Italy and Libya signed ‘The Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation 
between the Italian republic and the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.’  
66 Mu´ammar al-Gadaffi as cited in: Human Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around. Italy’s Forced Return of 
Boat Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers, September 2009, p. 10.  
67 Cf., Ibid., pp. 11, 12. 
68 Cf., Human Rights Watch, World Report 2011, p. 423. 
69 Hathaway, J. ‘Preface: Can International Refugee Law be Made Relevant Again?’, in Hathaway, J. ed., 
Reconceiving International Refugee Law, The Hague: Nijhoff 1997, p. xix. 
70 Compare Kostakopoulou, D.  & Thomas, R. ‘Unweaving the Threads: Territoriality, National Ownership 
of Land and Asylum Policy’, European Journal of Migration, vol. 6 (2004) pp. 12, 13: ‘In the 1980s, the anti-
immigration discourse shifted towards refugees: Refugees were portrayed as ‘bogus asylum seekers’, 
‘economic migrants’ and ‘abusers of the asylum system.’ The imposition of visa requirements on people 
coming from countries from which many were likely to flee, and the ‘privatization’ of immigration control via 
carriers’ liability legislation, were strategies designed to clamp down on refugees. Detention of asylum seekers 
either in detention centres or in prisons, owing to a lack of space in detention centres, was added to the menu 
of exclusionist policies designed to deter the entry of ‘unwanted foreigners.’  Cf. also Huysmans, J. ‘The 
European Union and the Securitization of Migration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 38, (2000), p. 753. 
In general, see: Brochmann, G. & Hammar, T. (Eds.). Mechanisms of Immigration Control. A Comparative Analysis 
of European Regulation Policies Oxford/New York: Berg (1999). And Guild, E. ‘Seeking Asylum: Storm Clouds 
Between International Commitments and EU Legislative Measure’, European Law Review, vol. 29 (2004), pp. 
198-218.  
71 Brochmann, G. (1999), p. 312.  
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1.3 Internal and External Immigration Control 
 
Aware of the fact that borders alone will not stop people from crossing them, the 
means of immigration control aim at different points of the immigration track, 
ranging from the country of origin via transit countries, to the eventual arrival in 
the receiving state. Indeed, immigration control is rapidly moving away from the 
geographical border 72  and can generally be divided into internal and external 
control as suggested by Brochmann and Hammar.73 External and internal means 
are based on so-called push and pull factors, that are meticulously mapped, that 
cause people to leave or flee from their own country and attract them to others.  
External control seeks to control, prevent and contain immigration before 
departure (if it intervenes in countries of origin) or arrival (if it focuses on transit 
countries). If we limit ourselves to mechanisms of external control relevant to 
refugee movements, the first thing to be noticed is a strategy of prevention. As 
Brochmann discerns: ‘There is an assumption present that economic development 
also fosters the generation of democratic institutions, and that development will 
therefore eventually contain the need to flee.’74 A case in point is the new vision on 
human rights presented by the Dutch Government in its paper Naar een menswaardig 
bestaan (2007). The Dutch Government expresses the view that a pro-active human 
rights strategy needs to be incorporated in its foreign policy, assuming that enabling 
and supporting a worldwide observance of human rights also serves its own 
national interests. Preventing and containing refugee movements appears to be a 
recurring interest. Aware of the fact that so-called failing states cause large numbers 
of people to flee, the Dutch Government commits itself to the observance of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ that states have vis-a-vis their nationals, even promising if 
possible to intervene if states fail this responsibility. 75  Remarkably enough, the 
government’s new human rights strategy holds that human rights pertain to the 
relationship between a state and its nationals.  Indeed, this clearly limits other states to an 
observance of this responsibility to protect, at times perhaps pursuing to enforce 
this responsibility. The assumption that an individual is supposed to enjoy his or 
her human rights in the country of origin is once again affirmed by the striking 
absence of any reference to the right to seek asylum. Despite the fact that the 
Dutch Government holds human rights to be indivisible which implies that the 
lack of concern for one human right is detrimental to all human rights, article 14 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights76 is passed over in silence. Instead, the 
Dutch Government appears to have substituted the ‘right to stay’ for the right to 
seek asylum. The position of the Dutch Government echoes the much debated 
UK’s  A New Vision for Refugees (2003) in which the UK government empathically 
depicts a new perspective on refugee protection:77 ‘If we are seeking to imagine the 
                                                 
72 Cf. Van Houtum, H. ‘The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries’, Geopolitics, vol. 10 (2005), pp. 672-679.  
73 Brochmann & Hammar 1999. 
74 Brochmann 1999, p. 305.  
75 The UK also opts for humanitarian and/or military intervention in order to prevent refugee flows.  For a 
discussion of this proposal see: Van Troost, L., ‘Gewapende interventie en ‘regime change’: Onwezenlijke 
gedachten of wezenlijke onderdelen van plan Blair?’ in Bruin, R. & Teitler, J. Eds, Niemandsland. Opvang van 
vluchtelingen in de regio, Amsterdam: Amnesty International 2003, pp. 179-190. 
76 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 14 (1): ‘Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution.’ 
77 For a discussion of the UK’s proposal and its legal ramification see: Noll (2003), pp. 303-341.  
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best possible regime for refugees then we should be ambitious. In this visionary 
world there would be no refugees. No-one would be living in fear of persecution 
and there would be no abuse of human rights. Everyone would be adequately 
protected by his or her own state. This may sound like a utopia but it is the only 
full solution to the refugee problem.’78 Hathaway and Neve point out that at the 
close of the Twentieth Century, UNHCR also promoted a right to stay or remain: 
‘As the right of refugees to access secure and dignified asylum fell out of favor in 
both the North and South, states prevailed upon intergovernmental institutions to 
devise a less intrusive alternative to the duty to receive refugees.’ UNHCR 
responded by proclaiming a ‘right to remain.’ 79  This leaves one to wonder, 
however, what remains of the repeated mantra that human rights apply ‘to 
everyone, at all times and everywhere’, as they can only be enjoyed in the state of 
which one is a national. As attractive as fighting the root causes of refugee flows 
may be in order to guarantee a right to stay, it should be remembered that the 
obligation to protect refugees cannot be reduced to solving the problems that 
causes them to flee in the first place.80  
Imposing visa requirements also resorts under the means of immigration 
control. The EU visa regime determines the countries whose nationals are required 
to be in possession of a visa, and the countries whose nationals are exempted from 
this requirement.81 The drafting of the so-called ‘Black List’ and ‘White List’ ‘has 
developed in disconnection with refugee matters’, 82  Moreno Lax argues. 83  
According to the Maastricht Treaty (1992) the imposing of visa requirements is 
considered to be a legitimate means to cope with refugee crises.84 The by now 
firmly established visa regime, imposing requirements for nationals of mainly non-
OECD countries,85 including refugee producing countries, is a flagrant disavowal 
of the above- mentioned difference in position between immigrants and potential 
refugees.  
                                                 
78 As cited in Van Troost 2003, p. 180. 
79 Hathaway & Neve (1997), p. 133.   
80 Besides, the discourse on attacking the root causes of refugee flows seems highly rhetorical and symbolic. 
Compare Afeef, ‘The Politics of Extraterritorial Processing: Offshore Asylum Policies in Europe and the 
Pacific’, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford, Working Paper no. 36, October 2006, p. 9: ‘The frequent rhetorical 
allusion to the ‘root causes’ approach, however, has not translated into extensive and concrete initiatives on 
the ground, and this strategy remains largely unexplored.’ 
81 Cf., Van Houtum, H & Pijpers, R. ‘The European Union as a Gated Community: the Two-faced Border 
and Immigration Regime of the EU’, Antipode, vol. 39 (2007), pp. 291-308. 
82 Moreno Lax (2008), p. 325.  
83 Cf. also Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. & Gammeltoft-Hansen, and H. ‘The Right to Seek - Revisited. On the 
UN Human Rights Declaration Article 14 and Access to Asylum Procedures in the EU,’ European Journal of 
Migration and Law, vol. 10 (2008), pp. 439-459.  
84 Maastricht Treaty, article 100 ( c ): ‘In the event of an emerging situation in a third country posing a threat 
of a sudden inflow of nationals from that country in the Community, the council may introduce visa 
requirements for nationals from the country in question.’ 
85 Huysmans casts the current regime of immigration as a ‘mediated policy of belonging’. Cf., Huysmans, J. 
(2000), p. 757. He further argues: ‘Border controls and by implication the internal security problematic 
created in the EU has a cultural dimension. Although it is often suggested that external borders have been 
fortified for all so-called third- country nationals, this is not what has happened in practice. Border control is 
polysemic: Individuals crossing borders are often differentiated according to more than one criterion. The 
EU’s external borders, for example, have been more ‘real’ for most  non-OECD nationals than for members 
of OECD countries … This differentiation is confirmed in the list determining the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of a visa for entering Member States of the European Union.’ (Ibid., p. 763).  
30                                  The International Protection of Refugees 
 
Next to visa requirements, 86  carrier sanctions (i.e., penalizing transport 
companies for carrying undocumented immigrants) are generally considered to be 
‘the most effective blocking mechanisms for asylum flows.’ 87  Other effective 
external blocking mechanisms include the principle of the safe country of origin 
and safe third country through which the asylum seeker has passed, which both are 
a justification for the invocation of the manifestly unfounded application for 
asylum, and exclusion of the individual from the asylum procedure. It also includes 
the establishment of bilateral agreements with transit countries such as previously 
mentioned Libya, and Morocco, where irregular immigrants are forcibly returned, 
and where potential refugees are not effectively protected.88 Next to these ‘passive’ 
or ‘soft’ blocking mechanisms, more active (and aggressive) ones are deployed, 
such as the externalization of border controls, the strengthening of borders with 
concrete and fences, the use of technological devices (infra-red scanning, motion 
detectors) aiming at apprehending and intercepting immigrants on the high seas.89  
The backwash of external immigration control is that potential refugees are 
seriously impeded in their right to seek asylum and have their claims assessed and 
reviewed.90  If, in the previous section, it was argued that the consequences of 
strategies to prevent abuse are far more serious than the concerns that induced 
some caution with respect to subsidiary forms of protection, it is because potential 
refugees are seriously emasculated to seek asylum. 91  Indeed, as scholars and 
practitioners in refugee law have pointed out, any progressive development in 
refugee law remains an empty gesture in the face of restrictive or non-admission 
                                                 
86 It is important to stress that visa requirements apply to potential refugees as well as to recognized refugees. 
Cf. Morono Lax (2008), p. 324. Annemarie Busser relates the bizarre consequences of such a policy. In her 
Gevangen tussen grenzen. Verhalen van vluchtelingen, she collected the stories of refugees with whom she has been 
involved as a legal employee for Amnesty International. She relates the story of Rizgar, a refugee from Syria, 
whom the Dutch authorities permitted to reunite with his family, as his wife was recognized as a refugee. 
However, the Dutch authorities claimed to be unable to provide Rizgar with the required immigration 
formalities, causing him to illegally travel to the Netherlands. This took him two years, in which he was 
frequently detained and tortured for his illegal entry and stay in transit countries. The Dutch authorities 
declared that his travel to Dutch territory was his own responsibility, even though they would grant him 
access upon arrival and a legal resident permit. For the story of Rizgar and his wife see: Busser, A. Gevangen 
tussen grenzen. Verhalen van Vluchtelingen,  Amsterdam/Antwerpen: Atlas 2005, pp.  11-36.  
87 Moreno Lax (2008), p 317. See also Brochamnn1999 p. 307.  
88 For a discussion of these agreements and the legal issues engaged see Afeef, 2006.  
89 The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) expressed its grave concerns about the 
practice of intercepting immigrants on the high seas: ‘[T]he CPT has grave misgivings about the policy 
adopted by certain countries of intercepting, at sea, boats transporting irregular migrants and returning the 
persons concerned to North or North-West Africa. A practice with similar implications allegedly takes place 
at certain European land borders. Countries that implement such policies or practices could well be at risk of 
breaching the fundamental principle of ‘non-refoulement’, a principle which forms part of international human 
rights law as well as of European Union law. This is particularly the case when the countries to which 
irregular migrants are sent have not ratified or acceded to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees.’ (European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading treatment or 
Punishment, 20 Years of Combatting Torture, 19th general Report 1 August 2008-31 July 2009, p. 42).   
90 I will return to this at length in Chapter Five.  
91 That the intermingling between the objectives of migration control and refugee protection should be of our 
grave concern, is expressed by the 2007 awarding of the Nansen refugee Award to Katrine Camilleri by 
UNCHR. Camilleri is a lawyer from Malta who gives legal assistance to refugees arriving at Malta. UNHCR 
considered that ‘ Dr. Camilleri and Jesuit Refugee Service are key partners in helping UNHCR fulfill its goal 
of assisting governments to identify refugees caught up in migratory movements and responding to their 
needs. See http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/46ee38792.html, accessed (October 2007).  
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policies.92 Caught up in immigration movements, endangered in the right to seek 
asylum and therefore at risk of being refouled, potential refugees, for whom asylum is 
a matter of life and death, are increasingly left destitute and unprotected.93 Today 
we have good reasons to say that the credibility and integrity of the asylum system 
is no longer imperiled by the non-return of rejected asylum seekers, but that it is 
hazarded by the deflection of asylum seekers from our territories. 94  
While external instruments aim at controlling immigration before arrival or 
departure, internal immigration control is directed against immigrants and asylees 
who have to await a final decision on their (prolonged) legal stay, or who already 
managed to settle illegally. In order to control the latter group, with the prospect of 
returning or removing them, knowledge about who they are, where they are, and 
where they ought to be, is crucial. Though irregular immigrants would seem to defy 
codification and registration, there are, in fact, several sophisticated means to 
identify and register them. To this end, highly advanced technological devices of 
identification, surveillance and registration are being developed. The information 
they subtract is stored in several databases that are mutually connected. In the 
European Union, for example, the Schengen Information System (SIS) and 
Eurodac are currently operable, and a third database, the Visa Information System 
(VIS) is under construction. Advanced in line with the three possible migration 
histories of irregular immigrants, the databases contain information and 
documentation on the identity of the immigrant who illegally entered Europe (SIS), 
who applied for asylum (Eurodac), or requested a visa (VIS).95 The information 
gathered in the latter two relates to identity and nationality and includes fingerprints 
and biometrical data. These databases and the networks created between them 
constitute, according to Broeders, the new digital borders of Europe, as they fix the 
digital traces of the migration histories of immigrants and asylum seekers.96 The 
idea is that these digital traces equip authorities charged with tracking down 
irregular immigrants with the means to re-identify them. Thus, for example, 
Eurodac stores the fingerprints of every asylum applicant over the age of 14. If an 
apprehended illegal immigrant hides who he is and from where he came, his 
fingerprints can be entered in Eurodac.97 If a match is made, he can be linked to an 
                                                 
92 Cf., Battjes, H.  ‘Het Europees Asielrecht’, Justiële Verkenningen, afl. 6 (2004), p.90; and Hathaway 1997, p. 
xx.  
93 Hein de Haas estimates that the percentage of irregular immigrants who are stopped in Morocco and who 
are in need of international protection varies between 10 and 20 percent (Cf., De Haas (2008), p. 8. 
94 Cf., Guild, E. (2006), pp.649, 650.  
95 Cf., Broeders, D. ‘The new Digital Borders of Europe. EU Databases and the Surveillance of Irregular 
Migrants,’ International Sociology, vol. 22 (2007), p. 85: ‘In general, irregular migrants have three possible 
‘migration histories.’ They either crossed the border illegally (with or without help), they were asylum seekers 
and stayed after their claim was rejected, or they came on a legal visa and stayed after its validity expired. The 
network of databases develops accordingly. Irregular migration defies codification, but irregular migrants 
found in member states can be registered in SIS. Those who enter through asylum procedures will be 
registered in Eurodac, and those who enter on a legal visa will, in the future, be registered by VIS.’ 
96 Cf., Broeders (2007), p. 71-92. 
97 Broeders warns against the so-called ‘function creep’, wherein a system oversteps the functions it was 
originally designed for and, as a consequence, simultaneously sidesteps the limits of the legal framework. 
Thus, Eurodac was originally developed as a system to support the Dublin-Convention that aimed at 
preventing asylum-shopping, and provided the standards to determine the country that was held to be 
responsible for processing the asylum claim. However, it rapidly developed as an effective tool to combat 
illegal immigration.  
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asylum dossier that contains relevant information about his identity and nationality 
that presumably facilitates his or her removal. 
Just as external immigration control engages serious legal issues, so also does 
internal immigration control. Internal immigration control frequently makes use of 
immigration detention. As intimated already in the previous section, one of the 
most important tools for internal immigration control is the return or removal of 
irregular immigrants and rejected asylum seekers. The EU return Directive from 
2008, sets down the conditions for return and/or removal, considering in its recital 
4 that an effective return policy is a necessary element of well- managed migration 
policy. Though the Directive prefers voluntary return over forced removal (recital 
10) it does set down conditions for the use of coercive measures and detention. 
Article 15 of the Directive stipulates that detention is only legitimate if other less 
coercive measures cannot be applied effectively because there is a risk of 
absconding, or the concerned immigrant is avoiding or hampering preparations for 
his or her return. Clearly, then, detention is only justified for the purpose of return 
and/or removal. Article 15 (4) thus states that if ‘a reasonable prospect of removal 
no longer exists … detention ceases to be justified and the person concerned shall 
be released immediately.’98 Referring to general principles of EU law, the Directive 
stresses that decisions taken with respect to detention should be adopted on a case-
by-case basis and be based on objective criteria. This implies at the very least an 
individual assessment of a risk of absconding, as well as an assessment of 
alternative means such as regular reporting with the authorities. 99  However, 
different reports show that detention of irregular immigrants and rejected asylum 
seekers often does not meet these criteria and fails general principles of law.100 As 
Kostakopoulou and Robert Thomas observe, detention, which used to be an 
exceptional measure of last resort, is today in favor of becoming the rule.101 
With respect to immigration detention, two facts relating to the duration and 
circumstances of detention are particularly alarming. Though it is admirable that 
the EU Return Directive has ended the practice of indefinite detention, it is 
questionable, if not to say deplorable, that it provides that detention for removal 
may not exceed six months, giving states the opportunity, however, to extend this 
period with twelve months. Though the Directive emphasizes that unaccompanied 
minors and families may only be detained as a measure of last resort and for the 
                                                 
98 Note that the Return Directive is based on article 5 of the European Declaration on Human Rights and 
lays down the situations in which a person may be arrested and detained. Article 5 (1) (e) evokes ‘the lawful 
arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country, or of a person 
against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.’ This forecloses the possibility 
to bring irregular stay within the ambit of criminal law. On April 28, 2011, the European Court of Justice in 
Judgment C-66/11 El Dridi ruled that Member States may not detain a person on the sole grounds of illegal 
stay, as this would interfere with the objectives pursued by EU law which allows for detention for the 
purpose of enforcing a return decision only. 
99 Cf., Raad voor Strafrechtstoepassing en jeugdbescherming, Advies Vreemdelingenbewaring, (June 16, 2008), pp. 
20, 21. Cf. also European Council of Refugees and Exiles, Information Note on the Directive 2008/115/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third-country nationals. Document CO7/2009/Ext/MDM; and Van Kalmthout, A. ‘Het 
regiem van Vreemdelingenbewaring. De balans na 25 jaar’,  Justitiële Verkenningen,  no. 4 (2007), pp. 190-201. 
100  Amnesty International, The Netherlands: The Detention of Irregular Migrants and Asylum-Seekers, doc. EUR 
(35/02/2008); Human Rights Watch, Fleeting Refuge: The Triumph of Efficiency over protection in Dutch Asylum Policy, 
(April 2003); Raad voor Strafrechtstoepassing en jeugdbescherming, Advies Vreemdelingenbewaring, (June 16, 
2008).  
101 Cf., Kostakopoulou & Thomas (2004), p. 13.  
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shortest possible time, it does not foreclose the possibility of detention of up to 
eighteen months for children and vulnerable persons. An extensive and 
comparative study on the relation between detention and removal conducted by 
Van Kalmthout puts doubt, however, on this time limit of eighteen months. 
Empirical data show that effective removal is most likely to occur within three 
months of detention. After three months, only 20 percent of detained immigrants 
are removed, and after six months, the percentage is brought back to a minimum, 
close to nil.102 
With respect to the material conditions, it cannot be over-emphasized that 
irregular immigrants and rejected asylum seekers are deprived of their liberty with a 
view to their removal from a state’s territory, not because they are criminals. In its 
General Report 2008-2009, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) stresses that the 
‘purpose of deprivation of liberty of irregular migrants is thus significantly different 
from that of persons held in prison either on remand or as convicted offenders.’103 
CPT, therefore, strongly argues that ‘a prison establishment is by definition not a 
suitable place in which to hold someone who is neither accused nor convicted of a 
criminal offence.’104 However, the general report also communicates that ‘there are 
still far too many instances where CPT comes across places of deprivation of 
liberty for irregular migrants, and on occasion asylum seekers, which are totally 
unsuitable.’105  
Indeed, it has often been observed that non-criminal aliens are treated as 
criminals. In fact, they are treated worse, as even basic principles of penal law are 
massively violated. As detention for removal involves non-criminal individuals, the 
principle of minimum restrictions requires that they be detained ‘in centres 
specifically designed for that purpose, offering material conditions and a regime 
appropriate to their legal situation and staffed by suitably qualified personnel.’ 106 In 
practice, however, this principle has been abandoned.107 Irregular immigrants and 
rejected asylum seekers are detained in penal institutions or in institutions that 
resemble a penal regime. They lack juridical safeguards, have no access to 
appropriate medical care, have to share their cells with two or more persons and 
are kept under a regime of ‘restricted community’ which basically means that they 
are locked in their cells, a measure which is otherwise exceptionally used for 
extremely violent convicted criminals. Moreover, they are severely restricted in their 
privacy, and not even granted a temporary leave of absence to join their partners 
when they are giving birth, or to bid farewell to a dying parent.108  
                                                 
102 Cf., Kalmthout, van A. et.al. Terugkeermogelijkheden van vreemdelingen in vreemdelingenbewaring. Een onderzoek naar 
verhinderende, bemoeilijkende of vergemakkelijkende factoren van terugkeer van vreemdelingen in vreemdelingenbewaring. Deel 1 
De vreemdelingenbewaring in Tilburg en Ter Apel. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2004. 
103  European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 20 Years of Combatting Torture, 19th General Report, 1 August 2008-31 July 2009, p. 38.  
104 Ibid., p. 38. 
105 Ibid., p. 38.  
106 VU Special Rapprteur on the Rights on Non-Citizens Weisbrodt as cited in: Van Kalmthout, A.M., ‘Het 
regiem van Vreemdelingenbewaring. De balans na 25 jaar’, Justitiële Verkenningen, 2007, no. 4, p. 96.  
107  Cf., Van Kalmthout, A.M., Ook de illegaal heeft een verhaal. 61 gesprekken met illegale vreemdelingen in 
vreemdelingenbewaring, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2006, pp. XIV, XV; See also Boone, ‘Penitentiaire 
beginselen en de bewaring van vreemdelingen’, Proces. Tijdschrift voor strafrechtpleging, (2003), vol. 6. 
108 Cf., Van Kalmthout, (2007), p. 98. The harsh regime of alien detention was brought to public awareness 
after the Schiphol fire in October, 2005. Though a burning cigarette of one of the detainees probably set the 
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Not only are we witness to an increase in detention for removal,109 the number 
of immigrants detained upon arrival is also rising.110 Border detention relates to the 
refusal of entry upon arrival if a person does not meet visa requirements or other 
immigration formalities. In order to prevent him or her gaining access to the 
territory beyond the border checkpoint (usually an airport or harbor check point) 
he or she can be detained. On account of article 31 of the Refugee Convention 
which, recall, states that refugees shall not be penalized for illegal entry, detention 
of asylum seekers is a highly morally sensitive issue.111 However, Kay Hailbronner 
develops an argument that is to provide the basis for the detention of all asylum 
seekers, not just for those who are rejected.112 He starts his argument by stating 
that he doesn’t want to quarrel over numbers but, nevertheless, feels the urge to 
remind that less than ten percent of all asylum applications in the Member States of 
the EU are successful, implicitly suggesting that the majority of applicants are 
fraudulent claimants who use the asylum procedure as a backdoor route to illegal 
settlement. He then explicates that, traditionally, detention relates to the 
deportation of rejected asylum seekers, raising the question whether or not it can 
be considered to be a reasonable and legitimate means for all asylum seekers. 
Hailbronner reiterates all the relevant norms of international human rights law 
relating to the detention of asylum seekers. Consequently, he considers detention to 
be illegitimate for preventing the entry of bogus and fraudulent claimants. Such a 
reasoning would be suspect, as it seems to presuppose that all asylum seekers are 
fraudulent. But, as he rightly argues, whether an asylum seeker is a genuine refugee 
or a bogus claimant is something that has to be decided in the asylum procedure, 
and ought not to be presupposed beforehand.  With reference to Article 31 of the 
Refugee Convention, Hailbronner then argues that detention for unauthorized 
entry is illegitimate, as well. Nor can asylum seekers be detained for the mere fact 
of applying for asylum. Hailbronner, nevertheless, goes on to find a rationale for 
                                                                                                                   
fire, the fire spread as quick as lightening, as the detention center did not fulfill important requirements of 
safety and security. Those who managed to escape (eleven persons were killed in the fire) were forced outside 
and pushed together behind a fence. Despite the extremely traumatic experience of having escaped a sea of 
flames, and hearing and seeing people die in it, the detainees were immediately replaced to other detention 
centers, where they were locked up or even put in isolation cells. The former Minister of Immigration and 
Integration, Rita Verdonk, publicly stated the situation was adequately dealt with. The day after the fire, she 
phoned the wife of one of the detainees who had just given birth to say her condolences and show her 
compassion. It turned out that the husband wasn’t killed in the fire, but could not be found, as he was put 
away in an isolation cell where he was prohibited to contact his wife or lawyer. 
109 In The Netherlands, for example, detention capacities have increased from 200 cells in 1984, to 3100 cells 
in 2007. Van Kalmthout calculated the cell capacity of aliens to be 13 to 17 percent of the total penal capacity 
(detention of aliens in police cells not included). At a rough estimate, 25 percent of the total prison 
population is made up of non-criminal aliens (Van Kalmthout, A.M. ‘De politiecel als bewaarplaats voor 
illegalen’, Proces. Tijdschrift voor strafrechtpleging, (2003), no. 6, pp. 294-300). 
110 Migreurop, a network of activists and researchers, has established that there are 235 camps of different 
kinds for the detention of foreigners. For information and maps of camp sites, 
see: http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/carte-en.pdf.  
111 Compare European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 20 Years of Combatting Torture, 19th General Report (1 August 2008-31 July 2009), p. 37: ‘It should be 
noted that asylum seekers are not irregular migrants, although the persons concerned may become so, should 
their asylum application be rejected and their leave to stay in a country rescinded. Whenever asylum seekers 
are deprived of their liberty, pending the outcome of their application, they should be afforded with a wide 
range of safeguards in line with their status, going beyond those applicable to irregular migrants …’ 
112 Cf. Hailbronner, K. ‘Detention of Asylum Seekers’, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 9 (2007), pp. 
159-172.  
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detention. Until a decision has been made, so his argument goes, asylum seekers are 
to be considered as being unlawfully in the country.113 Detention is reasonable, 
then, not because of their illegal arrival, but in order to prevent their illegal entry 
and continued stay. To be sure, the assumption is not that all asylum seekers are 
malafide. The problem is, precisely, that it cannot be decided beforehand who 
qualifies as a genuine refugee and who turns out to be a bogus claimant 
 
 
1.4 Temporary Protection 
 
Thus far, demurrals over restraints to the Refugee Convention have been discussed, 
as well as the way states have chosen to respond to these objections. Over against a 
willingness to fill the protection gap resulting from the limited 1951 refugee 
definition, states have displayed an impatient eagerness to adopt exclusionary 
practices with the excuse of putting a stop to the abuse of the asylum system. 
Generally it can be said that the subjection of potential refugees to the means of 
immigration control – which, recall all started with the problem of return – has 
launched the logic of abuse, evoking hostility and distrust towards protection 
seekers, while undercutting good decision- making on the merits of every asylum 
claim. It is noteworthy that the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) 
accedes that the credibility of the asylum system lives on the return of rejected 
asylum seekers. Vice versa, ECRE stresses, the credibility and admissibility of any 
return policy is premised on the existence of fair and equal asylum procedures.  
Contesting that these are in place,114 ECRE argues ‘that failure to protect those 
in need of protection fatally undermines the credibility of Member States’ removal 
systems.’115  
Given the repercussions of the embankment of illegal immigration on refugee 
protection, Moreno Lax rightly argues that ‘deterring policies can no longer 
disregard the difference between asylum seekers and other migrants with the excuse 
that ‘it is impossible to distinguish between persons who may be justified to claim a 
right or to be rejected or returned, and the large number of people seeking 
                                                 
113 The EU Return Directive, however, explicitly states that asylum seekers are not to be considered as illegal 
upon the territory of a Member State. Cf., footnote 43, above. 
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admission for other purposes’.’116 This section explores a possible answer to this 
challenge that ultimately provides an alternative for traditional forms of refugee 
protection. Disconnecting refugee protection from immigration might well be the 
sought-after answer to this problem. The declutch may be achieved by a regime of 
temporary (regional) protection. The present section outlines the current and 
heated debate on temporary protection. Temporary protection allegedly meets the 
objections discussed above, raised against the Refugee Convention, as it enables 
states to uphold their obligations and even extend protection to more persons in 
need of it, while at the same time taking into account the interest states have in 
combating illegal immigration.  
Temporary protection differs from subsidiary protection discussed above, as it 
is typified by the demand for humanitarian protection. Temporary protection came 
into view -- again117-- in the 1990’s as it supposedly provided a pragmatic tool to 
cope with the mass influx of refugees from the former Yugoslavia. Later, and after 
the fact as it were, temporary protection obtained legal form with the EU Directive 
on Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons 
(2001/EC/55).118 The practices of states to grant temporary refuge to persons who 
escaped ethnic cleansing in Bosnia is potentially instructive for understanding the 
meaning and purpose of temporary protection. 
Generally speaking, temporary protection is granted out of humanitarian 
concern as the safe return home under dignified circumstances is deemed to be 
impossible 119  due to a situation of armed conflict or generalized violence. The 
difference between temporary and subsidiary protection is that the standard of 
proof with respect to former is more easily satisfied. 120  The chief difference, 
however, between both forms of protection is to be found in article 19 of the 
Temporary Protection Directive which states that if an asylum claim has been 
rejected, the individual claimant ‘continues to enjoy temporary protection for the 
remainder of the period of protection.’ The generosity implied therewith has to be 
understood within the context that ‘temporary protection is not self-executing’, but 
is only activated if the Council of the EU decides that a mass influx of refugees 
exists.121  
Importantly, temporary protection is granted with a view to eventual return. 
Temporary protection is thus contingent upon a prevailing situation of conflict and 
violence, and is to be withdrawn once the facts and circumstances that necessitated 
protection have come to an end. The explicit assumption of temporary protection 
is thus that return is a feasible option. 122  Accordingly, temporary protection is 
tacitly recognized to meet the objection that refugee protection is ‘a slow ‘yes’ to 
                                                 
116 Moreno Lax (2008) p. 364. Moreno Lax here argues against Hailbronner, who is cited in the referred 
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117  For an historical overview of discourses on practices of temporary protection see Fitzpatrick, J. 
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permanent admission’, 123  as it stresses the return home. 124  According to Joan 
Fitzpatrick, temporary protection allows ‘democratic states in mediating public 
demands that asylum not be a back door to immigration, but that humanitarian 
ideals be sustained.’125 Granted out of humanitarian concern, intended to protect 
against refoulement and with a view to eventual return, the Convention regime is not 
fully applicable to the beneficiaries of temporary protection. Trying to locate 
temporary protection within the overall regime of protection, Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam therefore argue: ‘[W]ords such as ‘refuge’ and ‘protection’ may offer 
some advantage over any comparable use of the word ‘asylum’ in situations of mass 
influx. Asylum is undefined; it can be used broadly to signify protection of 
refugees, or it can be used in the narrow sense of a durable or permanent solution, 
involving residence and lasting protection against the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
State of origin. A receiving State called upon to grant ‘asylum’ to large numbers 
may well demur; admission is more likely to be facilitated by reference to the norm 
of non-refoulement …’126 
While temporary protection is considered to be a particular instance of 
expanding the scope of persons in need of international protection127, the dilution 
of protection has been a cause of grave concern among academics. This is 
particularly so because temporary protection may also be extended to persons who 
may fall within the scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention.128 Though UNHCR 
has argued that the grant of temporary protection to Convention-refugees should 
only occur if, due to a sudden influx, normal asylum procedures are overwhelmed, 
EU law, by contrast, does not invoke a nervous exhaustion of the asylum system as 
a prerequisite for applying temporary protection to refugees. 129 In this respect the 
Directive seems aberrant. Though it does not, in theory, replace Convention-based 
protection, it does ‘represent a threat to the 1951 refugee regime’130 if applied to 
Convention refugees or persons otherwise in need of international protection. 
States will nonetheless be reluctant to assume obligations under a regime of 
temporary protection as this would most likely expand the number of persons in 
need of protection. This internal contradiction so to speak probably explains why 
the Directive has not been activated so far.  
Again we see that the possible alleviation of the immediate plight of a potential 
large number of people does not unequivocally entail the level of protection as 
afforded under the Refugee Convention. In fact, the Temporary Protection 
Directive might well be taken as the definite separation of non-refoulement from the 
grant of asylum. As Goodwin-Gill and McAdam argue: ‘In attaining its present 
universal and peremptory character, non-refoulement has separated itself from asylum 
in the sense of lasting solution.’131 Though the Directive has not, as said, been 
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used, its existence is potentially instructive for understanding recurring discussions 
on alternative forms of protection, in particular with respect to the regional aspect 
of the Directive and the link it establishes between the temporary nature of 
protection and the eventual return home.  
Indeed, the debate on temporary protection did not come to end with the 
adoption of this Directive. Before and after the referred Directive, discussions on 
temporary protection centered around a variety of questions that go to the heart of 
the refugee protection regime. These questions can be put together in the following 
general questions: should temporary protection be limited to situations of a mass 
influx, at the risk of including refugees who fled persecution? 132  Or, should it 
instead be granted to persons who do not fulfill the applicable criteria of the 
Refugee Convention and who escaped from armed conflict or ongoing severe 
violence? Should temporary protection be formalized and brought under the aegis 
of the law, extending the legal obligations of states with regard to persons in need 
of international protection?133 Or, should it be regarded as an informal practice of 
discretion and humanitarian goodwill, dislodging it from the realm of enforceable 
rights?134 Underneath these questions a genuine concern for the level of protection 
persists. Indeed, what caused the debate to be heated is the fear that temporary 
protection is not complementing the 1951 Refugee Convention but is instead 
replacing it. These misgivings are no doubt fostered by recurring discussions on 
new approaches to refugee protection that explore alternative forms of protecting 
refugees. In addition to the separation of non-refoulement and asylum states sought to 
achieve in their response to refugees from the former Yugoslavia, the catchword of 
current discussions on temporary regional protection is no doubt ‘pro refugee, anti 
asylum.’ Indeed, as Noll observes ‘there is an interesting line of development from 
the introduction of Temporary Protection in the early 1990’s to the contemporary 
discussion of ‘new approaches’…’ 135  After briefly discussing these ‘new 
approaches’ as proposed by different governments136, I will turn to the academic 
debate on temporary protection. 
In 2003, Amnesty International published a book of collected essays and papers 
that investigate, analyze and assess the exploration of alternative forms of 
protection.137 The authors focused on the different viewpoints, and the legal issues 
they engaged, of the European Commission, the UNHCR and Member States. In 
particular, the focus was UNHCR’s Convention Plus from 2002, and the already 
mentioned UK’s A New Vision for Refugees, from 2003, which is generally considered 
to be to most radical, as it openly opts for exclusive temporary regional protection 
under the slogan ‘pro-refugee, anti-asylum.’ Another influential ‘new vision’ worth 
mentioning, is People Flow. Migration and Europe which was published on the 
opendemocracy.net and written, amongst others, by Theo Veenkamp who, at the 
time, was the head of the Netherlands Agency for the Reception of Asylum 
                                                 
132 Cf., Fitzpatrick (2000) p. 288. 
133Cf. Ibid., p. 280. And in general also Castillo, M.A., & Hathaway, J. ‘Temporary Protection’,  in Hathaway, 
J. ed. Reconceiving International Refugee Law, The Hague,: Nijhoff  1997, pp. 1-21  
134 Cf. Hailbronner, 2004, p. 65; Hathaway 2005, p. 26. 
135 Noll (2003), p. 340.  
136 For an extensive overview of these proposal, as well as critical analysis thereof see Noll (2003).  
137  Niemandsland. Opvang van vluchtelingen in de regio, Bruin, R. & Teitler, J., eds., Amsterdam: Amnesty 
International 2003. 
Chapter 1  39 
 
seekers.138 The basic tenet of Amnesty’s book is that temporary protection does 
not, despite reassurances to the contrary, complement the Refugee Convention, but 
is instead replacing it, slowly committing euthanasia to the Convention and the 
international refugee protection regime.139 However, as Gregor Noll rightly argues, 
these viewpoints and proposals on new forms of protection ‘remain moving targets 
for analysis, as the political debate is still in a formative phase.’ 140  Another 
disadvantage of comparing the different proposals is that it can all too easily be 
pointed out that the UK’s New Vision, which constituted the main reason for 
concern, was rejected by the EC and UNHCR for  reasons of being too radical. As 
the EC commented on the UK’s proposal, any exploration of alternative forms of 
protection should respect and be fully committed to the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
However, the rejection of the UK’s proposition may not hide from view that both 
Europe and the UNHCR are not ill-affected towards extraterritorial asylum 
policies.141 In its World Report 2011, Human Rights Watch has observed that the 
‘UK and other EU countries (including Norway) pursued plans to build reception 
centers in Kabul, Afghanistan, in order to repatriate unaccompanied children, 
despite concerns over security and lack of safeguards.’142 
To gain understanding of the stakes involved in the debate on temporary 
protection, it is, therefore, more fruitful to focus on the theoretical framework. 
James Hathaway provided such a framework. According to Hathaway, temporary 
(regional) protection constitutes a new paradigm in refugee law. His powerful plea 
for temporary protection is certainly meant as an antidote for the array of 
restrictive measures adopted to control refugee movements. In the co-authored 
article with Neve, ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again (1997), the 
authors argue that ‘the deficiencies of the present asylum system are so severe that 
the failure to explore change would be unethical.’143 By stressing that the real threat 
to refugee protection comes from a continuing unwillingness of states to admit and 
protect refugees, the critique is parried that temporary protection entails a 
degradation of the 1951 Refugee Convention.144 For refugee law to be relevant and 
viable again, it is required that the rights of refugees be balanced with rights and 
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interests of states. One way of achieving this balance, it is argued, is to opt for 
temporary protection with a view to returning refugees home, as this would relieve 
states of the burden of granting refugees permanent admission. 
Importantly, Hathaway argues that temporary protection is neither 
complementing nor substituting the 1951 Refugee Convention. Rather, it is a way 
of implementing the Convention. Temporary protection accords with Convention-
based protection, as the latter has always explicitly stressed the temporary nature of 
refugee status and does not in any whatsoever stipulate a right to permanent 
admission. In a co-authored article, ‘Temporary Protection’, Castillo and Hathaway 
thus argue: ‘In asking whether there is good reason to consider the adoption of 
temporary protection as either a complementary remedy to, or replacement for, 
traditional modes of protection, commentators assume permanent integration to be 
the status quo position. To the contrary, at least in law, temporary protection is 
already the universal norm.’145 
However, Hathaway does seem to admit that regional protection with a view to 
return, which is likely to reach a greater number of refugees compared to the 
current system, is in fact, qualitatively less than more traditional forms of 
protection: ‘The small minority of refugees that presently find solid protection in 
developed states may see a reduction of  their relative privileges under such a 
system, but a reduction in the Cadillacs of the few could, I believe, provide bicycles 
for the many.’146 
To explain and fully appreciate the exploration of temporary protection, it 
should be kept in mind that temporary protection, almost of necessity, equals 
regional protection. If, the argument runs, temporary protection is really to serve 
the end of eventual return, its proper form should be regional protection, as 
sheltering refugees in their region of origin most likely facilitates their return home: 
‘[P]roximity to the country of origin is desirable in order to facilitate eventual 
repatriation, and to allow for the prospect of greater ongoing contact between 
refugees and those of their community who have not left the home country.’147 
This bestows a wholly different and new meaning on the proposition that refugee 
law is not immigration which, recall, purported to express that the potential refugee 
takes up a different position compared to other immigrants. Against the backdrop 
of temporary protection, the proposition now seems to express that refugee 
protection does not imply immigration at all. According to Hathaway, then: ‘Simply 
put, the human rights function of refugee law does not require a routine linkage 
between refugee status and immigration.’148  
Indeed, it is the regional aspect that raises concern about temporary protection 
as a diluted or downgraded form of protection. To fully grasp the stakes involved, 
it must be understood in conjunction with the debate on extraterritorial asylum 
policies which have percolated into the issue of temporary protection from its very 
beginning. 149  The coincidence of offshore policies and temporary protection 
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evidences that the issue of return not only relates to rejected asylum seekers, but is 
extended to all asylum seekers and refugees. 
Let me briefly sketch the contours of extraterritorial asylum policies. Generally 
speaking, we find three elements150: 1) protection in the region of origin which 
requires that regional protection capacities be supported and improved, 2) 
extraterritorial processing of asylum claims, and 3) the return of asylum seekers to 
regional processing centers where they can either avail themselves of protection 
because of (1), or have their claims assessed because of (2). Extraterritorial asylum 
policies seek to disconnect refugee protection from their immigration to the West 
(which, recall, was the core aim of the UK’s New Vision) and/or strengthen the 
prevention of illegal immigration by conferring refugee status before departure. 
Importantly, even though the UK’s proposal was declined, the EU is not, as said, 
ill-affected towards offshore asylum policies. In this respect, it is important to keep 
in mind that attention for extraterritorial policies and temporary protection 
coincided with increased blocking of access for potential refugees to the territory of 
EU Member States.151 Indeed, offshore policies are even presented as solving the 
problem that states can only differentiate between a real refugee and a bogus 
claimant after adjudication, which seriously disempowers states to combat illegal 
immigration. In its Policy Plan on Asylum, the EC thus recommended that 
‘mechanisms capable of allowing for the differentiation between persons in need of 
protection and other migrants before they reach the border of the potential host state 
must be adopted.’ 152  According to some, extraterritorial asylum policies are, 
therefore, nothing but an extension of the non-entrée regime for refugees.153 
Indeed, with protection available in the region of origin, and the existence of 
extraterritorial processing centers, it is legitimate to ask what remains of the right to 
seek asylum in one of the Member States of the European Union. As De Vries 
explains, asylum seekers are likely to be rejected upon arrival ‘not because the 
applicant is not in need of protection, but because the state examining the 
application considers that protection should be sought elsewhere.’154 Obviously, 
‘elsewhere’ refers to protection havens or safe areas (the appropriate word here is 
‘camp’.  I will return to that in the next chapter) under the control of UNHCR 
and/or other NGO’s. The objection raised against this form is that it is limited, at 
best, to the prohibition of refoulement.155 But as De Vries rightly argues, it must be 
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kept in mind that protection from refoulement alone falls short of the level of 
protection provided to asylum seekers who make their applications in the EU. 
Protection from refoulement does not imply access to material reception conditions 
such as health care, education and housing.’156 
The grave consequences for refugees of this diluted form of protection are 
aggravated by the fact that there is ambiguity over the responsibility to give 
protection.157 As it is unlikely that neighboring countries in the region of origin -- 
which already shelter large numbers of refugees -- are willing to take full 
responsibility for refugee protection, they will probably abdicate key elements of 
protection to UNHCR. Therefore, chances are that the current practice of 
sheltering refugees outside the jurisdiction of the host state, with UNHCR in 
charge of assisting and controlling refugees, will be intensified.158  The corollary 
thereof is that UNHCR will act as a de facto sovereign, deciding upon to whom 
protection will be offered and to whom it will be refused. However, according the 
1951 Convention, since states are responsible for refugee status determination, the 
handing over of this responsibility to UNHCR entails the risk that the legal status 
of refugees remains undetermined. Whereas in the territorial asylum procedure the 
enjoyment of protection and rights follows upon recognition, recognition as a 
refugee by UNHCR does not automatically establish a link with protection rights 
and resettlement. While states are eager to abdicate responsibility of protection to 
UNHCR, they are unlikely to endow UNHCR with the responsibility of refugee 
status determination – a key element in refugee protection – as this would require 
that they transfer a considerable and important aspect of their sovereignty, for 
which the right to inclusion and exclusion is quintessential, to a non-state actor.159 
Humanitarian regional temporary protection does not afford refugees certainty 
about their legal status. Instead, it leaves their status undetermined. This is in 
flagrant opposition to the explicit aim of the Refugee Convention which, recall, 
aims to restore the legal person of the refugee so as to assure him the widest 
possible exercise of his rights and freedom. Indeed, temporary protection levels 
protection in the legal sense down to sheltering refugees in camps where they are 
offered humanitarian assistance. Harell-Bond very well captures the point when she 
argues with respect to protection offered by UNHCR: ‘[A]ssistance to refugees is 
conceived of in terms of charity rather than as a means of enabling refugees to 
enjoy their rights.’160 The statement of UNHCR on the cover of Refugee Magazine, 
on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Refugee Convention, proves to be 
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telling (and unsettling) in this respect. To celebrate, UNHCR apparently wanted to 
explain the meaning and purpose of the Convention by adding to it: ‘The Wall 
Behind Which Refugees Can Shelter.’161  
Concerns with respect to temporary protection are compounded by the fact 
that, with UNHCR as the main provider of ‘protection’, refugees are left without a 
supervisory authority to observe if protection and rights are granted to them. 
Consequently, refugees have little, if any, legal remedies for the violation of their 
rights,162 which is all the more pressing given the fact that their rights are massively 
violated in ‘protection zones’ administered by UNHCR.163 In their extensive and 
long-term research on protection in the region of origin under the control of 
UNHCR, Harell-Bond and Verdirame have focused on human rights violations 
instead of refugee situations in which human rights were respected, ‘not with the 
aim’, they explain, ‘of casting a negative light on governments or UNHCR, but 
because, as a matter of fact, no refugee enjoyed his or her rights when confined to a 
camp/settlement.’ 164  Absent a supervisory authority, without access to legal 
remedies on the part of the asylum seekers, according to Verdirame, ‘what happens 
on the ground is much more the result of individuals’ decisions and personalities 
than of the application of standards and procedures. The social scientist may 
consider this to be a completely self-evident statement, but for the lawyer … this 
finding is rather discomforting.’165 Indeed, with their status undetermined, and the 
impunity of the violations of their rights, refugees, according to Noll, are held in a 
worldwide state of exception.166 
I have tried to demonstrate that the regional aspect implied in temporary 
protection has provoked its opponents to agitate against it, exposing it as an 
inhumane regime that only serves the interests of states to keep refugees at bay. It 
is no exaggeration to say this form of alternative protection is utterly incapable of 
fulfilling the explicit purpose and aim of the Refugee Convention as laid down in 
its preamble. 
Still, I believe that temporary protection brings to light the fundamental 
conceptual presuppositions of the Refugee Convention, and the international 
protection regime that developed from it. The distinguishing feature of temporary 
protection is not, as Hathaway asserts, that it explicates and remolds the temporary 
nature of protection. Given the temporary nature of refugee status, such an 
assertion is nothing but stating the obvious. Rather, the distinguishing feature of 
temporary protection is that it puts into practice the conceptual pre-understanding 
                                                 
161 UNHCR, Refugees Magazine, issue 123: “The Wall Behind Which Refugees Can Shelter – the 1951 Geneva 
Convention 50th Anniversary’, (July 2001). Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3b5e90ea0.pdf. 
162 Griek, I. ‘Traditional Systems of Justice in Refugee Camps: Cause for Concern? in Pattanaik, Mk. Ed.  
Human rights of migrants: Issues and perspectives, Hyderabad: ICFAI University Press 2009, pp. 140-152.  
163  For a critical analysis of human rights violations and the role of UNHCR with regard to this see: 
Verdirame, G. ‘Human Rights and Refugees: The Case of Kenya’, Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 12 1999, pp. 
54-77;  Harell-Bond (2002), pp. 51-85; Verdirame & Harell-Bond, Rights in Exile. Janus Faced Humanitarianism. 
Berghahn Books, New York/ Oxford, (2005); Bruin & Van Anken, ‘Vluchtelingenkampen: juridisch 
niemandsland onder de hoede van UNHCR’, in Bruin, R.  & Teitler, J. eds., Niemandsland. Opvang van 
vluchtelingen in de regio, Amsterdam: Amnesty International 2003, pp. 97 – 118.  
164 Harell-Bond & Verdirame 2005, p. xiv.  
165 Verdirame (1999), pp.  54,5.  
166 Compare Noll (2003) p. 340: ‘The notion of “Temporary Protection” can be validly described as a state of 
exception imposed on the European refugee regime. Temporary Protection denoted a regime allowing States 
to opt out of ordinary asylum processing by leaving the question of status undetermined.’  
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that refugees ought to be there, not here. And in doing so, it explains why, among the 
three durable solutions to the refugee problem, repatriation or return has always 
taken priority. Moreover, temporary protection reveals, as will be argued in the next 
chapter, that the camp is the hidden fourth durable solution to the refugee 
problem. Though the camp is a glaring disavowal of the aim to afford refugees 
international legal protection, it can nevertheless be traced back to the conceptual 
terms that shape current understanding of the refugee problem, and that has 
directed the international legal response thereto. In the next chapter, I will, 
therefore, focus on the concept of the refugee, arguing that the current conceptual 
understanding is ultimately and entirely inadequate to grasp the nature of the 




















In the previous chapter, I asserted that temporary protection – regardless of the 
question whether it complements, implements or replaces the 1951 Refugee 
Convention – brings out the conceptual master frames that shape the current 
understanding of the refugee problem, as it plays out the assumption that refugees, 
at the end of the day, belong in their home country, not in the country of asylum. 
In this chapter, I will substantiate that claim. I will demonstrate and analyze this 
conceptual pre-understanding that identifies the refugee problem as a problem of de 
facto statelessness. In Chapter Five, I will again return to the issue of de facto 
statelessness, arguing that it fails to grasp the predicament that befalls refugees and 
is therefore inappropriate to direct the legal response to the refugee question. In 
particular, it will be argued that the very concept of de facto statelessness is at the 
root of the perplexities that pertain to the concept of asylum. In the present 
chapter, however, I will demonstrate that by virtue of the concept of de facto 
statelessness, the international refugee protection regime is rooted in the basic 
distinction between here and there. More precisely still, de facto statelessness 
upholds and secures this distinction as it plays out the assumption that refugees do 
not belong here but ought to be there. The refugee, however, shatters this 
distinction, as he is no longer there nor yet here, but is instead nowhere. De facto 
statelessness, however, secrets the refugee’s displacement, veiling that he is indeed 
nowhere. And in doing so it collapses the ‘there’ where the refugee supposedly 
belongs, into the nowhere of the camp, the absolute non-place, where the refugee’s 
displacement, instead of being resolved, continues.  
 
 
2.1 De facto and de jure Statelessness 
Chapter One already spelled out the problem which the international refugee 
protection regime seeks to redress. It does not, as said, seek to solve the problems 
that cause people to flee in the first place. Instead it responds to the predicament 
that befalls refugees upon fleeing. This predicament relates to the lack of legal 
protection the refugee is suffering. Refugees are therefore considered to be a class 
of unprotected persons. The international community responds to this by offering 
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international protection so as to restore the legal person of the refugee and afford 
him protection and rights. 
As to the issue of unprotected persons, the historical background of the 
emergence of the refugee protection regime is edifying. In a letter from 1921 on the 
question of Russian refugees, the International Red Cross expressed the view that 
the lack of any form of protection was the main cause of the distress these refugees 
had to suffer. Also, it expressed awareness that the presence of thousands of 
unprotected persons scattered throughout Europe   constituted an anomaly in 
international law: ‘These people’, the Red Cross Committee stated, ‘are without 
legal protection and without any well-defined legal status. The majority of them are 
without means of subsistence, and one must particularly draw attention to the 
position of the children and the youths amongst them who are growing up in an 
ever-increasing misery without adequate means of education, and who are in 
danger of becoming useless and harmful elements in the Europe of tomorrow ... [It] 
is impossible that, in the 20th century there could be 800,000 men in Europe 
unprotected by any legal organization recognized by international law.’1  
Refugees were referred to as unprotected persons not only because they could 
no longer rely upon their home government to grant them protection, but also 
mainly because they could not invoke protection under international law which was 
premised on the principle of reciprocity between states. The bilateral agreements 
that constituted international law assured that the citizens of state X be respected 
and protected upon their travel to state Y, provided that the citizens of the latter be 
accorded the same treatment upon their arrival in X. If this principle of reciprocity 
was not respected, the alien was likely to be denied access to the territory of a 
foreign state. As Van Panhuys explains, ‘an alien could not lay claim to legal 
protection by virtue of his general status of an alien, but rather by virtue of the fact 
that he was a national of foreign State.’2 The alien was a Gast im Recht, enjoying legal 
protection under international law, provided that his national government will give 
him its backing.3 International law was thus clearly premised on the view that the 
responsibility for the alien lay within his own state of nationality. This gave states 
the right to grant their nationals diplomatic protection in the face of injuries by 
another state in whose territory they remained, based ‘on the notion that “whoever 
ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the state.’4 Vice versa, states had the absolute 
duty to take back their nationals. Indeed, the duty to readmit constituted the basic 
guarantee for international law. 
However, international protection of the alien, contingent upon the fact that his 
home government will give him its backing, was of no avail to the refugee. The 
distinguishing feature of the refugee, after all, was that he could no longer rely upon 
his home government. In a letter from 1949 to the Social and Economic Council, 
the International Refugee organization (IRO) brought the refugee’s exclusion from 
international law to awareness: ‘The refugee is an alien in any and every country to 
which he may go. He does not have the last resort which is always open to the 
                                                  
1 Memorandum From the Comité de la Croix-Rouge at Geneva to the Council of the League of Nations, 
League of Nations Official Journal, March-April 1921, p. 228.  
2  Van Panhuys, H.F.The Rôle of Nationality in International Law, Leiden: Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij, 
Leiden,1959, p. 44.  
3 Cf., Ibid.,  p. 57.  
4 Waas, van L. Nationality Matters. Statelessness under International Law,  Antwerpen: Intersentia 2008. p. 219. 
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“normal alien” --  return to his own country ... Moreover, the refugee is not only an 
alien wherever he goes,  he is also an “unprotected alien” in the sense that he does 
not enjoy the protection of his country of origin. Lacking the protection of his 
country of origin, the refugee does not enjoy a clearly defined status based upon 
the principle of reciprocity as enjoyed by those nationals of those states which 
maintain normal diplomatic relations ... A refugee is an anomaly in international law, 
and it is often impossible to deal with him in accordance with the legal provisions 
designed to apply to aliens who receive assistance from their national authorities.’5 
From the viewpoint of international law, the refugee was, strictly speaking, not 
even an alien, i.e., a foreign national who, by virtue of his nationality, belonged to 
another state. Excluded from the possibility to return home where he could avail 
himself again of state protection, it could no longer be properly said that the 
refugee belonged ‘there’, i.e., in his country of origin. If the refugee was said to 
constitute an anomaly in international law, this was clearly because the refugee 
shattered the very distinction between here and there, which is the concrete 
manifestation of the inside/outside divide by virtue of which a polity limits itself 
over against another. Neither belonging there nor here, the refugee was placed on 
equal footing with the stateless person who does not have a nationality under the 
law of any state, and who is, therefore, destitute of protection.6 In fact, there wasn’t 
even a clear distinction between refugees and stateless persons: Both were classified 
under the common denominator of unprotected persons. Though refugees often 
formally retained their nationality, the international community judged it to be 
inappropriate to still consider them as belonging to a state that seriously impaired, 
afflicted and threatened them. The international community, for example, took this 
position with respect to German Jews under the regime of Hitler. Though still 
regarded as nationals by the national-socialist administration, the international 
community did not consider Jews to be German nationals, as their nationality no 
longer effectively protected them.7 Hence, Weis in his Nationality and Statelessness in 
International Law (1979), argues that it ‘is evidence of the importance attached to 
international protection as an element of nationality that persons deprived of 
protection, i.e., refugees, are frequently classed together with persons destitute of 
nationality, i.e., stateless persons, under the common denomination of unprotected 
persons.’8 
Nonetheless, though refugees were considered to be stateless for technical 
purposes, there was general agreement that the root causes of refugeehood differed 
from the problems causing statelessness. As statelessness is the reverse of 
nationality, its causes are believed to be rather technical and legal in nature. Weis 
broadly enlists the causes of statelessness: ‘A person may either be stateless at birth, 
as a result of the fact that he does not acquire a nationality at birth according to the 
law of any state, or he may become stateless subsequent to birth by losing his 
nationality without acquiring another.’ 9  Refugeehood, by contrast, occurs when 
                                                  
5 Communication from the International Refugee Organization to the Economic and Social Council (1949) as 
cited in Hathaway 2005, pp. 84, 85.  
6 Cf. Weis, P. Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, Alphen aan den Rijn / Germantown: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff International Publishers 1979, p.161.  
7 Cf. Ibid.,  pp. 59, 60.  
8 Ibid., p. 44.  
9 Ibid., pp. 161, 162.  
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persons escape the threat that state authorities exert over their lives and freedom. 
In the classic study, The Status of Refugees in International Law (1966), Grahl-Madsen, 
therefore, holds that as far as refugees are concerned, the lack of protection is the 
symptom of which persecution is the disease: ‘The lack of state protection is not 
relevant unless it is caused by a deep-rooted political controversy between the 
authorities and the individual ... [The] preoccupation with the refugee’s lack of 
protection leads to concerning oneself with ambivalent symptoms rather than with 
the real issue, namely that it is characteristic for a refugee that his relations with the 
authorities of his home country have become the negation of the normal 
relationship between a State and its nationals (and residents).’ 10  Grahl-Madsen 
sums up the argument: ‘Refugees are unprotected as a matter of fact, not as a 
matter of law, as are the stateless.’11 
It has been this line of reasoning that has motivated the distinction between de 
facto and de jure statelessness to develop. De facto statelessness identifies the refugee 
problem, whereas de jure statelessness constitutes what is commonly understood by 
statelessness. De facto statelessness purports to express that the lack of protection is 
a matter of fact, rather than of law. Though the bond of nationality is currently 
broken, ineffective and of no avail to the refugee for reasons of persecution, de facto 
statelessness expresses the assumption that the refugee is, in principle, a national of 
his state. De jure statelessness, by contrast, expresses that a person is nowhere a 
national, as he is left unclaimed by any and every state. Indeed, statelessness reflects 
that there is no single state on earth that could be attributed the legal responsibility 
of protection. 
Apparently, then, there is a clear and obvious distinction between the refugee 
and the stateless person. The distinction was reaffirmed and consolidated by the 
adoption of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and 
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.12 To fully understand this 
ramification and grasp the implications thereof, these two Conventions and their 
drafting history need to be taken into account.  
The difference between the two groups of unprotected persons can perhaps be 
best explained by looking at the technical purposes of the relevant Conventions, 
and the difference in orientation in the way international law deals with these 
respective issues. With respect to refugees, international law responds to a situation 
that comes into being as a consequence of past occurrences in the home country 
that have induced a fear of persecution. With respect to statelessness, by contrast, 
the principle focus of international law is on the problems that cause statelessness 
in order to reduce it and prevent statelessness from occurring in the future. This 
difference in orientation is entrenched in UNHCR’s mandate responsibility 
concerning refugees and stateless persons. In its Action to Address Statelessness. A 
Strategy Note (2010), in which UNHCR limits itself to the issue of de jure 
statelessness while stating that the problem of de facto statelessness is to be dealt 
with on a further occasion, it is explicated that ‘[i]n contrast to the UNHCR’s 
international refugee protection mandate, a principle focus of the stateless mandate 
                                                  
10 Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Leiden: Sijthoff, 1966, pp. 98, 99.  
11 Cf., Ibid., p.97.  
12 Hereafter collectively referred to as the Statelessness Conventions. 
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is to prevent statelessness from occurring in the first place.’13 This difference in 
orientation is constituted by the fact that statelessness – the reverse of nationality – 
is considered to be a legal and technical problem caused by gaps in nationality 
legislation, lack of access to birth registration, failures to issue identity documents14 
and problems resulting from state succession.15 The perception of the legal and 
technical nature of the problem is reflected in the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness. 
But of course, until matters of nationality are settled so as to resolve the 
predicament of stateless persons, they are in need of protection. The 1954 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless persons aims to afford such 
protection in the absence of nationality. Whereas there is hardly any difficulty in 
stating the difference between the refugee and the stateless problem on the basis of 
the 1951 and the 1961 Conventions, things become more complicated with respect 
to the 1954 Convention due to its close relation to the Refugee Convention. In fact, 
the issue of statelessness was originally intended to be dealt with in an additional 
protocol to the Refugee Convention which would allow for a mutatis mutandis 
application of the provisions of the Convention to the stateless. However, during 
the second conference of plenipotentiaries in 1954, convened by the Social and 
Economic Council, it became clear that a protocol wouldn’t be an appropriate 
document.16  
There were, no doubt, all sorts of practical reasons for this; the most obvious 
being that not all states who ratified the Refugee Convention participated in the 
second conference, whereas states not party to the Convention intended to sign the 
protocol. But the main reason why a formally and materially independent 
Convention for the stateless was created eventually was derived from the question 
of scope: Which persons were to be covered by an international instrument that 
afforded rights and protection to the stateless? It turned out that a clear 
demarcation between the refugee and the stateless person was of utmost 
importance. But it proved to be a difficult task to draw the line. 
As Nehemiah Robinson’s influential interpretation of the 1954 Stateless 
Convention and its history shows, the first question with respect to scope arose 
from the fact that many refugees were also stateless. Indeed, article 1A (2) of the 
Refugee Convention that provides for the refugee definition explicitly includes a 
person without nationality who, owing to a well- founded fear of being persecuted, 
                                                  
13 UNHCR ‘Action to Address Statelessness: A Strategy Note’, International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 22, p. 
304.  
14 Clearly, these causes of statelessness are of direct effect to immigrants who remain within a state without 
any legal status. Though Noll does not explicitly deal with the issue of statelessness, his reflections on the 
failure of human rights to protect illegal immigrants gives insight in the problems illegal immigrants 
encounter, and the misery they suffer (Cf., Noll, G. ‘Why Human Rights Fail to Protect Undocumented 
Migrants’, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 12 (2010) pp. 241-272). As estimates over the number of 
immigrants illegally present in Europe run high, it is clear that statelessness is not a problem of developing 
and undemocratic countries, but that Europe has its own stateless population, as well (Cf., Van Waas, L. ‘The 
Children of Irregular Migrants: A Stateless Generation?’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 25 (2007) 
pp. 437-458).  
15 These are, of course, the apparent causes of statelessness. There is general agreement that discrimination is 
more often than not a key factor in causing statelessness. Cf., UNHCR ‘Action to Address Statelessness: A 
Strategy Note’, International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 22, p. 305.  
16 For the history and interpretation of the 1954 Convention, see: Nehemiah Robinson, Convention Relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons. Its History and Interpretation, Published by World Jewish Congress 1955, Reprinted 
by UNHCR in 1997. Available at http://www.unhcr.org 
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cannot return to the country of habitual residence. This inclusion expresses a clear 
awareness that statelessness adds to the risk of a person becoming a refugee 
(refuting, as a matter of fact, that statelessness is a mere technical and legal issue). It 
is important to stress, however, that if a stateless person is granted protection on 
the basis of the Refugee Convention, this is for reasons of a well-founded fear of 
persecution. Put differently: Even though a stateless person can be a refugee – and 
many refugees are, in fact, stateless17 -- he is not a refugee on account of being 
stateless. This is crucial, as it reflects that statelessness is not essential to the refugee 
definition. As Simpson puts it: ‘Not all stateless people are refugees, nor are all 
refugees technically stateless. Statelessness is not the essential quality of a refugee, 
though many refugees are in fact stateless.’18  Consequently, it was decided that 
persons coming within the ambit of the 1954 Stateless Convention were not to be 
covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, during the discussion of the 
definition of statelessness, the question whether or not persons who have not lost 
their nationality but refused to avail themselves of the protection of their state of 
origin was back on the table. Eventually, agreement was reached that the Refugee 
Convention already expressed the extent to which the international community was 
willing to protect those who were stateless de facto. To solve the quandary about the 
definition, the secretary-general of the second conference referred to a definition of 
statelessness in the report, Nationality, including Statelessness, by a Special Rapporteur 
of the International Law Commission. The definition read as follows: ‘Stateless 
persons in the legal sense of the term are persons who are not considered as 
nationals by any state according to its law.’19 According to Nehemiah Robinson, 
this ‘definition clearly referred to de jure stateless persons only, because if a person 
was only stateless de facto he was still considered a national by a state.’20   
But the question as to which persons the Stateless Convention was to apply still 
remained somewhat unresolved, as is evidenced by the fact that the Convention in 
its final act (after a long debate whether it should be included in the first definition 
article) recommended states to also extend the benefits of the Convention to 
persons who are stateless de facto.21 
So, despite the material and formal independence of the 1951 and 1954 
Conventions the refugee and stateless person are not mutually exclusive. This is 
most clear from the fact that legal responsibility for the stateless begins with 
refugees who are stateless (article 1(A) 2 of the 1951 Convention) and that the 
Convention that responds to the problem of the absence of nationality includes a 
facultative clause to extend its provisions to persons who are stateless de facto. In its 
Recommendation on the Acquisition by Refugees of the Nationality of their Country of Residence 
(1969), The Council of Europe seems to refer to this clause. In consideration 9 (b) 
(ii), the Council recommends states ‘ to treat de facto stateless refugees as though 
they were stateless de jure.’22  
                                                  
17 Cf., Darling, K. ‘Protection of Stateless Persons in International Asylum and Refugee Law’, International 
Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 21 (2009), pp. 742-767. 
18 Simpson, as cited in Grahl-Madsen 1966, p. 77.  
19 Cited in Nehemiah Robinson 1997 p. 8.  
20 Ibid, p. 8 
21 Cf. idem pp. 8, 9.  
22 Council of Europe Recommendation 564 (1969). In its Recommendation on Certain Aspects of the Acquisition of 
Nationality (1973), no. 696, the Council again points out that ‘in addition to legal provisions concerning de jure 
statelessness, adequate measures require to be taken for those who have no effective nationality, i.e. who are 
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In this respect, another observation can be made. De facto statelessness, recall, 
relates to the lack of protection the individual is suffering, despite the fact that he 
or she formally retains his or her nationality. The refugee, in other words, suffers 
from an ineffective bond of nationality. Albeit currently broken, de facto 
statelessness thus presupposes the individual’s legal attachment to his or her own 
country. The upshot thereof is that the relation between the individual and the state 
of nationality is not made irrelevant. According to Grahl-Madsen, however, this is 
not entirely correct from a legal point of view. Recall that diplomatic protection 
was predicated on the view that the alien enjoys protection, not because of rights 
that accrue to him as an individual, but because he is a national of a foreign state. 
As ill-treatment of an alien also harms the state to which he belongs, the latter is 
justified to act and intervene on behalf of its citizens in a foreign territory. Suppose, 
Grahl-Madsen says, that the refugee’s nationality still matters. This would imply 
that his former home government would still be justified to act on his behalf.23 As 
we saw, however, at the beginning of this chapter, the refugee constituted an 
anomaly in international law, as he was excluded from diplomatic protection. 
Accordingly, article 7 of the Refugee Convention exempts refugees from the 
principle of reciprocity that, recall, was the key principle of protection of aliens 
under international law. Though article 7 postulates that refugees shall be accorded 
the same treatment as aliens, the underlying assumption is not that the refugee 
equals the alien, but instead, the stateless person. As Grahl-Madsen argues: ‘The 
drafters of the Convention on the Status of Refugees were of the opinion that the 
formal nationality that some refugees possessed was ineffective, as the refugees 
could not in anyway benefit from it ...Article 7, dealing with the exemption from 
reciprocity, further evidenced the fact that recipient states were expected to 
assimilate fully those refugees possessing a formal nationality along with those who 
were stateless.’24 
Grahl-Madsen takes the argument a step further. It is not inconceivable, he 
argues, that a refugee avails himself of diplomatic protection again; for example, 
when his state of origin issues him a passport. But this can have an adverse effect 
upon refugee status, as the asylum country can hold that the passport is proof of 
the regained protection by the refugee’s country of origin. Grahl-Madsen reminds 
that diplomatic protection is only relevant in the international sphere and is not in 
and of itself a guarantee that internal protection is available as well.25 For this very 
reason, Grahl-Madsen argues that refugee recognition should occasion the making 
irrelevant of the refugee’s former nationality: ‘States of asylum are now realizing 
that their refugees may become long-term visitors. The refugees, for their part, fear 
their states of nationality and seek protection from their new home. International 
refugee law has proved slow to deal with the conflicts governments face, as exiled 
citizens, still nominally “protected” by their home state, seek to adjust to their state 
of asylum. Refugee law must clarify the role that the state of nationality should play 
                                                                                                                     
stateless de facto (refugees)’. In the light of this, the Council recommends states to ‘to introduce provisions 
whereby, in the case of de facto statelessness (ineffective nationality), the absence of an authorisation required 
under the national law of another State would cease to be an obstacle to naturalisation in member States after 
a given period.’  
23 Cf., Grahl-Madsen 1966, p. 98. 
24 Grahl-Madsen 2001, p. 335.  
25 Cf., also Van Panhuys 1959,  p. 161. 
52                                          The Concept of the Refugee 
 
once a refugee has fled it. This article proposes a norm of international refugee law 
wherein the state of origin, by breaking its ties with a refugee, loses any right to 
“protect” or act on behalf of the refugee.’26 Clearly, the claimed irrelevance of the 
refugee’s former nationality also has its bearing on the issue of asylum and the 
refugee’s integration within the host state. I will return to that in Chapter Five. 
However, notwithstanding the alliance between the refugee and the stateless 
person, the chief difference between them still holds. This difference, as intimated 
already, is rooted in the distinction between de facto and de jure statelessness and 
finds expression in the widely held belief that statelessness is not essential to the 
refugee dilemma. 
This, no doubt, has caused the distinction between de facto and de jure 
statelessness, a prevalent theme during the years following and preceding the 
Refugee Convention, to recede into the background. But with the recent and 
seminal study on statelessness by Laura Van Waas, which she presents in Nationality 
Matters. Statelessness under International Law (2008), the distinction came into view 
again. What is striking in her argument is a profound understanding of the 
importance – both in a legal and anthropological sense – of nationality. This 
enables Van Waas to fully bring to awareness what the absence of nationality 
amounts to for those individuals whose lives are destitute of protection. However, 
it is this very same profound understanding of why nationality matters, that enables 
me to take Van Waas’ argument beyond the issue of statelessness and take issue 
with the alleged distinction between de facto and de jure statelessness. 
Though Van Waas’ academic concern is clearly with the stateless, she carefully 
documents the correlation between the phenomena of refugeehood and 
statelessness.27 Putting forward impressive empirical data, she demonstrates that 
statelessness is an important factor in producing mass displacement,28 while at the 
same time showing that refugees are often at risk of becoming stateless. 29  
Nonetheless, she retains the strict division between de facto and de jure statelessness. 
Commenting on the above cited letter from IRO, she argues: ‘This dire 
predicament indeed befalls the refugee, since the factual situation in the country of 
origin prevents him from returning home to exercise his rights as a national or 
calling in the assistance of his home country. However, where the stateless are 
concerned, this fate is sealed in legal terms – only to be resolved through the 
attribution or restoration of the bond of nationality.’30 
The picture that unfolds from Van Waas’ argument is that the refugee is a non-
national in the country of asylum; the plight of the stateless person is that he is a 
non-national everywhere. The sticky situation of the refugee is that the factual 
situation in his home country prevents him to return; the quandary of the stateless 
person is that he has no where to return. The refugee is suffering from an 
ineffective bond of nationality; the stateless person has no nationality at all. Indeed, 
                                                  
26 Grahl-Madsen 2001, p. 320.  
27 Cf.  Van Waas (2007) pp. 437-458. 
28 Cf., Van Waas 2008, p. 13.  
29 Cf., Ibid., , p. 179. Compare also Ibid.,  pp. 416,417: ‘[W]e discovered a connection between statelessness 
and displacement, as well as the fact that the possession of an unlawful or ambiguous immigration status to 
the creation and perpetuation of statelessness.’ 
30 Ibid., p. 225.  
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the lack of nationality, Van Waas holds, is not essential to the refugee definition 
which, she reminds, ‘relies on a question of fact rather than of law.’31 
Van Waas is right to the extent where the application of the refugee definition is 
at issue. As the refugee’s protection need results from a factual situation in which 
the authorities are persecuting the individual, or are unable or unwilling to protect 
him against the aggression of non-state actors, the refugee’s nationality must be 
established in order to identify the persecutors. With a view to the conferral (or 
refusal) of refugee status, there is no way of denying the relevance of the refugee’s 
nationality, or, to put it in more general terms, of his relation to his own country. 
But the important question to be raised, of course, is whether de facto statelessness, 
which presupposes the continuing connection between the refugee and his own 
country, even though this relation is currently perverted or severed, adequately 
grasps the fundamental dilemma the refugee experiences and for which he seeks 
international redress. I hold that it does not. The sharp-edged division between de 
facto and de jure statelessness which transcends the formal refugee definition, 
effectively denies that the refugee, like the stateless person, has no where to return. 
De facto statelessness, I will argue veils the refugee’s displacement32 and hence is 
part of the cause of the ongoing misery refugees are suffering in today’s world. 
In order to explain, the role and function of nationality in international law 
needs to be taken into account.   
Generally speaking, nationality establishes the relation between the individual 
and the state responsible for granting him or her rights and protection. 
Consequently, nationality is the precondition for the enjoyment of rights, and has 
as such been coined as the right to have rights.33 Van Panhuys, for example, even 
wonders whether it is consistent and reasonable to enlist the right to nationality 
among human rights (article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) 
provided that the enjoyment of all other human rights is predicated on 
nationality.34 As nationality establishes the relation between the individual and the 
state, nationality, according to Weis, is an element of order allocating individuals to a 
state.35 In his philosophical exploration of the spatiality of the law, Hans Lindahl 
grasps with great clarity the philosophical concern with respect to nationality : ‘to 
                                                  
31 Ibid., p. 21.  
32 Though Lissa Malkki does not elaborate on the concept of de facto statelessness, she does argue that the 
current regime of international refugee protection veils the refugee’s displacement. Cf., Malkki, L., ‘Refugees 
and Exile: from refugee studies to the national order of things’, Annual Review of Anthropology, vol. (1995b), p. 
516. 
33 Arendt invokes the notion of ‘a right to have rights’ in her influential discussion of the refugee question in 
The Origins of Totalitarianism. To be sure, Arendt herself does not take the right to have rights to denote the 
right to nationality. As Van Waas points out, US Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren is said to have 
rendered nationality as the right to have rights. His description of the individual’s plight upon loss of 
nationality is certainly reminiscent of Arendt’s reflections: ‘The total destruction of an individual’s status in 
organized society [that] strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community. 
His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to find himself.’ (US Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Earl Warren as cited in Van Waas  p. 218.)  Aleinikoff suggests that Chief Justice Warren 
actually quotes Hannah Arendt (Cf.,  Aleinikoff, T. ‘Comments on the Rights Of Others’, European Journal of 
Political Theory, vol. 6 (2007), p. 426). I will discuss the arendtian notion of a right to have rights in more detail 
in Chapter Three.  
34 Cf. Van Panhuys 1959, pp. 219-221.  
35 Cf. Weis 1959, p. 53. 
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ascribe rights and obligations is also always to assign a legal place to persons and vice versa.’36 
Nationality, in short, emplaces the individual, informing us where he or she ought to be 
and properly belongs.  
The absence of nationality is, therefore, tantamount to the lack of a legal place 
where a person ought to be and properly belongs. Van Waas drives at a similar 
conclusion by focusing on one pparticular aspect of nationality, to wit, the right to 
freedom of movement. The right to freedom of movement, she argues, is a 
function of nationality, as it entails (1) the right to re-enter one’s own country, (2) 
the right to remain, and (3) the right to leave37. Echoing Arendt, who cautions that 
refugees and the stateless are only, in appearance, free to   move, as their ‘free’ 
movement ‘gives them no right to residence’ 38 , Van Waas pins down the 
fundamental dilemma of the stateless (to which she, contra Arendt, limits her 
argument): ‘This fact signals a grave potential difficulty for the stateless: no 
nationality, so no automatic right to (re)enter or reside anywhere. With this 
observation in mind, the right to international free movement for the stateless is 
not only relevant to the ability to “vote with one’s feet” … but indeed reveals a 
more basic dilemma: where do they have a right to live?’39 
On account of the notion of de facto statelessness, the answer to that very same 
question seems relatively simple for refugees. As their lack of protection is 
considered to be a brute but not a legal fact, refugees have a right to live in their 
own country. Indeed, driven to the limit, de facto statelessness assumes that refugees, 
at the end of the day, ought to be there, i.e., in their own country, not here, where 
they are out of place and do not belong. 
Surely, this ties in with the self-understanding of some refugees for whom their 
belonging in the abandoned country is a matter of justice. Invariably, the 
Palestinian’s insistence on their right to return comes to mind. I’m not denying that 
refugees themselves might decide or wish to return40, nor do I intend to indict 
return as such. What interests me are the veiling effects of the concept of de facto 
statelessness. And what worries me is the primacy, both on a practical and 
theoretical level, of return in matters of asylum. These will be the topic of the next 
section. The purpose of critically analyzing de facto statelessness is not to haul up 
return as a durable solution to the refugee problem but to deprive it of its 
predominance which is taken for granted today. 
 
 
2.2 The Spatiality of Law: Belonging Here, There, Nowhere 
 
Recall that the very notion of de facto statelessness aims to capture the plight that 
befalls refugees upon fleeing and for which they seek international redress. If, 
                                                  
36 Lindahl, H. K. ‘Finding Place for Freedom, Security and Justice. The European Union’s Claim to Territorial 
Unity.’, European Law Review, vol. 29 (2004), p. 478.  
37 Cf. Van Waas, 2008, pp. 240-248.  
38  Arendt, H. The Origins of Totalitarianism, San Diego/New York/London: Harcourt Inc., 1969, p. 296. 
Hereafter referred to as OT. 
39 Van Waas 2008, p. 246.  
40 The term repatriation applies in variety of situations. According to Zieck, the repatriation of refugees to 
their country of origin is ‘the one instance of repatriation that is invariably qualified by the adjective 
‘voluntary.’ (Zieck, M. UNHCR and Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees. A Legal Analysis, PhD diss., Tilburg 
University 1997, p. 2). 
Chapter 2  55 
 
however, the role and function of nationality are taken into account, the inadequacy 
of de facto statelessness becomes manifest. Nationality, Weis reminds us, is an 
element of order as it allocates the individual to a state responsible for his or her 
protection. Nationality, in other words, calls to mind that rights and duties do not 
just accrue to the human being, but are instead contingent upon a status that 
identifies and emplaces the individual. The one who is forced to live outside the 
bonds of nationality therefore forfeits a legal place where he can enjoy and exercise 
his rights and freedoms. Indeed, on the understanding that law emplaces human 
beings in terms of rights and duties, the refugee loses his abode. That is, he loses the 
place where he abides by the law and where he is properly dwelling.41  
De facto statelessness rightly captures the lack of protection the refugee is 
suffering. But qualifying this lack as a brute fact, it fails to see that this lack is 
tantamount to the loss of an own place which is legally warranted. Indeed, in 
common parlance it is said that the refugee flees his own country. If I, as a Dutch 
citizen, travel the world, I move from place to place. But the refugee, by crossing 
an international border, does not, for that matter, move within a common world. 
Upon his arrival in the targeted host state, the refugee is not emplaced, i.e. is not 
where he by virtue of his nationality ought to be. But since his nationality is no 
longer of any avail to him, the refugee can neither be said to be misplaced. Neither 
emplaced, nor misplaced, the refugee rather lacks a place of his own. If refugees are 
indeed said to be displaced persons, their displacement should be taken to denote 
this legal lack of an own place. It is in exactly these terms that Lindahl understands 
displacement: ‘[I]ndividuals who are not in-legal-place … are not simply misplaced 
in virtue of not being where they ought to be; instead they are displaced, that is to say, 
they claim a legal place of their own for which there is no place within the 
distribution of places made available by a region.’ 42  In Chapter Five it will be 
argued that the claim to asylum must be understood as a claim to an own place. For 
now it suffices to say that the desperate experience of refugeehood is to belong 
nowhere in this world. That the refugee, upon crossing an international border, 
belongs nowhere in the legal sense, affects him in every aspect of his life. He 
cannot find shelter in his private existence against this legal aberration (the point 
will be further discussed in Chapter Three where the ‘right to have rights’ is 
elaborated). Even if the refugee were to settle spontaneously in another country 
and grow social and economic attachments there, then this very fact of social and 
economical belonging does not protect him against the legal fact of belonging 
nowhere as he would live under the constant threat of detention and deportation.43 
The refugee who arrives at the borders of the potential host state certainly 
comes from outside. But the refugee’s outside is not a foreign state, positioned 
                                                  
41 Cf. also Lindahl (2006), p. 887. 
42 Ibid.,  pp. 888, 889.  
43 On the specific issue of detaining and deporting refugees who spontaneously settled in host countries see 
Malkki, L. Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press 1995a, p. 263. A similar argument can be developed with respect to 
undocumented immigrants. Even though they certainly constitute an important work force, this does not 
seem to warrant any form of legal protection. According to Noll, the undocumented immigrant ‘is socially 
and legally embedded in the oikos.’ (Noll (2010), p. 263). But as Noll continues to argue, any ‘move to 
vindicate human rights under the CMW [Migrant Workers Convention] with the host state may be countered 
by expulsion, any move to vindicate labour-related rights with the employer may be responded to with the 
threat of informing the authorities of the irregular presence of the migrant in question.’ (ibid,. p. 257).  
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over against the receiving state. That is, the refugee’s outside cannot be reduced to 
a qualified and determined ‘there’ (a foreign country, a different state). Indeed, the 
refugee is not an alien or a foreigner. Rather, he is a stranger in the strong sense of 
the word on account of his displacement. The decennia preceding the 1951 
Refugee Convention expressed a clear awareness of this. When, recall, in 1949, the 
Social and Economic Council was called upon to define the refugee problem, it was 
argued that the refugee was an alien in each and every country he went to. Worse 
still, he was not, strictly speaking, an alien, as the alien’s option of last resort, i.e., 
return home, was not open to him. Considered to be an anomaly in international 
law, the refugee really was a stranger, as he fell outside the distribution of places 
that made up international legal order. But also recall that the distinction between 
de facto and de jure statelessness was not as clear cut then as it is today. 
As a refugee44 one does not register in any legal order. The predicate de facto 
statelessness is precisely meant to register those who do not register anywhere. 
However, this does not unequivocally entail that they register after all, for example 
in a supra-national legal order, as is sometimes believed. By referring to those who 
do not register, the supra-national legal order can always retreat to a mere 
reconfirmation that they do not register, without any normative implications. 
Indeed, the predicate de facto statelessness brings some veiling effects to bear upon 
the refugee question. Perceiving the lack of protection to be a mere factual matter, 
de facto statelessness roots the international refugee protection regime in the basic 
distinction between here and there. This distinction is one manifestation of the 
inside/outside divide that is constitutive for democratic legal order. Indeed, 
without taking up a place here, which a polity recognizes as its own place as it is 
separated from foreign places beyond the border, the inside/outside divide would 
be incomprehensible. As long as each individual has a place of its own within the 
distribution of places that make up order, the distinctions between here and there, 
own and foreign properly function to delimit an inside over against an outside. 45 
Simply put: We, the members of this particular polity, belong here, in this place we 
deem to be our own, while non-members, i.e., the others, belong there, that is, in a 
foreign country, a different state. Aware of the fact that violence, repression and 
war force people to live outside their country of origin, de facto statelessness 
nevertheless adheres to this simple scheme and bears out the presupposition that 
we live in a common world where each individual has a place of its own. De facto 
statelessness thus seems to provide the correctives for the refugee’s ‘misplacement’ 
in the asylum country, where he does not properly belong but only serves time so 
to speak.  
However, the veiling effects of de facto statelessness can no longer be ignored. 
For it can only be consistently argued that someone does not belong ‘here’ if to the 
‘here’ a determined and qualified there corresponds. The refugee, however, disrupts 
this correspondence. He disrupts, that is, the binary qualifications grids of the ‘here’ 
and ‘there’ which are constitutive for the common world we live in. De facto 
statelessness keeps this disruption in check so to speak. Yet the disruptive force of 
                                                  
44 Note that the argument follows the refugee after his flight and before his arrival in the asylum state. The 
usage of the word ‘refugee’ does not, therefore, refer to a person recognised as such by the conferral of 
refugee status.  
45 For the following analysis of the relation between emplacement, misplacement and displacement, I am 
highly indebted to Lindahl.  
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refugee movements becomes manifest whenever asylum policies exclusively aim at 
return and, in particular, when return ‘home’ proves to be impracticable or 
impossible. 46 For, then it becomes clear that the ‘there’ is no longer a qualified 
somewhere (a foreign country, a different state) determined over against a 
particular ‘here’. On the contrary, and quite literally, the ‘there’ where the refugee 
supposedly belongs becomes a ‘no matter where, as long as it is not here.’  
This is quite an adequate formula to capture a regime of temporary protection 
as discussed in the previous chapter. Indeed, with respect to temporary protection 
one should not be put off with the temporary nature of protection as its alleged 
novelty. The novelty of temporary protection is, rather, that it puts into practice the 
conceptual pre-understanding that refugees do not belong here but ‘there.’ If it is 
offered in affluent Western countries, temporary protection is contingent upon the 
seclusion and exception of refugees from host societies, lest they not integrate and 
take up a place. For, if anything is likely to reduce the chances that refugees are 
willing to return ‘home’, it is their integration in host societies. But things become 
all the more precarious, as temporary protection figures in a discourse that seeks to 
disconnect refugee protection from immigration. If return ‘home’ then  proves to 
be impossible, refugees are at risk of being indefinitely ‘held’ in ‘settlements’ or 
‘safe areas’ that are excepted from the normal order of societies that ‘host’ refugees 
upon their territory. In his incisive analysis of current debates on temporary 
protection, Gregor Noll depicts what happens if under a regime of temporary 
protection neither of the three durable solutions (i.e., return, resettlement or 
integration) is available: ‘Consider a situation where a refugee… finds that all the 
resettlement quota are exhausted, local integration is unavailable, and voluntary 
repatriation inconceivable due to a persistent risk in her country of origin. Given 
that Temporary Protection Centres are conceived as closed centres, such a refugee 
would be confined to indefinite detention. The same would apply to a person 
whose claim was rejected … but who cannot be returned to his or her home 
country for whatever reason that is beyond the person’s control.’47 
Indeed, the current practice of sheltering refugees in camps administered by 
UNHCR and other NGO’s gives a pretty good idea what a regime of temporary 
protection in the region of origin comes down to. Temporary regional protection, 
as well as refugee camps, both share in the same assumptions: 1) that the facts and 
circumstances that necessitated protection won’t prevail and come to an end within 
a reasonable period of time, and 2) that refugees belong in their home country. As 
Harell-Bond and Verdirame put it: ‘UNHCR’s promotion of repatriation as the 
                                                  
46 To be sure, Van Waas is well aware of the fact that in numerous cases returning refugees is unfeasible. But 
she seems to limit her argument to refugees who are also stateless: Compare Van Waas 2009, p. 247: ‘[T]he 
fact of statelessness commonly presents an irreconcilable obstacle to eventual repatriation of refugees and 
other such displaced persons.’  
47 Noll, G. (2003), p.334. With respect to the impossibility of returning failed asylum seekers, Kate Darling 
casts the lack of regard for statelessness within asylum procedures as a grave failure of the system. Compare 
Darling (2009), pp. 764, 765: ‘Without a presumption that statelessness implies discrimination amounting to 
persecution, making a case for this at the removal stage is very unlikely. .. The discussion about what removal 
means for stateless persons simply does not take place and existing international human rights obligations are 
not reflected upon. Underlying all removal discussions in cases of statelessness is the sticky question: what do 
we do with people who are not refugees, yet, who have no state willing to accept them on their territory 
either as temporary residents or as citizens? In some cases, failed stateless claimants just wait in the 
destination country, under the constant threat of being deported one day, uncertain of their present or future 
status.’  
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best ‘durable solution’ to the refugee problem has consolidated the policy of 
encampment, on the grounds that refugees are temporary.’48 With respect to the 
temporary nature of the problem, which supposedly legitimizes practices with a 
view to return home, they argue: ‘By viewing countries of asylum as ‘waiting rooms’ 
before repatriation, UNHCR has virtually given up on integration, choosing instead 
to coerce refugees to the margins of host societies and to segregate them in 
camps … repatriation is premised on the view that refugees have an eternal and 
visceral tie with the country of origin – ‘home’ – the place to which they will always 
belong.’49 
Yet, the slogan ‘There is no place like home’, adopted by UNHCR to celebrate 
return,50 acquires a wholly different meaning against the backdrop of the statistics 
provided by UNHCR itself. These statistics show that for refugees there is indeed 
no place like home. In its memoranda, Protracted Refugee Situations (2004), UNHCR 
estimated that the average duration of major refugee crises has increased from 9 
years in 1993, to 17 years in 2003.51 UNHCR further estimates that over six million 
refugees find themselves in such a protracted refugee situation. The US Committee 
for Refugees and Immigrants estimates this number to be over ten million, the 
world’s most protracted situation of Palestinian refugees not included.52 Temporary 
regional protection is likely to increase already existent protracted situations ‘in 
which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. 
Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social 
and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile.’53 Hence, Harell-
Bond, on the basis of her own long-term research in refugee camps, concludes: 
‘The main context in which the distribution of internationally-funded assistance to 
refugees takes place is the refugee camp. Despite their ostensible ‘temporary’ nature, 
these settings have become the main living environment for many refugees for 
years and, in some cases, for more than one generation.’54 
The ethnography of injustices and sufferings in refugee camps refute UNHCR’s 
claim that the lives of refugees are not immediately at risk in refugee camps. 
Refugee camps are breeding places of diseases and epidemics, 55  of ethnic and 
sexual violence,56 and are often attacked by armed groups from outside.57 In the 
                                                  
48 Harell-Bond & Verdirame 2005, p. 272.  
49 Ibid., p. 335.  
50 Cf., Ibid., p. 339. Compare also Anker, D. Fitzpatrick, D. & Shacknove, A. ‘Crisis and Cure: A reply to 
Hathaway/Neve and Schuck’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 11 (1998), pp. 302: ‘One of the most serious 
flaws in a reformulation of refugee law to emphasize temporary protection is the fact that most refugee crises 
are enduring. It is the exception rather than the rule that the causes of flight can be resolved within the 
approximately five-year period that defines the outer bonds of a temporary protection regime meeting basic 
standards of humane treatment.’  
51  Cf., UNHCR, Protracted Refugee Situations, p. 151. Doc.No.EC/54/SC/CRP.14, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org 
52 Statistics available at http://www.refugees.org/data/wrs/04/pdf/38-56.pdf. 
53 UNHCR, Protracted Refugee Situations, p. 150.  
54 Harell-Bond, B. ‘Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees be Humane?’, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 24, 
(2002) p. 56. 
55 Cf., Damme, W. Van. ‘Do Refugees Belong in Camps? Experiences from Goma and Guinea’, The Lancet, 
vol. 346 (1995), pp. 360-362. 
56 Cf., Harell-Bond & Verdirame 2005; Malkki, L. Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology 
among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1995. 
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Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, Harell-Bond and Verdirame have recorded the 
development of what has been called the buufis syndrome. Buufis (which stems from 
Somali language) refers to a person who tries to escape the camp by repeatedly 
applying for resettlement to the camp authorities: ‘In fact, buufis is a kind of disease 
spread through verbal expressions. It can have an advantage, because when 
someone goes to the UNHCR everyday consecutively, he may be given 
resettlement. But, it can also be life- threatening because if the person recognizes 
that he cannot go overseas, he may kill himself, starve himself or simply run 
mad.’ 58  Massive violations of basic rights and the violence committed with 
impunity against refugees are among the plethora of the miseries of camp-life. 
Harell-Bond and Verdirame pin down the glut of injustices and sufferings inside 
refugee camps when they explain the methodology of their long-term research on 
sheltering refugees in camps which they present in Rights in Exile. Janus Faced 
Humanitarianism: ‘We have focused on violations of human rights rather than on the 
instances in which human rights may have been respected, not with the aim of 
casting a negative light on governments or on UNHCR, but because as a matter of 
fact no refugee enjoyed his or her rights when confined to a camp/settlement.’59 
Importantly, the lack of protection and the failure to afford refugee rights inside 
camps can be brought back to the violation of one specific fundamental human 
right. As Harell-Bond and Verdirame argue: ‘We found evidence of violations of 
the full catalogue of human rights. Whether in a local camp or a settlement, 
refugees were effectively segregated – prevented from enjoying freedom of 
movement, a fundamental right upon which the enjoyment of other rights is 
contingent.’60 
Keeping in mind that freedom of movement is a function of nationality, the 
camp which curtails refugees in this specific fundamental right, is the living proof 
of the fundamental dilemma refugees are facing: Where do they have a right to live? 
The concept of de facto statelessness, which obscures that this is the calamity 
refugees are exposed to from the moment they cross an international border, is 
therefore far from innocent. Veiling the refugee’s displacement, de facto statelessness, 
instead of identifying the refugee problem blurs what is at stake. 61 Expressing that 
refugees, at the end of the day, belong ‘there’, it fails to see that the problem for 
which the refugee seeks international redress is that he is nowhere in a legal sense.62  
Yet, the refugee’s displacement is bound to recur. For at the limit of de facto 
statelessness the camp appears. Indeed, the ‘there’ where the refugee supposedly 
belongs is a no- longer existing homeland that collapses into the nowhere of the 
                                                                                                                     
57 Compare Anker, D. Fitzpatrick, D. & Shacknove, A (1998), pp. 300, 301: ‘Many refugee emergencies arise 
in situations of historic enmity among neighbors: in such circumstances, a regional solution may aggravate the 
protection challenge rather than moderate it.’  
58 Cindy Horst as cited in Harell-Bond & Verdirame 2005, p. 286.  
59 Ibid., p. xiv.  
60 Ibid., pp., 15, 16.  
61 The glaring lack of awareness with respect to the refugee’s displacement is sardonically illustrated by the 
practice of return as practiced by UNHCR. On November 26, 2010, UNHCR proudly posted a tweet on 
twitter about a young refugee smiling into the camera. The tweet included a link to the referred picture. The 
subscription to the photo read as follows: ‘Born in Exile. A young Afghan refugee born in Pakistan, smiles 
for the camera in the government-funded township of Sheikh Mesri on the outskirts of Jalalabad. The girl is 
part of the community that left Pakistan in 2007, for the eastern province of Nangarhar. These returnees have 
no land and they are living in temporary accommodation. UNHCR is trying to secure land for them.’  
62 Cf., also Lindahl (2004), p. 481.  
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camp. As Malkki argues in ‘News from Nowhere’: ‘The very notion of 
displacement implies emplacement, a ‘proper place’ of belonging, and this place has 
long been assumed to be a home in a territorial, sovereign, nation-state. The 
specific device of the refugee camp also operates in intimate relation to the logic of 
the national order of things. The camp presents itself, socially and juridically, as a 
‘space of exception’, and as an emergency measure, and is yet startling routine and 
familiar.’63 It is time, therefore, to see what the camp really is. It is not merely 
something to which we resort for practical reasons in times of emergency.  On the 
contrary. The camp is the ultimate result of the conceptual framing of the refugee 
problem as a problem of de facto statelessness.64 The camp, I submit, is the hidden 
fourth solution to the refugee problem.65 
As to the recurrence of the refugee’s displacement, it is important to keep in 
mind that camps are located outside the normal jurisdiction of the host state that 
gives space upon its territory to construct refugee camps. ‘Host’ states abdicate 
nearly all facets of protection to UNHCR and its implementing partners, the 
corollary being that UNHCR acts as a de facto sovereign. As already argued in 
Chapter One, this constitutes a grave difficulty for refugees, as the decision on their 
legal status is suspended with the effect that their legal status remains undetermined. 
Indeed, in Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life, the Italian philosopher, Giorgio 
Agamben, defines the camp as a space in which the state of exception, i.e., the 
temporary suspension of the validity of the law in times of emergency, materializes 
and becomes permanent. As a space of exception, the camp is taken outside the 
normal legal order and appears as the absolute non-place. 66  The camp thus 
announces the recurrences of the refugee’s strangeness and anomalousness, as it 
gives a spatial arrangement to displacement. Put differently: The refugee’s 
displacement, i.e., the fact that he is neither here nor there but nowhere, 
materializes into the nowhere of the camp. The camp – whether it is located in the 
region of origin, at the borders of Europe, or comes under the friendly face of the 
reception centre 67  -- signals that the refugee can nowhere be emplaced again, 
except in the camp where his displacement continues. Instead of restoring the legal 
person of the refugee so as to assure him the widest possible exercise of his rights 
                                                  
63  Malkki, L. ‘News from Nowhere: Mass Displacement and Globalized ‘Problems of Organization’, 
Ethnography, vol. 2 (2002), p. 353. 
64 In this respect it is worth mentioning that Malkki has analysed the use of former concentration camps in 
which refugees were sheltered after the Second World War. Sheltered in camps, refugees came accessible for 
research, documentation and interventions. Malkki argues that the post-war figure of the refugee largely took 
shape in these camps. Cf. Malkki (1995b), p. 500.  
65 In its fight against the ‘warehousing’ of refugees, the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants also 
emphasise that warehousing refugees is a de facto and all too durable fourth solution, next to three official 
solutions of UNHCR. See: http://www.refugees.org/data/wrs/04/pdf/38-56.pdf. In this respect, it is 
important to note that, as pointed out by Liisa Malkki, UNHCR discourse influences  a great deal of scientific 
inquiries into the phenomenon of refugees, the corollary being that basic assumptions about the problem, 
and the response thereto, remain unquestioned. One particularly disturbing example is that the use of refugee 
camps to control movements of people is passed over in silence. As Malkki argues: Other examples of the 
influence of the frameworks developed by international agencies on a wider world of scholarship include the 
widespread use of the bureaucratic UN model of the three “durable solutions” to the refugee problems – 
repatriation, integration and resettlement – as well as the relative absence of critical questioning of the refugee 
camp as an apparatus for the control of space and movement.’(Malkki (1995b), p. 505). 
66 Cf. Agamben, G. Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life (translated from the Italian), Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 1998 pp.168, 169.  
67 Cf. Ibid.,  p. 174.  
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and freedom, encampment strips the refugee of his legal and political status, 
reducing him to what Agamben calls bare life. Indeed, in camps, refugees have to 
suffer from what Arendt calls the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human. 
The camp contains the life that can nowhere be inscribed again,68 giving a grim 
twist indeed to the refugee’s displacement.   
It is for this very reason that Hannah Arendt’s influential exposition of the 
refugee problem is still relevant today. In the famous ninth chapter ‘The Decline of 
the Nation-State and the End of Human Rights’ of The Origins of Totalitarianism, 
Arendt offers a penetrating reflection upon the refugee and statelessness problem 
states were facing as a consequence of the wars that ravaged Europe at the 
beginning of the Twentieth Century. Until this present day, academic reflection on 
various forms of exclusion draws on Arendt’s reflections. Contemporary readings 
of Arendt mainly elaborate the paradox of human rights she discerns and the 
subsequent right to have rights she invokes. The next chapter discusses the right to 
have rights in more detail. However, I do believe that the full weight of the right to 
have rights can only be grasped, and the significance thereof be established, if the 
situation in which this right insists is brought to awareness. Importantly, the right 
to have rights is not at issue whenever exclusion occurs, for example in cases where 
social, economic and cultural rights are jeopardized or only half-heartedly 
protected. On the contrary, on Arendt’s view the right to have rights only makes 
sense whenever the right to residence is scuppered69 with the effect that people are 
forced to live outside the pale of law. Indeed, Arendt’s perceptive understanding of 
the refugee dilemma derives from the insight that the refugee, who is forced to live 
outside the bonds of nationality that connect him to a state, looses his place in this 
world. According to Arendt, then, the plight of the refugee is not only caused by an 
ineffective nationality, but is rather constituted by the fact that this ineffectiveness 
brings the refugee before the dilemma: where does he have a right to live?  
As the refugee lacks a legally sealed place of his own, Arendt holds that the 
‘core of statelessness’ is ‘identical to the refugee problem.’70 She therefore explicitly 
targets the difference between de facto and de jure statelessness, which she casts as 
one of the many efforts to simplify the refugee problem 71 , with ‘the express 
purpose of liquidating statelessness once and for all by ignoring its existence.’72 
Indeed, I believe that, with respect to the refugee question, the most important 
lesson to be drawn from The Origins of Totalitarianism is that the very distinction 
between de facto and de jure statelessness covers up the plight of refugees, and, 
moreover, effectively contributes to the continuance of the their deplorable 
                                                  
68 Compare Ibid.,  p. 175: ‘The state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the 
juridico-political order, now becomes a new and stable arrangement inhabited by the bare life that more and 
more can no longer be inscribed in that order. The growing dissociation of birth (bare life) and the nation-
state is the new fact of politics in our day, and what we call camp is this disjunction. To an order without 
localization (the state of exception, in which law is suspended) there now corresponds a localization without 
order (the camp as permanent space of exception).’ 
69 Cf., OT, p. 276. 
70 Ibid., p. 279. 
71 Compare ibid., p. 282 at footnote 28: ‘The many and varied efforts of the legal profession to simplify the 
problem by stating a difference between the stateless person and the refugee – such as maintaining “that the 
status of a stateless person is characterized by the fact of his having no nationality, whereas that of a refugee 
is determined by his having lost diplomatic protection” – were always defeated by the fact that “all refugees 
are for practical purposes stateless.’ For the sake of transparency, Arendt is citing Simpson here.  
72 Ibid., p. 279. 
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situation. There is little doubt that Arendt would have agreed with the International 
Law Commission’s Special Rapporteur Hudson who, during the drafting process of 
the Convention on Statelessness, unavailingly pleaded to take the situation of 
refugees into account as well. Though Hudson retains the expressions of de facto  
and de jure statelessness in his 1951 report, he certainly intimates that the latter fails 
to come to terms with the refugee situation: ‘It is true that the de facto stateless 
person has a potential nationality but it is not less true that this juridical nationality 
is an ineffective nationality. It seems to the Special Rapporteur that the most 
important aspect of this problem of statelessness is not the technical question of 
nationality only, but the real situation … The members of the Commission should 
bear in mind that de facto statelessness is much worse than de jure statelessness not 
only quantitatively but also qualitatively, because not only is it true that de facto 
stateless persons constitute by far the largest number of stateless individuals but it 
is also a fact that their condition is worse than that of the de jure stateless. They are 
not only deprived of the rights which derive from nationality but the mere fact that 
they are not technically deprived of nationality itself renders them incapable of 
obtaining a legal remedy under the proposed statue for stateless persons unless the 
Commission has the courage to face the problem and provides the said legal 
remedy.’73  
Arendt takes the point a step further. Her critique is not that ‘the statesmen’ fail 
to address the increasing problem of de facto statelessness, but that they create this 
category in order to bring people out of legal sight, thus aggravating the problem. 
The deteriorating language on statelessness obscures the fact that the refugee has 
no where to return as it is effectively denied that statelessness is part and parcel of 
the refugee dilemma. ‘Non- recognition of statelessness’ Arendt points out, ‘always 
means repatriation, i.e., deportation to a country of origin.’ 74  But the trick of 
deportation is of course, that  the country of origin is no longer a matter of course, 
to say the least, and Arendt highlights the fact that the country of return collapses 
into the camp. With respect to refugees, she therefore argues that ‘their situation 
has deteriorated just as stubbornly, until the internment camp – prior to the Second 
World War, the exception rather than the rule for the stateless – has become the 
routine solution for the problem of domicile of the “displaced persons”.’75 Note 
that, when Arendt invokes the category of the stateless, she not only refers to 
persons who are stateless de jure, but to refugees as well. She highlights the camp 
solution again when she pins down the debate – reminiscent of our own times – on 
the refugee problem: ‘Every attempt by international conferences to establish some 
legal status for stateless people failed because no agreement could possibly replace 
the territory to which an alien, within the framework of existing law, must be 
deportable. All discussions about the refugee problems revolved around this one 
question: How can the refugee be made deportable again? The Second World War 
and the DP camps were not necessary to show that the only practicable substitute 
for a nonexistent homeland was an internment camp. Indeed, as early as the 
thirties, this was the only “country” the world had to offer to the stateless.’76  
                                                  
73 International law’s Commission’ s Special Rapporteur Hudson as cited in Massey, H. Legal and Protection 
Policy. UNHCR and De Facto Statelessness, working paper UNHCR April 2010, p. 13.  
74 OT., p. 279.  
75 Ibid., p. 279.  
76 Ibid., p. 284. 
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The pertinence of Arendt’s argument cannot be dispatched by arguing that her 
discussion of the refugee problem dates from a pre-Convention period. For its 
pertinence derives precisely from the fact that it draws attention to the 
misunderstanding of the refugee problem which is achieved by the refusal to 
recognize statelessness in new refugees arrivals, ‘thereby making the situation of 
refugees even more intolerable.’ 77  Arendt’s analysis reminds us that the chief 
characteristic of the plight of refugees is the desperate experience of belonging 
nowhere in this world. Consequently, the lack of protection the refugee is suffering 
is not simply a brute fact, as opposed to the formal and legal lack of protection the 
stateless person is suffering. Admittedly, Arendt casts the issue of de jure 
statelessness to be a minor, innocent problem.78 I do not believe statelessness to be 
a relatively innocent problem.79 But the upshot of my argument is that the strict 
division between de facto and de jure statelessness is unattainable on a conceptual 
level. If, as I have argued, the camp appears at the limit of the notion of de facto 
statelessness, we are in need of a radical rethinking of the basis of the international 
regime of refugee protection. Indeed, as Harell-Bond and Verdirame argue: ‘The 
debate on solutions to the refugee ‘problem’ has to start from the premise that 
warehousing refugees in camps and respecting their human rights cannot be 
reconciled.’80 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will sketch out the conceptual terms and 
contours for rethinking the refugee question, and the international legal response 
thereto. 
 
2.3 Refugees (Are) Like Us 
In the previous sections, I demonstrated that the international refugee protection 
regime, by virtue of the concept of de facto statelessness, is reliant upon the 
distinction between here and there. This distinction, as said, is a manifestation of 
the inside/outside divide that is constitutive for democratic legal order, as it serves 
the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that are ingredient to the sovereign 
right of a democratic people to determine and rule itself. It is often assumed that 
refugee protection fetters this sovereign right and, hence, poses a challenge to the 
receiving community, as the boundaries that preserve and secure an inside over 
against an outside are crossed by the refugee. De facto statelessness, however, keeps 
this challenge in check, so to speak, as it presupposes, when driven to the limit, that 
refugees ought to be there, not here. Put differently: Instead of challenging the 
boundaries of a polity, the refugee, who is believed to be only stateless de facto, 
leaves these very boundaries intact. We have reasons to doubt, therefore, that 
refugee law, as has been assumed, discards the distinction between nationals and 
foreigners its raison d’être.81 Instead of making this distinction irrelevant, refugee law 
seems to infinitely complicate it. Or, to put it more strongly, instead of making 
                                                  
77 Ibid., p. 281.  
78 Cf. OT, p. 279.  
79 Indeed, in her study on statelessness, Van Waas made it perfectly clear that to consider the problem of 
statelessness as a mere technical issue is to oversimplify things.  
80 Harell-Bond &Verdirame 2005, pp. xvii, xviii.  
81 Cf. Hathaway 2005, p. 5.  
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redundant the distinction between citizens and foreigners, and the people and the 
others, refugee law contributes to a reinvigoration of democratic collective identity. 
Indeed, to the distinction between here and there, the distinction between the own 
and foreign corresponds. In this section, I will demonstrate that refugee protection 
also assumes, instead of challenges, the distinction between the own and foreign. I 
will take issue, indeed, with the common assumption that refugees challenge and 
disrupt the collective identity of a people on account of their different cultural, 
ethnic, religious, and linguistic identities. Hathaway expresses the common 
understanding of the challenge: ‘Most refugees who seek entry to developed states 
today are from the poorer countries of the South; their “different” racial and social 
profile is seen as a challenge to the cultural cohesion of many developed states.’82 I 
will argue, however, that the refugee, who is recognized as such, is not ‘the other’, 
but rather confirms who we are and what we want to be. 
To begin with, the title of this section, ‘Refugees are Like Us’, is not open to 
reversal. It does not imply that the other way around, ‘we are like refugees’, is 
equally true, if only because this would bring us to the unsavory and perverse 
conclusion that, in the end, ‘we are all refugees.’ Rather, the claim that refugees are 
like us is the outcome of a reversal of the usual question. Following Bonnie Honing, 
who in Democracy and the Foreigner pulls the same trick with regard to foreigners and 
immigrants in general,83 the question is not only: what can we do for refugees, but 
also: what are they doing for us? A preliminary answer to this question is that 
refugees, instead of disrupting our identity, in one way or another affirm who we are 
and want to be. That is, by protecting refugees, we fulfill the moral demands of 
humanity, upholding, in fact, our own moral and humanitarian ideals.  
That a certain amount of self-assertion is part of the deal in protecting refugees 
is old news. 84  For example, in Asylia, Rigsby tries to find a rationale for the 
inscription in coins that declared places to be asylios, sacred and inviolable. This 
explicit declaration appears to be somewhat redundant, as certain sacred places, 
even without such an inscription, were automatically deemed to be asylios and a safe 
refuge for those in need of protection. Rigsby puts forward the hypothesis that 
these coins credited and honored the city-state involved: ‘In the civic title sacred 
and inviolable … we can see a spirit of self-assertion on the part of the Greek city 
states.’ 85  This spirit of self-assertion is also evidenced by Greek tragedy. So in 
Euripides’ Heracles’ Children, we hear the king of Athens proclaim upon his decision 
to grant the spouses of Heracles protection, that he would rather hang himself than 
do harm to the reputation and good name of Athens as a free city. 86  Also, in 
Aeschylus’ The Supplicant Maiden, we read the chorus commenting on the king’s 
request whether or not the women should be protected: ‘may the people who 
                                                  
82 Hathaway 1997, p. xxix. 
83 Compare Honig, B.  Democracy and the Foreigner, Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press 2001, p. 4: 
‘Rather than ‘How should we solve the problem of foreignness?’ and “What should ‘we’ do about ‘them’?” (questions 
that never put the “we” into question and this, surely, is part of their point and attractiveness), the question 
that animates this book is: ‘What problems does foreignness solve for us?’ 
84 In general see Cavallar, G. The Rights of Strangers. Theories of International Hospitality, the Global Community and 
Political Justice since Vittoria, Ashgate: Aldershot 2002.  
85 Rigsby, Asylia. Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996,  p. 
27. 
86 Cf. Euripides, The Children of Heracles, in ed. Allen, W., The Plays of Euripides, Warminster: Aris & Phillpis 
2001.  
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strengthen the city / protect its dignity as well.’87  Against the backdrop of the 
longstanding tradition of self-assertion, it comes as no surprise that asylum came to 
be used as what we today would call an ideological weapon. In Chapter One of 
Book 1 of City of God St. Augustine describes the violence afflicted upon Rome by 
the barbarians, and ascribes the greatness of Rome to the fact that the Romans 
designate churches and basilicas to be safe- havens for women and children, a 
practice unheard of in the history of the barbarians. One must be blind not to see, 
St. Augustine says, that this is a direct influence of Christ and the Christian faith.88   
But of course, the self-image of the people can only be affirmed, and its dignity 
and humanitarian ideals be upheld, if the ‘good refugees’ are protected and the ‘bad 
ones’ excluded. To make a huge leap in time: This is what is decided upon in the 
asylum procedure. And as it turns out, the good ones are the ones who are like us. 
As already said in the previous chapter, the enjoyment of protection and rights 
is contingent upon refugee status. Hence, a procedure to determine who qualifies 
as a refugee (or a person otherwise in need of protection) and who is discarded as 
such, is a prerequisite for international protection to become effective. 89  The 
category of the real, deserving or genuine refugee is, therefore, presupposed. But 
the category of the ‘real’ refugee is not a mere function of the eligibility criteria for 
which the Refugee Convention and the EU Qualification Directive provide. 
In this respect, two general remarks can be made. First, it should be kept in 
mind that national administrations enjoy a great deal of discretion in defining and 
redefining the criteria. Due to this discretion, the threshold of protection can 
constantly be altered by defining anew central elements such as ‘individual risk’, 
‘persecution’, ‘safe (third) country’, ‘actors of persecution’ and so on.90 Secondly, it 
is hard to deny that, as Brochmann and Hammar put it, ‘moral obligations tend to 
                                                  
87  Aeschylus, The Supplicant Maiden in Grene, D. & Lattimore, R., Aeschylus II, Chicago/London: The 
University of Chicago Press 1991, p. 30. 
88 St. Augustine, The City of God, London [etc.]: New ed 1967.  
89 Hence, the plea for an unconditional right to asylum oversimplifies things. This was strikingly illustrated by 
the discussion in Germany at the close of the Twentieth Century over article 16 of the constitution. Article 
16, which stated ‘Politisch Verfolgten genieβen Asylrecht’, expressed an individual right to asylum that 
corresponded to the moral obligation of Germany towards refugees. In the wake of large scale violence 
against foreigners and asylum seekers between 1991 and 1993, which was initiated by racist groups but over 
the course of time gained silent approval of a large part of the German population, the governing parties 
CDU/CSU committed themselves to the view that Article 16 of the Constitution was in need of revision.  
Instead of informing and explaining to their constituents the principled importance and value of refugee 
protection, the governing parties seemed to excuse the violence of extreme-right groups, attributing it to a 
large-scale increase in asylum applications (Cf., also Noll, G. ‘The Non-Admission and Return of Protection 
Seekers in Germany’, in: International Journal of refugee Law, vol. 9 (1997), p. 415). A constitution change with 
regard to Article 16 was thus called for, in order to formulate and narrow the conditions under which Article 
16 could be invoked. Opponents of this revision were eager to argue that asylum was a matter of hospitality 
and generosity. Some even expressed the view that to consider asylum as a right would already diminish 
Germany’s moral obligation vis-a- vis refugees (Compare Tönnies, S. ‘Kann Asyl ein Recht sein?’, Zeitschrift für 
Rechtspolitik, vol. 25 (1992), p. 43: ‘Der guten Sitte des Asyls ist nicht damit gedient, bei den Rechten 
eingereiht zu werden; gerade deshalb muβ sie heilig gehalten werden, und zwar als Pflicht.’) Premised on the 
assumption that asylum resorts under hospitality, it was argued that whomever wants to be generous, must be 
willing to take the risk of offering asylum to those who were, perhaps, not entirely sincere and justified in 
claiming asylum. One member of parliament in particular, Von Mangfoldt, was passionate to defend this 
argument: ‘‘Wenn wir irgend etwas aufnehmen würden, um die Voraussetzungen für die Gewährung des 
Asylrechts festzulegen, dann müβte an der Grenze eine Prüfung durch die Grenzorgane vorgenommen 
werden. Dadurch würde die ganze Vorschrift völlig wertlos.’(as cited in Kimminich, O. Asylrecht, Berlin: 
Luchterhand 1968, p. 78.  
90 Cf., Fitzpatrick (2008), p. 292.   
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become more relevant as motivations for government action when they coincide 
with some state or party interest. Admission of refugees, for example, is often 
influenced by foreign policy.’91 Indeed, the Refugee Convention is assumed to be a 
‘Cold-War-document’, an assumption evidenced by the statement of a high- 
ranking American official that ‘each refugee from the Soviet orbit presents a failure 
of the Communist regime.’ 92  Just as refugees from communist countries once 
served the interests of Western capitalist states, today’s refugees present a failure of 
the ‘third world.’ As Spijkerboer pins down the politics of refugee protection: ‘The 
Western world in the form of, for example, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, or military action (based on a United Nations mandate, or not) 
exerts considerable power over the South. If no efforts were made to legitimize this 
situation, this would seem to be the exercise of purely economic or military force. 
The West needs a general story for why the developing world cannot help itself, 
and why it needs our guidance on its way to a better future. Refugee law can be one 
of the places for the creation of such a legitimating story.’93  
So, clearly then, the category of the ‘real’ refugee is not simply predicated on the 
refugee definition, but is subjected, as well, to other conditions and circumstances 
that change from time to time.94 But of course this is not the whole story. We can 
only come to a full understanding of the discrepancy between the ‘real’ refugee and 
the relevant definitions if the refugee’s credibility, which is decisive in the status 
determination process, is taken into account. Indeed, in the asylum procedure, 
everything depends upon whether or not the protection seeker is able to present a 
credible account of the reasons for his flight and can convince the authorities that 
he is, in fact, in need of international protection. 95  As Robert Thomas argues: 
‘While much legal analysis has been devoted to the legal tests governing the 
determination of refugee status (e.g., the meaning and application of “persecution”, 
“membership of a particular social group” and the “internal flight alternative”), the 
majority of claims are determined on their individual factual circumstances. If an 
individual making an asylum or human rights claim cannot persuade the decision-
maker that his claim is properly to be regarded as credible, then he is unlikely to be 
recognized as a refugee or as a person otherwise in need international protection.’96 
Since much, if not everything, depends upon the asylum seeker’s credibility, the 
two possible outcomes of the asylum procedure, i.e., recognition or rejection, 
heavily rely on the distinction between the trustworthy, genuine, deserving refugee, 
                                                  
91 Brochmann & Hammar 1999,  p. 4.  In general see also Goodwin-Gill, G. ‘The Politics of Refugee 
Protection.’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol. 28 (1998), pp. 8-23 
92 High ranking American official, cited in: Spijkerboer, T. Gender and Refugee Status, Nijmegen: Gerard Noodt 
Instituut 1999, p. 197.  
93 Ibid., p.199.  
94 For example, in the Netherlands, the abrogation of the policy of humanitarian temporary protection for 
refugees who escaped war in Afghanistan and Iraq, coincided with the sending of troops to these countries.  
With Dutch peace-keeping troops present in Iraq and Afghanistan, there would no longer be a need for 
refugees to be protected in the Netherlands, as the troops were supposed to protect them there.  
95  Compare Hathaway 2005, p. 1: ‘The greatest challenge facing refugees in the developed world has 
traditionally been to convince authorities that they are, in fact, entitled to recognition of their refugee status.’ 
96 Thomas, R. ‘Assessing the Credibility of Asylum Claims: EU and UK Approaches Examined’, European 
Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 8 (2006), p. 79. 
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on the one hand, and the undeserving, untrustworthy or even bogus claimant, on 
the other.97 This prompts the question: What makes a claim credible or incredible? 
In this respect, the comprehensive and close analysis of over two hundred 
asylum claims filed by female applicants in the Netherlands conducted by Thomas 
Spijkerboer is particularly instructive if not revealing. Spijkerboer points to the 
discrepancy to explain what motivated his research: ‘People who are recognized as 
refugees certainly come from countries where human rights are violated, but so do 
people whose applications are rejected. Analyses investigating the relationship 
between the human rights situation in various countries of origin and recognition 
rates fail to identify a meaningful relation. The situation of women in many 
countries is bad, but this does not explain why some of them are considered as 
refugees and others are not. Refugee law is clearly inspired by humanitarian 
impulses, but this does not explain why some profit from this while others do not. 
I am trying to understand why Srilankan Anne … is not a refugee while Bosnian 
Laurie … is; what they experienced is pretty similar.’98  
Spijkerboer’s focus on women is not inspired by the fact that the refugee 
definition is supposedly oblivious to persecution grounds specific to women. Albeit 
an important issue, this is not his main concern. What interests him instead are the 
underlying normative assumptions that affect decision- making in asylum cases. His 
analysis reveals that with respect to female applicants decisions are based on ‘clear 
assumptions about femininity, gender and sexuality.’99 Female applicants have to 
accord with our basic normative notions in order to be deemed credible. That is, 
they have to be, and behave, like us. For example, they have to prove to be good 
mothers, mourning in the appropriate way over the death of their sons – even if 
this is unrelated to their flight motives. They have to show clear signs of grief, as an 
unmoved account of their losses is likely to be interpreted as mendacious, just as 
the mother or wife who is hysterical is believed to be only performing an act. ‘[The] 
asylum procedure’, Spijkerboer argues, ‘heavily relies on the concepts of gender and 
ethnicity. Applicants must conform to the assumptions related to these concepts; if 
they do not, they are basically incomprehensible as refugees and may be deemed 
incredible, non-deserving or even abusive.’100  
Though Spijkerboer’s analysis is limited to the hearings and decisions on female 
applicants, his conclusions can easily be generalized. Just as the female asylum 
seeker is constructed as a refugee, or not, so is the male applicant, albeit in a 
different way.101 In this respect, Jan Blommaert’s close analysis of the subjection of 
asylum seekers to identification processes that emphasize the national order of 
things is insightful. As language is part and parcel of the national order, Blommaert 
focuses on the imagination of language in the context of the asylum procedure. In 
his seminal article, ‘Language, Asylum and the National Order’, Blommaert 
meticulously discusses the case of Joseph, a young refugee from Rwanda whose 
story looks like a contemporary version of the biblical account of shibboleth. 
                                                  
97 The Dutch Aliens Act, for example, includes the category of ‘lying unaccompanied minors’. For the sake of 
nuance, however, it should be added that, at least in theory, an asylum seeker can give a credible account, but 
nevertheless, does not qualify as a refugee or person otherwise in need of international protection.  
98 Spijkerboer 1999, p. 201.  
99 Ibid., p. 5. 
100 Ibid., p. 8.  
101 Cf., Ibid.,  p. 195.  
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Blommaert reconstructs the normative assumptions on language that motivated a 
negative decision in this case. As to the reasons of rejection, Joseph’s case is not 
unique: Joseph was discredited, and hence his claim rejected, as the language profile 
he displayed significantly deviated from the official language of Rwanda. The 
immigration authorities were, therefore, certain that he didn’t come from Rwanda, 
casting him as an asylum seeker who lies about his nationality, and guessed that he 
was probably from Uganda (though it was clear that Joseph didn’t fluently speak 
the official language of that country, either). 
Blommaert pins down the normative assumptions on language that affected 
decision- making in this and other cases. Desperately trying to establish the 
nationality of the claimant, the authorities mistakenly believe that language is 
indicative of a person’s origin. Moreover, language is assumed to be static and 
timeless. Both assumptions are not without effect to decision- making, as they 
inspire the disqualification of the claimant whose sociolinguistic speech and 
repertoire do not fall tidily within the national order and its language. Blommaert 
refutes these assumptions, arguing that it is wholly reductive to assume a 
coincidence between language, origin and nationality. A refugee may not properly 
speak the language of his home country, but the speech he uses might very well 
reflect the realities of his region of origin. Indeed, given the troubled history of 
many countries from which refugees come, it is not unlikely that they, or their 
parents, lived on an exit strategy, moving from one part of the country to another, 
or even across state borders to find employment or seek safety. This no doubt 
causes linguistic exchange between different groups of people up to the point of 
blurring linguistic boundaries. Hence, Blommaert argues: ‘The fact is, however, that 
someone’s linguistic repertoire reflects a life, not just birth, a life that is lived in a 
real sociocultural, historical and political space. If such a life develops in a place 
torn by conflict and dislodged social and political relations, the image of someone 
being born and bred in one community with one language as his ‘own’ is hardly 
useful. In fact, using such a pristine image is unjust.’102 
Blommaert’s empirical and theoretical analysis of language assessment in the 
context of the asylum procedure evidences, again, that the asylum seeker’s 
credibility is predicated on our normative assumptions about human behavior. We 
can imagine a person speaking different languages -- because he studies abroad, has 
moved from one country to another, is a second and third generation immigrant, 
and so on. What we cannot imagine is that a person speaks a bit of different 
languages without being in full possession of one language (because he or she, for 
example, did not participate in the educational system of the country because he 
was constantly on the move) that constitutes the smooth thread that connects an 
individual to his origin. If an asylum seeker does not confirm our imaginations 
about language, he is simply incomprehensible and disqualified, and his claim 
deemed to be incredible or even malafide.103 
                                                  
102 Blommaert, J. ‘Language, Asylum, and the National Order’, Current Anthropology, vol. 50 (2009), p. 424.  
103 Blommaert pushes the point further, arguing that immigration authorities assume beforehand that the 
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The upshot of the analyses of Spijkerboer and Blommaert,  both of which 
unravel normative assumptions at work in the process of refugee status 
determination, is that asylum seekers are constructed as refugees if and only if they 
live up to our expectations and confirm our normative views. If not, they are 
simply incomprehensible as refugees. 
That normative imaginations and assumptions about human behavior are 
decisive for the asylum seeker’s credibility, signals a grave intricacy for refugees. 
For, the ramification of ‘how we do things’ is that they have little if any influence 
on the selection, interpretation and assessment of the facts they present that are to 
substantiate their flight motives. As Spijkerboer puts it: ‘Asylum seekers have little 
or no power to influence the manner in which decisions are made about them.’104 
The relation between the asylum seeker and the immigration authorities is, 
therefore, deeply asymmetrical. To be sure, this difference in power is not just due 
to failures in intercultural communication. Hence, Spijkerboer argues that the 
repercussions of normative assumptions will not be mitigated by training interview 
officials in intercultural communication. What is at issue is much more fundamental 
than that. Indeed, officials should be aware of the fact, Spijkerboer argues, that the 
‘communication between asylum applicants and interview officials will always take 
place against the backdrop of a considerable difference in power which is an 
obstacle to good communication … Training interview officials should not 
promote a feeling of now “know how to do it” but, rather, a feeling of uneasiness 
on account of the situation in which the interview takes place.’105 
This book offers a persistent reflection on the asymmetrical relation between 
the asylum seeker and the receiving community. For now it is important, however, 
to sketch out the philosophical concern involved in the fact that asylum seekers are 
constructed as refugees if they meet our normative views on human behavior. 
Refugee status is conferred upon applicants who are like us. Put differently: Asylum 
seekers become comprehensible as refugees if we can recognize them ‘as own.’ 
Underneath the distinction between the real, trustworthy, deserving refugee and the undeserving or 
even bogus claimant, the distinction between the own and foreign thus persists. Contrary to the 
view that the admittance and inclusion of refugees challenges what and who we are 
as a people, our identity appears to be the very starting point from which we 
proceed in cases of asylum.106 Not only do refugees affirm what we want to be by 
allowing us to uphold moral and humanitarian ideals. The self-assertion on the part 
of the receiving community extends beyond that. Indeed, as the terms under which 
an asylum seeker is recognized as a refugee are set up in advance, he or she also 
affirms the identity of the receiving community.  
 
2.4 Givers and Takers: Good Refugees and Abusive Claimants 
There is, however, yet another discourse that frames the challenge of asylum not in 
relation to collective identity but as a security issue. As already demonstrated in 
                                                  
104 Spijkerboer 1999, p. 6.  
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106 Cf., also Roermund, B. ‘De rechter: grenswachter of grensganger?’,  in Broers & Van Klink (eds),  De rechter 
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Chapter One, asylum is perceived to constitute a security threat because of the 
system’s liability to abuse by economic immigrants. The unauthorized presence of 
large numbers of immigrants upon a state’s territory damages the proper 
functioning of democratic legal order. More precisely still, the trespassing of 
borders by those immigrants undermines the right a democratic people claims for 
itself to select and exclude non-nationals in its own interest. 107  In this security 
discourse, the challenge or threat does not come from the real refugee but is 
instead attributed to the economic immigrant who takes advantage of the system by 
lodging a fraudulent claim. 
However, this logic of abuse is put in a wholly different light by virtue of the 
asylum procedure’s reliability on the category of the own as opposed to the foreign. 
Additionally, the basic distinction between ‘own’ and ‘foreign’ also explains why 
return is not only relevant to rejected asylum seekers (which, as shown in Chapter 
One, spurred the debate on the prevention of abuse) but eventually spills over to all 
asylum seekers and refugees. There is, or so I will argue, a clear link between the 
own/foreign distinction as decisive for refugee status determination, the logic of 
the prevention of abuse, and the current exploration of extraterritorial asylum 
policies. 
I will develop my argument on the basis of the aforementioned book by Bonnie 
Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner. I will proceed from the assumption that the 
normative assumptions on human behavior, by virtue of which the asylum 
procedure is reliant upon the own/foreign distinction, also influence the distinction 
between the real refugee, on the one hand, and the bogus claimant, on the other. 
This is not to deny, of course, that economic immigrants – for whatever good 
reasons they have in doing so – might seek to abuse the system with a view to 
illegal settlement in the receiving state. And, for the sake of nuance, the possibility 
should also be included that an application can be rejected without the claimant 
being cast as abusive. Admittedly, then, the distinction between the genuine refugee 
and the fraudulent claimant cannot be perfectly mapped onto the distinction 
between the own and foreign. But that both distinctions do fade into each other is 
evidenced by yet another divide that lurks behind the discourse on asylum and 
immigration. This is the divide, as laid bare and reflected upon by Honig, between 
givers and takers. Though Honig discerns the giver/taker divide with respect to 
foreigners and immigrants in general108, her argument seems to be, in particular, 
apposite in relation to refugees. 
As the ‘real’ refugee does not upset or unsettles us, but instead affirms who we 
are and want to be, he is a good refugee. Reinvigorating our identity, the real and good 
refugee is what Honig coins as a giver. The bogus claimant, by contrast, who 
imposes on our freedom and justice, is a taker who gives nothing in return. Causing 
our asylum system to be clogged, he imposes on our kindness and benevolence to 
offer asylum to those genuinely in need of international protection. And, so the 
reasoning goes, by offering himself to labor at a lower than minimum cost – which, 
                                                  
107 For more on the relation between democratic legal order, security and irregular immigration see: ‘Lindahl, 
H.K. ‘Border Crossings by Immigrants: Legality, Illegality and Alegality’, Res Publica, vol. 14 (2008), pp. 117-
135. 
108 Honig develops the argument with respect to good givers and bad takers in her reading of the Biblical 
Book of Ruth. Cf., Honig 2001, pp. 41-72. 
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after all, was the ultimate aim of his false claim – he profits from our economy 
without giving anything in return. 
Honig convincingly shows that in public discourse on immigration, immigrants 
are divided over two supposedly opposing positions. They are either good givers or 
bad takers109. So it is, too, with refugees. But this division over two supposedly 
opposing positions implies that, if the real refugee really is what we want him to be, 
he must occupy the position of a giver, steering away from everything that may 
make him suspect of being a taker. A case in point is the exclusion of refugees 
from free movement at the time of the abolition of the EU internal borders. As 
Elspeth Guild argues, ‘it was the spectre of the refugee moving and gaining 
entitlements to rights’ 110   that motivated this exclusion. Guild understands the 
creation of the Dublin system against the backdrop of this exclusion. That refugees 
were not to profit from the EU internal market, she argues, ultimately led to the 
upholding of internal borders for the purpose of determining which state is held 
responsible for refugee status determination.111 In this respect, it is also important 
to bear in mind that, with a view to end the practice of ‘asylum shopping’, the 
rejection of an asylum seeker holds throughout the European Union, whereas 
recognition is nationally limited. Seen from the perspective of the giver/taker 
divide, the refugee is in no position to demand anything, as is evidenced by the fact 
that although ‘an individual might have second degree family links or friends or job 
prospects in one Member State, but not in another, and thus wishes to apply for 
asylum in that Member State’ this is nonetheless ‘irrelevant to allocation of 
responsibility among the Member States under the Treaties.’112 This already makes 
clear that the giver/taker divide is not simply in favour of the real refugee, and only 
puts the bad one at a disadvantage. As a number of authors have noted, the Dublin 
Convention is at the root of the strident position EU Member States take with 
regard to refugee protection, as it was the first damage inflicted to the legal position 
of refugees, and the throw-off of a deterioration that has increased ever since.113  
Indeed, the binary opposition between givers and takers, good refugees and bad 
claimants, is equally detrimental to both. It disarms the good refugee, and arrests, 
so to speak, the intrusion of his arrival. Intrusion and disruption are instead 
attributed to the one who is said to deceive, abuse and take from us. Driven to the 
limit, however, the referred opposition implies, as said, that the real refugee must 
                                                  
109 Cf., Honig 2001, pp. 73-106. 
110 E. Guild (2006), p. 635.  
111 Cf., Ibid., p. 634.  
112 Ibid., pp. 636, 637.  
113  Cf. Guild (2004), pp. 198-218; G. Noll ‘Formalism v. Empiricism: Some Reflections on the Dublin 
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steer away from anything that may make him suspect of being a taker. He won’t be 
allowed to work, for this would take away our jobs. He wouldn’t be given proper 
housing, for this would take away all the beautiful houses we are entitled to, adding, 
moreover, to a housing shortage at our detriment. Nor would he be allowed to 
profit from social, economic, cultural and full health provisions, as we are the ones 
paying taxes for that. Hence, Nevzat Soğuk’s astute observation that the 
‘incorporation’ of refugees in our societies is at the same time a marginalization to 
keep refugees at a distance from the normal order of things and the possibilities it 
offers for a human life to flourish.114  
Indeed, the logic of abuse spills over to all refugees. Seemingly willing to take 
refugees in, but under our own terms, we mistrustfully hunt down the traces of 
their intrusion, trying to repress it by keeping them at a distance, either by secluding 
them from the normal order of things or by preventing them to arrive at all. Indeed, 
the ultimate consequence of the division between good givers and bad takers as 
sketched above, pretty much resembles a regime of temporary protection with a 
view to return home, which, recall from Chapter One, figures in a discourse that 
ultimately seeks to disconnect protection from immigration. Temporary protection 
clearly evidences Honig’s claim that hospitality is always fraught with hostility.  
To sum up the argument: The real refugee is a real refugee on account of 
affirming the identity of the host state. Reinvigorating the collective identity of the 
receiving community, the real refugee is a good refugee. To ascribe to him the 
position of a giver implies that he must cleanse himself of the suspicion that he is a 
taker and is in no position to expect or demand anything. Driven to the limit, the 
real and good refugee is a refugee who must be protected elsewhere. Indeed, the 
giver/taker divide casts light on what we have been thinking and practicing all 
along. Hence, Soğuk argues :‘The refugee is given a name only to be deprived of his 
ability to participate fully in the polity in which he finds himself … ‘To exist again 
in more than a name’, to have ‘work’, ‘home’, and ‘decisions to take’, the refugee 
must return ‘home’, that is, he must have his territorial ties reestablished …’115. 
To divide potential refugees over the two positions of either good givers who 
affirm who we are, or bad takers who abuse our freedom and justice, attributes, as 
said, the challenge of asylum to the bogus claimant. But, this veils the challenge 
inherent in every asylum claim. Indeed, from the viewpoint of challenging the 
receiving community, the distinction between good givers who deserve our 
hospitality and bad takers whom we approach with hostility, is simply false, as 
Honig also argues. Consider what happens if refugees live among us. They would 
learn the language, go to school, tie new social relations, fall in love, give birth to 
their children, find a job and so forth. That is, they will try and succeed to build 
their lives anew, regain a sense of belonging, worthiness and usefulness. But this 
implies that even the good refugee will be a taker, as he will be taking up his place 
in our society. Refugees want bread, but they want roses too.116 And if the claim to 
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116 ‘We want bread, but we want roses too’ was the slogan of the textile strike in Massachusetts in 1912, which 
united immigrant workers under the leadership of the Industrial Workers of the World.  In the 1990’s, the 
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asylum is experienced to be challenging, unsettling or perhaps even threatening, it is 
not simply because the claimant might turn out to be a bogus one. Rather, it is 
challenging, as the refugee demands that we make and give place to him because he 
has no where to return. 
Throughout this book I will frequently return to this challenge inherent in a 
claim to asylum so as to gain full understanding of the stakes involved in refugee 
protection. In the final chapter, I will explicate the implications of the loosening of 
the division between de facto and de jure statelessness in relation to the concept of 
asylum, proceeding from the very simple question: What is the refugee asking for in 
claiming asylum? For now, it suffices to say that the claim to asylum challenges the 
receiving community, as it calls for a redistribution of legal places that are provided 
for within a given polity. It is not, that is, the abusive, illegal-- let alone criminal-- 
act of the foreign outsider who is trespassing our boundaries. Rather, it is the 
transgressive act of the stranger coming from an undetermined, irreducible outside 
that calls for the ordering anew of our polity. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Let me try and sum up the argument. As argued in the section above, in order to 
qualify as a refugee, the asylum seeker must assume the norms and expectations the 
members of the receiving polity hold in common so as to make human behavior 
comprehensible. Sure, the refugee is certainly the one who differs from us, yet this 
difference is safely captured in the categories that are familiar to us, to wit the 
categories that determine what is foreign and what is not. The refugee might bring 
with him foreign contents of experience, but the point of the matter is that for 
these experiences, determining rules exist.117 So the refugee, instead of shattering 
existing structures of human experience, affirms who we are, and is therefore a 
good refugee. As our identity sets the terms for refugee recognition, the refugee, to 
borrow from the French philosopher, Jean Luc Nancy, ‘is awaited and received 
without any part of him being unwelcome.’118 But, as we receive the refugee by 
effacing his strangeness on the threshold, we are not, in fact, receiving him.119 As 
Jacques Derrida puts it: ‘If I welcome only what I welcome, what I am ready to 
welcome, and that I recognize in advance because I expect the coming of the hôte 
(guest) as invited, there is no hospitality.’ 120   Indeed, by way of affirming the 
identity of the receiving community, the refugee’s strangeness is effaced, his 
intrusion arrested. But as Nancy remarks, the arrival of the stranger always 
                                                                                                                     
immigrant workers, and hence, to economic immigration, it seems particularly apposite to the issue of asylum, 
as ‘the roses’ express ‘a sharing of life’s glories’ as the poem ‘Bread and Roses’ of James Oppenheim has it. In 
fact, the slogan ‘We want bread but we want roses, too’, derives from this poem written in 1911.  
117  To develop this argument I benefited from Waldenfels’ reflection on the own and foreign and 
manifestations of the inside/outside divide. Cf., Waldenfels, B. Order in the Twilight (translated from the 
German), Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press 1996,  pp. 76, 77.  
118 Nancy, J.L., ‘L’Intrus’, The New Centennial Review, vol. 2, 2002, p. 1.  
119 Cf. Ibid., p. 2.  
120 Derrida as cited in Dikec, Clark, Barnett, ‘Extending Hospitality: Giving Space, Taking Time’,  A journal of 
Modern Critical Theory. Special Issue Extending Hospitality: Giving Space, Taking Time, vol. 32 2009, p.42. 
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necessarily carries within itself something of the intruse, ‘otherwise the stranger loses 
his strangeness.’121 
As argued in the first sections of this chapter, the refugee’s strangeness – which, 
recall, made him a legal anomaly in the years preceding the Refugee Convention – 
stems from his displacement. Displacement signals the refugee’s lack of an own 
legal place, as he falls outside the distribution of places that allocate an individual to 
a state. The refugee is neither there nor here, but is instead, nowhere. Indeed, the 
absolutely desperate experience of being a refugee is to belong absolutely nowhere 
in this world. The refugee, therefore, does not come from a foreign place but from a 
strange place that is irreducible to a qualified ‘there’ that is determined over against a 
particular here. Coming from a strange place, having no where to return, the 
refugee asks and demands that we make and give place to him. For this very reason, 
the arrival of the refugee always poses questions, is always experienced to be 
challenging.  
But as said, this challenge is neutralized, and the refugee’s strangeness erased. 
This is ultimately achieved by the concept of de facto statelessness that offers the 
conceptual terms that frame current understanding of the refugee question. De facto 
statelessness underpins the general and stubborn inclination to the argument that 
refugees belong there, not here. But as argued, de facto statelessness secrets 
displacement, veils that the ‘there’ where the refugee supposedly belongs is no 
longer self-evident as the refugee’s own and proper place. Instead, the there where 
he supposedly belongs, collapses into a ‘no matter where as long as it is not here.’ 
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that what is supposed to be the human face 
of sovereign power, i.e., the protection of those who are not part of the sovereign 
people, is always prone to show the deathly pale face of a sovereign power that 
frenetically, and at times even violently, tries to shield itself from those who show it 
their weakness and vulnerability. For, as demonstrated in this chapter, there is a 
clear limit to the reasoning that refugees belong there, not here. At this limit, the 
non-existent homeland of the refugee collapses into the camp. The camp signals 
the recurrence of the refugee’s strangeness, causing him again to become an 
anomaly in the international legal community, as it gives a spatial arrangement to 
displacement. Instead of responding to the desperate experience of belonging 
nowhere in this world, the camp affirms that the refugee does indeed not belong in 
this world.  
Note, however, that at the limit of de facto statelessness, strangeness not only 
pertains to the refugee, but also recoils upon us, as well. Strangeness recoils as we – 
who like to believe to be good to refugees as is evidenced by the frequent 
declaration of EU Member States to be fully committed to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention122 - cannot possibly view this final solution to be our own. Indeed, the 
ultimate attempt to repress the refugee’s displacement by way of giving a spatial 
arrangement to it, seriously puts doubt upon our proclaimed belief in human rights 
and our commitment to protection obligations under the Refugee Convention. The 
setback of strangeness is equally evidenced by the increasingly unsavory means to 
which we resort in order to deflect refugees and keep them at bay, causing refugees 
to become trapped in movements of illegal immigration. In her examination of 
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how refugee protection obligations have been affected by the integration of the 
European Union and the harmonization of asylum policies, Guild, as we already 
saw in Chapter One, expresses her strong opinion on the matter: ‘It is difficult not 
to be shocked by the current situation.’123 Guild intimates that strangeness recoils 
upon us, as we cannot possibly recognize the means to which we resort to be our 
own.124 Discerning a growing discrepancy between EU policy and practice, on the 
one hand, and the fundamental values as enshrined in the Charter on Fundamental 
Rights, on the other, she develops an argument that cautions against the recourse 
to increasingly undemocratic means, as these are ultimately damaging to the 
European demos itself: ‘The current climate of exclusion and avoidance of 
responsibility is, unfortunately, likely to result in a potentially damaging challenge 
before the European Court of Human Rights. If that Court should determine that 
the standards which it has set out as necessary for the Member States to comply 
with article 3 of the ECHR (the prohibition of torture, including return to torture) 
are not reflected in the relevant EU legislation, the EU’s authority in this field will 
be deeply compromised.’125 
Present failures in refugee protection are generally explained by the reluctance 
states exhibit to meet their obligations towards refugees. Indeed, those on the 
lookout for refugee rights usually deploy the following argument to explain the 
downfall of protection: Though refugee law constitutes a humanitarian exception 
to the sovereign right to select and exclude non-nationals at the borders of a state, 
states shirk their responsibility as they continue to insist on their sovereignty. 
Importantly, however, the analysis of the conceptual presuppositions of the 
current international refugee protection regime intimates that present failures 
cannot simply be attributed to the reluctance of states. What is at issue is much 
more fundamental than that. The upshot of the analysis presented in this chapter is 
that sovereignty, indeed, crops up whenever refugee protection is at issue, albeit for 
different reasons. My inquiry revealed that the international refugee protection 
regime is rooted in the basic distinctions between here and there, and own and 
foreign. Both distinctions are manifestations of the inside/outside divide that is 
constitutive for sovereign self-determination and self-rule. This refutes the claim 
that refugee protection constitutes an exception to the right to select and exclude 
non-nationals, which is ingredient to sovereign self-determination and self-rule. 
Therefore, I submit that refugee protection does not fetter sovereign power, but 
instead brings it right back into focus. Consequently, if there is a need to rethink 
the basis of our asylum policies, we should proceed from a precise reflection on the 
concept of popular sovereignty. The question, therefore, that motivates this entire 
                                                  
123 Guild (2006) p. 631.  
124 Referring to the ‘spaces of exception’ in which asylum seekers and immigrants are held pending their 
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book is: What concept of popular sovereignty makes it intelligible for a democratic 
We to become responsive to the right to asylum as claimed by refugees? Why 












    
 





In Chapter One, I discussed the legal sources of the international protection of 
refugees, showing that, while the 1951 Refugee Convention is still considered to be 
the central pillar of the protection edifice, international human rights law has 
become an important factor in it, as well. At the same time, however, increasingly 
restrictive measures of immigration control counterbalance the expansion of 
international protection. Both developments seem caustic, and are proof of the 
tension – and at times even outright contradiction – between democracy’s 
adherence to universal human rights and the sovereign right of a people to 
determine itself and strengthen its borders.  
In this chapter, I will discuss the various attempts to mitigate the tension 
between democracy and human rights with regard to refugeeship. The locus classicus 
of these efforts is Hannah Arendt’s line of argument, which may be captured in the 
core phrase of ‘the right to have rights’. I will start with an explanation of this 
phrase in the broader context of her work. Then I will turn to the contemporary 
debate on the implications of Arendt’s thought, as launched, in particular, by Seyla 
Benhabib’s The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens (2004).  Benhabib 
proceeds from the tension between the sovereign right of the people to determine a 
legal space of their own, on the one hand, and the human right of refugees to find 
themselves a legal place of their own, on the other. She understands this tension to 
be a key element in a democratic response to the right of others to seek and be 
granted membership in communities to which they do not yet belong. Mediating 
between the rights and interests of both immigrating refugees and receiving states, 
Benhabib offers a theoretical basis for two common assumptions that ring out in 
debates on immigrants and refugees. First, the assumption that democratic 
collective identity is not predetermined and fixed, and second, that immigrants and 
refugees have a moral right to admission and membership. 
However, I will take issue with the conclusiveness of her argument by analyzing 
its presuppositions, in particular, the presupposition of moral universalism 
underlying her ‘discourse-theoretical’ approach. This critique is inspired, to a large 
extent, by Bonnie Honig’s writing, targeting the idea of reciprocity between the 
members of a polity and those who come to its doorstep. But in the end, I will 
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show that even this critique does not capture with sufficient rigor what the 
challenge inherent in a claim to asylum amounts to. The crucial point here will be 
how we have to think ‘facticity’ – a notion that governs the basic structure of this 
chapter from the starting point with Arendt’s key concepts of nationality and 
natality, over Habermas’s (hence Benhabib’s) idea of Faktizität (from Between 
Facts and Norms), to Honig’s analysis of proximity. 
 
 
3.1 The Crisis of Human Rights 
 
As already said in the previous chapter, Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism, offers 
a thought provoking reflection on the refugee problem that troubled Europe in the 
first half of the Twentieth Century. Her invocation of a right to have rights has 
particularly exerted great influence on the debate on immigration, the sans papiers, 
the stateless and refugees.1 The right to have rights is Arendt’s response to what 
she believes to be the radical crisis of the concept of human rights. 
Arendt’s critique of human rights is twofold. First of all, she discerns an 
unfortunate collapse of human rights into the rights of citizens belonging to a state. 
Though human rights affirm the dignity and freedom of the individual over against 
the state so as to protect the individual against the injustices, violence and 
arbitrariness of state authorities, the state is, nevertheless, the prime distributor of 
these rights. Consequently, even though human rights are said to be universal and 
inalienable, it proved to be a difficult, if not impossible, task to establish the rights 
of those who had lost the protection of their home government and fled their own 
countries. No one, Arendt observes, was ‘able to define with any assurance what 
these general human rights, as distinguished from the rights of citizens, really are.’2 
The drawback of the coincidence between human rights and citizens’ rights is that 
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Cruelty. Citizenship and Civility in the Era of Global Violence’, Constellations. An International Journal of Critical 
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2 OT, p. 293. Importantly, Arendt points out that the practice of asylum is some evidence of the effectiveness 
of human rights outside the context of the nation-state. The practice of asylum for political refugees, 
however, completely broke down in the face of Europe’s new refugees: ‘By itself the loss of government 
protection is no more unprecedented than the loss of home. Civilized countries did offer the right to asylum 
to those who, for political reasons, had been persecuted by their governments, and this practice, though never 
officially incorporated into any constitution, has functioned well-enough throughout the Nineteenth Century, 
and even in our century. The trouble arose when it appeared that the new categories of the persecuted were 
far too numerous to be handled by any unofficial practice destined for exceptional cases. Moreover, the 
majority could hardly qualify for the right of asylum, which implicitly presupposed political or religious 
convictions which were not outlawed in the country of refuge. The new refugees were persecuted not because 
of what they had done or thought, but because of what they unchangeably were – born into the wrong kind 
of race or the wrong kind of class, or drafted by the wrong kind of government … [T]he first glaring fact was 
that these people, though persecuted under some political pretext, were no longer, as the persecuted had been 
throughout history, a liability and an image of shame for the persecutors; that they were not considered as,  
and hardly pretended to be, active enemies …, but that they were and appeared to be nothing but human 
beings whose very innocence – from every point of view, and especially that of the persecuting government – 
was their greatest misfortune.’ 
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the former lack any reality absent the latter: ‘The Rights of Man, supposedly 
inalienable, proved to be unenforceable – even in countries whose constitutions 
were based upon them – whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of 
any state.’3  
The calamity of refugees was not that they were not treated as nationals by the 
state responsible for their protection, as was the case with minorities who -- bad 
enough in itself--often suffered from injustice and arbitrariness. The predicament 
of the refugees was that they found themselves in a situation of complete 
rightlessness: ‘The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of 
opinion – formulas which were designed to solve problems within a given 
community – but that they no longer belong to any community, whatsoever. Their 
plight is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; 
not that they are oppressed, but that nobody even wants to oppress them. Only in 
the last stage of a rather lengthy process is their right to live threatened; only if they 
remain perfectly “superfluous”, if nobody can be found to “claim” them, may their 
lives be in danger … The point is that a condition of complete rightlessness was 
created before the right to live was challenged.’4 
According to Arendt, the inability of states to deal with refugees testified to the 
breakdown of human rights. Human rights either accrue to the citizen, in which 
case they lack any distinguishing feature; or, they pertain to the human being, in 
which case they hang in the void. Arendt empathically argues that human rights, 
‘based upon the assumed existence of a human being’, fell apart when Europe was 
confronted with refugees who had lost everything ‘except that they were still 
human.’ The world, however, ‘found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of 
being human.’5 
Arendt’s second point of criticism is targeted against the supposed existence of 
a naked human being. The breakdown of human rights also debunks the 
assumption of a timeless human being whose freedom, dignity and equality are 
inherent in the natural or biological fact of being born a human. More precisely 
still, the crisis puts doubt on what Agamben coins as the fiction of ‘the continuity 
between man and citizen, nativity and nationality’.6  
Nativity certainly has a long- standing tradition in matters of nationality, as it 
predicates nationality either upon birth in a given territory (ius soli) or birth in a 
particular ethnic community that hands nationality down through the bloodline (ius 
sanguinis). 7  Yet the principle of nativity is certainly not conclusive. It does not 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 293.  
4 Ibid., pp. 295, 296.  
5 Ibid, p. 299.  
6 Compare Agamben 1998, p. 131: ‘If refugees (whose numbers have continued to grow in our century to the 
point of including a significant part of humanity today) represent such a disquieting element in the order of 
the modern nation-state, this is above all because by breaking the continuity between man and citizen, nativity 
and nationality, they put the originary fiction of modern sovereignty in crisis. Bringing to light the difference 
between birth and nation, the refugee causes the secret presupposition of the political domain – bare life – to 
appear for an instant within that domain. In this sense, the refugee is truly ‘the man of rights’, as Arendt 
suggests, the first and only real appearance of rights outside the fiction of the citizen that always covers them 
over. Yet, this is precisely what makes the figure of the refugee so hard to define politically.’ 
7  Though states, as of old, adhere to the doctrines of ius soli and/or ius sanguinis, Weis points out that 
nationality is not, for that matter, a simple biological-historical term. First and foremost, nationality, he 
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explain, for example, the injunction that no one be deprived of the right to change 
his or her nationality as stipulated in article 15 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Also, the description of nationality by the International Court of 
Justice in the famous Nottebohm case (1953) rebuts the view that nationality is 
solely predicated on birth. Nationality, the ICJ expressed, ‘is a legal bond having as 
its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests, 
and sentiments.’8 As Van Waas explains, many factors may serve as evidence for 
this ‘genuine connection’ such as, indeed, place of birth or descent, but also 
marriage, family ties, language and so on which allow for the attribution of 
nationality on the basis of ius domicile.9 
Clearly, then, nationality is not unequivocally linked to ‘birth’ and ‘origin.’ 
Indeed, recall from Chapter Two that nationality enables an individual to dwell in 
his or her own country. In its General Comment on Freedom of Movement (1999) 
the Human Rights Commission has made it perfectly clear that ‘one’s own country’ 
does not of necessity coincide with ‘country of origin’: ‘The scope of ‘his own 
country’ is broader than the concept of ‘country of nationality.’ It is not limited to 
nationality in the formal sense, that is, nationality acquired at birth or by conferral; 
it embraces, at the very least, an individual who, because of his or her special ties 
to, or claims in relation to, a given country, cannot be considered to be a mere 
alien.’10 
Indeed, the very expression ‘one’s own country’ already calls into question that 
nativity is the one and only principle of nationality. It suggests that in matters of 
nationality, what might be called the principle of natality is of equal importance.11  
Drawing on Arendt, the principle of natality reflects that what makes us human 
is not the simple, biological fact of being born a human, but rather, the symbolic 
fact that our birth marks a new beginning in this world. This she had learned from 
St. Augustine, who writes that ‘in order that there be such a beginning, man was 
created before whom nobody was.’ In her dissertation of 1929, Arendt comments 
on St. Augustine’s phrase, arguing that ‘the beginning that was created with man 
prevented time and the universe as a whole from turning eternally in cycles … 
without anything new ever happening. Hence, it was for the sake of novitas, in a 
sense, that man was created.’12  
Our ‘first’ birth subjects us to the necessities of biological and reproductive life, 
condemning us, that is, to ‘turning eternally in cycles.’ But, our second and 
symbolic birth makes us free. 13  Natality is, therefore, the principle of human 
freedom and action. Capable to ‘act as a beginner’ and ‘to enact the story of 
                                                                                                                   
argues, is a politico-legal term denoting membership in a particular state that is responsible for granting rights 
and duties (Cf. Weis 1979, pp. 1-3).  
8 As cited in Van Waas 2009, p. 32. 
9 Cf.,  ibid., p. 32.  
10 As cited in: Van Roermund, B. ‘Migrants, Humans and Human Rights: The Right to Move as the Right to 
Stay’, in Lindahl, H.K. ed., A Right to Inclusion and Exclusion? Normative Fault Lines of the EU's Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, Oxford: Hart Publishers 2009, p.166. 
11  Van Roermund notes that the predicate ‘nationality’ can easily be misunderstood as a gateway to 
nationalism. Therefore, he proposes to follow Arendt in her elaboration of the principle of natality which is 
to illuminate, Van Roermund argues, the concept of one’s own country (Cf., Ibid., p. 170).  
12 Arendt, H. Love and Saint Augustine (translated from the German), Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
1996, p. 55.  
13 For an interpretation on the difference between our ‘first’ and ‘second’ birth in the work of Arendt see: De 
Schutter, D. Een keters begin. Arendt’s filosofie over het actieve leven, Budel: Damon 2005.  
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mankind’, human beings, according to Arendt, never simply are, but rather ‘human 
existence consists in acting and behaving in some way or other.’14  Our second 
symbolic birth is, therefore, far more significant than our biological birth which 
roots us in a territory or fixes us in a bloodline. It is due to our second birth that we 
are able to disclose ourselves in words and deeds to others.15 Our entrance into the 
world of public life is, therefore, borne by natality. Natality enables us to share a 
world together with others of our kind. By virtue of natality, it can be argued, we 
have a place of our own within this world. Moreover, our acting and speaking 
together with others is the precondition of our having rights. The rights we have, 
Arendt argues, are not given to us by birth, but are the outcome of our joint 
political action: ‘Equality, in contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not 
given to us, but is the result of human organization insofar as it is guided by the 
principle of justice. We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a 




3.2 The Right to Have Rights 
 
So, Arendt’s rebuttal of human rights is twofold: They lack any effective reality if 
not backed up by membership in a political community, and at the same time, 
dislodge the human from everything that makes life human, muting those who are 
suffering from the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human. Both points of 
criticism are reflected in Arendt’s famous formulation of a right to have rights: ‘The 
fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the 
deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions 
effective… This extremity, and nothing else, is the situation of people deprived of 
human rights. They are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to 
action; not of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right of opinion. 
We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live 
in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to 
belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people 
emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global 
political situation.’17 
Here, Arendt captures one important aspect of the plight of refugees: Deprived 
of a place in the world, whatever refugees say or do does not matter. They are not 
perceived, but remain invisible. Denied the relevance of speech and rendered 
completely powerless, refugees are without a world in the thorough political sense 
in which Arendt understands the notion of a world. A world is what emerges 
between us whenever we share with others our own view of the world. A world is 
                                                 
14 Arendt 1996, p. 53.  
15 Compare Arendt, H. The Human Condition. A Study on the Central Dilemmas Facing Modern Man, New York: 
Doubleday Anchor Book 1959, p. 157: ‘With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world, and 
this insertion is like a second birth, in which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our 
original physical appearance.’ 
16 OT, p. 301. 
17 Ibid. pp. 296, 297.  
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the in- between that connects and separates us;18 it is what we have in common and 
what we share by exchanging our opinions and views which are always unique. It is 
this intricate interplay between commonness and uniqueness, between plurality and 
singularity, that make up a world and enables us to inhabit a world.19  The most 
fundamental dimension of the world is, therefore, the public space; that is, ‘the 
space where I appear to others as others appear to me.’20 The meaning of this 
public realm is political freedom which is guaranteed by the equality between those 
who appear in it. Importantly, Arendt understands equality primarily as ‘that all 
have the same claim to political activity’, which takes ‘the form of speaking and 
acting with one another.’21 The crucial point of political freedom, Arendt argues, ‘is 
that it is a spatial construct.’ Therefore, the refugee who is forced to leave his home 
community not only loses his fatherland, ‘but also he loses the only space in which 
he can be free – and he loses the society of his equals.’22 
Though refugees are, thus, without a world, it is far too quick to limit their 
plight to their exclusion from the public realm. In the vast literature on the right to 
have rights there is a general tendency to derive the meaning of this right from the 
refugee’s exclusion from the public realm and, hence, interpret it as a right to 
political action.23 The argument heavily relies on Arendt’s later work on the human 
condition and the distinctions she draws between the public realm and the private 
sphere, and between political freedom and the subjection to the necessities of 
natural life. The two parts of the disjunction that refugees are deprived of a place in 
the world and are suffering from the abstract nakedness of being nothing but 
human, have  been believed to be conceptually linked to the exclusion from the 
public realm and the ensuing condemnation to the silence and darkness of a private 
existence.24  
                                                 
18 Cf., Arendt, H. Men in Dark Times, London: Jonathan Cape 1970, p. 4.  
19 Compare Arendt, H. The Promise of Politics (ed. Kohn, J., translated from the German), New York: Schocken 
Books 2005, p.93: ‘Politics is based on the fact of human plurality. God created man, but men are a human, 
earthly product, the product of human nature … Politics deals with the coexistence and association of different 
men.’ Cf., also Arendt 1959, p. 156.   
20 Arendt 1959, p. 177.  
21 Arendt 2005, p. 118.  
22 Ibid., p. 119.  
23 Cf., note 35 above.   
24  In her account of Arendt’s politics of (in)visibility, Borren, for example, seems to express this view. 
Elaborating on the distinction between the private sphere and the public realm, Borren argues that visibility 
belongs to the latter where we appear and disclose to others who we are, whereas invisibility is ‘good’ for the 
former. In the private sphere, we live by what is given to us by mere existence, such as the passions of our 
hearts and souls, our caring, loving, and so forth. This has to remain invisible, protected against the public 
eye. Having formulated public visibility and private or natural invisibility to be the conditions of ‘sound 
political action’, Borren goes on to argue that public invisibility and natural visibility qualify as two ‘two 
pathologies of the political’ (Cf., Borren (2008), p. 224). According to Borren, both pathologies characterize 
the dire predicament of refugees and undocumented aliens. Both pathologies seem to imply that they are 
excluded from the public realm and thus denied their dignity without, moreover, being able to find 
reassurance in their private existence. Nevertheless, Borren holds that the two pathologies of the political are 
most notably detrimental to political action. Consequently, she argues that denial of access to the public 
realm, i.e., the loss of a place in the world that makes opinions significant and actions effective, is the essence of 
statelessness (Cf., Ibid,, p. 217). As predominance is given to public invisibility, Borren is able to contend that 
current strategies of self-obscuring practiced by illegal immigrants in their attempt to hide from the 
authorities, would have been incomprehensible to Arendt. But, Arendt was very well aware of the fact that 
refugees not only lost a place in the world where they could appear and share the world with others, but that 
they had lost their homes, as well. She knew that before anything else, they had to suffer the dreadful 
problem of where they had the right to live.  
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True, in The Origins, Arendt indeed asserts that the refugee is reduced to his 
mere existence. And mere existence, Arendt goes on to explain, is ‘all that is 
mysteriously given to us by birth and which includes the shape of our bodies and 
the talents of our minds’ and that can only be adequately dealt with ‘by the 
unpredictable hazards of friendship and sympathy, or by the great and incalculable 
grace of love, which says with St. Augustine, ‘Volo ut sis’ (I want you to be), without 
being able to give any particular reason for such supreme and unsurpassable 
affirmation.’25 
Though sympathy, friendship, love and charity are adequate ways to deal with 
mere existence, the balefulness of the refugee’s condition is precisely that he is 
entirely delivered over to such an ethical sense of those who are near in the absence 
of a law that protects him. ‘The prolongation of their lives’, Arendt says, ‘is due to 
charity and not to right.’26 And, it is great risk to bet on charity. For, the reduction 
to the natural givenness of mere existence not only makes the refugee dependent 
upon sympathy, charity or even an a-political humanitarianism, but equally exposes 
him to hostility, violence and abuse with impunity.27 
 Indeed, the refugee’s loss of a political community willing and able to grant him 
rights does not boil down to his exclusion from the public realm, which supposedly 
forces him into invisibility behind the four walls of his private existence. The dire 
predicament of refugees is much more severe. Wherever he remains, he fears the 
nocturnal knock on the door by the authorities who will tell him that he does not 
belong here (not even in his own house) and who are eager to arrest and detain 
him. The plight of the refugee is not only that he is without a world in the 
thorough political sense Arendt ascribes to it, but also – and more disturbingly – 
that he is nowhere in this world. He is not only suffering from the silence and 
darkness of his private existence, from his inability to move to political action, but 
also he faces the dilemma that he has no right to live anywhere. Slavery, Arendt 
asserts with the usual lack of tact that distinctively marks her, was bad. But in any 
case, slaves were still needed; they still had their own place within the world. ‘[In] 
the light of recent events’, Arendt, therefore, argues, ‘it is possible to say that even 
slaves belonged to some sort of human community: Their labor was needed, used 
and exploited, and this kept them within the pale of humanity. To be a slave was, 
after all, to have a distinct character, a place in society – more than the abstract 
nakedness of being human and nothing but human.’ 28  Both the slave and the 
refugee are not free; both are denied the opportunities for their emancipation, and 
deprived of the power to fight for their freedom. But, unlike the slave, the refugee 
is not even subjected to the necessities of biological, reproductive life. The refugee 
is rendered completely useless, made entirely superfluous,29  -- and even though 
Arendt has always been hesitant to define radical evil, she believes that making 
people superfluous is the greatest evil of all.30 To be uprooted, Arendt holds, is to 
                                                 
25 OT, p. 301.  
26 OT, p. 296.  
27 Cf. also Agamben 1998, p. 174.  
28 OT, p. 297. 
29 Zygmunt Bauman also expresses the view that refugees are of no use at all in this world, and that their lives 
are wasted. Cf., Bauman, Z. Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts, Cambridge: Polity 2004.  
30 Compare Arendt, H. & Jaspers, K. Correspondence 1926-1969 (ed. Kohler, L & Saner, H., translated from the 
German), New York/San Diego/London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers 1992, p. 166: ‘[W]e know 
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lack a place in this world which is recognized and guaranteed by others. It is the 
preliminary condition for superfluity, which means, not to belong to the world at 
all.31 
I, therefore, submit that it is far too quick to interpret the right to have rights as 
a right to political action and participation in the public space. Not only would this 
distort the understanding of the plight of refugees, but also it would miss out on 
the fundamental dilemma the right to have rights evokes. The right to have rights 
highlights that the refugee is without a world at the same time that he is nowhere in 
this world; it signals the deprivation of the refugee’s life of public appearance, as 
well as his situation of complete rightlessness. The conceptual question  the right to 
have rights evokes is, therefore: How is the refugee to claim a right to have rights 
while he is excluded from the rights that give us the equal claim to political activity, 
and that enable us to appear and stand up for our rights? Indeed, if we are not 
borne equal but become equal by virtue of our decision to mutually grant ourselves 
rights, that is, if our rights are the result of our political action, how can we hear the 
claim to a right to have rights by those who are without a voice? At the very least, 
the political reciprocity by virtue of which we are equal seems to imply a 
fundamental asymmetry between the receiving community and the refugee. If there 
is no ‘We’ between the refugee and the receiving state, how can he or she claim to 
be admitted to and belong to this very political community? As I will show below, 
Benhabib tries to put the pieces of this puzzle together.  
 
 
3.3 Between Hospitality and Membership 
 
In The Rights of Others, nationality matters are taken to a different level as Benhabib 
approaches the question of membership from the perspective of large scale 
movements of people across state borders. Membership and nationality matters are 
no longer issues that affect singular nation-states alone, but have become an urgent 
aspect of world politics and a key issue in the question of global justice.32 
 As immigration raises the question of membership, it would be inadequate to 
frame immigration as a matter of hospitality that is principled on the cosmopolitan 
ideal of ‘world citizenship.’ Indeed, if Benhabib were merely concerned for this 
cosmopolitan ideal, her reflection on, and contemporary interpretation of, 
Immanuel Kant’s right to hospitality would do. As is well known, the right of 
hospitality is formulated as the third definitive article of Kant’s On Perpetual Peace 
(1795), and states that ‘the law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of 
universal hospitality.’33 True, Kant’s claim that states are not allowed to dispel a 
foreigner if this would lead to his destruction, draws on the traditional right of 
                                                                                                                   
that the greatest of all evils, or radical evil, has nothing to do anymore with such humanly understandable, 
sinful motives. What radical evil really is I don’t know, but it seems to me it somehow has to do with the 
following phenomenon: making human beings as human beings superfluous (not using them as a means to an 
end, which leaves their essence as humans untouched and impinges only on their human dignity; rather, 
making them superfluous as human beings).’ 
31 Cf., OT p. 475.  
32 Cf., Benhabib 2004, p. 2.  
33 Kant. I. ‘Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch.’ in Reiss, H., ed. Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1994, pp. 99-108. 
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states to grant asylum to a foreigner whom they refuse to extradite to a state which 
wants them back for punishment. It might even be interpreted, as Benhabib 
suggests, as an early version of the prohibition of refoulement. Yet, Kant’s reflections 
on universal hospitality seem particularly apposite for current debates on 
cosmopolitanism, travel and temporary and economic migration. Kant limits 
hospitality to a right of temporary sojourn [Besuchrecht], and argues that a right to 
permanent stay [Gastrecht] requires a Wohltätiger Vertrag between the visitor and the 
state. The limitation of hospitality to temporary sojourn reflects the cosmopolitan 
ideal of exploring the free world and seeking contact with one’s fellow ‘world 
citizens.’ 
 But the issue of asylum has little if anything to do with this cosmopolitan ideal. 
Indeed, the right to have rights brings to awareness that to live in the world does 
not mean to be at home just about everywhere in the world, but to have a legally 
sealed place within this world. The right to have rights underscores, as Benhabib 
would say, the ongoing ‘significance of membership within bounded 
communities’.34 It highlights, that is, that membership is always spatially bounded. 
The spatiality of membership sets the stage for the dilemma that democratic 
states and refugees face when facing each other. For the spatiality of membership 
signals that state borders, first of all, separate members from non-members and 
determine who belongs and who doesn’t. Evidently, state borders are not reducible 
to a geographical line that delimits a territory. 35  Rather, state borders are, as 
Benhabib puts it, as much civic as they are territorial.36 Territoriality is, therefore, 
bound up with democratic closure: ‘Precisely because democracies enact laws that 
are supposed to bind those who legitimately authorize them, the scope of 
democratic legitimacy cannot extend beyond the demos which has circumscribed 
itself as a people upon a given territory.’37  
So, in the same vein that the individual’s enjoyment of rights and freedom is 
spatially bounded, so too is the freedom of a given people spatially limited,38 which 
is but another way of saying that the inside/outside divide is constitutive of 
democratic legal order. For the inside/outside divide to become manifest, it colors 
as a here and a there, materializes into the own and foreign. What is our own takes 
place and materializes into a here that we, the members of this polity, view to be 
our own place by virtue of the values we hold in common.39  
                                                 
34 Benhabib 2004, pp. 2, 3.  
35 In this respect, it is interesting to note that the field of political geography has evolved from focusing on 
geographical demarcation, the physical line so to speak, to studying borders as constituting and representing 
differences in space. As Van Houtum captures this shift, ‘the border is now understood as a verb, in the sense 
of bordering.’ (Van Houtum, H. ‘The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries’, Geopolitics,  vol. 10 (2005), p. 
672).   
36 Cf. Benhabib 2004, p. 1. And Ibid., p. 45.  
37 Ibid., p. 219.  
38 Arendt, too, highlights that the people’s freedom is necessarily spatially bounded.  If, in democracy, self-
legislation is to be understood as the free act of a people to determine and govern itself, this implies that a 
people’s freedom is always  bounded: ‘[L]aws are the positively established fences which hedge in, protect, 
and limit the space in which freedom is not a concept, but a living, political reality.’ (Arendt, ‘Karl Jaspers: 
Citizen of the World?’, in: Arendt, Men in Dark Times, Jonathan Cape, London, 1968, pp. 81, 82.). 
39 Compare Lindahl, H.K. ‘Give and Take: Arendt and the Nomos of Political Community’, Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, vol. 32 (2006) p. 888: ‘[t]o close off a space is to qualify this space as an own territory. Hence, by 
closing itself off as an inside with respect to an outside, a community posits a territory as its own, and vice versa. An inside and 
an own territory are two sides of the same coin.’  
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Importantly, the outside, with respect to which an inside is limited, is not 
undetermined. At the other side of the border we do not encounter an empty 
space. Instead, we enter upon the territory of a different state. Lindahl captures the 
meaning thereof when he argues that borders not only separate an inside from an 
outside, but also unite what they separate into an encompassing whole. Without 
uniting what borders separate, there would not be a foreign country beyond our 
borders, but a desert in which the polity that has closed itself off would be like an 
island of peace and freedom. By the same token, the other would not be a foreigner 
belonging to another state, but a barbarian. To say that borders unite what they 
separate is to say that we live in a common world in which each and every individual 
has a place of its own.40  
Thus, to live in the world means, first of all, to have a legally sealed place within 
this world. It is from this place and out of it that the free world can be explored. 
Indeed, recall from Chapter Two that the right to free movement is a function of 
nationality. The cosmopolitan ideal of being at home just about everywhere in the 
world is, therefore, not precluded by the fact of nationality. In fact, it is my legal 
membership in a political community that allows and enables me to leave home 
and travel the world. It, therefore, makes little sense to stage ‘world citizenship’ or 
‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ as the opposite of spatially limited membership. Rather, 
the opposite of being at home everywhere is not to have a place of one’s own 
somewhere, but to be nowhere.41 This, recall, is the absolutely desperate experience 
of refugees. Indeed, according to Arendt refugees are forced to live outside the 
common world.42 They, therefore, challenge the very assumption that we live in a 
common world. 
It is against this backdrop that Benhabib establishes a right to membership of 
‘others’ (thus pertaining to immigrants and refugees alike) in communities to which 
they do not yet belong. She gives both an empirical, or institutional, and theoretical 
justification for this right to seek and be granted membership. On an institutional 
reading, this right derives, Benhabib believes, from the injunction against 
denationalization as is formulated in article 15 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied 
the right to change his nationality.’ The   injunction is predicated on the risk of 
rendering a person stateless.43 But Benhabib establishes a direct link between the 
                                                 
40 Compare Lindahl (2004), p. 470: ‘[The] external borders that close off the EU also connect it to rest of the 
world. By laying down external borders, the EU includes itself and what it excludes in an encompassing unity 
of legal places: the legal world. The area is not a legal enclave in what is otherwise a geographical continuum – 
the ‘earth’, was we might call it; by referring to ‘third-country nationals’, whether legally or illegally resident in 
the EU, Directives 2003/9 and 2003/86 indicate that, no less than the area, the rest of the world has a 
normative status: it is the ensemble of territories where, unless authorized to enter the EU, these individuals 
ought to be. Accordingly, the EU posits the Area and third countries as places within a common legal world, 
common by virtue of the claim that all individuals have their own place within the distribution of places.’ (italics are mine).  
41  For this reason, Van Roermund refutes the claim the cosmopolitan ideal of world citizenship is 
paradigmatic of the right of freedom of movement: ‘[T]he cosmopolitan academic is not the role model for 
freedom of movement. For the academic, ‘shifting grounds’ is certainly an enriching and nourishing 
experience. But these ex-plorations presuppose a ‘homeland’ from which one may set forth to other regions, 
and to which one can always return.’ (Van Roermund 2009, p. 171). The right to freedom of movement 
should, therefore, paradoxically be interpreted as the right to stay, namely as ‘the right to stay rooted in a 
nursing and nourishing environment that ‘land’ or (more broadly) ‘country’ stands for in a paradigmatic way.’ 
(Ibid., p. 170).  
42 Cf., OT, p. 302. 
43 Cf., Van Waas 2009, p. 61. 
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prohibition of denationalization and the right to membership that is relevant for all 
immigrants, not just for those who are stateless: ‘Liberal democracies … must 
themselves accept naturalization, i.e., admittance to membership, as the obverse 
side against denationalization. Just as you cannot render individuals stateless at will, 
nor can you, as a sovereign state, deny them membership in perpetuity. You may 
stipulate certain criteria of membership, but they can never be of such a kind that 
others would be permanently barred from becoming a member of your polity. 
Theocratic, authoritarian, fascist, and nationalist regimes do this, but liberal 
democracies ought not to.’ 44  From a theoretical point of view, the right to 
membership is principled on communicative freedom which enables the individual 
to exercise personal autonomy. The right to seek and be granted membership is but 
the reverse side of the right – derived from the exercise of personal autonomy – ‘to 
withdraw consent to exist within certain state boundaries.’45 
Thus, Benhabib proceeds from the assumption that others do have a right to 
seek and be granted membership. This right challenges the traditional boundaries 
of the nation-state that define membership in terms of natural, historical or cultural 
belonging. In the absence of natural or cultural attachments to a country, how, if at 
all, can immigrants claim a right to membership? Indeed, the question that 
motivates the entire book is: If traditional boundaries are no longer apt to regulate 
the political and legal integration of newcomers, on what grounds, then, can 
membership be conferred? 
The particular strength of The Rights of Others derives from the fact that it seeks 
to accommodate the right claims and interests of both parties involved. Over 
against the individual’s freedom, Benhabib affirms the freedom of a democratic 
people which is guaranteed by the principle of sovereignty. The right to select and 
exclude non-nationals at the borders of a state is concomitant to the right of a 
sovereign people to determine itself. Perhaps the most important contribution of 
Benhabib’s argument to the ongoing debate on immigration is that it acknowledges 
that states set the terms for access and membership, while at the same time places 
the burden of proof in case of rejection on the receiving state. Throughout her 
book, there is a clear presumption against restricting the individual’s freedom by 
excluding him from membership, the corollary being that it is for states to explain 
and justify why a certain immigrant can never become a full member of the polis. 
From the outset of the book, it is clear that some practices of exclusion are always 
impermissible. So, states retain a certain discretion to impose requirements for 
membership, such as length of stay, resources, language skills or working abilities, 
as long as there is no discrimination on ascriptive grounds. ‘The others’, whose 
rights Benhabib seeks to spell out and secure, include all immigrants, without any 
differentiation between foreigners whom we like and who are like us, and 
immigrants who do not share in our dominant values, beliefs and practices. 
 Benhabib’s claim that exclusion on ascriptive grounds cannot be justified 
concurs with the EU Long Term Residents Directive (2003/109/EC) which 
                                                 
44 Benhabib 2004, p. 135. Dora Kostakopoulou takes the issue a step further, arguing that the issue of 
membership should be uncoupled from nationality matters altogether. Cf., Kostakopoulou, D. ‘Thick, Thin 
and Thinner Patriotisms: Is This All There is?’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 26 (2006), pp. 73-106. Cf., 
also Kostakopoulou, D. ‘Why Naturalisation?’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society , Special Issue on 
‘Europeanisation’: Regulation and Identity in the New Europe, vol. 4 (2003), pp. 85-115. 
45 Benhabib 2004, p. 137.  
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regulates the legal position of third country nationals legally within the European 
Union, affording them a European resident status which is to equal the status of an 
EU national. Recital 5 of the Directive reads: ‘Member States should give effect to 
the provisions of this Directive without discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic characteristics, language, religion or beliefs, 
political or other opinions, membership of a national minority, fortune, birth, 
disabilities, age or sexual orientation.’ Remarkably, though, refugees and persons 
granted subsidiary protection are excluded from the ambit of this Directive, with 
the effect that their legal status, even after years of legal residence, remains highly 
uncertain. 
My question to Benhabib is, therefore, very simple: Does her theory, that seeks 
to ground the political and legal integration of newcomers, provide a compelling 
argument to include refugees in the Long Term Residents Directive as is strongly 
advocated, amongst others, by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles?46 
Does her theory on inclusion, which tenaciously refuses to make membership 
contingent on history, ethnicity or culture, has the advantage of bringing the 
integration of refugees into view again, as is recommended by article 34 of the 
Refugee Convention? In short, does Benhabib offer a substantial reason to grant 
refugees asylum here, and afford them with the full catalogue of human rights so as 
to offset the current favoring of returning refugees home? As Benhabib, herself, 
notes, ‘while the right to seek asylum is recognized as a human right, the obligation to 
grant asylum continues to be jealously guarded by states as a sovereign principle.’47 
Does her effort to source a right to membership give a solid theoretical basis for a 




3.4 ‘We, the People’ 
 
The right to have rights is the right of those who are vulnerable in every aspect of 
their lives, as they are without a political community willing and able to bestow and 
guarantee rights. It is a claim at the behest of those who have been expelled from 
their country, and who are trying to reestablish their terrestrial ties by seeking 
admission in a different community. But the right to have rights is not an easy 
solution to the refugee and stateless problem. For, it also reflects a fundamental 
dilemma that is related to a basic insight in modern democracy and popular 
sovereignty. Modern democracy and popular sovereignty express that the people is 
both the author of the laws and the interested party thereof. Or, as Arendt puts it, 
the insight that we are equal and free on account of mutually granting ourselves 
rights. Hence the dilemma: If rights presuppose political reciprocity between the 
members of a community, and are the outcome of our joint political action, what, 
                                                 
46 Cf. Comments from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles on the European Commission Proposal 
to recast the Qualification Directive March 2010.   
47 Benhabib 2004, p. 69.  
48 2000/C 364/01, article 18: ‘The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the 
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January, 1967, relating to the status of refugees 
and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community.’  
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then, can be the ground for a right to have rights?49 How can the refugee, who as a 
non-member is excluded from political action, claim a right to have rights? The 
difficulty has been clearly formulated by Michelman: ‘According to Arendt’s 
argument, you require inclusion because inclusion is a precondition of your 
contributing by action to the production of, and hence the possibility of your 
having (further) rights; but this inclusion, which is presently lacking to you (that’s 
why you are claiming it) would by the same token be a precondition of your 
contributing to the production of, and, hence, your having, this very right to 
inclusion.’50 
In her journey to refound a right to membership, Benhabib proceeds from this 
very dilemma. Democracy, she argues, requires closure. As it expresses that 
legislation is the self-legislation of a We, it requires, from its very beginning, a clear 
demarcation between those in whose name the laws have been enacted, and those 
upon whom the laws are not binding, as they did not partake in the process of self-
legislation.51 The people’s freedom, guaranteed by the right to self-determination, is 
therefore necessarily bounded, 52  as it is brought about by the selection and 
exclusion of values that determine the common good at the same time that 
boundaries are drawn that separate members from non-members.53 Importantly, 
boundaries are always drawn from within, that is, we decide upon the norms, rules 
and practices of inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, suppose that the other would 
partake in the process in which those norms and practices are ruled. Then his very 
participation would already amount to some form of inclusion, while his very 
inclusion or exclusion was precisely what had to be decided.54 The lack of political 
reciprocity between those who are in and those who are out, therefore, implies an 
inevitable asymmetry between members and non-members. Benhabib’s observation 
is, therefore, astute: ‘A shared feature of all norms of membership … is that those 
who are affected by the consequences of these norms and, in the first place, by 
criteria of exclusion, per definitionem, cannot be party to their articulation.’55  
                                                 
49 Cf., also Schaap (2011), p. 27.  
50  Michelman, F. ‘Parsing “A Right to Have Rights”’, Constellations. An International Journal of Critical and 
Democratic Theory, vol. 3  (1996), p. 206. 
51 Cf. Benhabib 2004, p.  219.  
52 Cf., also Lindahl, H. ‘Border Crossings by Immigrants: Legality, Illegality and Alegality’, Res Publica, vol. 14 
(2008), p. 121.  
53 Cf., Benhabib 2004, p. 45.  
54 This is the ultimate insight of the five friends in Kafka’s short parable, ‘Gemeinschaft.’ In fact, it is their 
only realization that makes some sense. Told from the first person plural perspective, the five community 
members are at pains to reject a sixth man from their community. The five men understand each other to be 
friends, though they seem to be uncertain as to what constitutes their friendship. They share nothing in 
particular in common, except the fact that they are all adamant to keep the sixth man out. As the sixth man is 
quite persistent and vexing, they deliberate that, perhaps, they should explain to him why he cannot join 
them. But they cannot think of any substantial reason, as they themselves do not know why they form a 
group. But, apart from the fact that they are unable to communicate a valid reason to the sixth man, they 
bethink that to talk to him and include him in their deliberations would be tantamount to accepting him in 
their community. They are, it can be said, aware of the asymmetry between them and him. To be sure, this 
asymmetry does not in and of itself justify the exclusion of the sixth man or exclusion in general, as I intend 
to demonstrate throughout this book. 
55 Benhabib 2004, p.15. For an argument to the contrary see: Abizadeh, A. ‘Democratic Theory and Border 
Coercion. No Right to Unilaterally Control your Own Borders’, Political Theory, vol. 36 (2008), pp. 37-65. 
Based on the assumption that ‘the demos of democratic theory is, in principle, unbounded’, Abizadeh argues 
that practices of inclusion and exclusion ‘must consequently be democratically justified to foreigners, as well 
as to citizens.’(Ibid., p. 38). According to Abizadeh, democratic theory in and of itself already establishes 
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This, however, does not imply that Benhabib privileges a sovereign right of 
inclusion and exclusion. As said already, Benhabib offers a thought-provoking 
intervention in the debate on immigration as she takes the interests and rights of 
both parties involved into account. She mediates between the sovereign right of a 
people to determine itself, and the right of others to seek and be granted 
membership,  undercutting both the closing off of borders on the basis of a 
presumed predominance of sovereignty while, at the same time, showing ‘open 
borders’ to be theoretically infeasible, as well. She successfully argues against a 
rhetoric that privileges a sovereign people to be free to determine admission 
conditions on account of an alleged ‘distinctiveness of groups and cultures’56 that 
has to be protected against immigrants who dilute and impair that distinctiveness. 
Referring to cosmopolitan norms that regulate the relations between foreigners and 
states57 and that have been incorporated in international law, she argues that it is 
simply false to assume ‘that shared cultural commonalities will always trump human 
rights claims.’ 58  Cosmopolitan norms, she argues, have created ‘a network of 
obligations and imbrications around sovereignty.’59 
But Benhabib is equally sceptical about those theories that too quickly play the 
card of human rights in their defence of open borders, on the assumption that 
democratic closure is unjust and discriminatory, per se.60 As she recognizes the 
regulatory rights of democracies without denying others the right to seek 
membership, she has to come up with a theory of democratic self-understanding 
and self-definition that does not exclude the others beforehand for reasons of 
cultural integrity or identity. She draws upon a normative theory of deliberative 
democracy and discourse ethics in order to make intelligible why the rights of a 
people and the rights of immigrants are not mutually exclusive, but are open to 
mediation and mitigation. 
 Though not mutually exclusive, the rights of the two interested parties may, in 
fact, be conflicting. But conflict is not the problem. Rather it is, according to 
Benhabib, the way out of the problem. Indeed, the whole of Benhabib’s argument 
revolves around the teasing out of the discordant, fractured and unstable nature of 
democratic collective identity which makes it liable to an on-going contestation. On 
her account, the crack in collective identity is nothing other than the duality – 
constitutive for liberal democracies61 – between its concrete particularistic content 
                                                                                                                   
political reciprocity between members and foreigners. If power, such as border control, is exerted over 
people, this exercise should be justified to them democratically for a foreign power to be legitimate. 
Abizadeh, therefore, argues for the establishment of democratic forums or cosmopolitan democratic 
institutions so as to ensure that practices of inclusion and exclusion are jointly controlled by citizens and 
foreigners (Cf., Ibid., p. 54). This, however, raises the question why, if at all, practices of inclusion and 
exclusion would continue to hold if ‘the others’ and ‘we’ already jointly control these practices.  
56  For the sake of transparency, it should be noted that Benhabib argues against Walzer’s theory on 
democratic citizenship as he presents in Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (1983). Cf., 
Benhabib 2004, pp. 117-120.  
57  Cf., Benhabib, S. ‘Hospitality, Sovereignty, and Democratic Iterations’, in Post, R. ed. Another 
Cosmopolitanism. Seyla Benhabib (with commentaries by Jeremy Waldron, Bonnie Honig, Will Kymlicka), Oxford/New 
York: Oxford University Press 2006, p. 148.  
58 Benhabib 2004, 126.  
59 Ibid.,  p. 67.  
60 Benhabib here argues against Joseph Caren’s ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’. Cf. Ibid., 
pp. 94, 95.  
61 Compare Ibid., p. 44: ‘ “We, the people”, refers to a particular human community, circumscribed in space 
and time, sharing a particular culture, history, and legacy; yet, this people establishes itself as a democratic 
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and the universal principles of human rights to which it aspires. From the vantage 
point of the universal, those who are excluded can, and in fact will, contest the civic 
boundaries of a democratic state: ‘The democratic people constitute themselves as 
sovereign because they uphold certain principles of human rights and because the 
terms of their association interpret as well as flesh out these rights. Of course, the 
precise interpretation of human rights and the content of citizens’ rights must be 
spelled out and articulated in light of the concrete historical traditions and practices 
of a given society. Yet these principles are not exhausted, either in their validity or 
in their content, through their embodiment in specific cultural and legal traditions 
alone. They have a context-transcending validity claim, in the name of which the 
excluded and downtrodden, the marginalized and the despised, mobilize and claim 
political agency and membership.’62  
Thus, Benhabib sources the others’ right to membership in the fissure of 
collective identity which is limited to the duality between the universal and 
particular. As I set out to demonstrate, however, it is this derivation that obscures 
the stakes involved in the right to have rights by taking the political sting out of it.  
According to Benhabib, the theory that best suits the ongoing tension between 
the universal and particular, and that makes this tension fruitful, is a normative 
theory of deliberative democracy that draws on the principles of a discourse 
ethics.63  Following Habermas, Benhabib spells out that the primary concern of 
discourse ethics is the democratic warrant of norms and institutions. This concern 
motivates the basic premise of discourse theory: ‘Only those norms and normative 
institutional arrangements are valid which can be agreed to by all concerned under 
special argumentation situations named discourses.’64 
 Yet this basic premise raises more questions than it answers. Benhabib frames 
these questions as specific manifestations of what she coins as the paradox of 
democratic legitimacy. This paradox manifests itself in several ways, only two of which 
will be discussed here, as they explicitly relate to the question of setting 
boundaries.65  
We already implicitly touched upon a first manifestation of the paradox which 
relates to the question of scope.66 Formulated against the backdrop of discourse 
ethics, the paradox is this: As discourse theory proceeds from the assumption that 
only those norms and practices are valid that can be agreed upon by all those 
concerned, it presupposes a political reciprocity between those who partake in 
discourse. But the question, the first question, so to speak, is, of course: Who are to 
be involved in the discourse? Who are to be party to this reciprocal relation? 
Suppose that those who participate in the process of norm setting and positioning 
of boundaries would raise the question, who is to be included and who excluded. 
Clearly, the question is self-begging: As discourse had already started, it takes for 
                                                                                                                   
body by acting in the name of the universal. The tension between universal human rights claims, and 
particularistic cultural and national identities, is constitutive of democratic legitimacy.’ 
62 Ibid., pp. 123, 124.  
63 Cf., Ibid., p. 12.  
64 Habermas as cited in Ibid., p. 13.  
65 The paradox of democratic legitimacy also appears in Benhabib’s writings as the paradox between the will 
of all and the general will, relating to the question whether the general will can err. For a critical assessment of 
this paradox as Benhabib understands it, see: Honig, B. ‘Between Decision and Deliberation: Political 
Paradox in Democratic Theory’, American Political Science Review, vol. 101 (2007), pp. 1-17. 
66 Cf., Benhabib 2006, p. 167.  
92                                Refugees and the Right to Have Rights 
 
 
granted what it set out to decide, namely who is to have a seat at the table and who 
isn’t. Indeed, the boundaries that qualify some as members while discarding others 
as such cannot be democratically drawn. In relation to the question of scope, 
political reciprocity founders. Van Roermund clearly captures the dilemma: ‘Indeed, 
there is a problem at the very heart of reciprocity: prior to reciprocal 
acknowledgement, a decision has already been taken concerning who is to be 
involved in the set of individuals between whom reciprocity will reign. And, by 
necessity, this decision cannot be taken reciprocally, without seriously begging the 
question.’67 The question, who is to participate and who isn’t, always comes too 
late and can only be answered in retrospect. Democracy has always already begun 
and the very first question – or the very first decision – withdraws itself from 
democratic deliberation, thus forfeiting the reciprocity of reason giving. 
What is at issue here is, of course, the question of the constitution or 
foundation of a people. Benhabib, however, does not view the first question, who 
belongs to the people, as a matter of decision, but rather, casts it as a mere fact of 
historical contingency. As the question who belongs to the people - to be asked and 
answered by the very same people - is bound to silt in vicious circles, Benhabib 
relegates the problem to history. This has the effect that, as Nasström observes, the 
‘constitution of the people is typically brought up as a question of identity – does it 
need to be thick or thin in order for democracy to work? – whereas its legitimacy 
remains unexplored.’ 68  As the people itself cannot democratically decide who 
belongs and who doesn’t, the people, Benhabib argues, has to be understood as an 
historical contingent fact. 69  History thus comes at the rescue of democracy. 
Stipulating that the people is the outcome of historical contingent forces enables 
Benhabib to free the people from an essentialist understanding of nationhood and 
national belonging that define a people in terms of a community of fate.70 This has 
one clear advantage: For, even though democracies out of necessity require closure, 
this does not mean that they are closed. On the contrary, a fortuitous product of 
history, who belongs to the people and who doesn’t, is a rather contingent fact 
which renders the civic boundaries of a democratic community contestable. 
And indeed, the question who makes up the people not only darts out at the 
dawn of history, but also resurfaces whenever a person, arriving at the borders of a 
state, seeks admission and claims membership. The paradox that democracy cannot 
democratically decide on its own limits then reappears in full. For, suppose that We 
and the other were to take joint action to decide on his inclusion or exclusion; then 
his very participation in the process would already presuppose his or her inclusion 
which, however, was precisely the topic of the joint action. Hence, we have 
                                                 
67 Van Roermund, 2009, p.174 
68 Nasström, S. ‘The Legitimacy of the People’, Political Theory. An International Journal of Political Philosophy vol. 
5 (2007), p. 625.  
69 Cf., Benhabib 2004, p. 175.  
70 Cf., Benhabib 2006, p.167. Vice versa, democracy comes at the rescue of history as democracy tries to live 
up to universal norms of human rights. According to Honig, Benhabib understands history as a continuous 
occurrence of events in a linear process of time. Honig summarizes (and criticizes) Benhabib’s argument as a 
model of ‘rights adjudication’ which ‘reassures us that the continued developments along the trajectory of 
rights will take us to a desirable democratic outcome … This is a tempting narration, and a familiar one, in 
which supposed systems of rights are (to borrow Habermas’ term) ‘tapped’, as liberal democracies take the 
protections and privileges they first limited to propertied white males and then spread them outward to 
encompass all classes, races and genders.’ (Honig 2006, p. 113). Cf., also Honig (2007), p.  11).  
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Benhabib’s astute observation that ‘we can never eliminate the paradox that those 
who are excluded will not be among those who decide upon the rules of exclusion 
and inclusion.’71 
But felicitously, the discourse theory Benhabib elaborates has its own way of 
dealing with this. The boundaries between members and non-members can be 
rendered fluid, the asymmetry between inside and outside can be eased, and the 
dilemma of the deadlock of reciprocity can be mitigated by way of another 
manifestation of the paradox of democratic legitimacy. This time, the limit to 
democracy does not derive from the question of scope, but relates to the fact that 
the people’s sovereignty is proclaimed in the name of humanity. That is, the right 
of a people to determine and rule itself so as to bring out and guarantee freedom is 
predicated on universal principles in the articulation of which the people itself did 
not participate. What originates democracy is, again, something fundamentally a-
democratic, the paradox being that ‘the democratic sovereign draws its legitimacy 
not merely from its act of constitution but, equally significant, from the conformity 
of this act to universal principles of human rights that are in some sense said to 
precede and antedate the will of the sovereign and in accordance with which the 
sovereign undertakes to bind itself.’72  
On this account, the paradox of democratic legitimacy affirms the sovereignty 
of the people, while at the same time limits or directs it towards a universal moral 
standpoint.73 Adherence to universal principles of human rights does not infringe 
upon the people’s sovereignty nor does it render democratic practice futile. Rather, 
it is what sets democracy in motion and keeps it going; it sets a democratic people 
the task to flesh out the universal, to articulate, contextualize and make concrete 
the universal demands of human dignity and equality. In democracy, the universal 
matters, in the twofold sense that it is what is paramount and what materializes 
with democratic practice. Democracy, in short, embodies the universal. Echoing 
Habermas, Benhabib claims that the universal is dependent upon context while at 
the same time it can never be immanent or exhausted by any particular context. 
Though context- dependent, the universal is also what counts against any particular 
context, breaking every democratic closure asunder. The universal demands, so to 
speak, that it be reclaimed, resignified and repositioned time and again. Committed 
to the universal which it seeks to flesh out, democracy defines itself as a constant 
working-through of the paradox of democratic legitimacy. So even though 
something fundamentally a-democratic pertains to the origin of democracy, this 
does not, in Benhabib’s view, put doubt on the legitimacy of a democratic people. 
For, in working through the paradox, a democratic people assure itself of its own 
legitimacy. That is, by assuming and re-appropriating the universal, the democratic 
people ‘shows itself to be not only the subject but also the author of its laws.’74 
To sum up the argument: From the second manifestation of the paradox of 
democratic legitimacy, a constitutive tension between the universal and particular 
unfolds that allows easing of the harshness of the inevitable asymmetry between 
members and non-members that arises from the first manifestation of the paradox. 
                                                 
71 Benhabib 2004, p. 177.  
72 Ibid., p 44.  
73 Cf., Honig (2007), p. 4.  
74 Benhabib 2004, pp. 19, 20.  
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The people’s commitment to the universal reminds it, so to speak, of its own moral 
failures or shortcomings with respect to those who have been excluded without 
their consent. The whole point of discourse ethics is, therefore, to bring a 
democratic people to the awareness of ‘the disjunction between the universalist 
content of its constitutional commitments and the paradoxes of democratic 
closure.’ 75  And this is to make possible the critical altering of practices and 
exclusion.76 Note that not just the rights of others are at stake here. What is equally 
at stake is the legitimacy of the people. Indeed, if Benhabib argues that fairly open 
or porous borders ‘are most compatible with the philosophical self-understanding 
and constitutional commitments of liberal democracies’, 77  it is because the 
legitimacy of the people would be seriously compromised if it tries to secure and 
close itself off against ‘the others’ for reasons of national sovereignty and cultural 
identity or integrity.78 As said, it is by virtue of the tension between the universal 
and particular that democracies are set the task to flesh out the universal time and 
again. And as it turns out, immigrants prove to be of great help to that task, 
contributing to and sustaining (instead of challenging) the very democratic 
legitimacy of the people. On account of their different cultural habits, values, 
beliefs and practices, they question the way host communities presently express and 
embody the universal, posing ‘a challenge to the democratic legislatures to 
rearticulate the meaning of democratic universalism.’79 
 
 
3.5 ‘We, the Others’ 
 
So, what opens up a space for others to claim membership is, according to 
Benhabib, the crack in collective identity. ‘Our fate, as late-modern individuals’, 
Benhabib reasons, ‘is to live caught in the permanent tug of war between the vision 
of the universal and the attachments of the particular.’80 Apparently, immigrants 
ensure this does not result in a clash of arms. Because of the duality between the 
universal and particular, democratic collective identity is inherently contingent and 
hence open to challenge. Immigrants play on this contingency, posing nasty 
questions as to who we think we are to limit the universal in the way we do. And in 
doing so, immigrants act thoroughly democratically, contributing, that is, to 
‘ongoing processes of transformation and reflexive experimentation with collective 
identity.’81 
                                                 
75 Ibid., p.  20. 
76 Cf., Ibid., p. 21. 
77 Ibid., p. 12.  
78 Benhabib here implicitly addresses the broader question as to why states comply with international law. 
Alexander Betts explains this compliance on the basis of a combination of reciprocity and legitimacy. With 
respect to the international cooperation in relation to asylum he argues: ‘Providing asylum imposes a cost on 
the individual contributing State. However, States generally value the existence of the overall regime because 
it provides public global goods of security and stability, on the one hand, and humanitarianism, on the other. 
Insofar as respecting asylum contributes to the overall regime, long-run reciprocity is likely to be in States’ 
interests. Furthermore, providing asylum also confers legitimacy upon States insofar as compliance with the 
long-established norm of asylum is an important factor of what defines a ‘civilized State.’ (Betts, A. ‘The 
Refugee Regime Complex’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol. 29 (2010), p. 19).  
79 Benhabib 2004, p. 212.  
80 Ibid., p.  16.  
81 Ibid., p. 65.  
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But here things start to rumble. And they start to rumble because Benhabib 
makes collective identity the starting point for negotiating the civic boundaries of a 
democratic polity. Indeed, what allows for a mediation between the rights of others 
and the sovereign right of a people is the contingency of the people’s identity. 
However, as I will argue, this causes a gradual but fatal slide from the question of 
immigration to the issue of integration. Though it would be artificial to draw a 
strong line between both issues, the point of the matter is that the question of 
integration arises in relation to immigrants who already availed themselves of a legal 
place within the host community, be it as members or as legal residents, whereas 
the issue of immigration revolves around precisely that: getting access to a 
community to which one does not belong. Making collective identity the starting 
point has the opposite effect that integration ultimately sets the terms for 
immigration. 
True, as should be amply clear by now, Benhabib is certainly aware of the 
fundamental asymmetry between immigrants and the receiving state as the latter 
sets the norms for inclusion and exclusion. Yet as I intend to demonstrate, she 
entirely downplays this asymmetry, either by focusing on the rights of immigrants 
already legally within a polity, or by establishing a moral reciprocity between the 
immigrant and the receiving state, which will be discussed in the next section. 
Equally true is that Benhabib strongly rejects immigration policies that only admit 
foreigners who ‘are like us.’ 82 The others Benhabib has in mind are no doubt those 
immigrants who come from non-Western countries with different cultures, 
traditions and religions, and which are, for sure, not as prosperous as the affluent 
West where they hope to make a better living. But insofar as Benhabib sources a 
right to membership in the contingency of collective identity, her conceptual 
argument sells out precisely those immigrants. 
To explain, we must take a closer look at the way in which The Rights of Others 
frames the challenge inherent in the arrival and presence of others. When the 
stranger arrives upon the shores of the other, Benhabib says, there is always a 
moment of anxiety.83 The question is: Why? As it appears to me the challenge 
others pose to the receiving community doesn’t much differ from what foreigners 
‘like us’ do: Both reinvigorate democratic collective identity. Because of the 
necessity of democratic closure and the regrettable exclusion it entails, democracy 
cannot but fall short of the universal principles it claims to adhere to. Immigrants – 
for whatever other reason – seek admission precisely because we claim to uphold 
universal principles of human rights. And, by showing their belief in us, we can 
believe in ourselves again. The other’s challenge to democracy safely sits on 
democracy’s own principles; instead of challenging the host community, the other, 
rather, realizes the democratic project. If there is a challenge, it is only because of 
our own falling short of our own principles. Shortcomings, to be sure, that can be 
restored if only we think again how best to realize the universal. 
Indeed, from a universalist standpoint, every democratic closure, every concrete 
context, is found to be morally wanting. Benhabib, therefore, holds that ‘potentially 
all practices of democratic closure are open to challenge.’84 Yet such a challenge is 
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too general for what she has in mind, as it lacks the concreteness she is after in 
arguing for a critical alteration of inclusion and exclusion. So, in the same move as 
when it said that all practices of inclusion and exclusion are open to challenge, it is 
claimed ‘that there are some practices of democratic closure which are more 
justifiable than others.’85 Benhabib, therefore, has to come up with a criterion that 
explains why some practices of inclusion and exclusion are more justifiable than 
others. In her theoretical framework, what provides this criterion is the legitimacy 
of the people, 86  with the effect that the challenge of the other is limited to a 
contestation of collective identity. Let’s take a closer look at this challenge and tease 
out what it presupposes and what Benhabib does not say. 
On Benhabib’s account, the other contests the historical particularistic 
concretization of the universal, exposing the contingency thereof. So if the other 
confronts us, and is perhaps even experienced as somewhat threatening, it is 
because he questions the way we believe the universal announces itself. On account 
of his different values, beliefs and practices, the other reminds us that the universal 
might just as well be articulated and represented in a different way. For example, 
we believe that a woman’s dignity is guaranteed by her freedom to dress as she 
pleases, not being obliged to veil herself. But the Muslim woman tells us that it is 
precisely her scarf that expresses and guarantees her dignity as a woman. This is 
exactly what Karima Dezba, a school teacher in France whom Benhabib cites, is 
telling us: ‘Because my wearing the scarf […] is so fundamental to who I am […] 
you should respect it as long as it does not infringe on your rights and liberties.’87  
The Muslim woman wearing the scarf exposes us to the contingency of our 
own values. She opens up a perspective unto a different way of signifying and 
representing what we both believe to be universal and absolute, i.e., our dignity as a 
woman. Reclaiming the universal through democratic practice, Benhabib holds, will 
be successful if one day Delacroix’ Marianne will be represented by a woman veiled 
by her scarf.88 
 So if the other incites us to engage in reflexive processes of identity 
transformation, which democracy is all about, 89  it is because she opens up a 
perspective onto another We, claiming  a different future for our living together as a 
people. But for such a challenge to occur at least two conditions must be met. First 
of all, the other who calls us into question must already be within the borders of 
our polity. That is, for challenge to occur, the other is already legally among us and 
has already established long lasting and meaningful ties with the ‘host’ community. 
Put differently: She already has a place of her own which she can leave so as to 
enter upon the public realm where she can raise her voice and agree or disagree 
with whatever dominant opinions resound there. This is exactly what the three 
young Muslim girls did in France when they refused to take off their scarves at 
school, forcing, Benhabib says, ‘what the French State wanted to view as a private 
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symbol – an individual item of clothing – into the shared public sphere, thus 
challenging the boundaries between the public and the private.’90 
Secondly, for the exposure of our contingency to take place, the other surely 
does not act as an isolated individual. On the contrary, she has to understand and 
represent herself as belonging to a We. Indeed, were there only to be three girls 
who refused to unveil themselves in their classrooms we would probably not be 
bothered by their act. As Bonnie Honig comments on this example offered by 
Benhabib: ‘The girls appeared in the public realm as the effects of a social 
movement, no less than Rosa Parks did when she supposedly spontaneously one 
day out of the blue simply refused to move to the back of the bus.’91 
Benhabib discusses these real-life examples to illustrate what we are dealing 
with when thinking about the other’s right to membership. But the examples don’t 
do the job they are supposed to do, as the individuals that figure in them already 
have long- lasting attachments with the community (they participate in the 
educational system) and even are already full members. They might be 
marginalized, bad enough in itself, and belong to a minority group, but still: They 
are members in the legal sense of the word. The three Muslim girls who were 
expelled from school because of their scarves do not illuminate the problem of a 
right to have rights, but instead show us, by default, what a ‘truly cosmopolitan 
citizenship’ would entail, namely ‘the reclaiming and the repositioning of the 
universal – within the framework of the local, the regional, or other sites of 
democratic activism and engagement.’92 
 To push the point a bit further: The Rights of Others is not about a right to have 
rights or a right to membership, and how democratic communities can respond to 
this. It is about the content and meaning of new forms of democratic citizenship in 
‘multinational and multicultural societies.’ Outsiders, Benhabib says, are not at the 
border but within.93 This is true, no doubt. But it is surely not the correct way to 
pose the problem of immigration. For if outsiders are already within, it is no longer 
about finding a ground for membership against the backdrop of large scale 
movements of people across state borders, but about the integration of newcomers 
who do not share in the dominant cultural tradition of the host state. 
 In this respect, it is particularly disturbing that Benhabib passes over the 
problem of first-gate admission in silence. The question from which Benhabib 
proceeds is: ‘Once first admission occurs, what is the obligation of a liberal state to 
those it has admitted?’94  This question, however, entirely downplays what is at 
stake with the right to have rights, as it presupposes that ‘the others’ are already 
granted permission to stay upon the territory of the host state. To then press for 
full membership rights appears to me to be rather chimerical.  
First of all, to press for full membership rights on the basis of the injunction 
against denationalization does not solve the quandary. Recall that Benhabib takes 
the injunction to reflect the assumption that no one should be a permanent 
stranger upon the land and that, therefore, the path to membership ought not to be 
blocked. To be sure, there are plenty of good reasons to argue against a permanent 
                                                 
90 Ibid., p. 187.  
91 Honig 2006, p. 116.  
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exclusion of the full catalogue of political, civil, social, economic and cultural rights 
(reasons, to be sure, which are always limited to immigrants legally within the 
country). But the question is: Does it derive from the inferred injunction? Clearly, it 
does. For the injunction is relative, that is, predicated on the risk of rendering an 
individual stateless. Most immigrants retain the nationality of their home countries, 
implying that a possible denial of membership would not result in statelessness. 
The point has already been made by Aleinikoff: ‘[It] is not clear to me that the 
prohibition against denationalization gets us very far towards a right to 
naturalization. The harm of denationalization is that it usually leaves a former 
citizen stateless; but a failure to naturalize rarely has such an effect. The vast 
majority of immigrants residing in a host state retain the citizenship of their home 
states. Perhaps there is some duty to provide some kind of membership to stateless 
migrants, but this would do little for most resident immigrants.’95 
 Second of all, if current conditions governing admission and access to 
membership are taken into account, it appears that the door to membership is 
already open for the majority of immigrants. Though one manifestation of 
sovereignty is certainly the right to determine the rules for the conferral of 
membership in its own national interest, states have already significantly relaxed the 
requirements for naturalization.96 As Van Waas is keen to remind us, however, this 
very relaxation has come in tandem with increasingly restrictive measures of 
immigration control. That is, prospective immigrants are selected at the borders of 
a state precisely because they are viewed as potential new citizens. As Van Waas 
argues, states ‘can now hold what is, in effect, a selection process for prospective 
immigrants by predetermining the conditions that must be met for eligibility to 
enter a country. This can be seen as a sort of initial qualification round for access to 
citizenship.’ 97  For example, potential immigrants who wish to come to the 
Netherlands have to pass a language test in their country of origin in order to prove 
Dutch language skills. Additionally, they have to prove acquaintance with what is 
deemed to be essential cultural and historical knowledge about the future host 
country. As Dijstelbloem, et.al, conclude in their extensive research on the 
technologies of migration policy, integration policy is increasingly used as a tool for 
immigration control. 98   Groenendijk also disputes the view that pre-departure 
integration measures merely serve the aim of improving integration chances of 
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prospective immigrants. The goal of such pre-departure tests is, rather, to select 
‘desirable immigrants’ and restrict access to other ones.99 With respect to German 
and Dutch language tests in the country of origin before departure, Groenendijk 
observes: ‘So far, the policies appear to correlate with a considerable but temporary 
drop in the number of family-reunification visas in the Netherlands and Germany. 
Headlines in Dutch newspapers generally defined the measure as successful 
because they had the latter aims (selection and reduction) in mind. Both in 2008 
and in 2009, the Dutch Parliament was concerned about the “pass level” of the test 
because the percentage of successful candidates was considered too high.’100 
 The upshot of integration setting the terms for immigration is that those whom 
we are willing to admit as ‘others’ are set up in advance.  I am not suggesting that 
Benhabib somehow secretly favors the preservation of cultural homogeneous 
communities. But as she frames the question of a right to seek and be granted 
membership against the backdrop of cosmopolitan citizenship in multicultural 
societies, the very question from which she proceeds dissolves into the question of 
integration. As she also skips the question of first-entry rules, her argument 
dispatches into integration, setting the terms for immigration. The upshot thereof is 
that a polity’s responsiveness to others is limited to the known, expected, invited 
and desirable others. 
There seems one way out for Benhabib: her appeal to a moral universalism. But 
as I intend to show below, this does not clear the air of chimera to me. In fact, it 
makes it even worse. 
 
 
3.6 A Moral Right to Membership? 
 
Benhabib, no doubt, would object. And she could substantiate her disagreement 
with reference to the moral universalism that bears out the motto of her book ‘No 
human is illegal.’ This moral universalism is to explain why we not only open our 
borders for immigrants whom we already selected as prospective citizens and who 
are like us, but also for those immigrants we did not expect and who are not like us. 
On account of this moral universalism, we never simply act as citizens in our own 
interest, Benhabib argues, but are perceptive to the rights and interests of others, as 
well. 
Indeed, the recourse to a moral universalism nuances the common view of 
democracy in a decisive way. Recall that democracy, as Benhabib rightly argues, 
requires closure. Though premised on universal principles, ‘We, the people’ can 
never be everyone. Indeed, democracy signals that legislation is the self-legislation 
of a We that is both the author of the laws and the interested party thereof. But this 
is not the whole story: The fact that democracy is principled on the universal 
highlights that those who have an interest in the laws do not simply coincide with 
those who enact the laws.101 Precisely insofar as the people’s sovereignty is derived 
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from, and directed towards, universal principles of human rights, we can never 
merely act as citizens in our own interest; we should also always take into account 
the interests of others who do not belong to our polity: ‘Since discourse theory 
articulates a universalist moral standpoint, it cannot limit the scope of the moral 
conversation only to those who reside within nationally recognized boundaries; it 
must view the moral conversation as potentially extending to all of humanity … Due 
to the open-endedness of discourses of moral justification there will be an 
inevitable and necessary tension between moral obligations and duties resulting 
from our membership in bounded communities and the moral perspective we must 
adopt as human beings simpliciter.’102  
Let’s imagine, then, a conversation between the members of a polity who realize 
they are humans as well, and who are outraged by the sufferings of refugees in 
today’s world. On some lucky day, they increasingly gain awareness of their own 
moral foundation which falls short with respect to refugees who, as Benhabib says, 
are kept in a world- wide state of exception.103 Spurred by their moral indignation, 
they decide to recognize the right of each individual to have rights. Those who 
participate in this moral discourse and dream the others in it, are very well aware 
that even in post-national constellations, membership in a bounded community will 
remain crucial for the enjoyment of rights. Decided as they are to use their best 
endeavors to end the plight of refugees, they propose something like a passport of 
world citizenship, taking, in fact, a suggestion by Benhabib seriously. ‘The 
individual’, she writes, ‘who is stateless, in our times as much as in Arendt’s, 
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becomes a nonperson, a body that can be moved around by armies and police, 
customs officers and refugee agencies. Wouldn’t perhaps a truly cosmopolitan 
politics require that every human child receive a passport as a world citizen in 
addition to his/her local identification papers?’104 
Let’s assume that the notion of a world citizen makes sense, absent a world 
state, and let’s not bother about who is to issue such a passport (which is, of 
course, the first question). Would this solve the quandary? Certainly it would not. 
For the possession of a passport as a world citizen does not answer the question as 
to which state holds legal responsibility for the individual, or which state is 
responsible for assessing an asylum claim, and where asylum has to be granted. To 
be in possession of a world passport endows the individual, at best, with an 
imperfect moral right which is of no avail because, as Michelman argues,  ‘there is 
no ascertainable agent, among all citizenries and countries of the world, who 
specifically bears the duty (of admission somewhere) correlative to claim (against 
exclusion everywhere) of any particular refugee.’105 
 The proposal of a world citizen passport which every human child should 
acquire at birth raises another, related question. It seems to suggest that the 
asymmetry between inside and outside, which Benhabib is at pains to demonstrate, 
isn’t really a problem as long as we engage in a continuous process of growing self-
awareness that makes us conceive of the other as a human being just like we are 
human beings. Yet the following should be kept in mind: Even if we opt for fairly 
open borders and give effect to our proclaimed commitment to refugee rights, and 
even if this is most compatible with our political and philosophical self-
understanding, it is still we who decide to grant refugees leave to entry and to remain. 
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And even if this would significantly benefit refugees, it does not solve the 
conceptual problem of the asymmetry between us and them, nor would it mitigate 
the peril that one day we might decide to close our borders again. Lindahl, as 
always, astutely sketches the dilemma Benhabib or any other theorist faces who 
invokes moral universalism transcending political reciprocity. If the asymmetry 
between inside and outside continues to hold, and it is we who decide for fairly open 
borders, then ‘the others’ would have a privilege, and not a right, to immigrate. ‘[A] 
privilege to immigrate’, Lindahl argues, ‘either presupposes political reciprocity 
between members, such that those inside grant outsiders leave to enter, or it draws 
its normative character from moral reciprocity between individuals. In the first 
case, reference to a ‘privilege’ does not get us beyond the status quo, as the 
asymmetry between the positions inside and outside continues to hold … In the 
second case, it reintroduces the dilemma … namely, that, although cosmopolitan 
right is held to trump positive law, there is no sovereign that may enforce the 
‘privilege to immigrate.’ 106 
The intricacy returns, in all vehemence, in the moral framing of a right to have 
rights and the subsequent moral dialogue Benhabib constructs between me and the 
other. In the expression, ‘a right to have rights’, the first use of the term ‘right’ 
obviously differs from the rights that are contingent on this first right. Benhabib 
explains the difference by dividing both usages over two different planes: a moral 
one and an empirical or juridico-civil one. Rights in the latter sense presuppose, as 
said before, political reciprocity as they ‘generate reciprocal obligations among 
consociates, that is, among those who are already recognized as members of a legal 
community.’107 The right to have rights, by contrast, does not stem from political 
reciprocal relationships, but ‘is addressed to humanity as such’ and ‘evokes a moral 
imperative.’108 Benhabib goes on to explain that ‘in the first mention, the identity of 
the other(s) to whom the claim to be recognized as a rights-bearing person is 
addressed remains open and indeterminate … The asymmetry between the first 
and second uses of the term ‘right’ derives from the absence in the first case of a 
specific juridico-civil community of consociates who stand in a relation of 
reciprocal duty to one another.’109 
The lack of a political reciprocity between ‘the others’ and receiving states is, 
thus, counterbalanced by a moral reciprocity that does exist, Benhabib holds, 
between the members of a polity and its others. This moral reciprocity grounds the 
first- gate admission rights for refugees for which Benhabib presses, while she 
concedes states the power over first- gate admission rules for immigrants. But to 
morally ground a right to seek asylum does not solve the conceptual problem as 
enshrined by the right to have rights. Indeed, Benhabib entirely downplays what is 
at issue in the right to have rights, either by skipping the problem of first- gate 
admission or by setting the problem aside by saying that it is a moral right.  
Benhabib takes the context of immigration as the proper framework to discuss the 
most crucial issues of the predicament democratic states and refugees face in facing 
each other, which backfires on refugees. 
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 Consider in this respect the moral dialogue between me and the other. The 
dialogue as Benhabib imagines, runs as follows: ‘If you and I enter into a moral 
dialogue with one another, and I am a member of a state of which you are seeking 
membership, and you are not, then I must be able to show you with good grounds, 
with grounds that would be acceptable to each of us equally, why you can never 
join our association and become one of us. These must be grounds that you would 
accept if you were in my situation and I were in yours. Our reasons must be 
reciprocally acceptable; they must apply to us equally.’110 Recall that, according to 
Benhabib, communicative freedom should be at the core of membership 
regulations. The dialogue as sketched above, therefore, has to respect the 
immigrant’s communicative freedom, that is, his ability to agree or disagree with us 
on the basis of reasons. What sharpens the debate on immigration is, of course, the 
latter possibility: the immigrant’s disagreement with our decision not to grant him 
leave to entry and/or to remain.111 But Benhabib, though committed to the view 
that no human is illegal, nowhere discusses this possibility. As Aleinikoff rightly 
observes, if access to membership is reliant upon a dialogue of mutual reason- 
giving, it is hard to think of any reason the undocumented immigrant can bring into 
play to convince the members of the polity that he has a right to be within their 
polity. The same is true for refugees. For despite the initial differentiation between 
refugees and other immigrants with respect to first- gate admission, Benhabib does 
not uphold the difference when it comes to the issue of permanent residence. First 
admission, she argues, does not automatically lead to membership.112 Hence, her 
concluding remarks at the end of the book: ‘I have pleaded for first-admittance 
rights for refugees and asylum seekers but have accepted the right of democracies 
to regulate the transition from first admission to full membership.’113 So, states are 
relatively free to set the conditions with which both immigrants and refugees have 
to comply in order to qualify for full membership, as long as these requirements – 
length of legal stay, resources, language skills, working abilities – do not violate the 
communicative freedom of the others concerned. Surely, these requirements, 
whatever their specific content, won’t pose many problems for regular immigrants. 
Already selected as potential new citizens, they have taken the opportunity to 
participate in the economy and society of the receiving state and build some capital. 
As the European Council on Refugees and Exiles notes, however, refugees are 
often unable to comply with such material conditions, as they face obstacles in 
trying to exercise their right to work. Due to their limited access to the labor 
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market, in combination with the physical and psychological effects of their flight, 
refugees do not have equal opportunities with other immigrants to achieve certain 
material conditions. 114  And, what if refugees do not meet the requirements of 
linguistic skills and working abilities as we have already decided to only grant them 
temporary protection with a view to return home, which necessitates their seclusion 
from society and the normal order of things? In that case, we would have respected 
first admission rights, as Benhabib wishes, but leave it to ourselves to decide 
whether or not refugees are allowed permanent settlement. What if we decide to 
respect the refugee’s communicative freedom by sending him back home, as we 
believe that one’s natural and original surroundings nourish the exercise of personal 
autonomy? What if we decide to grant only a humanitarian leave to remain, 
offering the refugee some training in certain capacities that are of use back home so 
that upon return he can support himself and his family? If membership really is an 
issue of global justice, as Benhabib claims it is, we might just as well decide to make 
the world a better place to live, cut in the costs of asylum procedures and transport 
the available amount of money to development aid, so that people can stay where 
they are.115 Moreover, it might just as well be argued that we do not even have to 
grant refugees the right of first entry if we decide, in the context of our 
neighborhood policy, to export the asylum procedure overseas. 
And if we enter into a moral dialogue with the refugee, explaining to him that 
he can never be a full member of our polity and justify his return ‘home’ with all 
the above and other reasons, what reason can he possible give to convince us that 
he does have a right to stay? How moral and reciprocal can this dialogue be? How 
moral and reciprocal can it be, if at all, even if the outcome of the dialogue comes 
at the advantage of the refugee, as we have decided he is allowed to stay? Sofia 
Näsström’s criticism of Benhabib seems well-aimed to me: ‘[I]f migration is 
sourced in decisions and actions taken by the people, how reciprocal could this 
process of reason-giving be? […] It becomes clear that rather than resolving the 
problem of migration, the ‘reciprocity of reason- giving’ perpetuates the status of 
migrants by means of democratic law. It takes the existence of a people as a given, 
and thereby makes progress and change dependent  upon a human right which, as 
Arendt foresaw, is no right except for those who already have rights, that is, for 
those who are situated within the boundaries of a people.’116 
Below, I will once more return to the right to have rights. I will argue that it is 
the right of those who can no longer say ‘We’, and who, therefore, lack the power 
to challenge the collective identity of a democratic people. The right to have rights 
does not pose a challenge to a receiving community by opening up a perspective 
onto another We, as Benhabib believes it does; instead it calls into question the right 
a democratic people claims to have to select and exclude non-nationals. Put 
differently, it calls into question the legitimacy of the people. Only if we proceed 
from this challenge can we gradually work towards an understanding of asylum as 
                                                 
114  Cf., ECRE, Comments on the Proposal for a Council Directive amending the Long Term Residents Directive 
(2003/109/EC) to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international protection March 2008.  
115 Bauböck makes a similar argument against Benhabib with regard to economic immigration. Cf., Bauböck, 
R. ‘The Rights of Others and Boundaries of Democracy’, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 6 (2007), 
p. 400.   
116 Nasström (2007) p. 649.  
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protection here, so as to bring into view again the integration of refugees in host 
societies, which The Rights of Others failed to do.  
 
 
3.7 Border (In)Security 
 
The preceding pages argued that recourse to moral universalism is of little avail to 
those who arrive at our borders unexpected, uninvited and undocumented -- 
which, of course, most refugees are. A moral reciprocity between ‘the others’ and 
the members of a receiving polity, as Benhabib fleshes out, fails to respond to the 
right to have rights, as it is claimed by those who are intercepted and diverted, 
rejected and returned, and who do not, of course, agree with our reasons to refuse 
them. This no doubt constitutes the most difficult and pressing case when it comes 
to the issue of immigration. Indeed, the right to have rights manifests itself at the 
borders of a state and relates to the problem of first- gate admission. The right to 
have rights, therefore, first translates as the right to seek asylum and have access to 
an asylum procedure. I will return to this in the final chapter. 
As shown in Chapter One, the current immigration policy of the EU interferes 
with the refugee protection regime and actually contravenes the right to seek 
asylum. 117  A range of measures taken to control immigration before departure 
and/or arrival has made it increasingly difficult for refugees to reach the territory of 
one of the EU Member States and to lodge an asylum claim. Benhabib is not 
unaware of this. In fact, she even makes the strong claim that refugees ‘exist at the 
limits of all rights regimes and reveal the blind spot in the system of refugees, 
where the rule of law flows into its opposite: the state of exception and the ever-
present danger of violence.’118 
But Benhabib cannot explain this situation except by explaining it away as a 
failure of our own universal and moral commitments. The misfortunes refugees 
have to suffer are unhappy exceptions to an otherwise happy rule of sovereign self-
determination that is cloaked by principles of human rights. These misfortunes do 
not inform us about the rule except insofar as the rule provides the correctives to 
end these dire adversities. On Benhabib’s account, liberal democracies are self-
limiting collectives that have excluded the use of force and violence as they ‘at one 
and the same time, constitute the demos as sovereign, while proclaiming that the 
sovereignty of this demos derives its legitimacy from its adherence to fundamental 
human rights principles.’119 In her view, sovereignty belongs to the law, since it 
belongs to the people and is, therefore, limited by universal principles that give the 
people its legitimacy. Benhabib has convincingly argued that democracy requires 
closure, and in doing so, she has drawn attention to the on-going relevance of the 
concept of sovereignty. Though she does not put it in these terms, herself, it is fair 
                                                 
117 Compare Betts (2010), p. 26: ‘The creation of new cooperative mechanisms within the travel regime has 
enabled Northern States to reduce asylum seekers’ access to spontaneous arrival asylum in the North while 
not overtly violating the principle of non-refoulement set out in the 1951 Convention. Given that the main legal 
and normative obligations of the refugee regime only kick in once an individual reaches the territory (or 
jurisdiction) of the asylum State, controlling access to territory has allowed many Northern States – most 
notably European States – to avoid incurring obligations and bypass the refugee regime.’ 
118 Benhabib 2004, p. 163. 
119 Ibid., p. 198.  
106                                Refugees and the Right to Have Rights 
 
 
to say that sovereign power reigns over the boundaries that separate inside from 
outside.  
But this is only part of the story. For sovereign power does not only reign over 
boundaries from within, but also from without. The catchword here is insecurity. A 
brief look at the official website of Frontex – the EU border security agency that 
co-ordinates border management among member states – reveals what is at stake 
here. According to its mission statement, the aim of Frontex is to strengthen the 
freedom and security of EU citizens.120 The main focus of Frontex is, therefore, on 
what threatens our freedom and security and to avert that threat.  
Indeed, over the past few years, asylum and immigration came to be perceived 
as a security issue.121 This does not express any suspicion that asylum seekers and 
undocumented immigrants have some general disposition towards criminal 
conduct. The Dutch memoranda on Illegal persons (Illegalennota) from 2004, makes 
perfectly clear that no essential link exists between asylum, unauthorized stay or 
entry, and criminality. To the contrary, persons illegally staying upon the territory 
are not likely to commit criminal acts, not even minor ones, in order to survive, as 
it is in their interest not to draw the attention of the authorities.122 The Dutch 
memoranda on return (Terugkeernota), also from 2004, illuminates why asylum and 
immigration constitute a security threat. It argues that as ‘a matter of course, the 
institution and governance of a democratic legal order cannot be reconciled with 
the presence of large numbers of people illegally staying upon Dutch territory.’123 
The Memoranda intimates that the de facto presence of persons upon the territory 
damages democratic legal order124 because, as Lindahl explains, the people ‘reject 
attributing to themselves the immigrant’s stay as an act that they have jointly 
authorized as an act in which they have a joint interest.’125 
Clearly, our legal and political institutions do not operate well if surrounded by 
disorder. For democracy to be effective, a unified medium over against disorder is 
required in which the normal laws can be applied. Claiming to strengthen the 
freedom and security of EU citizens is, therefore, another way of saying that 
Frontex guarantees and maintains the normal running of things. Frontex is an 
agency that anticipates threats. As can be read on its website, the first task of 
Frontex, given its aim of strengthening freedom and security, is to carry out risk 
                                                 
120 See Frontex’s mission statement available at the official Frontex website http://www.frontex.europa.eu 
(last accessed on April 1, 2011). 
121 Cf. Huysmans (2000), pp. 751-777. 
122 Cf., Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Illegalennota /29537, (2003-2004), p. 4.  
123 Directoraat-generaal Internationale aangelegenheden en vreemdelingenzaken, Terugkeer Nota. Maatregelen 
voor een effectieve uitvoering van het terugkeerbeleid/29344, no. 1, 21 november 2003, p. 8.  
124 Lindahl has sought to understand what security is, for it to be threatened by immigration and asylum. 
Lindahl reveals that the rationale for qualifying asylum, immigration, terrorism and transnational crime all as 
security issues lies with the fact that all these phenomena pose a challenge to state borders. Arguing that the 
concept of (in)security is reliant upon the concept of (dis)order, Lindahl argues that immigration constitutes a 
security threat as it involves the unauthorized border crossings by immigrants: ‘[T]he ‘securitization’ of 
immigration … is a specific response to the perception of border crossings by aliens as a disruption or 
disturbance of political order. Whereas insecurity is intimately connected to the experience of disorder, 
security is linked to acts of ordering, of instituting order in response to what disrupts it. To the extent that 
they disrupt political order by disturbing the distinction between inside and outside, border crossings by 
immigrants attest ex negative to the general function of order: to ‘limit the unlimited, to determine the relatively 
indeterminate’(Cassirer).’ (Lindahl (2008) p. 120.) 
125 Ibid., p. 127.  
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analysis, assess threats, look at vulnerabilities, weigh the consequences 126  and 
coordinate actions to turn the threat. Frontex claims to merely complement the 
border management of EU Member States, and to promote the cooperation among 
border- related law enforcement bodies responsible for internal security.127 
 But the threat Frontex is to discern and avert is a threat precisely because it 
damages the normal running of things. Put more strongly: Asylum and immigration 
are perceived to threaten the continued existence of the European polity. This 
corresponds with the way immigration and asylum are usually depicted: 
Immigration is a flow that overwhelms us, threatening us to be washed away, and it 
is said, we are swamped by refugees.128 And this, no doubt, allows for all means 
necessary to turn that threat. Indeed, isn’t it telling that Frontex, in its concern for 
our freedom and security, does not even mention justice, which is the third 
fundamental value of Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? In its aim to 
secure our freedom, it might just as well have added: at any cost. 
Any account of Frontex, or of border management in general, must take into 
account that a border security agency ultimately operates as a police force129 and, 
therefore, never merely enforces the law but acts in the space that is opened up 
beyond mere law enforcement. 130  Border security agencies operate in a double 
movement; in the same blow as they claim to act in the interest of the EU and its 
citizens, they exempt themselves from the values, norms and regulations that are 
valid inside the polity they seek to protect. Fischer-Lescano, et al.,  argue that 
Frontex operates in a legal void, as not all its actions are legally covered or open to 
judicial review: ‘European jurisdiction is at present unable to react to potentially 
unlawful practice of the European border control regime because the situation 
suffers from a lack of efficient access to legal protection.’ 131  Frontex does not 
enforce the law, but rather, exerts an unchecked force over the naked bodies of the 
immigrants and asylees who venture their way to Europe.132 
 This double movement of affirming and securing the normal order, while at 
the same time suspending it, features a state of exception in which, as Agamben 
says, acts that do not have the value of law acquire its force.133 Taking his cue from 
Carl Schmitt, Agamben argues that the state of exception reveals the paradox of 
sovereignty according to which sovereign power is both inside and outside the law 
                                                 
126 For example, in the summer of 2009, Frontex reconsidered and re-analyzed push and pull factors for 
illegal immigration against the backdrop of changes worldwide caused by the economic crises, published in its 
report The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Illegal Migration to the European Union (August 2009). 
127 Cf. Frontex’s mission statement available at: http://www.frontex.europa.eu 
128 Dummett draws attention to the vocabulary, and the implications thereof, used to describe refugee and 
immigration movements. Cf., Dummett, M. On Immigration and Refugees London: Routledge 2001.  
129 Some authors even assert that Frontex operates in a quasi- or even para-military fashion. Cf., Spijkerboer, 
T. ‘The Human Costs of Border Control.’  European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 9, (2007b), p.127: ‘[B]oth 
Member States and the EU itself have increasingly adopted a technical, quasi-military approach to border 
control.’ Cf., also Fischer-Lescano, A., Löhr, T., Tohidipur, T. ‘Border Controls at Sea: Requirements Under 
International Human Rights and Refugee Law’, International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 21 (2009), 257. 
130 In Zur Kritik der Gewalt, Benjamin demonstrated that the police does not exercise power but instead exerts 
a naked force in which acts of law enforcement cannot be distinguished from acts of law- making. The 
indistinction between enforcement and constitution constitutes the ignominity of this authority as its acts lose 
all claims to validity. Cf., Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913-192, Cambridge/London: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press (1996) p. 243.  
131 Fischer-Lescano et al., (2009), p. 295.  
132 Cf., Ibid., pp. 275, 276.  
133 Cf., Agamben 2005, p. 38.  
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at the same time: ‘the sovereign, having the legal power to suspend the validity of 
the law, legally places himself outside the law.’134 The paradox expresses that in 
order to secure and preserve an inside, sovereign power moves outside. 
Importantly, the paradox of sovereignty is not only manifested in turbulent 
times when states explicitly declare a state of emergency with a view to secure law 
and order, -- as did Italy, for example, in the summer of 2008, in relation to illegal 
immigration. The paradox also holds, and is even brought to its most extreme 
point, when states resort to ambiguous, or even outright unlawful means, that are 
no longer referred to as emergency measures but instead gain a semblance of 
normalcy, - as happened one year later in Italy, when the Berlusconi government 
consolidated the harsh anti-immigration emergency measures in legislation that 
came to be known as the ‘security package.’135 Hence, Agamben argues that ‘[t]he 
principle according to which sovereignty belongs to law, which today seems 
inseparable from our conception of democracy and the legal State, does not at all 
eliminate the paradox of sovereignty; indeed it even brings it to the most extreme 
point of its development.’136 
That the paradox of sovereignty is brought to its most extreme point has 
certainly something to do with democracy’s inability to face its own violence. 
Frontex saves lives. The fact that it is the EU border security agency that 
coordinates action to keep unwanted foreigners at a distance is glossed over by 
such lofty phrases as ‘search and rescue operations.’ 137  In the same way, the 
violence of threatening with force and exerting control over persons in distress at 
sea is pushed to the background and subordinated to the humanitarian aim of 
saving lives.  
Today, it appears that our freedom and security is strengthened at any cost. 
And, the human cost of border control is high. United Against Racism, a NGO 
based in Amsterdam, published a list of 13,250 documented immigrant deaths at 
the borders of Europe.138 The list takes as its staring point 1995, the year in which 
restrictions on immigration were put into practice, and documents the deaths until 
2009. As these concerns only documented deaths, the actual number is expected to 
be much higher. The list includes both deaths of immigrants directly caused by acts 
of border guard officials (such as shooting and minefields)139 as well as the deaths 
                                                 
134 Agamben 1998,  p.15.  
135 For an overview of Italy’s declaration of a state of emergency in relation to illegal immigration and the 
subsequent adoption of anti-immigrant legislation see: Human Rights Watch, Italy: Reject Anti-Migration Bill. 
Effort to Criminalize Undocumented Migrants Comes as Hostility to Immigrant Rises, June 22, 2009. Available 
at: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/21/italy-reject-anti-migrant-bill 
136 Agamben 1998, p. 30. 
137 Fischer-Lescano, et al. come to the persuasive conclusion that ‘states cannot circumvent refugee law and 
human rights requirements by declaring border control measures – that is, the interception, turning back, 
redirecting, etc., of refugee boats – to be rescue measures.’ (Fischer-Lescano, et al.,  (2009), p. 291). 
138 Cf., ‘List of 13,250 Documented Refugee Deaths Through Fortress Europe’, published by United Against 
Racism,  available at www.unitedagainstracism.org. 
139 Though these deaths are certainly the exception, it should be noted that the state of exception opens up 
the space for violence to occur with impunity. In its report ‘Violence and Immigration’ (2005) Médecins Sans 
Frontières observes that the rise of (illegal) immigration ‘goes hand in hand with an increase in the degree of 
violence used in the measures to control it.’ (Médecins Sans Frontières, ‘Violence and Immigration. Report 
on Illegal sub-Saharan Immigrants (ISSs) in Morocco’ (2005) available at www.meltingpot.org, p. 4). For 
documentation of the use of violence by border guards see: Human Rights Watch, Stuck in a Revolving Door. 
Iraqis and Other Asylum Seekers and Migrants at the Greece-Turkey Entrance to the European Union, November 26, 
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of those immigrants who accidentally die on their way to Europe (suffocation as 
stowaways, drowning, suicide, starvation, dehydration, and so forth). Though with 
respect to the latter there is no direct causal link between immigrant deaths and the 
border control regime, there seems to be an indirect link, as these fatalities are clearly 
related to the tightening of border control, forcing immigrants to take dangerous 
immigration routes and resort to life-risking means. According to Spijkerboer, this 
indirect link at least triggers a positive obligation of states, first, to critically analyze 
and evaluate the risks and consequences of the current border protection regime 
and, second, to take the necessary efforts to minimize the risks of immigration.140 
With judicial acumen, Spijkerboer argues that ‘[t]he obligation of a State to take 
appropriate steps to safeguard lives is not conditioned on a causal relationship 
between the State’s actions and someone’s death. Rather, the obligation is triggered 
by the State’s knowledge that a particular life is at risk and that same State’s ability 
to do something about it. Increases in the number of fatalities of irregular migrants 
are related to the tightening of border controls. Thus, these fatalities are a 
foreseeable consequence of this policy. Although this does not lead to State 
responsibility, it does trigger a State’s positive obligation to take preventive 
measures to safeguard the lives of those who are put at risk. In the context of 
border control measures, because States’ policies increase the loss of lives of 
irregular migrants, they are obliged to exercise their border controls in such a way 
that the loss of lives is minimized.’141 
This is not to deny the sovereign right of states to control their borders. But to 
establish this positive obligation is to bring to awareness that that border control is 
not only a matter of right, but of politics, as well. And, what is ultimately at stake is 
whether or not we can still regard the means deployed as our own. Today we have 
to face the fact that in the concern for securing the normal running of things, we 
appear to be willing to set that normal running of things aside. This leaves one to 
wonder whether we ourselves are not contributing to our own decline,142 as long as 
we resort to, and rely upon, a naked, unchecked force that is exempted from 
human rights monitoring and legal scrutiny and that, at times, even resorts to an 
excessive use of violence. 
 In this respect Honig’s question that motivates her entire Emergency Politics. 
Paradox, Law and Democracy, proves to be of utmost importance. She takes seriously 
the concern of a people for its own existence. But she moves the meaning and 
purpose of this concern just a little and takes it into the direction where it comes 
down to the question of how to survive an emergency situation. As the question 
                                                                                                                   
2008; Pro-Asyl, The Truth is Bitter But it Must be Told. The Situation of Refugees in the Aegean and the practice of Greek 
Coast Guard, (October 2007), available at: www.proasyl.de 
140 Cf., Spijkerboer, T.‘Over de Grens. Staatsaansprakelijkheid en de doden aan de grenzen van Europa’, Ars 
Aequi, (2009a) pp. 623-632.  
141 Spijkerboer (2007b), p. 138.  
142 I am referring, of course, to the title of the ninth chapter of the Origins of Totalitarianism, in which Arendt 
reflects on the refugee problem, ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of Human rights.’ As the title 
implies, lack of concern for the one is bound to drag along the other in its decline. See OT, page 290: ‘For the 
nation-state cannot exist once its principle of equality before the law has broken down … Laws that are not 
equal for all revert to rights and privileges, something contradictory to the very nature of the nation-state. The 
clearer the proof of their inability to treat stateless people as legal persons and the greater extension of 
arbitrary rule by police decree, the more difficult it is for states to resist the temptation to deprive all citizens 
of legal status and rule them with an omnipotent police.’ 
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implies, it would be reductive to deny the seriousness of a given situation, which 
leaves us no choice but to act. But the question as to how to survive hints at 
something else than the question relating to the means necessary to deflect, for 
example, immigrants and refugees so as to prevent their reaching our territory. The 
question, how to survive, revolves around the question as to how we ourselves, as a 
democratic people, relate to the means we adopt in order to overcome a crisis. To 
be more precise, it concerns the question whether we can still recognize the means 
deployed as our own. Honig’s question plays on something like a political care for 
the collective self that takes care of a people’s political and democratic integrity.143 
This political care for the self projects us into the future of the aftermath of the 
crisis where we are still around to clean up the mess we made. And, if we project 
ourselves into the future and are concerned not just for our mere existence, but for 
our integrity, as well, we might decide today to abstain from arbitrariness, injustices 
and violence because, as Judith Butler says, of ‘the memory and anticipation of too 
much sorrow and grief, and this – in the name of the living.’144 
Against Agamben, Honig suggests that we do not have to swallow the decision 
on the exception that suspends the validity of the normal laws. The political care 
for the self refuses ‘the sense of stuckness that emergency produces’145 and that 
makes us feel powerless. An emergency may be declared, but this does not 
foreclose the possibility of political action. And this political action might very well 
locate itself at the limits of the state, where it stands up, for example, for refugees’ 
rights ‘simply because they are there.’146 The very phrase ‘simply because they are 
there’ remains much closer to the predicament that democracies and refugees face 
in facing each other. Indeed, if we stand up for refugees’ rights simply because they 
are there, we do not simply act on the assumption that ‘we are all human.’ Indeed, 
the political action Honig has in mind draws on proximity rather than reciprocity. 
Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter, I will probe proximity as an alternative 
to Benhabib’s attempt to morally ground the right to have rights. Before I embark 
on a conceptual evaluation of this alternative account, I will first illuminate what 
proximity amounts to in actual practice.  
 
 
3.8.1 How to Shut Down a Camp 
 
Here is a story of proximity. It is a story with a happy ending in the otherwise ‘sad 
global epic of the denial of refugee rights.’147 It is recounted by Michael Ratner, 
                                                 
143 Compare Honig, B. Emergency Politics. Paradox, Law, Democracy, Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University 
Press 2009, pp. 8, 9: ‘What do we need to do to ensure our continuity as selves and/or our survival as a 
democracy with integrity? Our survival depends very much on how we handle ourselves in the aftermath of a 
wrong … When faced with such situations, we must act and we must inhabit the aftermath of the situation in 
ways that promote our survival as a democracy … Politically, surviving the emergency situation with integrity 
as a democracy might mean engaging in a kind of political care for the self.’  
144 Butler, J. ‘Critique, Coercion and Sacred Life in Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’’, in eds. De Varies, H & 
Sullivan, L.E  eds., Political Theologies. Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, New York: Fordham University 
Press 2006, p.219.  
145 Honig 2009, p. 10 
146 Ibid., p. 130. 
147 Ratner, M. ‘How We Closed the Guantanamo HIV Camp: The Intersection of Politics and Litigation’, 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 11 (1998) p. 187.  Bonnie Honig has her own anecdote that unpacks the 
intersection between law and politics. It concerns the actions and decisions of Louis Ferdinand Post, to 
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one of the lawyers who put the case of Haitian refugees detained at the U.S. naval 
station in Guantanamo Bay on trial. The story of the Haitian refugees is worth 
being told, Ratner believes, as it shows that in highly political cases, an exclusive 
focus on law is rather powerless, as is the appeal to moral humanitarian arguments. 
Legal advocacy was, of course, important in fighting the Guantanamo camp where 
refugees were detained for the sole reason of being HIV positive. In itself, 
however, legal argument meant very little. It was the political action that counted. 
In June, 1993, after a decision of the District Court and under the persistent 
pressure of public opinion, the Clinton Administration finally freed the refugees 
who were held at Guantanamo for more than a year, and granted them access to 
the United States --something the Court did not explicitly demand. The Court’s 
decision denounced state practice to bar Haitians from access to a proper asylum 
procedure by raising the standard of a well-founded fear for those supposedly 
infected with HIV. As the Haitians could not be forced back to Haiti, nor were 
granted access to US territory, they faced indefinite detention in the camp. Though 
the release of the refugees was a judicial victory, it would be too bold a claim to say 
that the law had won. For one thing, Clinton could easily have appealed the Court’s 
decision which was likely to be reversed by the Supreme Court which is known, 
Ratner points out, to be hostile towards aliens in general, and Haitians in 
particular.148 Moreover, state practice of setting up processing camps outside US 
territory where all constitutional and procedural rights are eliminated, was not 
directly challenged. After the HIV-camp incident, Guantanamo continued to 
function as an offshore processing center, and subsequent legislation was adopted 
that significantly extended the power of the executive branch to (mis)treat refugees 
as it pleases.149 
But to say that the law had won would also be to miss the political energy and 
agitation that flocked around the litigation, and that gathered thousands of people 
together to resist the racism and discrimination displayed by the detention of HIV- 
positive Haitian refugees. In fact, it was the vigorous political action that 
strengthened the lawyers to push their case further. Initially, they went to trial to 
claim due process rights for their clients prior to a decision of the INS to send 
them back to Haiti. They didn’t see any legal opportunity to challenge the exclusion 
of their clients on the basis of being HIV- positive (at that time third- country 
nationals infected with HIV were barred access from the United States) or to 
challenge the legality of the camp. They feared that such a direct challenge of state 
practice would be detrimental to their clients, as they would never be granted, they 
believed, access to the United States, and thus were likely to be forcibly returned to 
Haiti where they faced death. Claiming due process rights had the short term 
advantage of preventing their clients to be returned home, and at least would allow 
                                                                                                                   
whom Honig dedicates a whole chapter in her Emergency Politics. Post was an assistant secretary at the 
Department of Labor during what came to be known as the First Red Scare – a series of bomb attacks by 
anarchist and communist groups. The state’s solution to the terrorist treat of 1919, was the large scale 
deportation of aliens allied to or associated with the Communist party. When, in 1920, Post was charged with 
the responsibility for the deportations, he resorted to all of law’s resources to stop them. My own reading of 
the HIV-Guantanamo trial is highly inspired by Honig’s keen-witted interpretation of Post’s actions to 
dwindle the number of deportations (Cf. Honig 2009, pp. 65-86).  
148 Cf., Ratner (1998) p. 218.  
149 Cf., Ibid., p. 220.  
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lawyers to visit the camp (something which until then was only (im)possible with 
the permission of military authorities). However, supported by a massive grass-
roots campaign in defense of the rights of this specific group of refugees, the 
lawyers decided to go to trial again and challenge ‘the legality of what had become 
an HIV detention camp where refugees were detained indefinitely.’150 And they 
succeeded. The District Court ruled that the humanitarian camp, as it was referred 
to by both the Bush and Clinton administrations, constituted ‘nothing more than 
an HIV prison camp’ where ‘refugees remain in detention solely because they are 
Haitian and have tested HIV-positive.’151 
The struggle to free the refugees and bring them to the United States is a story 
about what it means to act politically in times of emergency; what it means, that is, 
to democratically resist exceptional measures that leave refugees in a legal void. 
Significantly, the coalition that came into being was called Emergency Coalition to Shut 
Down Guantanamo. It was an emergency coalition because of the crisis conditions 
under which the political action took place. But the emergence, it seems to me, can 
also be taken to point to something else, namely the emergence, or the rising forth, 
or the coming to the stage of a different democratic subject. The Emergency 
Coalition shows that, as Bonnie Honig argues in her Emergency Politics. Paradox, Law, 
Democracy, the people as the subject of democracy is also always a multitude. As also 
always a multitude, the people have to be constituted and re-constituted, shaped 
and reshaped as a unity, again and again. This allows us to understand, Honig says, 
‘democracy as a form of politics that is always in emergence.’152 
As Ratner explains, the Bush and Clinton Administrations based their policy on 
‘what they believed was politically popular – and black HIV-positive Haitian 
refugees were certainly not thought to be popular.’153 The callousness and harsh 
cynicism of government practice was demonstrated by INS official Duke Austin, 
who said to the New York Times that ‘nothing was wrong with the camp because the 
Haitians were “going to die anyway”.’ 154  And indeed, Michael Cordozo, who 
worked for Clinton at the Department of Justice, told the lawyers ‘that in his view 
… Clinton could weather a dead Haitian on Guantanamo better than he could deal 
with the negative political fallout of having HIV-positive Haitians coming to the 
United States.’155 
But the people, who only a few months earlier elected Clinton as their new 
president, proved government to be wrong. The marginal position of the refugees 
surprisingly came to their advantage. Their weakness and supposed unpopularity 
turned out to evoke great solidarity in different kinds of communities that, for one 
reason or  another, felt connected to the refugees: AIDS-activists, the Haitian 
community, African Americans, refugee and human rights organizations, religious 
leaders, Hollywood and public figures concerned about AIDS, students, anti-
imperialists and Haitian democracy advocates.156 The people stood up, said ‘No’, 
and came into action. 
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So, the lawyers who represented the Guantanamo detainees did not exclusively 
focus on law. Of equal importance was the outside strategy they developed and 
deployed so as to assure that the case of the Haitian refugees became a matter of 
great public concern. The outside strategy included getting media attention, 
demonstrations, petitions and even engaging in civil disobedience.157 The lawyers 
were no longer afraid that the organized political action, and at times even 
aggressive political strategies, would backfire on them and harm their cause: ‘The 
politicians had already factored in the negative; we did not have to do it for them 
… Thoughtful activism is necessary to win legal battles and can achieve multiple 
and unforeseen objectives in struggles that are essentially political. Silence, on the 
other hand, achieves nothing.’158 
Nor, as is clear, did the lawyers act alone. The final victory was the result of 
concerted action between different groups with different, and sometimes opposing, 
views and tactics, who managed, however, to find a common ground. The Haitian 
community, plagued for years by the stigmatization of Haitians beings carriers of 
HIV, wanted to steer away from the AIDS issue, and addressed the racism against 
refugees from Haiti. AIDS-activists, on the other hand, wanted to stress that 
Guantanamo was in fact an HIV prison camp. In the end, however, during a large 
demonstration, members from the Haitian community led the chant ‘HIV is not a 
crime’ and AIDS activists carried the slogan ‘No Aristide, No Freedom.’159 The 
Roman Catholic Church declared a day of fasting in solidarity with the refugees, 
which was picked up by students all over the country who participated in a week-
long hunger strike. New York City stated that it would be willing to take all the 
Haitians in and provide for them housing and medical assistance. 
Finally, those who participated in the political action on behalf of the refugees 
did not simply act in the name of humanity. They did not ground their actions in a 
moral universalism, claiming freedom, dignity and equality for all. In a way, they 






‘How we Closed the Guantanamo HIV Camp’ perfectly illustrates what Honig 
argues in Emergency Politics, to wit, that the rule of law is always dependent upon the 
rule of man. It shows that, as she says, ‘the poor migrants and refugees’ are not ‘so 
dependent on law to position them with more clarity in its network.’ 161  To 
understand the final victory as a mere result of legal advocacy is to downplay the 
political action of those involved back then, and to disempower political strategies 
of resistance still needed today. Indeed, the intersection between the legal process 
and the grass-roots campaigns might well be said to have reworked the paradox of 
politics as Honig understands it. According to Honig, this paradox is the chicken-
and-egg problem of politics which renders the question what comes first – the 
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people or the laws – undecided. At the moment of founding, the people do not yet 
exist as a unitary force that forms and makes the laws that are to unite, exactly, the 
people. So, those who take the initiative to found community, act as if the people 
already exist as a unity, and claim a future world on the basis of which they act. But 
we, of course, do not have to agree with the unity and identity ascribed to us. We 
are, Honig says, also always a multitude, the ‘unruly ungovernable double’ of the 
people. 162  That is why the paradox not only pertains to the ‘first’ moment of 
founding. Instead, the paradox of the projection in the future of a people that is to 
ground this very founding, continues to haunt democracy: ‘In some sense that is, 
the “people” are always undecidably present and absent from the scene of 
democracy. That is why it is always part of the point of democratic political practice 
to call them into being.’163 
According to Honig, Arendt’s notion of a right to have rights serves as a good 
motto for the constant need to rework the paradox of politics, and to bring the 
people into existence again and again.164  In fact, those who participated in the 
Emergency Coalition to Shut Down Guantanamo, might well be said to have reworked 
the paradox ‘as it is experienced by minorities, the stateless, the powerless, and the 
hapless.’165 For, with the Emergency Coalition, another We emerged that claimed, as 
Honig would say, ‘a future … on behalf of peoples and rights that are not yet and 
may never be.’166 Those who participated in the Emergency Coalition, acted as if the 
refugees were already entitled to procedural and constitutional rights, claiming that 
they merely defended and represented these rights that existed ex ante. 
Government, of course, did not agree. It even requested an unprecedented $10 
million sanction against the lawyers for making a frivolous case.167 The lawyers did 
not give in, and continued to act on behalf of the refugees and their fundamental 
rights, reworking, again, the paradox, as these rights were both the condition and 
the objective of their actions.168 And by doing so, they took the law, as Honig 
would say, into new directions, showing that Another We is possible.  
However, I do believe that Honig, in her understanding of the right to have 
rights as a polemic call against existing communities that presupposes Another We 
that it seeks to bring into being, misses out on something, as does Ratner in his 
recounting of the HIV-camp case. As for him, of all the political actions that took 
place on behalf of the refugees, their own action was the most important one. The 
hunger strike to which the refugees resorted was the turning point that ‘set the 
course for an outside agitation strategy.’169 The most important lesson for him is, 
therefore, that the ‘clients are the actors who drive the strategy. They have their 
own reality, their own demands, their own vision. We know more about the law, 
and we may have a particular range of skills and abilities … Our clients know more 
about their own lives and bring their own power to the case.’170 
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There is, of course, some truth in stressing that refugees are not just victims 
who passively endure their fate. But to say that they bring their power to the case is 
to misunderstand the inhumane disempowerment refugees have to suffer inside 
camps. Their disempowerment speaks to the fact that all that remained for them 
was their naked body, their bare existence as the site of ‘political action.’ I do, of 
course, disapprove of and reject the statement of INS official, Duke Austin. But 
sadly, he captured the point quite well: Those detained in the camps are going to 
die anyway, their lives are not worth living and they are reduced to their muted 
bodily existence. They are deprived not just of their legal and political status, but of 
everything that makes them human. 
Indeed, recall from the beginning of this chapter that the right to have rights 
signals that the life of the refugee is deprived of public appearance as well as his 
complete rightlessness. The conceptual problem at issue is how to claim a right to 
have rights while excluded from the rights that give us the equal claim to political 
activity. Of course, we can act on behalf of those who have lost a community willing 
and able to grant their rights, claiming another future, another We. Of course, we 
can, and should ‘intervene in ways that claim Europe for a different present and 
future, for different constituencies, for a different politics.’171 But the right to have 
rights brings us before the possibility of another We only if we take it upon 
ourselves to stand up for refugee rights. A contestatory politics that acts out 
another We that it both presupposes and pursues, in a sense, comes far too soon 
for the refugee. The refugee does not claim a different future for another Europe. 
Instead, he claims protection against the threat to his life and freedom. Agonistic 
politics that bring about a new and different We does not illuminate the challenge 
inherent in a claim to asylum. 
There is a difference, therefore, between political action that draws on plurality, 
and the claim to a right to have rights at the behest of those who have lost their 
place in this world. There is, that is, a difference between the foreigner and the 
refugee. For – contra Benhabib – the distress of the refugee is precisely that he is 
not yet in a position to quarrel with us about our values that we believe represent 
the universal. Refugees are not a well-defined minority that can say ‘We, the others’ 
demand from you respect for our values, beliefs and practices that ‘We, the others’ 
believe embody the universal. What motivates the refugee’s question is, rather, a 
matter of life and death. But why would a polity care? For – contra Honig – the 
refugee may be nearby in a geographical sense, and yet not register in a political 
sense. The dilemma at issue here is marvelously depicted by Bertolt Brecht’s play 
Flüchtlingsgespräche (1940). The two man who escaped Der Wieheiβterdochgleich sadly 
have to conclude that no country is willing to take them in and offer them a place 
of their own. They know they are alive. But that’s all they can say. 172  Sure, 
sometimes they benefited from acts of neighbour love – and neighbour love 
inspires Honig’s theory of proximity. But as one of the refugees considers: ‘Warum 
es ist unheimlich, in einem Land sein, wo Sie davon abhängen, ob einer soviel 
Nächstenliebe aufbringt, daβ er Ihretwegen seine eigenen Interessen aufs Spiel 
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setzt. Sie sind sicherer in einem Land, wos keine Nächstenliebe brauch, damit Sie 
kuriert werden.’173 
Honig’s evaluation of proximity evades the problems of a moral universalism. 
But it cannot sidestep the question of why the refugee’s proximity would register as 
a challenge to the identity of a democratic polity.  
Despite the decisive differences between Honig’s approach that locates 
proximity in the paradox of politics, and Benhabib’s approach that locates 
reciprocity in the paradox of democratic legitimacy, both usher in a similar 
conclusion. For both approaches locate the challenge of the right to have rights in 
the tension between the actual We and a possible We. Both mold the challenge as a 
challenge that exposes the contingency of the We, by opening up a perspective 
onto the possibility of another We.  
But the refugee, I submit, discloses a more radical sense of contingency. Having 
lost a community of equals, the refugee is the one who can no longer say ‘We.’ Jean 
Améry’s insight into the refugee experience, therefore, deserves careful 
consideration. For as he,  himself  a refugee from national-socialism, painfully 
makes clear in Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne: Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten 
(1966), the refugee is a person (and not even that) who can no longer say ‘we’: ‘Ich 
war ein Mensch, der nicht mehr ‘wir’ sagen konnte und darum nur noch 
gewohnheitsmaßig, aber nicht im Gefühl vollen Selbstbesitzes ‘ich’ sagte. 
Manchmal geschah es, daß ich im Gespräch mit meinen mehr oder weniger 
wohlwollenden Antwerpener Gastfreunden beiläufig einwarf: Bei uns daheim ist 
das anders. ‘Bij ons’, das klang für meine Gesprächspartner als das Natürlichste von 
der Welt. Ich aber errötete, den ich wußte, daß es eine Anmaßung war. Ich war kein 
Ich mehr und lebte nicht in einem Wir.’174  
The challenge inherent in a claim to asylum derives from this. For the arrival of 
the refugee who has lost everything reminds us of the possibility, not of another 
We, but of the absence of a We. The refugee does not intimate a possible We, but 
rather, the impossibility of a We. The right to have rights does not, that is, play on the 
tensions between the actual We and a possible We, but rather, draws on the 
tensions between being and not-being, between the presence of a We and the 
absence of a We. As will be argued in the next chapter, this possibility of 
impossibility is also always our own possibility. 
 
 
3.9 A Focus on Facticity – in Conclusion 
 
The refugee’s inability to say ‘We’ is the other side of his displacement which 
signals that he is nowhere in this world. The right to have rights, therefore, only 
makes sense within the context of displacement, and reflects the refugee’s 
powerlessness to understand and represent himself as belonging to a We.  
This is also, I believe, how Michelman understands the right to have rights. For a 
right to have rights to make sense and actually count against a particular 
community, Michelman suggests that the two usages of the term ‘right’ be divided 
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over two different planes. Not unlike Benhabib, he argues that the rights to which 
membership entitles are the outcome of our joint political action. The right to have 
rights, by contrast, is not based on political reciprocity, and hence is not, 
Michelman says, politically grounded.175 But the right to have rights does not, for 
that matter, establish a moral reciprocity between the one who claims it and the 
receiving polity. To morally ground such a right in the supposed existence of an 
abstract naked human being, and to say, as Benhabib does, that we respond to it as 
human beings simpliciter, is not only to fight against Arendt’s loud cautions against 
human rights, Michelman says. It would also miss what Arendt was trying to point 
out, namely the ‘irreparable groundlessness of rights’ which affirms ‘our own 
precarious, existential, collective self-care.’176 
The preceding pages already tacitly opened up a perspective on the 
groundlessness of rights and, in particular, on the groundlessness of membership 
rights. Recall from the discussion of Benhabib’s elaboration of discourse theory 
that the question of membership, who’s in and who’s out, is itself withdrawn from 
discourse. Democracy, it was argued, cannot democratically decide on its own 
(civic) limits. But according to Benhabib, history repairs this fundamental a-
democratic aspect at the origin of democracy. Who belongs to the people and who 
doesn’t is a matter of facticity in the sense of historical contingency. The corollary 
thereof is that the challenge inherent in the arrival of ‘others’ is limited to a 
contestation of collective identity. The others open up a perspective onto another 
We that fleshes out the universal in a different way. Basically, it is a moral 
universalism that warrants this opening. 
By shifting the question of the constitution of the people to the question of 
history and identity, Benhabib actually forecloses the possibility of questioning who 
legitimately belongs to the people.  As Näsström argues: ‘Who legitimately makes 
up the people is not something that we may lawfully contest on this view.’177 As 
will be argued in the remainder of this book, the refugee does exactly that: He 
challenges the legitimacy of our polity, calls into question the right we claim to select 
some as members while discard others as such. Indeed, if democracy cannot 
democratically decide its own limits, whence this right? If the first question of 
democracy, i.e., who belongs and who doesn’t, withdraws itself from the process of 
mutual reasoning- giving, what, then, can be the ground for membership? And, what 
can be the ground of the right to select and exclude? To search for the ground of 
membership is, indeed, as Aleinikoff colorfully puts it, like searching for the Holy 
Grail. The right to have rights throws us all the way back to the origin, and does 
not settle with history as an answer. Instead, it casts doubt on the origin as a 
sufficient ground for the legitimacy of our living together as a people. Otherwise 
still, the right to have rights raises fundamental questions about our legitimacy and 
unity as a people, as it exposes the fundamental lack of ground at the origin of our 
existence as a people.178 
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Honig’s paradox of politics ushers in groundlessness. The paradox expresses, 
time and again, that what is at stake in democracy is the unity and legitimacy of the 
people. And it explains the stakes of democracy by pointing out the ambiguities at 
the origins of a democratic polity. 
Let’s briefly consider, then, the constitution or foundation of a democratic 
order.  
The constitution of order is brought about by the suspension -- or outright 
rejection -- of the existing order and the anticipation of a new order. Of course, 
those who take the initiative to found order do not, as Fitzpatrick reminds us, 
produce order as a ‘sudden burst outside the process of time’, but instead, present 
themselves ‘as defenders of a history already accomplished’.179  Indeed, as Lindahl 
points out in his incisive reading of the constitution of the European Union, the 
High Contracting Parties of the Maastricht Treaty (1975) expressed themselves to 
be ‘determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe.’180 So, in the claimed purpose to lay the ‘bases of a future Europe’181, the 
Treaty refers back to a past in which the peoples of Europe are already united. But 
the snag is, of course, that during the turmoil of founding, the European people do 
not yet exist as a unity. Instead, they are solicited as a legal and political unity on 
account of this very act of founding. 
 Importantly, the Treaty claims to lay the bases for a future Europe. It 
anticipates, that is, Europe as a new order. But, since this new legal and political 
order is not yet in place, but at the verge of its existence, it cannot, at the moment 
of founding, qualify the founding act as legitimate. But neither can the preceding 
order, which is suspended, disqualify this act as illegitimate. As an existing order is 
repudiated and a new order anticipated, the founding act hangs over the abyss.182 
At the moment of founding, therefore, the founding act is neither legitimate nor 
illegitimate but is, rather, as Lindahl says, alegal.183 But, this is only justifiable if the 
founding act succeeds and establishes the legal framework that, in retrospect, 
appropriates this founding act and gives it its legitimacy.184 Due to this alegality, 
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legitimacy, Lindahl argues, only holds in retrospect: ‘Indeed, the founding acts of 
legal order are themselves neither legal nor illegal because both terms of this binary 
distinction already presuppose a legal order as the condition of their intelligibility. 
Instead, foundational acts are alegal because they institute the distinction itself 
between legality and illegality. Only retrospectively, if they catch on, can they come 
to manifest themselves, albeit precariously and incompletely, as legal acts.’185 
 The founding act, which is ascribed to the people, is dependent upon the law it 
founds that first makes the people appear as a unity and casts their self-founding as 
legitimate. This intricate interplay between founding and what is founded, between 
the people and its laws, forecloses the possibility to ever decide what comes first: 
the people or its laws? According to Honig, this undecidibility is the chicken-and-
egg problem of politics. The circularity involved in founding reveals, Honig says, 
‘law’s formative power, its never fully- willed role in processes of subject 
formation.’ 186  But, at the same time, the formative power of law brings law’s 
powerlessness to awareness, as it can never fully consolidate the people as a unity 
and warrant its legitimacy. Though rising forth as a unity because of law, the people 
are never fully captured by law.187 
But this implies that the act of founding is not only dependent upon what it 
founds, but also continues to be operative in the further existence of the founded 
order. Indeed, the foundation of order is not an already established and achieved 
fact; it is not crowned by fate or history and cannot be properly located at the dawn 
of history. Rather the act of founding is never over. There is, that is, no end to the 
foundation of order. Hence, there is the need to refound order, time and again. 
This refounding is not only necessary, it is also inevitable. In fact, it happens all the 
time. It happens whenever the law is applied. It happens with every act of law 
enforcement. For, as is well known, to apply or enforce the law, first of all, requires 
a decision to apply the law (or not). And, this decision is irreducible to the law 
being applied. With this irreducibility of decision, the founding act or power 
manifests itself again. For, the decision to apply the law (or not) not only sets the 
relation between law and this particular case it did not foresee. With the decision, 
law also unfolds back upon itself, reaffirms itself, as every decision sets the limits of 
law again and anew.188 As Lindahl argues: ‘Because there is no direct access to the 
unity of a collective, legislative acts can never only enforce the distinction between 
legality and illegality, and hence, never only enforce the unity of legal order. The 
legal qualification of human behavior also always involves an appraisal of what 
counts as (il)legality; it is also always an act that constitutes the boundaries, hence the 
unity, of a legal order. More precisely, boundary enforcement and constitution are 
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always interconnected in such a way that, although one or the other is more 
prominent, neither is ever given in pure form.’189 
It is this very originarity and irreducibility of law- making that rules out, as Honig 
would say, a binary opposition between the rule of law and the rule of man. Indeed, 
the Guantanamo trial showed, in an extreme form, that the granting of rights to 
refugees not only depended on law, but on the actions of men, as well. Thomas 
Spijkerboer draws a similar conclusion after critically analyzing case law on family 
reunification of the European Court of Human Rights: ‘[L]egal argumentation – 
even in its most technical form -- is inconclusive.’ 190  And, this opens up the 
possibility, he argues, that social movements can influence legal argument: ‘If a 
social movement succeeds in establishing a relatively radical view as credible, the 
centre of the debate shifts, possibly taking the courts along. All that courts need is 
an innovative way of dealing with the technical issues that allows for shifting to the 
new centre.’191 Spijkerboer here expresses that – to use Honig’s terms – proceeding 
from law does not exclude taking law in different directions. Law’s requirement to 
make unity out of plurality relies on something that is not implied, not contained in 
law. The outcome of law – a univocal decision or sentence – relies upon a decision 
that, as said, is irreducible to law. Put differently, the rule of law is always 
implicated in a decision that can never be fully recuperated by law, which 
evidences, Honig says, that the rule of law is always dependent upon the rule of 
man. Hence, Honig argues that ‘[p]erhaps somewhere between the rule of law and 
the rule of man we might …  find or enact the rule of man or people: plural and 
riven, plainspoken and arcanely technical, lawlike and lawless, all at the same 
time.’192 
But if there is no such thing as a binary opposition between the rule of law and 
the rule of man, as Honig says herself, it is equally worth stressing that the latter 
depends on the former as well. That is, to apply the law is, indeed, to apply the law. 
And even though application involves a decision that disrupts the logical extension 
of the rule to the case, leaving the decision undetermined by legal principle,193 one 
cannot but link up with the already established meaning of the law if one, as Lord 
Radcliff famously tells, wants to be a wise man in practice.194 But, there is more to 
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the dependency of the rule of man on the rule of law than Lord Radcliff’s concern 
for the principle of legality. The dependency not only holds in retrospect, but in 
prospect, as well.  
If we imagine the world otherwise, and claim a new law that brings the world 
into being as we imagine it should be, we already presuppose the legitimacy of what 
we are pursuing. That is, the world we seek to bring into being is both presupposed 
and pursued. Indeed, recall that founding – or law- making power – is always 
dependent upon what it founds. The dependency evidences that we can never leave 
the everyday order of law and return to a pure state before the law where the origin 
lies sparkling as a jewel. That one cannot but link up with the law, therefore, 
implies that the multitude, whose power Honig stresses, cannot present itself as a 
multitude. We can, in other words, never directly behold plurality. We always adopt 
a parallax view, so to speak, to the infinite range of possibilities that have been 
excluded, marginalized and repressed by the current favoring of one particular 
possibility. Every new claim, mindful of and intimating plurality while imagining a 
new and better world, cannot but present itself – in prospect – in law’s name, and 
use its very terms. There is no going back before the law. As will become clear in the next 
chapter, facticity has to do with exactly this. Without a polity’s understanding of its 
facticity, proximity in Honig’s sense, will not register, thus will come to no avail for 
refugees. As will be argued in the next chapter, facticity brings a more radical 
contingency into view. Facticity and radical contingency will explain why a polity cares 
for the one who has lost his place in this world and can no longer say ‘We.’  
  
                                                                                                                   
course, the judge’s law-making capacity, a capacity which only judges themselves, and that for excellent 
reasons, are likely to dispute. It is to me a matter of great surprise that so much ink has been employed by 
commentators in demonstrating this fairly obvious conclusion. If judges prefer to adopt the formula – for 
that is what it is – that they merely declare the law and do not make it, they do no more than show 
themselves wise men in practice. Their analysis may be weak, but their perception of the nature of law is 
sound.’194 And if the judge proves himself to be a wise man in practice it is because he cannot but claim that 
he applied the law that was declared beforehand (which is, of course, the principle of legality). (Lord Radcliffe 
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The refugee who stands at the door always challenges the receiving community. 
Whatever legal obligations states have with respect to refugees, human rights law 
and refugee law do not prevent that the arrival of the refugee is unsettling, perhaps 
even experienced to be threatening, as it makes us, as members of the polity, feel 
insecure.  
Notwithstanding their differences, reciprocity and proximity try to make sense 
of this challenge against the backdrop of a polity’s contingency. Contingency is but 
the reverse side of the requirement of democratic closure. To say that a people’s 
freedom is necessarily spatially limited is to say that democratic legal order is 
inherently contingent. As it is related to the limitation of freedom, contingency 
features the finitude of a democratic people. 1 Finitude arises from what Lindahl 
coins as the basic achievement of legal order which is ‘to limit the unlimited’: ‘To 
the extent that the basic achievement of legal order is to limit the unlimited, 
exclusion has a positive significance, for, without it, no legal order would be 
possible; but this achievement is irreducibly ambiguous, for, exclusiveness also 
ensures that no legal order ever succeeds in fully consolidating itself … in a word, 
legal orders are irredeemably contingent.’ 2 
 By drawing attention to inclusion and exclusion, Lindahl highlights that 
democratic legal order is not given in advance and ready-made, but is instead, 
brought about. That order is brought about implies that things and persons are not 
always already ordered, thus refuting the claim of a natural order in which things and 
persons are assigned and fixed in a place of their own where they properly and 
naturally belong (and should return to). Rather, what ‘precedes’ order is the 
unlimited that is in need of limitation. What ‘precedes’ is, as Waldenfels says, the 
                                                 
1 Compare Lindahl (2008), p. 212: ‘Indeed, a common interest is always determinate: Some interests are 
selected as worthy of legal protection and others discarded, usually implicitly, as legally irrelevant. That the 
material sphere of validity of legal norms and orders is bounded means, therefore, that only a finite range of 
rights and obligations is made available by any given legal order, because these rights and obligations give 
legal content to a bounded common interest.’ 
2 Lindahl (2008), p. 126.  
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unordered that is brought to order.3 The unlimited or unordered that ‘precedes’, 
signals that ‘before’ order, an infinity of multiple ways to go exist, only one of 
which can be selected for the time being. Every order is, therefore, provisional, 
hence questionable, as it fails other possibilities to which it relates as possibilities it 
did not choose. The ‘not’ compromises the negativity of order. Importantly, 
negativity here reflects a privative reasoning, as it refers to the taking away or 
exclusion of multiple possibilities in favor of one particular possibility that 
unavoidably fails all the others. Finitude, thus, appears as deprivation, i.e., as a 
regrettable but necessary failure with respect to an infinite range of possibilities. 
Finitude, in short, derives from infinity. Finitude (contingency) thus understood, 
allows for a contestation of order in the name of possibilities that have been 
forgotten, marginalized and repressed. Finitude is the reminder, so to speak, that 
another way of limiting the unlimited, of ordering the unordered, is possible. 
But there is more to finitude than the necessary limitation of freedom. The 
challenge inherent in a claim to asylum brings a different (though related) finitude 
into view. The refugee deepens our sense of finitude, as his mere presence reflects 
the possibility of the absence of a We. As argued in the previous chapter, the refugee 
reminds us of the possibility of the not-being of a We. Not-being and absence put 
into doubt that finitude is exhaustively dealt with when thought of as the limitation 
of freedom. Indeed, the finitude that comes into view with the question of asylum 
is not just a deprivation that allows for the passage to another We. The finitude that 
comes along with the refugee is, rather, the end. 
The possibility of the not-being of a We, therefore, not only attaches to the 
refugee who has experienced the death of a We, both as the cause and effect of his 
flight. That the absence of a We is possible gets to us because we ‘know’ this 
possibility also fundamentally belongs to our own existence as a people. Indeed, the 
right to have rights raises the question how the possibility of not-being bears upon 
ourselves as a people. This is, ultimately, the question of the We’s finitude. 
This chapter argues that radical finitude is the ultimate perspective of a political 
care for the collective self that Honig invokes in her Emergency Politics. To take care 
of the self is to be concerned for one’s own being, one’s own existence. Indeed, 
what makes a people sovereign is this very concern for its own existence. Concern, 
therefore, sheds light on the self that is at issue in the sovereign right of a people to 
determine and rule itself. This chapter aims at the self in order to bring about the 
democratic We as and in its finitude. The next chapter argues that a democratic We 
can give effect to the right to have rights on account of its radical finitude. 
To expound finitude, I will elaborate a theory of collective selfhood, starting 
with the distinction between identity as sameness and identity as selfhood. This 
double concept of plural identity allows me to embark upon the most challenging 
part of the thesis: a reflection on the mode in which the people can be said to exist 
as a self. The argument is cast in the mold of a new reading of Heidegger’s Dasein. 
Whereas most Heidegger interpretations tacitly assume that singular existence is the 
paradigm case of Dasein, I will try to make a case for human plural existence as 
typified by the polity to be analyzed as Dasein. I will reflect on three issues that are 
                                                 
3 Compare Waldenfels 1996, p. 1: ‘If orders are not accepted as ready- made and hypostasized, their selective 
and exclusive achievements presuppose something that comes to order and that precedes them as something 
to be ordered.’ 
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of direct relevance for the topic of this thesis so as to gain (i) a better 
understanding of facticity with which I closed the previous chapter; (ii) a clearer-cut 
difference, hence interdependence, between representation and reflexivity, or 
between improper and proper understanding; (iii) insight into finitude as it directs 
the concern and order of Dasein-in-the-plural; and (iv) an appreciation of the 
mood that is inherent in this finite mode of existence, to wit, collective angst or a 
shared sense of insecurity. This inquiry into facticity, self-understanding, death and 
mood renders the concept of popular sovereignty more vulnerable and fragile.  
 
 
4.1 Reflexivity and the Sovereign Self 
 
A chain of quotations hailing from Benveniste, has it that popular sovereignty is 
bound to introduce representation since, as Waldenfels formulates the problem, 
‘there is no we that can say ‘we.’ ‘We’ is always said by ‘representatives’ or 
‘mouthpieces’, using it in an inclusionary way. 4  I will not doubt this linguistic 
phenomenon, only ask why this is so. The answer, I venture, pertains to the 
ontology of self; in our case, the plural self. This self does not exist as an entity 
over the first person being represented. On the contrary, the ‘self’ is shorthand for 
the relationship between a first person and her thinking of herself qua first person. 
This is why reflexivity is always bound up with representation. Vice versa, without 
represented identity also being reflexive, the theory of popular sovereignty cannot 
deliver according to its promise, namely the promise to solve the problem of how 
we can comply with political authority, and yet be free. 
My inquiry into collective identity, therefore, takes identity in a reflexive modus. 
Note that reflexivity in this sense has little to do with a critical reflection on 
collective identity which Benhabib bears out when she calls for reflexive processes 
of collective identity transformation. Benhabib would like us to believe that this 
transformation, in the final analysis, comes along with a certain ease, as the 
challenge that incites the transformation safely sits on a democratic people’s own 
universal principles. Reflexivity, however, puts doubt on this ease, as it brings into 
focus a people’s attachment or belonging to its identity.5 Recall that, on Benhabib’s 
account, the other ‘dares’ us as he questions our embodiment, our materialization 
 
4 Cf., Waldenfels, B. Vervremdung des Moderne, Essen: Waldstein Verlag 2001, p. 140. Waldenfels is quoted in 
Roermund, B, van. ‘The Law and ‘We’’, Ethical Perspectives: Journal of the European Ethics Network, vol. 13 
(2006), p. 530. 
5  Rudi Visker offers a profound account of the unease and discomfort that emerges whenever we are 
confronted with others who differ from us in almost every aspect of their lives. The other unsettles us, not 
merely because he shows us a different way of living, but because he or she makes us aware of our 
attachments. He or she unsettles us not because he or she incites a process of identity transformation, but 
rather brings our own attachments into experience by reason of which we cannot change ourselves. Compare 
Visker, R. The Inhuman Condition. Looking for Difference after Levinas and Heidegger, Dordrecht [etc.]: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers 2004, pp. 289, 290: ‘I can, of course, to a certain extent, admit that mine is not the only 
set of values possible. But having granted this, I cannot but add: and yet, they are the only ones possible for me 
… At first sight, the situation thus described seems to fit nicely what is known as ‘tolerance’: a willingness to 
bear what one does not approve of, or indeed positively rejects. But there is a complication: for the weight we 
have to bear does not simply come from what we cannot respect in the Other, it also involves the weight our 
own values impose on us. In other words, the tension is not simply an inter-subjective one, it is intra-
subjective, deriving from the Other confronting us with a question to which we fail to come up with an 
answer: what is it that makes these values, this Existenzweise my own (our own)?’ 
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of the universal. He challenges, I argued, what matters. This turn of phrase catches 
what is at stake with reflexive identity, as it raises the question to whom these things 
matter. 
In Oneself as Another, Ricoeur aspires to this question. For, how, he asks, can we 
ask about what matters if we forget to ask to whom it matters.6 The values the other 
challenges are not just values that happen to befall us due to a concurrence of 
historical circumstances. They are, more intimately, our values, they belong to us. The 
other may challenge whatever it is we are, but, as Agamben perceptively argues, 
‘whatever being’ is not indifferent being, it does not matter which, but being such 
that it always matter.7 
 There is a difference, therefore, between identity as referring to what we are, 
and identity such that it always matters what we are. In the first case, identity refers 
to what we are that is set up by excluding what is other and different, and that can 
be compared accordingly. In the second case, identity revolves around our relation, 
our belonging to whatever it is we are. This time, identity reflects that, as Waldenfels 
says, ‘[t]he personal pronoun is continued in the possessive pronoun, and the 
privileging of the ‘I’ is strengthened to a privileging of what is ‘mine’.8 And, what is 
ours is key to understanding what it means to exist as a self. What is at issue in 
being a self is not only what we are, but also, and more importantly, who we are. 
We experience the difference whenever we look in the mirror or see our image 
reflected in a window.9 For, what I see is myself; I recognize the mirror-image as my 
own image. This is actually quite bewildering. For, I see myself in something that I am 
not. 
Perplexity continues to hold if matters are taken to the level of the plural self. 
The question of the self was already at issue with Honig’s paradox of politics. One 
of the lessons to be drawn from this paradox is that the democratic We is not a 
subject that nicely fits the identity ascribed to it. Or, to say the same thing 
differently, the We is not a subject on the ground of which an identity can be ascribed. 
For this would be to presuppose that whatever quality or property is held to be true 
for the We is already present within the We-subject. Otherwise still, the identity, 
properties, predicates ascribed to the We would correspond to the We as subject. 
Identity as sameness amounts to this. Taking the We as a subject makes the subject 
of democracy – We, the people – to be in an endless search for its true, authentic 
and original identity that it always risks losing when playing the game of 
                                                 
6 Cf., Ricoeur, P. Oneself as Another (translated from the French), Chicago/London: The University of Chicago 
Press 1994, p. 137.  
7 Cf., Agamben, G. The Coming Community (translated from the Italian), Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota 
Press 1993, p. 1.  
8 Waldenfels 1996, p. 77.  
9 The difference is also famously at issue in Musil’s Der Man ohne Eigenschaften. Ulrich, the protagonist who is 
called the man without qualities by his friend Walter, is not, to be sure, without qualities. In fact, he is very 
well aware of his qualities. He won’t deny that he is male, young, white, born and raised in this particular time 
and place, gifted with a bright intellect, and so forth. To answer the question, what he is, is relatively simple 
for Ulrich. But, what troubles him is that the question, who he is, is not answered by a sheer enumeration of 
all his qualities which he, no doubt, shares with numerous others. What causes Ulrich’s uncanniness, and 
what makes him feel ill at ease, is that he is not entirely sure, as he himself says, how he belongs to his 
qualities and they to him. (And, of course, what makes Der Man Ohne Eigenschaften  such an intriguing piece of 
literature is that Ulrich’s quest for himself runs parallel to Austria-Hungary’s disarray about itself, and its 
attempt to find itself again in the ruins of its identity).  
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representation. With the paradox of politics it is, rather, the other way around: We, 
the people rises forth, emerges from the identity claimed for it. The We is not first; 
it comes after. As will become clear in this chapter, that the We is not a subject is 
but another way of saying that the We is not the ground for democratic legal order. 
But if the We is not so much the cause but rather the effect of politics, the 
question is: how can it recognize the identity claimed for it as its own? What is its 
own is precisely what matters. But what is its own is, at the same time, far from 
self-evident, if only because it relates to, and arises from, what is not oneself. 
Hence, the people’s concern for its own existence. Indeed, concern and what matters 
are key in understanding what it means for a people to understand and establish its 
self. ‘Does not’, Ricoeur asks, ‘the question about what matters or not depend on 
self-concern, which indeed, seems to be constitutive for selfhood?’10  
The issue of sovereign self-determination thus urges an inquiry into the 
existential-ontological category of the own. Clearly, the own crops up whenever the 
people’s identity is at issue. But it is on account of the own – or the proper – that 
the question of identity remains somewhat unresolved, and even makes us feel 
uncanny, as it is not simply a matter of answering it in terms of what-ness. What we 
are is always, in a way, plainspoken and familiar. But what is familiar is not what is 
most our own. For what is our own raises the question, how we relate to what we 
are, how we deem our identity to be our own, causing what we thought was 
familiar to appear as unfamiliar and not ourselves. 
 So, what is at stake with the own or the proper is the grasping of the We as a 
self. Only if the We recognizes everything it is as properly belonging to it, does its 
self arise. The own is what enables us to exist as a self, by our self and for the sake 
of our self.11 In his essay, ‘Ex Nihilo Summum (Of Sovereignty)’, Jean-Luc Nancy 
therefore argues that sovereignty centers around the relation of the people to its 
identity and, hence, the ‘consequence consists in referring to the sovereign the 
constitutive problematic of the relation to self or of auto-position in general.’12 
To tease out this reflexive relation is not just an idle matter of splitting hairs. On 
the contrary. The stakes involved in raising the question what it means for a people 
to exist as a self are high, if only because it unravels the linguistic phenomenon that 
a we can never say ‘We’ as a genuine ontological problem. Moreover, the focus on 
the self allows for a deconstruction of the opposition between direct or 
participatory democracy, on the one hand, and indirect or representative 
democracy, on the other, -- if by deconstruction we mean exposing the 
predominance and favoring of one of the terms of the opposition over against the 
other in order to subsequently question this predominance. 
As is well known, direct democracy, even though practically infeasible, clearly 
enjoys a theoretical primacy over against representation which is said to be a 
 
10 Ricoeur 1994, p. 137 
11 On the relation between the own, the self and reflexivity see also Agamben’s essay ‘*Se: Hegel’s Absolute 
and Heidegger’s Ereignis’, in Agamben, G. Potentialities. Collected Essays in Philosophy (translated from the Italian), 
Stanford: Stanford University Press 1999, pp. 116-137.  
12  Nancy, J.L. ‘Ex Nihilo Summum (Of Sovereignty)’, in Nancy The Creation of the World. Or Globalization 
(translated from French, D. Pettigrew & F. Raffoul (eds.)), New York, Albany: State University of New York 
Press 2007, p. 99.  
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second-best option derivative of the former.13 At first glance, popular sovereignty 
seems to establish this primacy of direct democracy, as it expresses that the people 
is both the author of laws and the interested party thereof. To say that ‘the people 
rules over the people’ is to presuppose, first, that the people is originally present, 
and second, partakes in the process of legislation. Van Roermund instructively 
summarizes this common reading of popular sovereignty and democracy: 
‘Rousseau’s phrase that law is law if and only if “the whole people rules over the 
whole people” is commonly read in what we may call the co-referential thesis (CT). 
Roughly put, CT states that law can only be law if ‘rulers’ and ‘ruled’ are co-
referential terms. They refer to the same set of people, who are supposed to rule 
what they want and do what they ruled.’14 This common reading builds on a notion 
of identity in terms of sameness. Decisive in this respect is not, or at least not only, 
that the people is identified according to a limited set of criteria, establishing a 
substantive and homogeneous polity in which all members share in the same 
identity. The point of the matter is, rather, that those who rule and those who are 
being ruled are the same. Again, what is presupposed is the original presence of the 
people, which is lost, however, in the representation of the people to which we 
resort for all kinds of practical reasons, and which hamper that we may all engage 
in the political and legislative process. Yet, if it is true that the only and true 
meaning of popular sovereignty is that ‘the people rules over the people’, then  
direct democracy continues to guide what indirect democracy is supposed to do, 
namely to re-present the people, that is to make present again the people that has 
been lost in representation. So, the ultimate aim of democracy is to regain an 
original presence. On this account, the people can be said to be in an endless search 
for its original, true and authentic identity. According to Nancy, the political 
tradition of the West comes down to this: ‘Until this day, history has been thought 
on the basis of a lost community – one to be regained or reconstituted.’15 
However, the primacy of direct democracy negatively impacts upon the issue of 
asylum. More specifically, this general account of popular sovereignty and 
democracy causes us to end up in a deadlock whenever the right to have rights is at 
issue. Recall, in this respect, Seyla Benhabib’s attempt to reconcile popular 
sovereignty and human rights as discussed in Chapter Three. Admittedly, Benhabib 
claims to have proceeded from representative democracy. 16  But, there is little 
doubt that her argument relies upon a ‘preference in the opposition’ of direct 
democracy, as discourse ethics proceeds from the assumption that only those 
norms and institutions are valid if those who are affected by them can participate in 
their articulation. But, if direct democracy is the measure, this implies that the 
rights of those who do not belong to the democratic We of which they seek 
membership, and who, for that very reason, are excluded from the process of norm 
articulation, can only be referred to the moral realm. Against the backdrop of a 
                                                 
13 For a critical account of this general understanding of the relation between direct and indirect democracy 
see Lindahl, H.K. ‘Rechtsvorming als politieke representatie: de kwestie van constitutionele toetsing’, in 
Broers, E.J. & Van Klink, B. De rechter als rechtsvormer, Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers ( 2001), pp. 173-
196.  
14 Van Roermund (2006), p. 531.  
15 Nancy, J.L. ‘The Inoperative Community’, in Nancy, J.L. The Inoperative Community (translated from the 
French, Connor, P. ed.), Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press 1991, p. 9.  
16 Cf. Benhabib 2004, pp. 217-220. 
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theoretical favoring of direct democracy, the right to have rights can only be 
morally grounded and appear as a moral right, which, as argued in Chapter Two, is 
no right at all, but a privilege subject to the whims of the sovereign. The referred 
primacy thus enmeshes us in the loop that the right to have rights cannot be 
politically grounded unless those who claim it are already in and join discourse 
about it, in which case it is wholly redundant to claim it. 
 Does this mean that the right to have rights is nothing but the expression of a 
vague hope, or worse, an exercise in cynicism? After all, given the sovereignty of 
the people, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to move away from the primacy of 
direct democracy. Questioning this would be tantamount to renouncing a people’s 
freedom which is at the core of the right to determine and govern itself. 
 Or, so it seems. For if sovereignty is indeed to guarantee the freedom of the 
people, then it is insufficient to say that the people rules over the people. As Nancy 
argues in his short essay on sovereignty, ‘Ex Nihilo Summum’ (Of Sovereignty), what 
the formula ‘the people rules the people’ misses is, precisely, that the people is 
sovereign, i.e., that the people rules itself.17 For freedom to be guaranteed, it is not 
enough that those who rule and those who are being ruled are the same. It is also, 
and above all, required that the people recognizes the enacted laws as its own laws. 
It is here that reflexivity kicks in. As Van Roermund argues: ‘Felicitously, CT is not 
the only reading possible for Rousseau’s phrase; a second and much neglected 
reading is as feasible as the first one. When in lawmaking, the whole people rules 
over the whole people, this amounts to the whole people ruling over itself. Let us 
formulate this understanding in the Reflexivity Thesis – both the normativity and 
the validity of law lie with its rulers (legislators) ruling on themselves. RT opens up 
a new horizon of questions … If the basic tenet of Rechtsstaatlichkeit is that rulers 
rule over themselves, we are in fact dealing, at the core of legislative action, with a 
sense of ‘identity’ different from the one presented in CT. We will have to inquire 
into political meaning of ipse rather than idem, of selfhood rather than sameness 
[…].’ 18  Paradoxical as it might appear at first glance, it is exactly identity as 
selfhood that is open to the specific challenge inherent in a claim to asylum. As this 
chapter and the next argue, self-concern and what is most our own ‘ground’ a right 
to (seek) asylum. 
The reflexive notion of identity Van Roermund here invokes, expresses that 
popular sovereignty articulates that the people is reflexively defined as being 
concerned for its own being. It is in exactly these terms that Martin Heidegger tries 
to capture human existence for which he coins the notion of Dasein. So, in Being and 
Time (1927)19 human being as Dasein is reflexively defined as the being for whom its 
own being is at issue. For Heidegger, the question about our own being – which is 
captured by the notion of Eigentlichkeit – comes down to the problematic of 
selfhood. In fact, it is the very problematic of the self that prompts the move away 
from human being as subject, on whose ground a substantive identity can be 
ascribed, and to coin the notion of Dasein to denote human existence. So, in 
 
17 Cf. Nancy 2007, pp.  96- 109.  
18 Van Roermund (2006), p. 533.   
19 Heidegger, M. Being and Time (translated from the German), Oxford/Cambridge: Blackwell Publisher, 1962. 
Hereafter referred to as BT; Heidegger. M. Sein und Zeit, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag 2001. Hereafter 
referred to as SZ.  
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Pathmarks, human being is defined as the being that ‘gives rise to itself as a self… 
Dasein exists in such a way that it exists for the sake of itself.’20 
I will seek to demonstrate the political relevance of the exposition of Dasein as 
Heidegger elaborates in Being and Time. To be sure, Heidegger did not write a 
political philosophy himself. In fact, Heidegger’s understanding of the selfhood of 
Dasein has caused many to believe, under the influential criticism of Arendt, that 
Being and Time is entirely inapt for thinking about politics and law. In ‘What is 
Existential Philosophy?’ (1946) Arendt, who was a student of Heidegger, 
implacably dissects Dasein as the opposite of man. As it exists for the sake of itself, 
plurality and sharing a world together with others of its kind – which is what makes 
us human – do not belong to the ontological make up of Dasein. In Heidegger, 
Arendt says, ‘being-a-Self has taken the place of being human.’ 21  Arendt’s 
dissection of Dasein does not stop here. Not only is the question of the meaning of 
the self at once inapt for political philosophy, it is even dangerous. For what 
constitutes the most severe threat to politics, Arendt later argues in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, and what even proves to be the condition sine qua non for a 
totalitarian regime to develop, is the existence of completely isolated, disconnected 
selves who have lost their sense (their common sense as well as their sensus 
communis) of sharing a world.22 The only way to reconnect these isolated selves, 
Arendt’s argument continues, is to mold them into the iron bond of totalitarianism 
in which family members, friends and neighbors are willing to betray each other in 
order to be loyal to the Party.23 
It is no mere coincidence that Arendt, only a few years before The Origins was 
published, uses similar words and arguments to attack Heidegger’s philosophy. At 
that time, academic philosophy had become a personal problem for Arendt, who 
escaped national-socialism and, eventually, found refuge in the United States. She 
was haunted by the possible relation between thoughts and the catastrophic events, 
and in particular by the question whether Heidegger’s political erring, i.e. his 
commitment to the Party and active involvement in the Gleichschaltung24 could be 
traced back to his thinking.25 Shortly after the war, Arendt seemed to have little 
doubt that this was indeed the case. Clamping the essential character of human 
existence to absolute self-ness, all that remained for Heidegger to reconnect these 
                                                 
20 Heidegger, Pathmarks (translated from the German), ed. W. McNeill Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1998 p. 121. Hereafter referred to as PM.  
21 Arendt, H. ‘What is Existential Philosophy’, in Arendt: Essays in Understanding 1930 -1954.-Formation, Exile 
and Totalitarianism (ed. J. Kohn), New York: Schocken Books 1994, p. 181. 
22 Cf., OT pp. 323,324. 
23 Cf., ibid, p. 307. 
24 Indeed, when Arendt, in the famous interview with Gaus from  1964, explains that what shocked her about 
Hitler’s rise to power was not what her enemies did, but what her friends did she certainly had Heidegger in 
mind. Compare Arendt, H. ‘What Remains? The Language Remains: A Conversation with Günter Gaus’, in 
Arendt: Essays in Understanding 1930 -1954.-Formation, Exile and Totalitarianism (ed. J. Kohn), New York: 
Schocken Books 1994, pp. 10, 11: ‘[F]riends ‘co-ordinated’ or got in line. The problem, the personal problem, 
was not what our enemies did but what our friends did. In the wave of Gleichschaltung, which was relatively 
voluntary – in any case, not yet under the pressure of terror – it was as if a relatively empty space formed 
around one. I lived in an intellectual milieu, but I also knew other people. And among intellectuals 
Gleichschaltung was the rule, so to speak. But not among others. And I never forgot that. I left Germany 
dominated by the idea – of course somewhat exaggerated: Never again! I shall never again get involved in any 
kind of intellectual business. I want nothing to do with that lot.’ 
25 Cf., also Critchley, S. ‘Originary Inauthenticity – On Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit’, in Critchley, S. & 
Schürmann, R., On Heidegger’s Being and Time’, Routledge, London [etc], 2008, p. 140-141. 
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entirely disconnected selves, Arendt contends, was to ‘draw on mythologizing and 
muddled concepts like ‘folk’ and ‘earth’ in an effort to supply his isolated Selves 
with a shared, common ground to stand on. But, it is obvious that concepts of that 
kind can only lead us out of philosophy and into some kind of nature-oriented 
superstition.’26 
Within a few years, however, Arendt’s resolute rejection of Heidegger grew 
cold. In a lecture delivered in 1954 to the American Political Science Association, 
Heidegger is staged as one of the few philosophers who abated Arendt’s vexation 
with a tradition of philosophy which obdurately ignored the fact that the world is 
inhabited by men in the plural. Heidegger’s thinking, she said, might offer a fruitful 
contribution to a philosophical concern with politics: ‘It lies in the nature of 
philosophy to deal with man in the singular, whereas politics could not even be 
conceived of if men did not exist in the plural … It may be – but I shall only hint at 
this – that Heidegger’s concept op ‘world’, which in many respects stands at the 
center of his philosophy, constitutes a step out of this difficulty. At any rate, 
because Heidegger defines human existence as being-in-the-world, he insists on 
giving philosophical significance to structures of everyday life that are completely 
incomprehensible if man is not primarily understood as being together with 
others.’27 
Indeed, against the isolating tendencies in Dasein that Arendt rebuffed in the 
early years, it could be reasonably argued that plurality is not excluded from the 
ontological make up of Dasein. Heidegger indisputably argued that being-with 
[mitsein] fundamentally belongs to Dasein.28 ‘Mitsein’ and ‘world’ are at the center of 
contemporary political reorientations of Heidegger as launched, in particular by 
Giorgio Agamben, Simon Critchley and Jean-Luc Nancy. 29  However, reading 
plurality into Dasein so as to make it relevant for the question of community differs 
 
26 Arendt 1994, pp. 181-182. Indeed, what equally presses the debate about Heidegger’s political erring is the 
way das Volk appears in Being and Time. Dasein, Heidegger says, shares in the fate of its people ‘to make up the 
full authentic historicizing of Dasein.’(BT, p. 436). This opposes the isolating tendency that troubled Arendt 
so much, as the referred passage from Being and Time seemingly supposes that Dasein is preceded by das Volk. 
Also, and more disturbingly, it suggests that Dasein partakes in a history imposed by fate of a people who 
drives at its future by seeking to regain its origins (Cf., Esposito, R. Communitas. The Origin and Destiny of 
Community (translated from the Italian). Stanford: Stanford University Press 2010, pp. 97, 98.) From the 
authentic historicizing of the people it is only a small step to ‘the destiny of the German people’ which 
Heidegger invokes in his notorious Rektoratsrede, and his praising of the ‘inner truth and greatness’ of the 
national-socialist movement in Einführung in die Metaphysik (Cf., Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (translated 
from the German), New Haven & London: Yale University Press 2000, p. 213).  
27 Arendt, H. ‘Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought’, in Arendt: Essays in 
Understanding 1930 -1954.-Formation, Exile and Totalitarianism (ed. J. Kohn), New York: Schocken Books 1994, 
p. 443.  
28 Compare BT, pp. 154,155: ‘[T]he world is always already the one that I share with others. The world of 
Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is being-with others.’ 
29 In order to make the existential analytic of Dasein relevant for a reflection upon the question of 
community, it could be argued that mitsein, to which Heidegger dedicates only a few pages, should be 
radicalized. This is indeed the project Nancy undertakes. Arguing that plurality is not at odds with Dasein, 
Nancy seeks to formulate the implications of finitude for the being-with of Dasein, as ‘Dasein’s “being-
towards-death” was never radically implicated in its being-with – in Mitsein – and that it is this implication that 
remains to be thought.’ (Nancy 1991, p. 14). Compare in this respect also Esposito’s Heideggerian 
understanding of plurality: ‘[H]eidegger refers to the originally singular and plural character of a shared 
existence, which is properly ecstatic: each opens to all, not despite of but inasmuch as single, the contrary of 
the individual … [T]he other is already with the one given, on account of the fact that there is no one without 
the other. In this sense, a “we” cannot even be spoken of that isn’t always “we-others”. For Heidegger, this 
means beginning not with “me” or with “not-me”, but with cum, with “with.” ’ (Esposito 2010, p. 94). 
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from the approach taken here. Proceeding from the reflexive structure of popular 
sovereignty, I will try to come to an understanding of the political implications of 
Heidegger’s move from subject to Dasein30, by way of exploring what it means for 
a We to exist as a self. As will become clear in the pages that await us, to exist as a 
self means to exist finite. Importantly, the finitude that comes into view with 
selfhood moves beyond the finitude that results from inclusion and exclusion that 
is to limit the unlimited. As I aim at collective selfhood, I will not, as said, let mitsein 
sway Dasein. Instead, I will reread the existential analytic of Dasein from the 
perspective of the first person plural. 
 
 
4.2 Introducing Dasein: the Question of Being 
 
Let me try and open up a point of entry for those unfamiliar with Heidegger. This 
preparatory section briefly discusses the question of Being which is central to 
Heidegger’s thinking.31 As painstaking as this question may be, some understanding 
of the stakes involved is required, as it is this question that first constitutes human 
existence as Dasein, and second, establishes Dasein as finitude. What is not entailed 
in Dasein, however, is that human existence should be preferably analyzed as 
singular, individual existence.  
A shortcut to Heidegger, then, would say something like ‘Heidegger’s thinking 
is concerned with Being, centers around the question of Being.’ In itself, such a 
shortcut says nothing, if only because it seems rather counter-intuitive that Being, a 
simple and indispensable verb in our languages, can pose a problem for thinking at 
all. In all kinds of human affairs, ranging from philosophy and the sciences, to 
politics and law, and to our everyday dealings with things, we do not aim at Being. 
Instead, we concern ourselves with all sorts of things in the world, which we 
handle, use, take care of, analyze, investigate, identify, decide and establish 
properties of. As Van der Walt points out, especially when it comes to law, it seems 
that ‘there is hardly anything else … that marks itself as so thoroughly concerned 
with the fully defined and identified aspects of things.’32 
 Now, Heidegger’s main point of argument is that we are so accustomed to, so 
busy with and caught up by things and their properties – whether it is the pen we 
use to write a paper, a case of law we have to decide, or a metaphysical inquiry into 
                                                 
30 I, thus, take seriously a suggestion made by Lacoue-Labarthe, who pointed to the possibility of a political 
reading of Dasein. Cf. Lacoue-Labarthe, Ph. ‘In the Name of …’, in Lacoue-Labarthe, Ph.  & Nancy, J.L. 
Retreating the Political (translated from French), ed. S. Sparks, London: Routledge 1997, pp. 55-86.  With this 
suggestion, Lacoue-Labarthe responded to a very young Derrida who, in ‘The Ends of Man’, repudiated Being 
and Time because of a slumbering predominance of the We. This predominance resulted in a favoring of the 
intimate and the known, the familiar and the own, and the Heimat (Cf, Derrida, J. The Ends of Man, Oster Bay: 
State University of New York Conference Center 1968). Levinas, as well, discerned a ‘superstition of place’ in 
Heidegger, imputing to him a reactionary attachment to and rootedness into place, into the soil, which cannot 
but end in the dangerous distinction between the members of the nation born out of the soil and strangers 
(Cf. Levians, E. ‘Heidegger, Gagarine et nous’, Difficile liberté, Albin Michel (1963), pp. 255-259). 
31 Importantly, it is the question of Being as expounded by Heidegger that has recently been taken up by legal 
scholars. Cf. J. van der Walt, J. Law and Sacrifice. Towards a Post-Apartheid Theory of Law, London: Birkbeck Law 
Press 2005. And also Oren Ben-Dor. Thinking About Law in Silence with Heidegger, Oxford/Portland: Hart 
Publishing 2007. 
32 Walt, van der J. ‘The Murmer of Being and the Chatter of Law’, Social and Legal Studies, forthcoming 2011.  
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the nature of the human being --  that we simply forget that there is more to things 
than identifying and objectifying their aspects. We are, Heidegger argues, oblivious of 
Being, as we experience things all too easily in an objectified sense. But to raise the 
question of Being is not to say that we should search for Being apart from, before 
or above things. To be sure, Being is always the Being of beings; without beings, 
Being is Nothing. Being and beings belong together, -- though not in the sense that 
Being is a specific, excellent sort of a being that can be ranged and classified among 
beings, for example, as the Highest being that grounds all other beings, giving them 
their sense and direction. Being is not a being. We can never say of Being that it is, 
that it is some-thing present, accessible and intelligible. Strictly speaking, Being is 
not. Or, in a different philosophical idiolect, ‘existence’ is not just another 
predicate, if it is a predicate at all, in the logical sense of the word. Neither is it a 
quality or property added to something. 
To make more tangible what is at issue here and what we are otherwise so 
oblivious to, Heidegger’s exposition of the problem of sufficient ground in Von 
Wesen des Grundes (1928) is potentially instructive. We are all familiar with the 
problem of ground through the formula – elaborated on in Modernity by Leibniz – 
nihil est sine ratione. The formula translates as ‘nothing is without a reason’ or, 
positively stated, ‘every being has a reason.’ What is inconceivable, therefore, 
according to this formula, is that there would be something without a ground, 
without a reason. That a groundless being is simply inconceivable has everything to 
do with the motif of truth that inspires the nihil est sine ratione. 
 So, to arrive at the problem of ground, Heidegger offers a brief history of the 
conception of truth. The tradition of western metaphysics has located truth in 
proposition or judgment. More precisely, truth is the relation between a 
proposition and the thing of which the truth is stated in that proposition. For 
example, if the European Community declares the unity of Member States that 
have gathered around a market so as to enhance industrial production, this 
statement is true if economic and industrial activities are essential to the 
commonness of ‘We, Europeans.’ The relation between ‘Europe’ as the subject, 
and ‘common market’ or ‘economic activity’ as predicates, is a relation of identity 
which corresponds with a state of affairs. That is, a true statement identifies the 
object as well as its properties, and corresponds, moreover, to the nature thereof: 
adequatio intellectus et rei, truth is the correspondence between proposition and the 
ontic being.33 So, in Leibniz we read that ‘[a] predicate … is always present in a 
subject …; and in this fact consists the universal nature of truth, or the connection 
between the terms of the assertion, as Aristotle has also observed.’34  
As always, what interests Heidegger is this relation which is qualified as a 
relation of identity: ‘The essence of truth, however, is to be found in the connexio of 
subject and predicate. Leibniz thus conceives of truth from the outset … as truth 
of assertion (proposition). He determines the nexus as the “inesse” of P in S, and the 
“inesse” as “idem esse”.’35 Now, the problem of ground arises precisely because of 
this relation of correspondence and identity. For, ‘true assertions’, Heidegger 
argues, ‘assume a relation to something on whose grounds they are able to be in 
 
33 Cf., BT, p. 257. 
34 Leibniz as quoted in PM, p. 101.  
35 Ibid., p. 102.  
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accord.’36 Every being, then, has a reason. The reason for the European Union is 
the common market, as progressive industrial production and economic activity are 
essential to the commonness of the European peoples. A groundless being that has 
no definite reason is simply inconceivable, as it contradicts the nature of truth and 
resists being resolved in identity.  Something that cannot be identified without 
remainder, and not be grasped exhaustively in a true proposition, would be 
antithetical to the nature of truth. Put differently, a groundless being would be a 
being of which something cannot be said, which eludes the proposition that tries to 
state the truth of it. 
After kindly leading his audience into these complex matters, Heidegger, as 
always, points out something so simple, something that speaks for itself and is so 
self-evident, that we wouldn’t even consider it worth questioning. Truth that relates 
to beings of which the truth is stated does not reveal these beings in the first 
place.37 Before we all get busy with saying true things about real states of affairs on 
whose grounds these true things can be said, these states of affairs and the beings 
involved in them are already there, are already discovered and revealed, played out 
in an openness that does not come about through determination, identification and 
representation. Truth as adequatio, therefore, cannot be original truth. Instead, it 
must be derivative of a more original truth for which Heidegger coins the notion of 
aletheia, unconcealment or disclosedness. Aletheia is not at our disposal, cannot be 
captured by logos, but is, so to speak the work of Being. Being is what ‘makes’ 
beings present, delivers them into an openness in which they are manifested as 
being on their own account. 
Now, what makes up this primordial disclosedness is not, as said, some activity 
on the part of the human subject, but rather, the basic condition of our being-in-the-
world. Indeed, what achieves the move from knowing subject to Dasein is this basic 
tenet of being-in-the-world. Dasein expresses, precisely, that human being is not an 
entity that is enclosed upon itself, and that subsequently has to leave itself in order 
to engage with or gain knowledge about an exterior world. On the contrary, Dasein 
is always already in the world,38  not only in the sense that it is embedded and 
embodied, but first and foremost, that the world makes sense to it. Put differently, 
the very notion of Dasein expresses that human being does not have a relation to 
the world, but rather is this relation. This explains why it is so difficult, if not 
impossible, to translate Dasein in English. The Da cannot be fixed in a ‘here’ 
positioned over against a ‘there.’ Nor is it sufficient to say that Dasein is outside of 
itself, or understands its here from the there of the world.39 The very notion of 
                                                 
36 Ibid., p. 102.  
37 Compare Ibid., pp. 102, 103: ‘However, can anything more originary be brought to bear beyond the 
delimitation of the essence of truth as characteristic of the assertion? Nothing less than the insight that this 
determination of the essence of truth … is indeed an uncircumventable one, yet nevertheless derivative. The 
overarching accordance of the nexus with beings, and their consequent accord, does not as such primarily make 
beings accessible.’ 
38 Compare BT, p. 84: ‘It is not the case that man ‘is’ and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-being 
towards the world – a world with which he provides himself occasionally. Dasein is never ‘proximally’ a being 
which is, so to speak, free from being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a relationship 
towards the world. Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as being-in-the-
world, is at it is.’ 
39 Compare BT, p. 156: ‘ In the ‘here’, the Dasein which is absorbed in its world speaks not towards itself but 
away from itself towards the ‘yonder’ of something circumspectively ready-to-hand; yet it is still itself in view 
of its existential spatiality.’  
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Dasein plays on a spatiality in which a here and a there first become possible40: 
‘When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow 
first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its 
primary Being is such that it is always ‘outside’ [drauβen] alongside entities which it 
encounters and which belong to a world already discovered … but even in this 
‘Being-outside’ alongside the object, Dasein is still ‘inside’, if we understand this in 
the correct sense; that is to say, it is itself ‘inside’ as a being-in-the-world which 
knows.’41 
So, for Dasein to know its way around in the world, it does not have to bridge a 
gap between itself and its world, as does the knowing subject with the world ‘out 
there.’ This is why Dasein, constituted as being-in-the-world, has its being in being-
open. Human being ex-ists, stands out in an openness of a world which makes 
sense. The world is the inter-esse in which we relate to things and persons, prior to 
fixing the terms of our relations in a subject and object.42 As Dasein ex-ists, it 
already knows its way around, knows how to comport itself. In a way, Dasein is like 
the child who takes up a toy and starts playing with it. And, even if the child takes 
up an empty bottle or the remote control, which are not toys, and starts playing 
with it, this does not prove the child to be wrong, nor does it prove the necessity of 
knowledge about the use of objects. It simply shows that the child comports itself 
towards things; it shows an understanding that precedes theoretical reflection or 
explicit knowledge. In a similar vein, a polity is open to the world in that it tunes 
into an environment. In establishing and ordering itself, it takes its surroundings for 
granted in the concise sense of the word: Considering itself as a grantee rather than 
a grantor, it opens itself up to this gift from the world.  
Indeed, this knowing and comporting before reflection or knowledge 
constitutes Dasein as understanding [Verstehen]. Understanding makes up what in 
Being and Time appears as Dasein disclosedness, its not-being closed off, its not-
being enclosed upon itself: ‘Dasein is its disclosedness.’43 We always already understand 
the world, understand, that is, the whole of things. ‘In the end’, Heidegger argues, 
‘an essential distinction prevails between comprehending the whole of beings in 
themselves and finding oneself [Sichbefinden] in the midst of beings as a whole. The 
former is impossible, in principle. The latter happens all the time in our Dasein.’44 
We are always already related to things, know what to do with them, how to take 
care of them, and deal with them ‘in a unity of the whole’45: ‘Human Dasein –  
being that finds itself in the midst of beings, comporting itself towards beings – in so 
doing exists in such a way that beings are always manifest as a whole.’46 As will be 
 
40 Compare SZ, p. 132: ‘ ‘Hier’ und ‘Dort’ sind nur möglich in einem ‘Da’, das heißt wenn ein Seiendes ist, das 
als Sein des ‘Da’ Räumlichkeit erschlossen hat.’   
41 BT, p. 89.  
42 Compare Heidegger, M. Wegmarken. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 9, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann 1976, 
p.350: ‘ Der Mensch ist nie zunächst diesseits der Welt Mensch als ein ‘Subjekt’, sei dies als ‘Ich’ oder als ‘Wir’ 
gemeint. Er ist auch nicht erst nur Subjekt, das sich zwar immer zugleich auf Objekte bezieht, so daß sein 
Wesen in der Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung läge. Vielmehr ist der Mensch zuvor in seinem Wesen ek-sistent in 
die Offenheit des Seins, welches Offene erst das ‘Zwischen’ lichtet, innerhalb dessen eine ‘Beziehung’ vom 
Subjekt zum Objekt sein kann.’  
43 BT, p.171.  
44 PM., p. 87.  
45 Ibid., p. 87.  
46 Ibid., p. 121.  
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discussed in full detail later, Dasein understanding relates both to its world (it 
knows its way around and is at home in the world where it comports itself with the 
greatest ease, in a straightforward manner) and to itself as being-in-the-world. 
Being ‘inside out’ and, at the same time ‘outside in’, Dasein can never decide on 
what is outside, what belongs to the world and what properly belongs to itself. 
Precisely because there is no such thing as a clear- cut difference between inside 
and outside, Dasein is never in full possession of itself. And for this very reason, its 
own being is an issue for it. Put differently, Dasein is concerned for its own being. 
Constituted as being-in-the-world, the question that constitutes Dasein is what it 
means to be a self. 
So, again, we would fail human existence if we tried to grasp it in terms of a 
subject that is enclosed upon itself and subsequently has to find a way out of itself 
to reach the exterior world. As said already, human existence always already has its 
way around, ek-sists, that is stands out of itself onto an openness. Metaphysical 
thinking would not, of course, say that human beings are the same kind of beings 
as, let’s say, tables. But the point of the matter is that metaphysics tries to attain the 
identity of beings that leaves no trace of what is other to beings, treating all beings 
alike in an objectified sense, thereby closing off and shutting down the openness 
that Dasein is. But, Dasein knows better, so to speak. Not only are beings, as a 
whole, manifest and accessible to it, but also, Dasein already has (or rather is) its 
way of comporting itself towards different beings, of taking care of beings which 
differ in their Being. Dasein understands, beforehand, that a table differs in its 
being – which is being-readiness-to-hand (‘Die Seinsart dieses Seienden ist die 
Zuhandenheit’)47  from those beings that are like Dasein, itself, and which have 
their being in MitDasein.48 For Heidegger, man is the guardian of Being through 
whom Being makes sense. Dasein comports itself differently towards beings that 
differ in their Being, and takes care, that is, for the Being of Beings. This is why the 
Being of Dasein, itself, is defined as care [Sorge].49 The first question to be asked 
with respect to Dasein is, therefore, not what it is but, rather, how it is.50 Indeed, this 
is what the very notion of Dasein as being-in-the-world purports to express: 
‘Accordingly, world means: beings as a whole, namely, as the decisive “how” in 
accordance with which human Dasein assumes a stance and maintains itself in 
relation to beings.’51 It is, thus, with human existence as Dasein, that the question 
of Being can arise. Hence, we find Heidegger’s dazzling description of Dasein as 
                                                 
47 SZ, p. 71/BT p. 101.  
48 Cf.,  SZ, p. 118.  
49 Dasein’s way of being towards beings that are not Dasein, itself, are defined as Besorgen and Fürsorge. Compare 
BT, p. 157: ‘Concern [Besorgen] is a character-of Being which Being-with cannot have as its own, even though 
Being-with, like concern is a Being towards beings encountered within the world. But those beings towards 
which Dasein as being-with comports itself do not have the kind of Being which belongs to equipment ready-
to-hand; they are themselves Dasein. These beings are not objects of concern, but rather of solicitude 
[Fürsorge].’ (translation slightly altered) As the translators note, however, ‘[t]he etymological connection 
between ‘Sorge’ (‘care’), ‘Fürsorge’ (‘solicitude’), and ‘Besorgen’ (concern’) is entirely lost in our translation.’ 
50  Compare BT, p. 67: ‘Accordingly, those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 
‘properties’ present-at-hand of some entity which ‘looks’ so and so, and is itself present-at-hand; they are in 
each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. All the Being-as-it-is [So-sein] which this entity 
possesses is primarily Being. So when we designate this entity with the term ‘Dasein’, we are expressing not 
its ‘what’ (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being.’  
51 PM, p.114.  
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the being who in its being takes care of Being, that is, as the being for whom Being 
is at issue. 
Paradoxically, however, we tend to forget Being, are oblivious of Being, 
Heidegger says, notwithstanding this pre-understanding of beings in their Being. 
Does this mean that we should drop everything, free ourselves from our 
entanglement with things, retreat and start contemplating Being? On the contrary. 
The forgetting of Being and the lack of awareness of our own pre-understanding 
has an important role to play. It is what keeps us going, what guarantees that 
business is business as usual, without which we would be lost. Retreating from 
what catches us and with which we are caught in order to contemplate Being, pure 
and simple, is precisely what humans, as being-in-the-world, can never do. We pass 
over Being in order to concern ourselves with beings, in order to get and keep 
going. Fortunately, we are not the only ones to blame for this oblivion; Being, itself, 
has its part in it as well. Oblivion belongs to Being.52 As said before, Being renders 
beings present, is what gives place to beings. But in order to ‘do’ so, Being has to 
withdraw itself from whatever it is that is rendered present in order for it to be, 
exactly, present. If Being ‘makes up’ unconcealment and openness, it itself 
withdraws in concealment and darkness for that which is, thus, unconcealed to 
truly blossom. The unconcealment of Being, aletheia, can never leave its lethe 
behind. In his Truth and Singularity, Visker very well captures what truth as aletheia 
amounts to: ‘[I]n a certain sense, one cannot but forget Being. And, this oblivion is 
not a human affair, something which one can do or not do. Man can only see and 
act on the basis of a blind spot; he can only deal with beings by not dealing with 
Being, as such … being is, therefore, nothing more than the forgetting of being 
itself. It is because Being merely “is”, “works”, “occurs”, by keeping itself in the 
background because it can merely let beings be by retreating, that it is itself 
forgotten.’53 
What this implies is, first, that Being is never exhausted by logos, can never be 
made intelligible. Second, the question of Being that moves Heidegger’s thinking is 
not answered by a remembering of Being. Instead, the question asks that we 
become attentive to the oblivion of Being,54 that we do not forget the forgetting of 
Being.55 As oblivion belongs to being, we can never decide on the truth of being, 
 
52 On the oblivion of Being see Heidegger, M. Identität und Differenz, Pfullingen: Neske 1957.  
53  R. Visker, Truth and Singularity. Taking Foucault into Phenomenology, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers 1999, pp. 67, 68.  
54 Cf., Heidegger 1957. 
55 According to Van der Walt, this constitutes the potential redeeming qualities of Heidegger’s thinking for 
thinking about law. As oblivion belongs to Being, we can never directly approach being. At best, we can 
adopt a sidelong glance, a parallax view perhaps, approaching Being indirectly and through beings. According 
to Van der Walt, this sheds light on the relation between plurality and unity, politics and law. The Being of law 
refers to the manifold or the plurality that occasions the law, whereas law refers to the ontic determination 
and identification necessary for the unity made out of plurality which is required by law. Law, that is, cannot 
but resort to the ontic determination of the case, identifying and deciding it by destroying or forgetting the 
plurality that preceded and occasioned it. It cannot but, Van der Walt argues, exclude and forget plurality. It is 
only because of this irreducible forgetting, he explains, that law becomes possible. But, what can it possible 
mean for law not to forget this forgetting. According to Van der Walt, the Heideggerian thought at issue is: 
‘Being hosts  an irreducible plurality of possible manifestations and forms of human existence, all of which 
must be reduced to one such expression or manifestation (one correct understanding) whenever the law is 
called upon to resolve intractable moral and socio-political conflicts. This sacrificial reduction of the 
irreducible ontological plurality of Being to the ontic univocity of legal meaning … is incircumventible. But, 
this incircumventible forgetting need not be forgotten … Legal interpretation can meaningfully and 
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we can never directly approach Being. With Being as aletheia, unconcealment, the 
rendering present of things builds on a prior closure, a prior concealment. We 
never stand in the full light of an origin, but instead, ultimately face opacity. What 
human beings can never do is leave the everyday order of familiarity in order to 
appropriate an origin. In the existential analytic of Dasein this comes under the 
notion of facticity. Facticity, I believe, is the key notion from which the whole 
exposition of Dasein develops.   
 
 
4.3.1 Facticity. Or, the First Decision 
 
To introduce the difficult notion of facticity, I briefly return to the intersection 
between law and politics. Recall from the previous Chapter that the lawyers 
involved in the Guantanamo trial could do their ingenious work because the people 
demanded that the law be applied in a just way, claiming that their constitutional 
rights equally held for the refugees. By claiming rights the government denied to 
the refugees, they anticipated a possible meaning of the law that remained highly 
uncertain until the District Court ruled in favor of the refugees.  Indeed, both 
Honig and Spijkerboer make a case for law’s capacity to bring a new world into 
being, with different rights and different right-bearing subjects, by showing that law 
is always intermingled with politics. To proceed from law, then, does not get us 
stuck in an endless repetition of the same, but opens us to a world of change by 
taking law in an unforeseen direction. 
From a Heideggerian point of view, taking law into a new direction constitutes 
the finitude of freedom. That one always has to link up with the already established 
meaning of the law implies, Heidegger would say, that certain possibilities are 
already withdrawn. Freedom, recall, is always limited. Yet, freedom is not ruled out 
by this limitation, but emerges because of the irreducible decision involved in every 
application of the law. Because of this irreducible decision, the application of the 
law is always richer than its established meaning. It is, Heidegger would say, what 
exceeds. 56  This double movement of withdrawal and excess captures Honig’s 
paradox of politics, as it shows that linking up with law also always entails 
transgressing it. Note that what is at issue here is more radical than the malleability 
of legal rules which, for example, Duncan Kennedy defends.57 The point is, rather, 
that one can only apply the law by exceeding the law.58 
There is a fundamental ontological implication to be drawn here from which a 
more radical sense of finitude arises. The double movement of withdrawal and 
excess, of application and transgression, highlights that one can never leave the 
everyday order of law, even if one seeks to bring a new world into being. The 
                                                                                                                   
significantly be required to remember the inevitable forgetfulness of legal hermeneutics, and the destruction 
of plurality that it wreaks. Thus, can legal interpretation at least maintain an indirect regard for the plurality it 
is always bound to destroy … Thus, can it keep in play, alongside the law, that which law must set aside; thus, 
can it keep in play alongside the vociferous and sonorous legal meanings that it has to coin so as to decide a case, 
the elegiac murmur of the infinite possibilities of legal meanings it ruins and sets aside.’ (Walt, van der J. ‘The 
Murmer of Being and the Chatter of Law’, Social and Legal Studies, forthcoming 2011). 
56 Cf., PM, pp. 128, 129.  
57 Cf., Kennedy, D. ‘A Semiotics of Critics’, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 22 (2000),  p. 1168.  
58 Cf. Corrias, L. The Passivity of Law: Competence and Constitution in the European Body Politic, PhD diss., Tilburg 
University 2010, p. 90. 
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principle of ordering, Heidegger therefore says, is presupposed in the very act of 
ordering and cannot be found outside of it.59 Or, as Waldenfels argues, we always 
already move ‘within the framework of an order behind which we cannot regress 
except at the cost of unconsciousness or incomprehensibility.’60 Indeed, recall from 
the first chapter that a refugee’s asylum account is only deemed credible if he 
presents the facts that constitute the reasons for his flight within the symbolic 
context of the receiving polity. Without playing the rules of the hosting polity, the 
facts simply won’t reveal themselves, and the claimant will be incomprehensible as 
a refugee.  
Facticity has to do with this ‘always already.’ That we always already move 
within order implies that our existence as a people has always already begun. To be 
sure, that the beginning has always already been made and order thus begun, does 
not contradict the thesis, stated at the beginning of this chapter, that order is not 
ready- made, but brought about. That order is brought about by means of inclusion 
and exclusion – that the people claims as its right in order to determine itself and 
be free – does not mean that the beginning of order, the very first decision, so to 
speak, is at our disposal or discretion. The beginning of order cannot be ascribed to 
a Highest being (god) nor to ourselves (unless in retrospect) but, rather, stems from 
what Waldenfels calls a primary production.61 At the origin of order lies a decision that 
isn’t ours and that can never be fully appropriated by us. The first decision reminds 
us that we have never been present at the origins of our existence as a people. The 
fundamental lack of ground that appeared in the previous chapter, now opens itself 
as the abyss in which we experience our own absence. The abyssal experience of 
our own absence happens whenever we are confronted with something new and 
unexpected that cannot be incorporated immediately, does not register directly, but 
that can neither be ignored nor pushed back. As Waldenfels argues: ‘Astonishment, 
awe, fear, alarm, horror – all these affects with which we respond to such events – 
point to the fact that where something novel is making a breakthrough, we do not 
have the first word or initiative.’62 
The originary decision is beyond our reach, withdraws from our grasp, retreats 
in darkness and silences us. That a we can never say ‘We’, but can only be spoken 
for is, therefore, not merely a linguistic phenomenon, but reminds that we do not 
have the first word. And, every time the We is spoken for and represented, its own 
absence is affirmed and emerges from this very act of speaking and representing. 
This peculiar absence that hovers over our birth, thus, takes hold on our further 
existence as a people, rendering existence fragile. This fragility makes us ‘pause and 
be humbled’63  and makes us concerned for our own existence. Arising from a 
decision that isn’t ours, nor can be ascribed to a highest being, means that we are 
delivered over to ourselves without an origin to fall back on. Groundlessly being 




59 Cf., BT, p. 77.  
60 Waldenfels 1996, p. 3.  
61 Cf. Ibid., p. 101. 
62 Ibid., p. 101.  
63 Honig 2009, p. 79.  
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4.3.2 The Facticity of the We 
 
As the first act of ordering cannot be ascribed to an Orderer, nor to ourselves, we 
as a people are abandoned in the twofold sense of the word: We are forsaken and 
entrusted or delivered over to ourselves. 
Taking my cue from Nancy, it could be said that the We is ‘abandoned at birth’, 
in its beginning, and hence, ‘doomed infinitely to be born.’ ‘To be born’, Nancy 
says, ‘means precisely never to cease being born.’64 The We never ceases being 
born because its abandonment leaves it without a definite rule and measure to 
determine itself. And because of that, the We never coincides with the way in 
which it determines itself, so never manages to fully realize itself. The We always 
falls apart and can never remit in full its own lack, its own absence. 
But does this not imply that the We’s existence is infinite rather than finite? 
That, in other words, infinity is the truth of the We and finitude only the necessary 
limitation of its freedom? Certainly it does not. For, the We’s own absence not only 
refers to the origin, to the beginning of the We. It also relates to its own end. 
Indeed, death is the proper name of its own absence (this point will be taken up 
and developed below). Absence holds the beginning and end of the We together. 
The We never ceases being born because it feels death pulling at its shoulders. 
Beginning and end, death and birth are this close. As Nancy argues in The Sense of 
the World: ‘One has to do here with a death that has always already taken place in 
existence, as existence itself: death as birth … henceforth, not as birth to a beyond-
the-world, but simply to this world here.’65 From its very inception, the We endures 
its own absence, stands out to  the possibility of not-being. As this chapter argues, 
this is, in short, what it means to exist finite. ‘Finitude’, Nancy says, ‘is the truth of 
which the infinite is the sense.’66 As will become clear, finitude is precisely what 
enables us to exist as a self, to become a self. And there is no end to this becoming: 
‘The coming is infinite: it does not get finished with coming; it is finite.’67 
What Nancy calls abandonment appears in Being and Time as facticity. On a 
Heideggerian reading of the term, facticity expresses, precisely, that the We is 
neither an ens creatum nor causa sui.68 The We did not bring itself into existence, but 
is, instead, delivered over to itself, groundlessly, as it is not preceded by a Highest 
being. Groundlessly, as its whence and whither remain in darkness.69  Delivered 
over to itself, the We does not stand in the full light of an origin. So, before the We 
decides anything, cuts through a knot of already present possibilities, it is passable 
to what Nancy calls the decision of existence that it cannot make its own.70 The 
                                                 
64  Nancy, The Birth to Presence (translated from French, W. Hamacher & D. E. Wellbery eds.), Stanford: 
Stanford University Press 1993, p. 40.  
65 Nancy, J.L. The Sense of the World (translated from the French), Minneapolis [etc]: University of Minnesota 
Press 1997, p. 32.  
66 Ibid., p. 29. 
67 Ibid., p. 35.  
68 Cf. Heidegger, Ontology. The Hermeneutics of Facticity (translated from German), Bloomington/Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press 1999, p. 17. Hereafter referred to as OHF.  
69 Cf., BT, p. 173.  
70 Cf., Nancy, The Birth to Presence (translated from French, W. Hamacher & D. E. Wellbery eds.), Stanford: 
Stanford University Press 1993, p. 87.  
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decision of existence ‘possiblizes’ the We’,71 offering it to existence ‘by reason of 
which it is unappropriable.’72  
It is important to gain full understanding of what facticity means and entails, as 
it is on account of facticity that the self appears on stage. 
As facticity expresses that the We is forsaken and left to itself, it constitutes the 
basic tenet of being-in-the-world. In short, facticity expresses that the We is 
delivered over to the world. The We, as Heidegger would say, is thrown into the 
world. ‘The expression thrownness is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered 
over.’73 Recall from the previous section that being-in-the-world expresses that we 
do not have, but rather, are a relation to the world. We always already know our 
way around, know how to comport ourselves and understand the world prior to 
any explicit appropriation and interpretation on the basis of knowledge. We are, 
that is, adapted. We are always already inscribed in a meaningful network of 
relations, and find ourselves amidst a meaningful whole. The world, therefore, is 
not the globe. Rather, we are thrown into a certain place, a certain time. Delivered 
over to the world, always thrown somewhere, we are, that is, situated. The basic 
tenet of being-in-the-world casts the world as the in-between or the inter-esse that 
directs our interests, prior to any clear- cut division between those who share in 
this interest and those who don’t.74 That our world is the inter-esse that directs our 
interests means that we have to reckon with certain stable givens and a relatively 
determined state of affairs. What we can exploit depends upon what lies beneath, 
and if our soil does not contain oil we will establish a coal and steel industry that 
determines our economy. Our surroundings direct our activities, our customs, our 
habits, our way of living. If the land is flat, we lay cycling tracks with the effect that 
biking is not only good for leisure and sports, but also is a good means of 
transport. And, as even members of parliament go to work biking, we design our 
bikes in such a way that we have to sit up straight, which is certainly more dignified 
than hanging bowed over our mountain-bikes which we use on the weekends to 
sweat and work out.  
Facticity is shorthand for the ‘always already’, referring, that is, to the facts that 
are given to us: ‘Whenever Dasein is, it is as a fact; and the factuality [Tatsächlichkeit] 
of such a fact is what we shall call Dasein’s facticity.’75 Facticity, as Visker explains 
with respect to singular Dasein, amounts to ‘the inevitable facts that characterize 
each of us as the one s/he is.’ 76  Facticity, thus, denotes the specific sort of 
factuality or concreteness of Dasein that differs from the brute factuality of things: 
‘Facticity is, in fact, simply Heidegger’s technical term to distinguish what one 
could call ‘concrete Dasein’ from the kind of concreteness one meets in other 
beings. ‘Factical’ Dasein is, of course, a situated Dasein in many ways: It is born in 
a certain place, at a certain time, in such or such a family, it is a boy or a girl with 
certain physiognomy (colour of skin, of eyes, of hair, …) growing up in a town or 
 
71 Cf., Ibid., p. 85.  
72 Ibid., p. 86.  
73 BT, p. 174/ SZ p. 135.  
74 Compare Ibid., p. 119: ‘That wherein Dasein already understands itself in this way is always something with 
which it is primordially familiar. This familiarity with the world does not necessarily require that the relations 
which are constitutive for the world as world should be theoretically transparent.’  
75 BT, p. 82.  
76 Visker 2004, p. 16.  
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on the countryside, speaking the local dialect or not, etc. … One could say that 
whenever Heidegger writes ‘faktisch’ (factical) he was simply, by abbreviation, 
referring to all the above. But, the point is that there is a difference, characteristic 
for Dasein, between what is ‘faktisch’ and what belongs to mere factuality 
(Tatsächlichkeit). Whatever ‘facts’ one can enlist for this person’s Dasein, will be 
‘facts’ that are taken up in his or her Dasein: not predicates, but adverbs, modalities 
of his/her being.’77 It is a fact that I am white, just as it is a fact that the wall in 
front of me is white. But my whiteness differs from the whiteness in things, 
precisely insofar as it is my whiteness which is not indifferent to me, even though, 
as Visker stresses, I am not sure how my skin color belongs to me and me to it.78  
But if ‘our facts’ differ from the brute facts of things, then there is more to 
facticity than mere situatedness. Facticity, though related to the ‘facts’ of Dasein, by 
no means suggests that Dasein is fixed in its properties. Otherwise still, facticity 
refers to more than the factuality of Dasein as it each time is.79 The ‘always already’ 
does not express, Agamben argues, ‘the immobility of a factual situation’, but 
instead, unravels the ‘e-motion [Bewegtheit] proper to life.’80 The movement proper 
to life is guaranteed by the throw in which Dasein remains as long as it exists [Dasein, 
solange es ist, im Wurf bleibt81]. Dasein is not only delivered over to the world, but 
projects itself [Entwurf] into its world. And it is projection that explains why the ‘facts’ 
of Dasein differ from the facts of things. Or more precisely still, it explains why 
Dasein is not delivered over to facts, but to possibilities. Facticity is, therefore, not 
exhausted by thrownness, but constitutes Dasein’s very existence, as well.82 
What makes Dasein’s factuality pass over into potentiality, assuring that Dasein 
remain in the movement of the throw, is Dasein’s understanding. Dasein, recall, is 
not enclosed upon itself, but is essentially openness. Having its being in being-
open, Dasein, as said, is constituted as understanding. The passage in Being and Time 
that introduces facticity as the specific sort of factuality in Dasein continues to read 
that facticity also expresses that Dasein, beforehand, understands its world by 
taking up a place in its world and understands itself, again beforehand, from the 
                                                 
77 Ibid., pp. 222-223.  
78 According to Visker, facticity betrays a ‘certain ontologism’ that suggests that all our facts ‘can be taken up 
in existence.’ (Ibid., p. 16). Over against Heidegger’s transitive facticity, Visker, therefore, unravels an 
‘intransitive facticity’ that highlights that the facts that belong to us can, nevertheless, not be taken up in our 
existence and therefore, give a sense of what is our own we are unaware of (Cf. Ibid., p. 17).  
79 Ricoeur also understands facticity solely in relation to ‘factuality’, ‘concreteness’ and ‘situatedness’, as it 
denotes, according to him ‘in a global manner what in which we actually exist’. Even more so, facticity places 
‘the main emphasis on the always already.’ Cf., Ricoeur 1994 pp. 314-315. 
80 Agamben 1999, p.190.  
81 SZ, p. 179.  
82 Compare BT, p. 185: ‘[D]asein is constantly ‘more’ than it factually is, supposing that one might want to 
make an inventory of it as something-at-hand and list the contents of its Being, and supposing that one were 
able to do so. But Dasein is never more than it factically is, for, to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being 
essentially belongs. Yet, as Being-possible, moreover, Dasein is never anything less; that is to say, it is 
existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-Being, it is not yet.’ Nonetheless, facticity is usually understood 
to relate to thrownness and improper understanding. Critchley, for example, also stresses the centrality of 
facticity in the existential analytic of Dasein, linking it to Dasein’s thrownness and the improper, while 
distinguishing it from existence, projection and the proper: ‘I seek to read Heidegger’s analysis … against the 
grain in order to bring into view much more resilient notions of facticity and thrownness that place in doubt 
the move to existentiality, projection, and authenticity.’ (Critchley 2008, pp. 132, 133). 
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‘there’ of its world. 83  What is absolutely decisive in Hedeigger’s exposition of 
Dasein is that its understanding is related to possibilities, constituting Dasein as  
potentiality-for-being [Seinkönnen], 84   not in the sense, however, that Dasein is 
opened onto an infinite range of possibilities out of which it can select a few as it 
pleases. For, this would contradict the very nature of Dasein as being thrown into 
the world.85  Dasein, Heidegger says, ‘is thrown possibility through and through’.86  
Dasein, that is, is thrown into certain possibilities (we have the wind not the oil) 
implying that from its very inception, other possibilities are withdrawn from it: ‘[I]n 
having a potentiality-for-being, it always stands in one possibility or another: it 
constantly is not other possibilities, and it has waived these in its existentiell 
projection.’87  
Certain possibilities are always already withdrawn from us. The fact that 
anthropological distinctions between Europeans and non-Europeans do matter, 
prior to any valuation of these distinctions, bespeaks that we are thrown possibility, 
through and through. These differences are experienced, for example, if we travel 
outside Europe, and meet people for whom the Holocaust simply is not an 
historical fact, or to whom a different genocide matters. And even though the 
Holocaust matters to us in a wholly different way than the Armenian genocide 
matters to us, we can never explain in full why it matters, how it relates to us and 
we to it. Or, to give another example, we are always delivered over to a cultural 
heritage drenched with religion. And even if we no longer believe in a god, we still 
relate to the tradition of religion, for example, when we try to make sense of the 
human need for reverence or when we bury our loved ones. 88  What interests 
Heidegger, as always, is this relation. We always relate to possibilities into which we 
are thrown (which, evidently, does not imply or justify that we remain ignorant of, 
or indifferent to the slaughter in Anatolia). And, because of this having to relate, 
because of this relation, Dasein, as Critchley puts it, is ‘the name of a recoiling 
movement that unfolds only to unfold back on itself.’89 
Reflexivity amounts to this recoiling movement. The We ‘departs’ from itself, 
traverses, so to speak, the properties that belong to it in order to ‘return’ to itself.90 
And this explains why Heidegger casts Dasein’s understanding as potentiality-for-
being. Understanding is to be understood as a projection [Entwurf]. Consider again 
that Dasein does not create or invent itself ex nihilo, but is instead delivered over to 
certain givens with which it has to reckon. To stick with the example of ‘being 
European’, I have to picture myself in the category ‘European’ as the subject of 
that property. I have to project myself into the rather impersonal adjective ‘European’, 
 
83 Compare BT, p. 82 (translation slightly altered): ‘The concept of ‘facticity’ implies that a being ‘within-the-
world’ has being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its destiny with the 
Being of those beings which it encounters within its own world.’ 
84 Cf. BT, pp. 183, 184/ SZ, pp. 143, 144. 
85 Compare Ibid., p. 183: ‘Possibility, as an existentiale, does not signify a free-floating potentiality-for-being in 
the sense of ‘liberty of indifference’ (libertas indifferentiae).’  
86 BT, p. 183.  
87 BT, p. 331.  
88 On our relation to tradition see Agamben 1999, p. 105: ‘What must be transmitted is not a thing, however 
eminent it may be; nor is it a truth that could be formulated in propositions or articles of faith. It is, instead, 
the very unconcealment (a-letheia), the very opening in which something like a tradition is possible.’   
89 Critchley 2008, p. 133.  
90 Cf. Agamben 1999, p. 118.  
144 A Finite We 
I mirror myself into the image of a European. I read, for example, Euripides’ Heracles 
Children, as part of the cultural tradition of Europe, arguing that We, with respect to 
the rights of those washed ashore, should model ourselves after the King of 
Athens, who exclaimed that he would rather hang himself than throw discredit on 
Athens as a free city by turning down the refugees who asked for his protection.91 
 The European We is not the King of Athens. But the point is that in modeling 
itself after him, the We understands itself in and through identifying itself with 
what is not itself. To understand oneself is to anticipate oneself by assuming an 
image that is not exclusively its own. Identity is a kind of throw off and throw out, 
a leap forward. Anticipating itself, Dasein, Heidegger says, is ahead of itself. To 
make one’s own what is given – which is what being a self amounts to – is to take a 
leap forward (a future Europe) that refers back to a past (Athens). Anticipation and 
being-ahead of oneself belong to the core of being, exactly, a self. As anticipation is 
constitutive of the self, the self, so to speak, always comes too late, never catches 
up and never fully coincides with whatever it is with which it identifies. The self is, 
therefore, not fixed but always remains possible. Projection as being ahead of 
oneself enables us to be.  
So, again, Dasein’s understanding is not related to possibilities in the sense that 
Dasein stands before the open land of innumerous possibilities which it can try and 
experience. Rather, potentiality belongs to understanding because Dasein, in 
understanding itself out of possibilities into which it is thrown, is always ahead of 
itself. Being ahead of itself constitutes Dasein as potentiality-for-being. 92  As 
Heidegger puts it in Ontology. The Hermeneutics of Facticity, (1923) Dasein is always on 
the way: ‘Dasein is Dasein only in itself. It is, though as the being-on-the-way of itself to 
itself! … What is revealed in it is how the anticipatory leap forward and running in advance 
should be undertaken and can only be undertaken. The anticipatory leap forward: 
not positing an end, but reckoning with being-on-the-way, giving it free play, 
disclosing it, holding fast to being-possible.’93 
Understanding as projecting oneself into what is not ‘self’, thereby anticipating 
this very self, explains why Dasein is not simply delivered over to facts but, indeed, 
to possibilities. Facticity, thus, comes into view as groundlessly being delivered over 
to possibilities (thrownness) out of which Dasein understands itself (projection). 
Constituting what in Being and Time appears as being-thrown and projection was 
precisely what facticity purported to express in Ontology. The Hermeneutics of Facticity: 
‘Facticity is the designation we will use for the character of the being of ‘our’ ‘own’ 
Dasein … As that which is in each case our own, Dasein does not mean an isolating 
relativization into individuals which are only seen from the outside and thus the 
individual (solus ipse). “Our own” is rather a how of being [sondern Eigenheit ist ein 
Wie des Seins], and indication to a possible path of being-wakeful [Wachseins] … 
                                                 
91  For an overview of the practices of protection and asylum in antiquity see Grasmück, E.L. Exilium: 
Untersuchungen zur Verbannung in der Antike, Paderborn (etc.): Schöningh 1978. 
92 Compare BT, p. 185: ‘And as thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of being we call “projecting.” 
Projection has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in 
accordance with which, Dasein arranges its Being. On the contrary, any Dasein has, as Dasein, projected 
itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein has always understood itself and always will 
understand itself in terms of possibilities … [P]rojection, in throwing, throws before itself the possibility as 
possibility, and lets it be as such. As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its 
possibilities as possibilities.’ 
93 OHF, p. 13.  
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Accordingly, factical means something which is of itself articulated with respect to, 
on the basis of, and with a view to such a factical character of being, and “is” in this 
manner [faktisch heiβt sonach etwas, was auf so seienden Seinscharakter von ihm selbst her 
artikuliert ist und dergestalt ist].’94 
So, by virtue of facticity we articulate ourselves, understand our self out of that 
into which we are thrown. Facticity, therefore, constitutes the two most 
fundamental possibilities of Dasein, to wit, its proper and improper understanding 
which will be discussed below. 
 
 
4.4 The Famous Line in Being and Time 
 
I thus take facticity to denote that the We is groundlessly delivered over to 
possibilities out of which it understands itself. The We and its world are always 
intertwined. The We’s self-understanding, therefore, always takes place in an inter-
esse which is precisely not itself. Put differently: as understanding the We is both 
related to its world and to itself as being-in-the-world. It understands its world by 
taking up a place in its world, by projecting itself into its world, and in doing so it 
understands itself. It understands itself from the ‘there’ of its world, relying upon, 
and mirroring itself in a world that already makes sense 95 . The We, thus, 
understands itself both from within and without. 
 Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit, which are the two fundamental possibilities of 
Dasein’s understanding, respectively refer to this. Taken in a ‘strict terminological 
sense’, 96  Eigentlichkeit, or proper understanding, signifies Dasein’s understanding 
from within. It denotes the way Dasein understands itself on its own accord. Or 
more precise still, taking into account that Dasein signifies being-in-the-world: It 
signifies Dasein’s understanding of its self out of the possibilities into which it is 
thrown, out of the qualities to which it is exposed. Indeed, recall from the beginning 
of this chapter that the self does not exist as an entity over against representation 
and identification. Representation, identification, determination do not cover up 
what is our own; rather, what is our own arises from these very representations and 
identifications. Uneigentlichkeit, or improper understanding, relates to these 
identifications and representations. 
Heidegger’s language is admittedly highly abstract and complex. But what the 
two modes of understanding purport to express is simply this: Dasein establishes 
itself on the basis of possibilities into which it is thrown. It receives and derives 
what it is from its world, determines itself by drawing on what has already been 
established as meaningful. Thus, when the High-Contracting Parties to the 
 
94 Ibid., p. 5/ Heidegger, M. Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität), Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 
1988, p. 7.  
95 Compare BT, p. 182: ‘To say that in existing, Dasein is its ‘there’, is equivalent to saying that the world is 
‘there’; its Being-there is Being-in. And the latter is likewise ‘there’, as that for the sake of which Dasein is. In 
the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness we have 
called ‘understanding.’ In the understanding of the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, the significance which is grounded 
therein, is disclosed along with it. The disclosedness of understanding, as the disclosedness of the ‘for-the-
sake-of-which’ and of significance equiprimordially, pertains to the entirety of Being-in-the-world. To say that 
the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ and significance are both disclosed in Dasein, means that Dasein is that entity 
which, as Being-in-the-world, is an issue for itself.’ 
96 BT, p. 68.  
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Maastricht Treaty committed themselves to the ‘need to create firm bases for a 
future Europe’ they referred back to a past in which principles of ‘liberty, 
democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of 
law’ already counted as meaningful. 97  The enlisted fundamental values are 
improper, to the extent that those who claim a future Europe did not themselves 
invent these values. Yet, that the European We commits itself to what is not strictly 
or exclusively its own does not imply, of course, that it is indifferent to these 
values. When the contracting states express in the Treaty that they are determined 
to ‘establish among themselves a European Union’ they express, precisely, that a 
future We, a future Europe, tries to make its own an identity it did not invent all by 
itself and that it undoubtedly shares with other democracies. Eigentlichkeit, or the 
proper, refers to this. Clinging to one of these possible modes of understanding is 
to fall into pathology. Without the backup of improper identifications and 
representations, understanding itself from within would be inconceivable. And not 
to make one’s own what is improper would condemn the We to exist as a mere 
repetition in which it lives by the dictionary definitions of common values, 
identities and affections, engaging, moreover, in what Critchley calls a ‘politics of 
abstraction’ in which the We fails to anchor law in everyday social practices.98 
 The theme of the proper and improper – and hence, the theme of Dasein – 
thus brings the problematic of selfhood into play.99 Indeed, what Heidegger coins 
as the improper and proper, respectively, corresponds to identity as sameness 
(idem-identity) and identity as selfhood (ipse-identity). And, what makes matters 
complex is that ipse is not the expression of idem (to be a self, it is not sufficient to 
just sum up qualities and identifications), while at the same time there is no such 
thing as an ipse without the support of an idem. Viewed from the question of 
selfhood, it is clear that the proper and improper cannot be staged as an 
opposition,100 as, for example, the authentic and inauthentic can.101 In fact, the 
                                                 
97 After recalling ‘the historic importance of the ending of the division of the European continent and the 
need to create firm bases for the construction of the future Europe’, the High Contracting Parties of the 
Maastricht Treaty confirm ‘their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law.’  
98 Cf., Critchley, S. Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance, London [etc.]: Verso 2007, p. 
144.  
99 Heidegger’s move from subject to Dasein comes down to this. Compare BT., p. 367: ‘For the ontological 
concept of the subject characterizes not the Selfhood of the “I” qua Self, but the selfsameness and steadiness of something 
that is always present at hand. To define the “I” ontologically as subject means to regard it as something always 
present-at-hand.’ 
100 Compare BT, p. 146: ‘Understanding can be primarily immersed in the disclosedness of the world, that is, 
Dasein can understand itself first and foremost out of the world. Or else, understanding projects itself 
primarily in the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, that is, Dasein exists as its self. Understanding is either proper, arising 
from within one’s own self, or improper. The ‘im-‘ does not denote that Dasein cuts itself off from its self 
and understands only world. World belongs to selfhood [Selbstsein] as being-in-the-world … Being immersed 
in one of the two fundamental possibilities of understanding does not mean that the other is excluded … In 
understanding of world, the understanding of being-in [i.e., of Dasein, NO] is implicated, while the 
understanding of existence is also always an understanding of world.’ 
101 This is worth stressing, as the mutual dependency between the proper and improper is obfuscated – as is 
the theme of selfhood – by an understanding and/or translation of Eigentlichkeit as authenticity and 
Uneigentlichkeit as inauthenticity. This shade does matter, if only because of the political ramifications of the 
authentic and inauthentic. For, between the latter a strict opposition is possible. More precise still, the 
authentic and inauthentic derive their meaning from the opposition between them, inspiring a discourse that 
advocates a retrieval of a lost authenticity from a besmirching inauthenticity. Admittedly, the issue of 
Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit is possibly disturbing because of the possible infection of these notions with 
yet another distinction Heidegger only mentions in passing, namely the distinction between echt and unecht, the 
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authentic and inauthentic derive their meaning from the very opposition between 
them and, therefore, inspire a discourse that advocates a retrieval of a lost 
authenticity and a search for a true identity, a true people. With Dasein, this 
opposition becomes unattainable, as Dasein always starts, so to speak, from 
outside, determining itself by identifying itself with what it is not. Indeed, that 
Dasein understands its self out of the possibilities into which it is thrown already 
implies that Dasein cannot be fixed on either of the terms of the proper or 
improper.  
To sum up: facticity not only constitutes our inscription in a meaningful world 
that directs our understanding from without. It also constitutes our proper 
understanding as it sets the task to make our own what is given. Facticity, therefore, 
gives rise to what is probably the most famous line of Being and Time, to wit, that 
‘Dasein’s essence [Wesen] lies in its existence.’ 102  This explains, secondly, why 
Dasein is not indifferent to itself which, thirdly, accounts for the fact that Dasein is 
reflexively defined as the being for whom its own being is at issue. I will shortly 
discuss these three variations on the theme of facticity. 
Again, facticity does not purport to express that Dasein as and what it is, is each 
time a fact. Nor does it simply refer to all of what Dasein is. Instead, facticity 
speaks of Dasein’s abandonment, the ‘fact’ that Dasein is forsaken and left to itself, 
delivered over to possibilities out of which it understands itself. As Dasein is its 
possibilities, facticity, rather than revealing what Dasein is, reveals that the being of 
 
genuine, unalloyed and the ingenuine. Both the eigentlich and the uneigentlich, Heidegger says, can be either 
genuine or ingenuine (Compare SZ, p. 146: ‘Das eigentliche ebensowohl wie das uneigentliche verstehen 
können wiederum echt oder unecht sein.’ (proper as well as improper understanding can be either genuine or 
ingenuine). It is this possible infection, so to speak, that has caused the inadequate yet stubborn translation of 
authenticity and inauthenticity. Hence, Nancy rightly argues: ‘The category of the “authentic” essentially 
implies the idea of a purity of origin or provenance, of a native excellence, in relation to which one can 
represent or bring about an “inauthentic” falsification or degradation … German has its own word, which 
Heidegger uses, for the idea of “authenticity”: echt, Echtheit … Eigentlichkeit, by contrast, speak nothing but 
“ownness”, what belongs to someone or something as the person’s or thing’s own, what can be said of 
something in its own right … “Ownness” and “authenticity”, no doubt, are not without a certain relation. 
But, as it happens, thought about the decision of existence proposes, precisely, to make an essential 
distinction between the two, in spite of this relation.’ (Nancy 1993, p. 100).  
Importantly, the category of the genuine and ingenuine resurface in the discussion of das Man. So, important 
for the they, after all, is that ‘[e]verything looks as if it were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, 
genuinely spoken […]’ (BT, p. 217). In fact, I believe that das Man is the accumulation of the infection of 
Eigentlichkeit with Echtheit. Das Man reflects precisely a living together that is concerned for the difference 
between what is authentic and what is inauthentic and impure. Das Man, in other words, is the apex of a living 
together based on identity and identification on the grounds of having access to the origin which is to 
guarantee the purity and authenticity of the people. I, therefore, disagree with those attempts that seek to 
rethink and reevaluate das Man, as, for example, both Nancy and Critchley intend, despite the important 
differences between them. Critchley, thus, argues: ‘The critique of authenticity, particularly with regard to 
social and political life, permits a revalorization of social existence … [I]f we view Heidegger’s descriptions 
from the perspective of originary inauthenticity, then a good deal changes. For example, when Heidegger 
writes that in the world of “the they” “… everyone is another and no one himself”, or indeed, when he says 
that the “who” of everyday Dasein is Niemand, nobody, then such phrases might be otherwise interpreted. If 
we are, indeed, others to ourselves in social existence, if we are even nobody in particular, then this could well 
provide the basis for a thinking of sociality that would not be organized in terms of the goals of authenticity, 
autarky, or communitarian solidarity … The point is that das Man need not be seen as an inauthentic or 
leveled down “publicness” that requires the authenticity of das Volk. We might simply abandon the latter and 
affirm the former.’ (Critchley 2008, p. 148). It is difficult to see, however, how in Critchley’s suggestions and 
descriptions the problematic of selfhood, which the very theme of Dasein brings into play, is to be retained. 
102 BT, p. 67.  
148 A Finite We 
Dasein can burst forth as a ‘naked that it is and has to be’.103 Dasein never simply 
is, but is placed under the burden of having to be, or, to be more precise, of having 
to be a self. Since Dasein is only a self in its projections, Dasein’s Wesen is not a 
thing or a substance. Rather, its Wesen must be understood as a verb, as a rising 
forth in its projections. In order to be a self, Dasein hurls itself out of itself -- and 
never stops doing so. Which is why, precisely, its Wesen lies within its existence, 
rather than its existence being the realization of an essence. So, if the claim to a 
future Europe, as it figures in the Maastricht Treaty, refers back to a past in which 
values of that future Europe already appear as meaningful, this does not imply that 
the project of the European Union is the realization of some European essence. 
On the contrary, the European Union is a project precisely insofar as its projects 
itself in an image of Europe, and anticipates itself by means of an identification 
with what it is not yet. 
So Dasein, always in the movement of the hurl, is always ahead of itself.104 
Dasein has to endure that it is not, nor ever will be, fully present to itself. 
Projecting itself into what it is not yet means that, as Agamben puts it, man ‘to be 
himself [must] necessarily divide himself.’105 Marked by division and constituted as a 
fracture, facticity is not some event at the beginning of Dasein which brought 
Dasein into being. On the contrary, facticity does not lie behind us, but is always 
jeweilig, is always now.106 Dasein will never clear its lack of presence at its origin, will 
never be in full possession of itself, and will never attain an identity without 
remainder. For that very reason, Dasein is not indifferent to itself; is not 
indifferent, that is, to what is its own. Were Dasein to be in full possession of its 
self, it wouldn’t be really bothered by itself. The self wouldn’t really matter, as it 
wouldn’t be at stake. Rather, it is as if Dasein is losing a self it did not possess in 
the first place. According to Heidegger, what bespeaks of this non-indifference of 
Dasein to its self, is that Dasein expresses itself as an I. As Francoise Dastur 
explains the point: ‘So in saying I, Dasein expresses its own being, and it is for this 
that Heidegger reserves the term existence.’107 To say the same thing differently, 
what bespeaks of this non-indifference is that Dasein is in each case our own. 
Thus, in Being and Time, we read: ‘The Being, which in the being of Dasein is at 
issue, is mine. Thus, Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or a 
specific case of some genus of beings that are present-at-hand. Such beings are 
indifferent to their being, or, strictly speaking, their being is such that they can 
neither be indifferent nor not-indifferent. Because Dasein is in each case mine, my 
own [Jemeinigkeit] the personal pronoun must be said every time Dasein is addressed 
or called upon: ‘I am’, ‘You are.’108 As announced at the beginning of this Chapter, 
I intend to extend this enumeration of the personal pronoun in relation to one’s 
own being with ‘We are.’ To be sure, reading the existential analytic from the 
perspective of the first- person- plural is not to assert that ‘individual’ Dasein is 
                                                 
103 BT, p. 173, (Italics are mine).  
104 Compare BT, p. 236: ‘[B]eing towards one’s ownmost potentiality-for-being means that in each case, 
Dasein is already ahead of itself [ihm selbst … vorweg] …This structure of Being, which belongs to the 
essential, ‘is an issue’ we shall denote as Dasein’s being-ahead-of-itself.’ 
105 Agamben 1999, p. 118.  
106 Cf., OHF, p. 7 
107 F. Dastur, Death: An Essay on Finitude (translated from French), London: The Athlone Press 1996, p. 44.  
108 BT, pp. 67, 68, translation slightly altered.  
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preceded by a We, or that it can only truly be itself in community. To analyze the 
We, in and as Dasein, is simply to say that the We is not indifferent to itself and 
that to exist as a We is not about realizing an essence or refiguring a substantial 
identity. 
For indeed, Dasein’s non-indifference to itself, as well as its Wesen as a rising 
forth, imply that Dasein is reflexively defined as the being for whom its own being 
is at issue. Dasein is concerned for, takes care of its own self. The understanding of 
human being as Dasein, thus, brings a reflexive notion of identity into play. Dasein 
signals that the question of ‘what’  human being is, invoking a referential identity as 
physical and mental predicates are attributed to a subject, 109  does not exhaust 
human being because of the difference between what and who human being is.110 
Saying that for Dasein, its own being is at issue, allows us to grasp the relation of 
the We to its self. The clarity with which Dastur grasps the point with respect to 
the I, thus, rings equally true for the We: ‘Hence, there is an ipseity or an identity of 
the I that is definitely not to be equated with being a subject for the simple reason 
that it is never already realized but, rather, always ‘to be’, and because this ‘to be’ 
takes the form of a project of oneself-in-the-world that presupposes no substantial 
being as foundation.’111  
Grasping the We as a self, once again stresses that Dasein is placed under the 
burden of the painstaking task of having to be a self -- however, not in the sense 
that Dasein has to be something, has to conform to a model, figure a pre-given 
identity or substance. On the contrary, the ontology of selfhood is an ontology of 
potentiality.112 There is already one important ontological implication to be drawn 
from the notion of facticity. This implication elicits the dynamic of the argument 
this chapter develops. Facticity is what ‘makes’ us, in the absence of a god that 
created us, and in the absence of a subject that posits itself as its own ground. 
Facticity, indeed, signals that we are groundlessly delivered over to our self. 
Groundless, the self cannot be the subject or the presupposition of this relation. 
For, as Nancy rightly argues, ‘it is the relation that makes the self.’113 Indeed, if 
projection entails being ahead of itself, the self is not prior, but comes after. 
According to Lindahl, this is exactly the paradox of representation: There is no We 
in the absence of a representation of the We.114 The self, therefore, not only comes 
after and is lagging behind. It is, ultimately, also lacking. The self is introuvable, 
incessantly slipping away, eluding its identifications, representations and fixations. 
With respect to the plural self of democracy, Van Roermund pins down the 
implications thereof: ‘Notwithstanding the fact that all predicates, opinions, or 
interests in society have to refer to this self to count as political, the political self 
would not be ‘something’ tangible as a separate entity, a super-subject of a common 
 
109 On the difference between referential and reflexive identity see also Ricoeur 1994, pp.40-55. 
110 Cf., Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (translated from German), New Haven/London: Yale University 
Press 2000 pp. 148-153. Hereafter referred to as IM. 
111 Dastur 1996, p. 44.  
112 Compare also Nancy 1993, p. 186: ‘This is what “possibility” means. The relation to the “possible” is 
nothing other than the relation of existence to itself – which, let us note in passing, is what constitutes the 
unsubjectiviable mode of the Being of a singular “subject”: a relation to the “self” wherein the “self” is the 
possible.’ See also Ricoeur 1994, p. 308. 
113 Nancy 2007, pp. 99, 100.  
114 Cf., Lindahl 2009a, pp. 155-156. 
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predicate, or a public will beyond all private interests … Thus, a democracy would 
require not only that spokesmen represent the polity as an authorative self, but also 
that they account for the ‘unmarked rest’ from which this self derives its authority. 
It would celebrate what Rosonvallon has called ‘le peuple introuvable’ – the people 
that only exists in the way it is imagined to present, picture, or narrate itself in 
scattered representations, pictures and narrations.’115 
Dasein’s improper understanding relates precisely to these identifications, 
determinations, representations, imaginations and fixations, and is the finite 
moment in the endless relation of the We to its self. Improper understanding, 
recall, denotes our understanding from without, whereas proper understanding 
comes from within, arising out of our own self. As will become clear, proper 
understanding has, strictly speaking, nothing to say. Improper understanding, on its 
turn, shields us from this abyssal nothing. Importantly, then, improper 
understanding is not a distortion or a perversion of the proper. It does not cloak a 
proper, original, authentic, true and real self that gets lost in an alienating identity.  
What the improper does conceal – for concealment there is – is rather this slipping 
away of the self.  
 
 
4.5 We Are 
 
In order to understand what it means for a We to exist as a self – and hence to exist 
finite – the proper and improper have to be taken into account. In what follows, I 
will divide the discussion of the improper and proper over this section and the 
next. Note that to divide the improper and proper over the course of the argument 
is not to admit that they can ever appear in pure form or be affirmed independently 
from one another. In this section, I will discuss the improper, that is, what is not our 
own. Paradoxically, the improper enables us to say ‘We are.’ As will become clear, 
this improper saying ‘We are’ bespeaks of a familiarity and comfort with ourselves 
and our world. Yet, what is familiar to us is not the same as what is most our own, 
as will be argued in the next section. Proper understanding, which does not and 
cannot resound, conveys that the We is also always at discomfort with itself, ill at 
ease and not at home amidst what is most familiar to it. If familiarity and a sense of 
ease enables plural exisentence to say ‘We’, then discomfort and Unheimlichkeit 
remind us that the very declaration of the We is intimately bound up with the 
inability of saying ‘We.’ 
 As explained above, the non-indifference with respect to its own being moves 
a people to say ‘We’. More specific, Dasein declares itself as a ‘We are …’, that is, 
as defined by certain socio-linguistic and historico-cultural qualities, and by the 
values it holds to be true. Yet, even though Dasein can declare itself as a We, and 
Dasein is in each case our own, we should, Heidegger argues at the outset of the 
existential analytic, consider the possibility that the we is, paradoxically, not its self 
whenever it says ‘We’.116 As the We is not its self in saying ‘We’, the improper makes 
itself heard in the very declaration of the We. 
                                                 
115 Van Roermund (2006), p. 537.  
116 Cf., BT, pp. 151, 152.  
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Paradoxically, then, Dasein, though reflexively defined as the being for whom 
its own self is at issue, nevertheless turns away from its self117 (‘daβ es ihm selbst in 
gewisser Weise ausweicht’118) by turning its gaze towards its world out of which it 
understands itself: ‘Dasein is first and foremost fallen away from its proper self as 
potentiality-for-being and fallen [Verfallen] ‘into’ the world.’ 119  Dasein’s fall and 
‘alienation’, however, is not a deplorable fact but, as Heidegger has it, a ‘positive 
possibility’120 that constitutes Dasein’s ability to move around freely in its world 
with the greatest ease. Were Dasein to turn its gaze and merely stare at its self 
without the back-up of its alienating identifications it derives from its world, Dasein 
would surely be paralyzed. Evading its self is what gets and keeps Dasein going as 
the being that it is, that is, as always already alongside with, and absorbed in, its 
world. That Dasein is first and foremost not its self is not to take us off track, 
therefore, assuming that what is at stake is the search for an original, authentic self 
that has to be wrestled from an inauthentic identity in which Dasein is lost and not 
itself. On the contrary, that the We is not its self in declaring ‘We are …’, suggests, 
precisely, that the declaration of the We is not the expression or representation of a 
prior, already given and established self. 
Indeed, recall that the improper refers to Dasein’s identifications with what is 
not (yet) its own. In order to obtain a circumscribed identity, Dasein projects or 
pictures itself into possibilities into which it is thrown, makes itself an identity in 
accordance with an image that precedes it. With Dasein, alienation becomes 
original,121 implying that Dasein’s falling away from itself and its fallenness into its 
world is, in fact, not ‘a fall from a purer and higher ‘primal status’.’122 In falling, 
Dasein anticipates an identity in and through identification with what is already 
 
117 Cf., Ibid., p.  178.  
118 SZ, p. 139.  
119 BT, p. 220, translation slightly altered/ SZ, p. 175. Heidegger here introduces the notion of fallenness, 
which in the existential analytic appears as the third existential that characterizes Dasein, together with 
facticity (thrownness) and existence (projection). Most readings of Being and Time understand Uneigentlichkeit 
on the basis of Dasein’s fallenness, and, more specific, as Dasein’s fall into the they (das Man). Uneigentlichkeit 
then denotes Dasein’s existence as they-self. That Dasein is not its self in saying ‘I’ is then taken to denote 
that it is a  ‘they-self.’ One possible reading of the ‘interpreting liberation of Dasein’ which Being and Time aims 
to be, is, therefore, that Dasein is to wrestle and free itself from this domination of the They that has taken 
over its existence. Eigentlichkeit on this account comes to denote the freeing and wrestling of the self from the 
they-self. For a discussion of this liberation, and all the difficulties it involves, as well as the ambiguities 
Heidegger himself runs up to see Visker 1999. Understanding Eigentlichkeit as existing as oneself in 
contradistinction to existing as a they-self to which Uneigentlichkeit is reduced, has inspired the long- lasting 
debate over whether Heidegger, in fact, based his existential analytic of Dasein on a personal preference for 
some ideal of human existence. The issue of authenticity no doubt crops up here. In fact, I believe that 
understanding Uneigentlichkeit solely on the basis of Dasein’s fall into the they has much contributed to the 
understanding and/or translation of authenticity and inauthenticity. In this chapter, by contrast, I try to 
understand and make sense of the improper on the basis of facticity, and not, as is usually being done, on the 
basis of Dasein’s fallenness into the they. Understanding both the proper and improper on the basis of 
facticity brings into view that these two basic possibilities are indeed co-implicated instead of being the two 
terms of an opposition.  
120 BT, p. 220.  
121 Compare Visker 1999, p. 28: ‘[Heidegger] knows that the interpreting part of his analysis, the part which is 
to explain what there is about the Being of Dasein which lets Dasein first and foremost (zunächst und zumeist) 
alienate from itself – from its self – could end up with showing that, in fact, there is no alienation at all, that 
the reason why alienation is so successful is precisely because there is nothing else than that, because, in short, 
alienation would be original, a supplement to some frailty in Dasein’s Being, a suit of armour without which it 
could not survive.’ 
122 BT, p. 220.  
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given and what the world is reaching out to it. This anticipatory leap forwards 
directs Dasein to its future by referring it back to past, i.e., to thrown possibilities.  
This anticipatory projection into thrown possibilities, or this identification with 
what one is not (yet) in the process of (collective) identity formation, is at work 
whenever the constitution of a people is at issue. Recall from the previous chapter 
that for the founding act to be legitimate it has to act as if the people already 
existed, and as if it merely re-presented the people. A people at the brink of its 
existence thus anticipates itself in and through these representations. Of course, the 
fiction involved in the ‘as if’ is not the fiction proper to poetry, as if the people 
were nothing but a fiction springing from the creative imagination of those who 
took the initiative to found it. There is, as Nancy observes, an important difference 
between the fiction involved in poetry and the fiction involved in politics and 
law,123 if only because of the circularity involved in the act of constitution.124 A 
future, for example the European Union, is anticipated by way of referring back to 
a past, Europe, which, on its turn, acquires its meaning in and through this very 
projection.125 So, if Dasein is always ahead of itself, it is ‘ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-
in-a-world.’126 And precisely because of the circularity involved in the structure of 
Dasein’s being,127 can Heidegger claim that ‘existence is always factical’ and that 
‘existentiality is essentially determined by facticity.’128 
                                                 
123 Compare Nancy, A Finite Thinking (translated from the French), ed. By S. Sparks. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 2003, p. 157: ‘Dichtung  makes up a world … If poetry fictions, it does so as a theory: a vision 
that produces visions. By contrast, (juridical) fiction works with a world, with the accidental, eventful actuality 
of a “worldness” that the law neither produces nor sublates. If anything and everything can happen in 
Dichtung, that’s because it produces the unlimited field of its own production; if anything and everything can 
happen for right, it is because there’s always something that exceeds the limits of its spaces.’ 
124 For more on the circularity involved in the act of constitution see Derrida 1992, p. 36. 
125 The referred circularity gives credit to the invocation of self-evident truths and God in the American 
Declaration of Independence that Arendt, in her discussion of the American Revolution, tries to downplay as 
impure and as a sign of a lack of nerve on the part of the founding fathers to face the novelty and greatness 
of their act. According to Arendt, this novelty lies within the ‘We hold’ that expresses the power of free men 
to gather together and bind themselves on the basis of reciprocity and promises. This power, based on 
reciprocity in and of itself, legitimizes the act of constitution that, therefore, need not appeal to a higher 
authority or self-evident truths. As Honig reads Arendt in Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, ‘the 
“we” stands as the guarantor of its own performance.’ (Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1993, p. 105). As Honig rightly argues, Arendt here overlooks the fact that 
the people do not exist as a people prior to the act of constitution. Hence, Honig argues, reading Derrida 
against Arendt, that recourse to self-evident truths and natural law is not a failure to recognize the power and 
the acts of men but is, rather, the expression of the awareness that every act of founding has to link up with 
what has already been established as authoritative: ‘ On Derrida’s account, the signers are stuck in Sièyes’ 
vicious circle. They lack the authority to sign until they have signed. The American founders’ invocation of 
the name of the laws of nature and the name of God manifests this predicament. They appealed to a 
constative, according to Derrida, not, as Arendt would have it, because of a failure or lack of nerve or because 
they underestimated the power of their own performance, but because they did not overestimate its power. 
To guarantee power and secure their innovation, they had to combine their performative with a constative 
utterance.’ (Ibid., p. 105).  
126 BT, p. 236.  
127 Compare Ibid., pp. 194-195: ‘But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just 
‘sense’ it as an inevitable imperfection, the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up ... What is decisive 
is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way … The ‘circle’ in understanding belongs to 
the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein – that 
is, in the understanding which interprets. An entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an 
issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure.’ On circularity and facticity see also: Agamben’s understanding of 
the being of Dasein in Agamben 1998, pp. 150 -151: ‘The great novelty of Heidegger’s thought … was that it 
resolutely took root in facticity … The circular structure by which Dasein is an issue for itself in its ways of 
being is nothing but the formalization of the essential experience of factical life, in which it is impossible to 
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The possibility to say ‘We’ is thus rooted in our being-in-the-world. That saying 
‘We are …’ bespeaks a polity’s familiarity with its world, becomes clear in its 
everyday life. To be sure, everydayness is not to be mistaken for banality or 
mediocrity.129 Rather, it refers to the way Dasein first and foremost comports itself 
towards the world and understands itself accordingly. Everydayness expresses and 
assures that business is business as usual. For business to be business as usual, it is 
required that the We is not explicitly concerned with itself, is not haunted and 
preoccupied by the question who and what it is. If it is written on a wall ‘This is 
Serbia’, and someone remonstrates the slogan by writing ‘No, stupid, it is a post-
office’, he (or she) repossesses a normalcy and everydayness that gets stuck and 
suspended whenever people start claiming ‘This is Serbia.’130  That the world has 
its way and we have our way in it is only possible because we dismiss the question 
who we are, turn away from our self, and act. Indeed, in everyday life Dasein is 
what it does. To use a phrase of Agamben (a very important phrase in fact): Dasein 
is always a form-of-life.131 Heidegger, that is, defines human existence as Dasein 
precisely because human being is never simply ‘mere life’ or ‘natural life’ but also 
always already its form.  
The corruptive effects of the breakdown of everydayness (we all know what 
happened in the former-Yugoslavia) derive from the fact that people are thrown 
 
distinguish between life and its actual situation, Being and its ways of Being … For Heidegger, the central 
category of facticity is not Zufälligkeit, contingency – by which one thing is in a certain way and in a certain 
place, yet could be elsewhere and otherwise – but rather, Verfallenheit, fallenness, which characterizes a being 
that is and has to be its own ways of being. Facticity does not mean simply being contingently in a certain way 
and a certain situation, but rather, means decisively assuming this way and this situation by which what is 
given must be transformed into a task.’  
128 BT, p. 236.  
129 And, for that matter, the point of everydayness, as well as Heidegger’s reason for discussing it, is not that it 
proves the dominance of das Man. 
130 Thanks go to Leon Heuts who offered the example to me. The anecdote of wall- writing is related in 
Nedzad Begovic’ documentary Totally Personal (2005).  
131 Agamben coins the notion of form-of-life to resist the separation of naked law from human life. Those 
who are reduced to their naked lives are pushed below the threshold of humanity, are deprived of everything 
that makes their lives worth living, and find themselves in a state of exception. ‘By the term form-of-life’, 
Agamben argues, ‘I mean a life that can never be separated from its form, a life in which it is never possible 
to isolate something such as naked life. A life that cannot be separated from its form is a life for which what 
is at stake in its way of living is living itself. What does this formulation mean? It defines a life – human life – 
in which the single ways, acts, and processes of living are never simply facts but, always and above all, 
possibilities of life, always and above all, power. Each behavior and each form of human living is never 
prescribed by a specific biological vocation, nor is it assigned by whatever necessity; instead, no matter how 
customary, repeated, and socially compulsory, it always retains the character of possibility; that is, it always 
puts at stake living itself.’ (Agamben, G. Means without End. Notes on Politics, Minneapolis/London: University 
of Minnesota Press 2000, pp. 2, 3). Agamben clearly draws on Heidegger here. In fact, he even argues in 
Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life, that the political meaning of facticity is this very impossibility of 
separating a naked life from its form: ‘For both Heidegger and National Socialism, life has no need to assume 
‘values’ external to it in order to become politics: Life is immediately political in its very facticity. Man is not a 
living being who must abolish or transcend himself in order to become human – man is not a duality of spirit 
and body, nature and politics, life and logos, but is, instead, resolutely situated at the point of their 
indistinction.’ (Agamben 1998, p. 153). Importantly, facticity constitutes the decisive difference between 
Heidegger and fascism: ‘Nazism determines the bare life of homo sacer in a biological and eugenic key, making 
it into the site of an incessant decision on value and non-value in which bio-politics continually turns in 
thanatopolitics and in which the camp, consequently, becomes the absolute political space. In Heidegger, on 
the other hand, homo sacer – whose very own life is always at issue in its very act --  instead becomes Dasein, 
the inseparable unity of Being and ways of Being, of subject and qualities, life and world, ‘whose own being is 
at issue in its very Being.’ (Ibid., p. 153).  
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back upon ‘themselves’ and get preoccupied with their identity. In this respect, 
anthropologists have discerned a noteworthy (and unsettling) difference between 
refugees confined in camps and refugees who spontaneously settled in the cities to 
which they fled. The former group of refugees is excluded from normal life, and 
their lives are suspended in an emptiness in which there is nothing to be done. 
Their lives, as Agamben would say, are separated from its form.  For them there is 
no business as usual. Harell-Bond, for example, has observed that in the emptiness 
of camp life, even the most basic skills acquired over generations to cope with the 
environment are lost.132 Without everything that makes human life worth living – 
such as labor, work, providing for themselves and their families – camp-refugees 
have the horrific experience of being useless. No longer in a position in which they 
can understand themselves from what they do, they get preoccupied with what they 
are. Liisa Malkki observed that Hutu refugees who were confined in camps in 
Tanzania ‘engaged in an urgent, collective process of constructing and 
reconstructing a true history of their trajectory as “a people”. This was an 
oppositional process, setting itself against state-approved versions of the history of 
Burundi … [T]he Hutu refugees’ narratives outlined the lost features of the 
“autochtonous”,  “original”, Burundi nation and the primordial social harmony that 
was believed to have prevailed among the original inhabitants …’133  
The camp-refugees’ preoccupation with what they truly are as a people does not 
at all assure that things return to a normal, everyday state of affairs. On the 
contrary, it continues to disrupt everydayness, as it sets the stage for hatred and 
violence. Camps are generally believed to be breeding places that contribute to the 
continuation of armed conflict. In numerous cases, invasions and armed attacks are 
launched from camps. By contrast, Hutu refugees who spontaneously settled in 
host states did not engage in mythologizing their identities as they were busy living, 
working, acquiring skills required by their new environments, and so forth. Their 
lives turned back to a normal state of affairs precisely because they, literally, got 
back to business -- something the camp-refugees explicitly disapproved of. They 
were even outraged by Hutu refugees who lived in the cities, whom they depicted 
as traitors, as they engaged in commerce. Malkki reports camp-refugees to have 
said, ‘We have not come here to make commerce. We are refugees.’ 134  The 
refugees in the Mishamo camp in which Malkki conducted her research apparently 
agreed that a rich refugee was a contradiction in terms: ‘The camp refugees 
recognized that wealth would likely root people in the here and now, making them 
forget that they were in exile, and, thus, properly rooted elsewhere … 
[R]efugeeness, ideally, was an integral part of the process of a future return – just as 
it was inevitably linked to the past.’135 Indeed, the exclusion of normal life, and the 
suspension of everyday familiarity, is perhaps best expressed by the fact that for 
those refugees, business, quite literally, is not business as usual.  
From a Heideggerian point of view, everydayness purports to express, precisely, 
that Dasein, first and foremost, understands itself out of that with which it is 
                                                 
132 Harell-Bond, B. ‘Pitch the Tents. An Alternative to Refugee Camps’, The New Republic, September 19 & 26, 
(1994) p. 16.  
133 Malkki, L. ‘Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization’, Cultural Anthropology, 
vol. 11 (1996), p. 380. Cf. also Malkki 1995a. 
134Malkki 1996,  p. 381. 
135 Ibid., p.  382.  
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concerned and for which it is concerned.136  The everyday manner in which Dasein 
comports itself to its world and itself is, therefore, that of concern [Besorgen].137 Being 
engrossed in whatever it is Dasein is concerned with, understanding itself 
accordingly, Dasein, as said, forgets itself, turns away from itself.138 If who we are 
is constantly at issue in our public affairs, it would be a sure thing that we would 
never be able to take decisions and get the job done. We dismiss the question of 
who we are, and probably say something like: that we belong to this nation, for 
which we seek to strengthen the economy by investing in innovation, that we 
defend the right to abortion as fundamentally belonging to the right of women to 
self-determination, that we are on the lookout for human rights as we believe this 
makes the world a better place in which to live, determining our foreign policy 
accordingly, and so forth.  
As long as Dasein is caught up by the life and time of the world, it can 
reassuringly dismiss the question of who it is by saying what it is and what it is 
doing. In the everyday life of Dasein, that it is, is not at issue. In public debate, the 
We is always the for-the-sake-of-which. The stakes, however, are not explicitly that 
we are, but what we are. If we say we are committed to promoting human rights 
everywhere for everyone, as we believe a safer world is in our best interest, as well, 
it is only a matter of time before our political opponents object that we are not 
defending the interests of the people, but are instead supporting a partial interest of 
a small, wealthy and highly educated part of the people, and that it is, instead, in the 
interest of the people as a whole to lower the budget for foreign and humanitarian 
aid. That we are is not explicitly or thematically at stake here. Rather, what happens 
is that different, contesting claims about what we should concern ourselves with, 
and what best serves our interests are being put forward.139 Public debate about 
what we should do and what best represents and serves our interests, is what sets 
democracy into motion and keeps it going. 
 And of course, putting forward different contesting claims always takes place in 
a certain political climate, and always arouses certain moods and sentiments. Public 
debate is never merely rational but is, for a large part, also affectively loaded. 
Elation, aversion, sympathy, anger, indignation, desire, apprehension all affect 
public debate. Defending the right of freedom of speech can be pregnant with a 
sympathetic regard for and protection of minorities. But the picture changes, as it is 
changing today, when those minorities are said to threaten our freedom of 
expression, spurring us to heavily criticize their backward culture and traditions. 
And even though we believe our intention to emancipate them from their curtailing 
traditions to be lofty, they feel, of course, cornered. Also, the very use of the 
suggestive expression ‘illegal immigrant’ and ‘illegal immigration’ give vent to 
 
136 Compare BT, p. 155: ‘This elemental worldly kind of encountering, which belongs to Dasein and is closest 
to it, goes so far that even one’s own Dasein becomes something that it can itself proximally ‘come across’ 
only when it looks away from ‘Experiences’ and the ‘centre of its actions’ or does not as yet ‘see’ them at all. 
Dasein finds itself proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids – in those things environmentally ready-to-
hand with which it is proximally concerned.’  
137 Compare BT, p. 84: ‘Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its being towards the world 
[Sein zur Welt] is essentially concern.’ 
138 Cf., BT, p. 405.  
139 This is how Plotke understands political representation. Cf., Plotke, D. ‘Representation is Democracy’, 
Constellations. An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, vol. 4 (1997), pp. 19-34.  
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feelings of anxiety and resentment as it implies a connection between immigration 
and criminal law. Or, to give a wholly different example, if we read Tolstoy’s War 
and Peace, we know that Napoleon, though he truly intended to keep peace with 
Russia, nevertheless, despite himself and his intention to stay calm, went to war, as 
he couldn’t help being irritated, outraged and hurt by the stupidity and ingratitude 
of the Tsar. 
 So, according to Heidegger, indeed, every understanding of Dasein has its 
mood,140 is attuned and affective: ‘A mood [Stimmung] makes manifest ‘how one 
is, and how one is faring’ [‘wie einem ist und wird’]’.141 Not only does a mood tell 
us how one is, it also discloses where one is, as is still retained in the German 
expression of Befindlichkeit.142 So, if it is said that Dasein always already finds itself 
in the world,143  the meaning thereof is threefold: First, it refers to the where of 
Dasein, to the place it has taken up on the basis of a circularity that directs its 
concerns and projections which expresses, secondly, that Dasein always already has 




4.6 Concern and Order 
 
That the world has its way, and Dasein has its way in it, is conditioned on Dasein’s 
affective understanding of itself out of that with which it is concerned. Obviously, 
we are always concerned with some ‘thing’, for which Heidegger coins the notion 
of equipment [Zeug]145  so as to stress the instrumentality thereof. Certainly, the 
notion of equipment and equipmentality is not to lead us to believe that concern is 
restricted to the work and labor of our hands. In fact, putting forward multiple, 
contesting claims about what best serves our interests as a people, pretty well 
illustrates what concern amounts to. According to Heidegger, concern entails 
‘having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and 
looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, 
undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, 
determining … All these ways of Being-in [i.e., Being-in-the-world, NO] have 
concern as their kind of Being […].’146 
 Now, it is important to note that besorgen has an additional, somewhat archaic, 
meaning which gets lost in the English translation of ‘concern.’ Besorgen also means 
something like making sure that all ends up well, that things end up in the right 
                                                 
140 Cf., BT, 182.  
141 BT, p. 173. 
142 Cf., PM, 87. 
143 Compare Ibid.,  p.128: ‘ As finding itself [sich befinden] Dasein is absorbed by beings in such a way that, in its 
belonging to beings, it is thoroughly attuned by them … With this absorption by beings that belongs to 
transcendence, Dasein has taken up a basis within beings, gained ground.’  
144 Compare BT, p. 176: ‘ A mood assails us. It comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside’, but arises out 
of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such being […] The mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a 
whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something.’ 
145 Cf., BT, pp. 96, 97.  
146 BT, p. 83.  
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place suited to them.147 For the economy to properly function, for example, it is 
required that the tomatoes we grow are distributed, either to a grocery in town or 
exported to a foreign country, instead of lying rotting in the fields, and it wouldn’t 
be a very good idea to make a philosopher a stockjobber, or put her in charge of a 
national bank. Indeed, besorgen, concern, as Heidegger understands and expounds it, 
is what assigns to things a place suited to them.148 Concern, in short, is what gives 
and ensures order. 
 So things never merely are. Instead, they are taken up and function within a 
meaningful network of relations in which one thing always refers to another, and 
derives its meaning and function from this reference.149 The meaningful unity of 
this chain of connections is constituted by the ‘in-order-to’, the ‘at-which’, the 
‘towards which’ 150  and the primary ‘towards-which’ (or the for-the-sake-of-
which),151 which, as we saw before, is Dasein, itself. So, we use genetic engineering 
in agriculture (at-which) in order to make fruits and vegetables immune for certain 
diseases with a view to increasing the yield of production so that we can feed 
ourselves. Things are referred and assigned to one another152 and in thus being 
referred and assigned, they are given direction.153 Things are fixed in a direction 
for, in, and through our concern with them, implying that the where of things is not 
to be understood as some arbitrary position or occurrence in space [Stelle im Raum], 
but rather refers to the place [Platz] where they belong [Hingehören]154 or do not 
belong [in der Weise des Nichthergehörigen].155 Concern emplaces things, bringing with 
it the possibility that things are misplaced. Note that things can only be misplaced 
within this meaningful network of relations and within this Platzganzheit 156  or 
Platzmannigfaltigkeit,157 i.e., against the backdrop of the place assigned to them.158 
 
147 In Dutch, for example, we have the expression ‘zijn kinderen bezorgen’ which means taking care that 
one’s children end up well.  
148 So, Dasein, first of all, encounters things within its world in and through its involvement with them or its 
concern. More precise still, it is in and through Dasein’s concern that things are discovered. Concern is a 
‘freeing’ (Cf. BT, p. 117) of things on the basis of Dasein’s spatiality in which things can be here or there. 
Compare BT, p. 146: ‘When we let entities within-the-world be encountered in the way which is constitutive 
for Being-in-the-world, we ‘give them space’. This ‘giving space’, which we also call ‘making room’ [Einräumen] 
for them, consists in freeing the ready-to-hand for its spatiality. As a way of discovering and presenting a 
possible totality of spaces determined by involvements, this making room is what makes possible one’s 
factical orientation at the time. In concerning itself circumspectively [umsichtiges Besorgen] with the world, 
Dasein can move things around or out of the way or make room for them [um-, weg-, und “einräumen”] only 
because making room – understood as an existentiale – belongs to its Being-in-the-world.’ 
149 Compare BT, p. 120: ‘These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial totality; they are 
what they are as this signifying [Be-deuten] in which Dasein gives itself beforehand its being-in-the-world as 
something to be understood. The relational totality of this signifying we call “significance” [Bedeutsamkeit]. 
This is what makes up the structure of the world – the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is.’  
150 Cf., BT, pp. 97-101.  
151 Cf., BT, pp. 116-117.  
152 Cf., BT, p.  97.  
153 Cf., BT, p. 135.  
154 Cf., SZ, p. 102.  
155 Cf., SZ, p. 73.  
156 Cf., SZ, p. 111.  
157 Cf., SZ, p. 102.  
158 Compare BT, pp. 135, 136: ‘[w]hat is close in this way gets established by the circumspection of concern, 
with regard to the direction in which the equipment is accessible at any time. When this closeness of 
equipment has been given directionality, this signifies not merely that the equipment position [Stelle] in space 
as present-at-hand somewhere, but also, that as equipment, it has been essentially fitted up and installed, set 
up, and put to rights. Equipment has its place [Platz], or else it ‘lies around’; this must be distinguished, in 
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Heidegger surely has his way of putting what is so familiar and close to us at a 
distance, and of turning everydayness into something which is highly unusual. This 
is exactly why, as he explains, the whole network of meaningful relations and the 
distribution of places recedes in the background, remaining implicit just as Dasein’s 
own self retreats from conspicuousness. 159  Indeed, concern denotes our pre-
reflexive involvement with things on the basis of our always already being-in-the-
world which is familiar beforehand: ‘Any concern is already as it is, because of some 
familiarity with the world.’ 160  It is no coincidence that Dasein’s facticity is 
introduced in the context of Dasein’s everyday way of comporting itself towards its 
world, as Dasein is delivered over to exactly this meaningful network. The world is 
familiar to Dasein on account of its facticity: ‘This everyday way in which things 
have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with 
never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine 
understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovery and appropriating 
anew, are performed. In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way 
in which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a ‘world-in-
itself’ so that it just beholds what it encounters.’161 Put differently, and in terms we 
have already used, for Dasein, order has always already begun. And, precisely 
because of that, it wouldn’t bring Dasein very far to just behold what it encounters, 
waiting for the world to reveal itself.162 Note that concern also has the structure of 
projection: Though the motivation to promote human rights for everyone 
everywhere does not come out of the blue – in fact, when we constituted ourselves 
as a European We, we affirmed our attachment to these values – we do not know 
what it is exactly and what it entails unless and until we get started with it.163  
Now, of course our involvement with things can get stuck. In fact, it gets stuck 
all the time. Bank managers (even though they are not philosophers) can plunge the 
financial market into a worldwide economic crisis. Fighting illegal immigration does 
not, in fact, reduce illegal immigration as we hoped it would do, but instead 
contributes to the increase of it. Dumping our tomatoes in poor African countries 
robs indigenous farmers of their labor, as they cannot produce tomatoes at such a 
low price; and, as they are forced to live below the means of subsistence, our 
tomato-export is sure to backfire at us, as the farmers are forced to move to 
Europe where they work illegally in our tomato industry. Bad weather can hamper 
traffic, causing us to be late to work, or to not be able to arrive at the office at all, 
and the bike I deemed to be my property has been taken away from the shelter. But 
this wavering is possible precisely because of the binary logic that structures the 
meaningful references and assignments of things to each other and that determines 
the place suitable to each: Things are where they belong or don’t belong. 
                                                                                                                   
principle, from just occurring at random in some spatial position. When equipment for something or other 
has its place, this place defines itself as the place of this equipment – as one place out of a whole totality of 
places directionally lined up with each other […] Such a place, and such a multiplicity of places are not to be 
interpreted as the “where” of some random Being-present-at-hand of things. In each case, the place is the 
definite Dort und Da of an item of equipment which belongs somewhere.’ 
159 Cf., BT, p. 100.  
160 BT, p. 107.  
161 BT, p. 213.  
162 Cf., BT, p. 98.  
163 To use one of Heidegger’s own examples to underscore the structure of projection in our concern: The 
less we just stare at the hammer, the more we seize hold of it and use it (Cf., BT, p. 98).  
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Significance and familiarity stand out against the possibility of the ‘not.’ Something 
is missing, acting up, not properly functioning, lying around, not being where it is 
supposed to be, and so on. These disturbances and interruptions of the proper 
functioning of the significant and meaningful context, which normally remains 
implicit, causes it to become conspicuous for a moment: ‘[W]hen an assignment has 
been disturbed – when something is unusable for a purpose – then the assignment 
becomes explicit.’164 But precisely because the assignment becomes explicit and the 
referential context lights up, we know what to do. By becoming explicit, it provides 
us the correctives, and informs us about what has to be done for order to be 
restored again. 
 Take the example of the legal order.165 The category of the illegal serves as a 
good example of an interference that makes the totality of assignments and 
references salient. Consider, in this respect, how Lindahl understands trespassing: 
‘[S]omeone enters a place where s/he ought not to be. In such cases, a distribution 
of ought-places lights up as a whole, because it becomes apparent that the misplaced 
person ought to be in any one of those ought-places, rather than this one. Acts that 
trespass spatial boundaries render conspicuous the familiar unity of a totality of 
legal places as assigning a certain place to an individual (or debarring him/her from 
that place), and which the individual does not (or does) occupy.’166 The illegal thus 
renders conspicuous and confirms the legal order. An illegal act does not, therefore, 
put the We fundamentally into question, but instead, affirms it as the subject 
authorized to draw the line between here and there, spacing out places where things 
and persons ought to be. 
Concern, as Dasein’s everyday comportment to a familiar world, thus comes 
into view as a taking care of the continuation of an order that has always already 
begun. Concern plays on and ensures that the world has its way, and that the We 
has its way in it. As long as the We is concerned with and for things, it is able to 
express itself as a We: ‘In talking, Dasein expresses itself [spricht sich … aus] not 
because it has, in the first instance, been encapsulated as something ‘internal’ over 
against something outside, but because, as Being-in-the-world, it is already ‘outside’ 
when it understands. What is expressed is precisely this Being-outside…’167 Hence, 
we see the relation between concern, everyday familiarity, the improper, and saying 
‘We.’ This sequel discloses the existential meaning of being-in- the world.168  In 
short, it is on account of Dasein’s familiar being in the world that it can declare 
itself as a We. 
Note that if the We is taken as Dasein, what brings about and unifies the We is 
not primarily a common interest or some qualified property, but, before anything 
 
164 BT, p. 105.  
165 On the relation between the legal order and everydayness see Veraart, W. De Passie voor een alledaagse 
rechtsorde. Over vergeten, herinneren en vergeven als reacties of historisch onrecht, Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 
2010.  
166 Lindahl (2010), p. 40.  
167 BT, p. 205.  
168 Compare BT, p. 80: ‘ ‘In’ is derived from innan – ‘to reside’, ‘habitare’, ‘to dwell' [sich auf halten] … The being 
to which Being-in in this signification belongs is one which we have characterized as that being which, in each 
case, I myself am [bin]. The expression ‘bin’ is connected with ‘bei’, and so ‘ich bin’ [I am] means in turn ‘I 
reside’ or ‘dwell alongside’ the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. ‘Being’[ Sein], as 
the infinitive of ‘ich bin’… signifies to ‘reside alongside ….’, ‘to be familiar with …’ 
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else, concern.169 By virtue of its concern, Dasein takes care of itself. What properly 
belongs to Dasein, therefore, is not some interest or common property that comes 
first and unites each and everything as belonging to the same totality. Rather, ‘care 
[Sorge] is here seen as that to which human Dasein belongs.’170 So, already in Der 
Spruck des Anaximander, Heidegger emphases consideration, concern, care in 
relation to order, intimating that to assign to each its due is to be concerned for 
what is being ordered: ‘Insofar as beings which linger awhile give order, each being 
thereby lets care belong to the other, lets care pervade its relations with the others 
[…].’171  
Concern is what gives place to things and persons. According to Heidegger, 
concern is, therefore, rooted in Dasein’s spatiality: ‘Here and there are only possible 
in a Da – that is to say, only if there is a being that as being Da has disclosed 
spatiality.’ 172   But if Dasein’s spatiality comes down to spacing out places, this 
raises the question as to Dasein’s own place. And, indeed, Dasein, too, is said to 
have a place of its own: ‘Dasein’s existential spatiality, which thus determines its 
‘place’ [‘Ort’], is itself grounded in Being-in-the-world.’173 But what does Dasein’s 
emplacement amount to? To what or to whom does it owe its emplacement?174 
Part of the answer has already been given: Dasein’s ‘place’ is grounded, 
Heidegger says, in its being-in-the-world. Dasein, recall, understands its world by 
projecting itself in it, and by thus projecting itself, it takes up a place in the world. 
The line between here and there is not drawn as if carving it out on an empty 
space. Rather, Dasein has a ‘place’ of its own by virtue of the circularity and 
facticity involved in its improper understanding. There is no way out of this 
circularity. Here is how Heidegger, in Einführung in die Metaphysik, understands what 
he calls Dasein’s Ausweglösigkeit: ‘[H]aving no way out [for human beings] does not 
arise in the external sense that they run up against outward restrictions and cannot 
get any farther. Somehow or another, they precisely can always go farther in the 
and-so-forth. Their not having a way out consists, instead, in the fact that they are 
continually thrown back on the paths that they themselves have laid out; they get 
bogged down in their routes, get stuck in routes, and by getting stuck, they draw in 
the circle of their world […] In this way they turn around and around within their 
own circle. They can turn aside everything that threatens this circuit. They can turn 
every skill to the place where it is best applied.’175 
 The very circularity involved in improper understanding is precisely what 
enables Dasein to go farther, as it enables it to take up a starting point from where to 
proceed and continue. To go farther, clearly, is something else than a frenetic 
repetition of the same. Why this is so becomes clear if it is kept in mind that 
facticity and circularity inform that Dasein makes itself an identity in accordance 
with an image that precedes it. Dasein, recall, anticipates itself in identifying with 
                                                 
169 Cf. also Esposito 2010, p. 16.  
170 BT, p. 243 (translation slightly altered). 
171 Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking (translated from the German), Harper & Row Publishers, San Francisco, 
(1984), p. 47 (translation altered).   
172 BT, p. 171, (translation slightly altered).  
173 BT, p. 171 (translation slightly altered).  
174 The question is highly inspired by Lindahl's phrasing of the problem. Compare Lindahl (2004), p. 479: ‘Yet 
if legal authorities emplace human behaviour by virtue of being themselves emplaced, to whom do they owe 
their own emplacement?’ 
175 IM, p. 168.  
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what is not itself. Every identification, therefore, comes too early, and Dasein itself 
always comes after. So, even though Dasein determines itself as the ultimate for-
the-sake by way of circumscribing itself to place, it never coincides with that place. 
It is, therefore, in a sense, always unhomely and untimely. It is, therefore, no mere 
coincidence that when Dasein’s own place is at issue in Being and Time, ‘place’ is put 
between inverted commas. This suggests, precisely, that Dasein’s own place is never 
entirely its own place. It is exactly this point Lindahl incisively makes with respect to 
the European Union’s claim to represent Europe: ‘So, paradoxically, everything 
begins with the representation; the original place of the EU is necessarily a 
represented place, and its boundaries represented boundaries. Consequently, 
Europe is, properly speaking, a utopia; it is nowhere and ‘nowhen.’[…] The 
reflexivity implied in self-legislation, self-determination and the like, is necessarily 
mediate, representational. There is no absolute ‘here’ and ‘now’ that could attest to 
and guarantee this – or any other – community’s self-foundation […] This is 
tantamount to recognizing that the EU’s place in the legal world is not fixed […]  
The irreducible gap between Europe and the EU ensures that Europe is never 
entirely the EU’s own place.’ 176  As will be argued in the next section, proper 
understanding arises precisely from this nowhere, and speaks from the void. 
 
 
4.7 We Are Dying 
 
Recall that Dasein’s understanding, whether proper or improper, constitutes Dasein 
as potentiality-for-being on account of the projection into thrown possibilities 
which leaves Dasein ahead of itself. Now, if proper understanding arises from 
within, this implies that among the possibilities into which Dasein is thrown, there 
must a possibility that is not handed down from the world and that Dasein does 
not share with others. There must be a possibility, that is, that solely belongs to 
Dasein as its own. Here, a crucial stage of the exposition of Dasein announces 
itself. For the required possibility, according to Heidegger, is the possibility of 
death. So even though there is no way out of Dasein’s turning around in circles, 
there is one thing against which all circling shatters: ‘That is death.’177 
 To put death as a possibility that solely belongs to Dasein into relief, let me 
briefly shift from the register of the We to that of the I. This easily allows death to 
be contrasted with possibilities Dasein shares with others. Take the example of the 
female gender in which Dasein is thrown. 
 Though I certainly don’t want to be reduced to that, it is something that 
matters to me and that I try to figure out by looking at other women, picturing 
myself (or not) in what they say and do. I choose my examples. But with death I 
cannot do that. I do not know what death or dying is because there is absolutely no 
way in which I can experience it. Looking at how others die won’t solve the 
problem. I cannot, that is, experience my own death, my own not-being, by looking 
at that of others. Sure, I mourn the death of the ones I love. But what I cannot 
experience is, precisely, his or her own loss. We do not, Heidegger says, experience 
 
176 Lindahl (2004), p. 479. 
177 IM, p.168.  
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the death of others; at most, we are always just ‘there alongside.’178 This is not to 
say, of course, that the other’s death is indifferent to me, that it does not affect 
me.179 But the point of the matter is that, precisely because his or her death affects 
me, I do not and cannot experience it as his or her own death. So, even though 
Dasein always already shares its world with others, even though mitsein essentially 
belongs to Dasein, death definitely separates one Dasein from another. Death does 
not come as the great equalizer. On the contrary, death is what separates and 
throws us back upon our self. Death, Heidegger says, is always our own: ‘Dying is 
something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. By its very 
essence, death is always my own, insofar as it ‘is’, at all.’ [Der Tod ist, sofern es ‘ist’, 
wesenmäβig je der meine].’180  
 Seemingly, the attempt to reread the existential analytic from the perspective of 
the first person plural, founders here. Admittedly, from Ancient History to 
Modernity, the question of community has bordered on death. Myth tells us that 
community is founded on patricide and fratricide, and Hobbes’ Leviathan is said to 
project its subjects against the killing of each other. But in these cases, death, or the 
possible killing, are believed to originate community, which is something quite 
different than saying that the We is dying, if only because this amounts to the We’s 
not being and absence, whereas the constitutive killing is believed to bring 
community into being. Indeed, the possibility of not-being seems to be at odds 
with the very concept of sovereignty. Bodin, in his Les six livres de la république, 
(1576) argued that the law declares that the people never dies. In particular, death 
seems to be at odds with the concept of popular sovereignty, which centers around 
the freedom and identity of a given people and, hence, implies being, existence and 
appearing. Indeed, wouldn’t it be more plausible to associate ‘people’, ‘freedom’ 
and ‘constitution’ with birth and/or immortality? As Arendt has argued, political 
order gives permanence to the fleeting words and deeds of mortal men, inscribing 
their lives in the reliant and enduring immortal story of a people, linking generation 
after generation to the origin, the constitution of the polity.181 Indeed, Arendt, in a 
rather infelicitous turn of phrase, even noted that the evil of nuclear war does not 
                                                 
178 BT, p. 282.  
179 Of course, that we are ‘just there alongside’ the other’s death has been interpreted in terms of a complete 
indifference and total lack of care for the other, evoking an almost insurmountable abhorrence in many a 
reader of Being and Time. Critchley, shocked by the non-relational character Heidegger attributes to death, 
therefore opposes that we are ‘just there alongside’, arguing that ‘death is, first and foremost, experienced in a 
relation to the death or the dying of the other and others, in being-with the dying in a caring way, and in 
grieving after they are dead.’ (Critchley 2008, pp. 140-141). Finitude, on this account, is essentially relational, 
as we ‘experience’ it with the deaths of those we love. In her discussion of the fundamental difference 
between my own death and the death of the other, Dastur puts the finger on the blind spot in this kind of 
reasoning: ‘One may well think that ‘what one calls by the somewhat tarnished term love, is, par excellence, the 
fact that the death of the other affects me more than my own’, and this explains why one can decide to die 
‘for’ another. But, that cannot mean to die ‘in his place’, since while one may manage to delay the moment of 
his death, it is, on the other hand, strictly impossible to deliver the other from his or her own mortality. So, 
one can only secure for the other a little more time, not immortality – to the point where, even in the case of 
sacrifice performed out of love, it is not, in fact, a question of the death of the other but, rather, of the 
irreparable loss this would be for us who prefer not to live on after it. It is just because, in that special form of 
being with the other in which love consists, I include myself in the other’s death, that I shall never be able to 
have the experience of the other’s own mortality.’ (Dastur 1996, p. 48).  
179 Cf. BT, p. 144.  
180 BT, p. 284/SZ, p.240 (translation slightly altered). 
181 Cf., Arendt 1959, pp. 175-177.  
Chapter 4 163 
 
                                                
consist in the mass killing of men ‘who must die in any case’, but in the elimination 
of ‘a whole people and its political constitution, both of which harbor the 
possibility – and in the constitution’s case, the intention – of being immortal.’182 
 And even if we do expect that our community will one day come to an end as 
our body politic is prone to decay, as Rousseau is there to remind, this is still 
something different than Heidegger’s reflection upon death tries to tell us. For even 
though we know Rome decayed and perished, calling us to modesty not to expect 
our own state to be eternal,183 there is absolutely no information to gain from this 
with respect to our own end as a We. Rousseau compares the decay of the body 
politic with the natural death of our body, and seems to understand death as an 
outer limit, a biological fact against which all human life runs counter, a passing 
away, a ceasing to exist that awaits us at the end of the road. Indeed, we all expect to 
die someday; we all know that one day death will be real for us. But precisely this 
understanding of death as something to be expected that will eventually be real, 
deprives death of its essential character as possibility Heidegger is driving at.  
What makes Heidegger of special interest to our inquiry into the finitude of the 
We qua self is that he takes issue with a concept of finitude as referring to 
something unlimited, or as derivative of infinity -- and hence, as a passage to, for 
example, another we. Heidegger seriously doubts that finitude is exhaustively dealt 
with when limited to a negativity that manifests itself as a deprivation or failure of 
infinite possibilities out of which Dasein selects a few in order to determine and be 
itself. There is more to finitude, he suggests, than the necessary limitation of 
freedom. He, therefore, tries to think finitude as finitude, that is in its 
independency, and not as merely derivative of infinity. For Heidegger, this means 
that finitude be thought from the problem of death.184 As he refuses a privative 
reasoning when it comes to finitude and death, death for him is not what it has 
been in philosophy ever since Plato, i.e., a passage to the other side. Taken in an 
existential sense, death does not set the immortal human soul free from its 
imprisonment in the mortal body. Nor, does it suffice to understand death as 
something we humans have to reckon with. On the contrary, if death is to render 
finitude conspicuous it must be taken in its existential-ontological sense, that is, as a 
possibility into which Dasein is thrown and that immanently belongs to it. Thus, in 
Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger explicates: ‘The human being has no way out in 
the face of death, not only when it is time to die, but constantly and essentially. 
Insofar as humans are, they stand in the no-exit of death. Thus Dasein is the 
happening of un-canniness itself.’185  So, death or dying appears as a possibility to 
which we always already relate, that is: as a way of being.186 
What this means becomes clear if Dasein’s understanding is exposed as always 
intimately bound up with death. Insofar as death is a possibility, Dasein’s 
understanding of itself, by virtue of its projections into thrown possibilities, always 
already anticipates its own end, its own absence. Every projection, therefore, every 
 
182 Arendt, H. The Promise of Politics, New York: Schocken Books 2005, p. 161.  
183 Cf., Rousseau, J.J. Du Contrat Social, Hachette Littératures 1972 pp. 292-294.  
184 For an excellent and instructive reading of Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to death and finitude, 
see F. Dastur, Death: An Essay on Finitude (translated from the French), London: The Athlone Press 1996.  
185 IM, p. 169.  
186 Compare BT, p.  291: ‘Let the term ‘dying’ [Sterben] stand for that way of Being in which Dasein is towards its 
death.’ 
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representation of identification, is ridden with the possibility of not-being. And this 
is what it means to exist finite, which is but another way of saying that death is not 
something that eventually befalls Dasein. Rather, Dasein is factically dying as long 
as it exists.187 
This factically dying was already implicit in Dasein’s being-ahead of itself. 
Indeed, recall that Dasein, insofar as it understands itself by, in, and through its 
projections into thrown possibilities, that is, into something which it is not yet, runs 
ahead of itself. Dasein’s projections, identifications, and representations always 
come too early, so to speak, and Dasein remains forever too late to catch up with it. 
Dasein never coincides with itself, which is why, exactly, its own self is an issue for 
it. Falling apart implies that for Dasein to exist means: having to endure its own 
absence. Death is the proper name for the absence of oneself that is irreparable in 
spite of – or rather because of   – all projections by which it tries to make itself an 
identity. This is why being-ahead-of-itself has, indeed, ‘its most primordial 
concretion in Being-towards-death.’188 
Being-towards-death has little or nothing to do with reflecting upon death, 
worrying about it, wondering what comes after, imagining who will attend our 
funeral, or expecting it to happen, and so on. All of these and other ways of dealing 
with death pull it within the circle of everyday familiarity, as if our own death is 
something with which we can concern ourselves.  But concern converts what is 
possible into what is available; it does not relate to the possible, as such, but rather, 
to the possible realization of something.189 But being-towards-death means: having 
to endure one’s own absence instead of striving to realize it for oneself. The 
‘function’ of death, so to speak, in the existential analytic of Dasein, is to reveal that 
the not-yet that constitutively marks Dasein does not appear against the backdrop 
of something that has to be there, and that one day will be real (an essence, a 
substance, an ideal or identity). Death ensures that the not-yet does not disappear 
in the closure of an achievement, but instead, continues to be the opening that it is. 
Death is there to remind us that there is always something which refuses our 
getting hold of it, that there always remains something that cannot be realized. And 
because of that, death, according to Heidegger, is a pure possibility, that is, a 
possibility that cannot be destroyed by passing over into something actual, real or 
present. As pure possibility death is, therefore, the possibility of impossibility that drives 
us, not to something real and present, but to nothingness and absence: ‘Death, as 
possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be ‘actualized’, nothing which Dasein, as actual, 
could itself be. It is the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting 
oneself towards anything, of every way of existing.’190 
Death is not a passage. It is the end, exposing Dasein to the nothingness of its 
own being. With death, nothing instead of something becomes manifest. The 
nothingness of death watches over the possible, ensuring that Dasein’s finitude is 
not a failure or a lack or an imperfection with respect to something that is, or has 
to be, there. Death guarantees that Dasein is potentiality-for-being.191 Death, in 
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188 BT, p. 294.  
189 Cf., Dastur 1996, pp. 57, 58.  
190 BT, p. 307.  
191 Cf., Dastur 1996, p. 54.  
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short, enables Dasein to be. Hence, it is in relation to death that ‘Dasein’s character as 
possibility let’s itself be revealed most precisely.’192 
The question that arises is if and how death – as the proper name for our own 
absence and powerlessness – bears upon the We. Is there something that attests to 
the fact that the We has to endure a possibility it cannot realize, which remains and 
upon which it nonetheless relies? Can popular sovereignty be said to imply the 
possibility of its own not-being, its own absence that does not threaten it from 
outside, but that, instead, fundamentally belongs to it? Only if these questions can 




4.8 The Exception 
 
To answer the question what testifies to the possibility of not-being from within a 
polity’s existence, I return for a last time to the case of the Haitian refugees held at 
Guantanamo. Recall from Ratner’s discussion of the case that government 
intended to sue the lawyers for making an unfeasible and frivolous case. 
Apparently, government assumed that the situation of the Haitians did not 
constitute a case of law. Government’s reasoning certainly was appalling. Yet, it 
makes salient that before actual judgment on a case, it first has to be decided 
whether or not the particular fact and circumstances can be judged according to 
law. 
Indeed, as is well known, law does not foresee in all possible future cases and 
hence, contains no information about its application.193 Hence, the old syntagma 
ius in causa positum, which expresses that law has to set the relation to the case hic at 
nunc in question.194 The moment of decision manifests itself precisely in setting this 
relation, as it is here decided that a case does or does not belong to law. What is 
involved in every decision, therefore, is the separation from law and non-law, inside 
and outside. Otherwise still, it is by virtue of decision that law reaffirms itself, as 
the decision sets the limits of law again and anew. 
It is tempting to regard the decision as the ultimate act of inclusion and 
exclusion. But it should be kept in mind that the decision renders the process of 
inclusion and exclusion to be far more complex than positioning an inside over 
against an outside. For, if decided that a fact does not belong to law, it is not simply 
excluded from law but, rather, excepted. And what is excepted from law differs 
from what is excluded in a decisive way.  
 
192 BT, p. 293.  
193 Compare Agamben (2005), p. 40: ‘In the case of law, the application of a norm is in no way contained 
within the norm and cannot be derived from it; otherwise, there would have been no need to create the grand 
edifice of trial law. Just as between language and world, so between the norm and its application, there is no 
internal nexus that allows one to be derived from the other.’ 
194 The syntagma also expresses, of course, that law is and is not a general rule that absorbs singular facts. 
Nancy eloquently puts the ambiguity: ‘The ‘essence’ of right stems from the singular relation of accident to 
essence. De jure, the law ought to be the universal code whose very definition implies the annulment or the 
reabsorption of any accident. De facto (but this fact is itself constitutive of right, is itself the very fact of juris-
diction) cases ought to be referred and legitimated, case by case.’ (Nancy 2003, p. 155).  
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Consider again the argument according to which order is brought about by the 
selection of what is worthy of legal protection, and the exclusion of what is 
discarded as such. Note that, in contradistinction to what is included, which is 
always determined and identified, what is excluded is relatively undetermined. 
Generally speaking, what is excluded is pushed to the margins where the light does 
not reach; it is what is veiled in darkness and what is not articulated with respect to 
what is inside. And if it does get articulated, this articulation comes by way of a 
contestation of the current order. As Lindahl argues: ‘This indeterminacy comes to 
the fore in cries such as ‘Another Europe is possible’.’195 What is excluded, in other 
words, is a latent possibility of another We. 
But whereas what is excluded is relatively undetermined and indifferent (until 
such time as it manifests itself by claiming another We), the exception, by contrast, 
is relatively determined and not indifferent. Law, after all, has explicitly concerned 
itself with it in the decision not to apply. Having concerned itself with it, having 
touched upon it, the law withdraws itself from it, suspends itself in this case. But 
what is excepted, nevertheless, maintains itself in a relation to the law, precisely 
because the law withdraws from it, applies to it, as says Agamben, in no longer 
applying. 196  What is excepted from law is, therefore, not simply excluded and 
diverted back to the other side of law, but is, rather, included by means of its very 
exclusion. For this reason Agamben understands the exception as a kind of 
‘inclusive exclusion’.197  
The exception, to which the law does not apply, does not, for that reason, 
belong to law and cannot, therefore, properly be located inside. Yet to the extent 
that law has concerned itself with it, has touched upon it, it is not simply excluded 
from law and cannot be properly located outside. The exception is neither included 
nor excluded, neither inside nor outside. Rather, the exception is the threshold 
between inside and outside.198  
Insofar as the decision on the exception sets the limits of law again and anew, it 
proves to be constitutive of law. Situated in-between the exception is the condition 
of possibility to separate inside from outside. Yet, the exception is also what, at the 
same time, shatters this distinction. Being included by means of law’s suspension, 
the exception breathes an air from outside in, so to speak. The exception signals 
that what is inside does not simply coincide with what is selected and included as 
                                                 
195 Lindahl (2008) p. 128. Note that Lindahl’s argument fundamentally differs from the one put forward by 
Benhabib. Lindahl’s argument proceeds from the conditions that govern the constitution of legal order, i.e., 
the a-legal act of founding, which take hold of the further existence of legal order. The upshot of a-legality is 
that no legal order can ever fully realize itself, and is haunted by questions as to its legitimacy and unity. Legal 
order is, therefore, subjected to an ongoing contestation that challenges the boundaries that separate inside 
from outside. Benhabib, by contrast, frames contestation as a challenge to collective identity, i.e., to what the 
people is. As argued in the previous chapter, what cannot legitimately be contested on this view is who 
legitimately makes up the people. Contestation is ultimately dependent on the good-will, so to speak, of the 
people to give effect to the right to have rights as it is claimed by those excluded. Benhabib seems to follow a 
rather simple scheme of inclusion and exclusion without remainders, which is why she can express the hope 
of ‘ever wider inclusions’ to occur. For a critical reading of Benhabib’s theoretical framework of inclusion and 
exclusion, see Honig 2009, p. 125.  
196 Cf., Agamben 1998, p. 17. On the relation between the unity of law, decision and exception see also 
Roermund, B, van. ‘De rechter: grenswachter of grensganger?’, in Broers, E.J.  & Van Klink, B. De rechter als 
rechtsvormer, Amsterdam: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2001 pp. 159-162. 
197 Cf., Agamben 1998, p. 21.  
198 Cf., Agamben 2005, p. 57.  
Chapter 4 167 
 
                                                
properly belonging. In the same blow, it reminds that what does not belong cannot 
be properly located outside.  
Breathing an air from outside in, whispering, as it were, that there is something 
strange or improper to what is inside, while something that is ‘outside’ appears to 
belong to the constitutive core of what is inside, making it more intimate than we 
thought in the first place, the exception is, as Agamben says, the ‘principle of 
infinite dislocation’.199 The exception wanders inside, as it were, causing the non-
coincidence between ‘inside’, ‘inclusion’, ‘belonging’ and ‘membership’.200 If what 
is excluded is a latent possibility that is not yet included or realized, the exception, 
which is neither included nor excluded, is what persistently slips away. The 
exception is not simply a failed possibility. The exception is what remains, so to 
speak. It is what incessantly slips away from order, and what does not, nor ever 
will, appear, exposing order to a more persistent ‘not’, a more intrusive negativity. 
The exception is a possibility that cannot be realized, intimating, that is, a 
possibility of impossibility. As such, the exception deepens our sense of finitude as 
it draws near, not to what is absent in light of what is currently present, but to what 
is absent, as such. It draws near, that is, to the possibility of impossibility. 
 The exception, which is constitutive for order, signals the power of law to 
maintain a relation with reality that it both has to presuppose and establish.201 At 
the same time, however, it highlights the powerlessness of law to ever fully 
consolidate itself. As the principle of infinite dislocation, the exception reminds us 
that democratic legal order relies on something it cannot appropriate, cannot make 
its own. The exception, therefore, corresponds to the radical finitude of a polity’s 
existence.  
As the exception is neither inside nor outside, it does not appear. Yet, the 
exception, which signals the non-coincidence between inside, inclusion, identity, is 
nevertheless that which is incessantly and insistently present. Present and pressing, 
yet not apparent, the exception manifests itself paradoxically as arising from within, 
making our existence as a people essentially and existentially insecure. Insecurity, 
therefore, fundamentally has something to do with the possibility of not-being that 
lies within. As Lindahl eloquently argues ‘only beings for whom questionability is 
their mode of being, i.e. that have to deal with the residual groundlessness 
concerning what they are and that they are, can be insecure.’202 Only if this sense of 
insecurity is taken into account are we able to grasp the finite existence of a people 






199 Agamben 1998, pp. 19, 20. 
200 Agamben argues that ‘the relation between membership and inclusion is ... marked by a fundamental lack 
of correspondence, such that inclusion always exceeds membership ... The exception expresses precisely this 
impossibility of a system’s making inclusion coincide with membership by reducing all its parts to unity.’ 
(Ibid., p. 25).  
201 Compare Ibid., p. 19: ‘To refer to something, a rule must both presuppose and yet establish a relation with 
what is outside (the nonrelational). The relation of exception, thus, simply expresses the originary formal 
structure of the juridical relation. 
202 Lindahl (2008), p. 129. 
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4.9 Angst. Or Insecurity 
 
An existential-ontological account of collective selfhood shows that the We, from 
the very moment of its inception, is exposed to the possibility of its own absence. 
The possibility of not-being is among the possibilities into which the We is thrown. 
The We, therefore, always already relates to its own end. Taking in an existential-
ontological sense, death is the possibility of impossibility of every way of existing 
which ‘offers no support for becoming intent on something, ‘picturing’ to oneself 
the actuality which is possible, and so forgetting its possibility.’203 Death assures 
that the ‘not yet’ of all the We’s identifications, representations and fixations does 
not result in the closure of an achievement, but continues to be the opening that it 
is. Its very finitude makes the We a free self, keeps it on the way of the and-so-forth. 
But, this is not the whole story of the We’s finitude, nor can it be.204 The snag is 
that, even though death is a possibility of impossibility in the face of which the We 
is powerless, death (finitude), nevertheless, tells the We of its possibilities, and gives 
it the ‘power of its finite freedom’.205 Death (finitude) enables the We to be a self, 
informs the We that it is not fixed in its identity but, instead, exceeds itself as the 
‘projection of possibilities is, in each case, richer than the possession of them by the 
one projecting.’ 206  In other words, the hitch is that death (finitude) still has 
something to say to the We, as its own not-being appears against the backdrop of 
what enables it to exist.  
As Heidegger argues, however, in Was ist Metaphysik? (1929) for finitude to 
come about as finitude, the nothing must prevail without referring to, or being 
rooted in, something207 (Dasein’s possibilities). Death not only has to tell the We of 
its potentiality, it also has to convey the nothing holding sway over its existence. To 
exist as finite, the We must suffer from an impotence that does not convert into 
possibilities, but that, instead, resists its potentiality for being. It is here that affective 
understanding becomes of utmost importance. Indeed, if the We is thrown into the 
possibility of its own not- being, the relevant question is, of course, how this 
possibility is brought into experience. According to Heidegger, death is experienced 
in Angst. Angst, or insecurity, is the mood that accompanies Dasein’s anticipation 
of its own end and that, moreover, brings Dasein’s own powerlessness into 
experience. 
Recall that in the We’s everyday existence, its moods are not disturbing -- or at 
least, not really. Sure, times can be heated, feelings can run high, and the affections 
that cloak around public debate can be virulent. But as long as the We finds itself 
‘here’ that it understands from the ‘there’ of its concerns, it is, at the end of the day, 
safe, reassured, confident, and so on. But all of this may not hide from view that 
the We’s self-understanding takes the form of an anticipation that not only keeps 
                                                 
203 BT, p. 307.  
204 Cf., PM, p. 129.  
205 BT, p. 436.  
206 PM, p.128.  
207 Compare PM, p. 85: ‘All the same, we shall try to ask about the nothing. What is the nothing? Our very 
first approach to this question has something unusual about it. In our asking, we posit the nothing in advance 
as something that ‘is’ such and such; we posit it as a being. But, that is exactly what it is distinguished from. 
Interrogating the nothing – asking what and how it, the nothing, is – turns what is interrogated into its 
opposite. The question deprives itself of its own object.’  
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the We on the way, but also disrupts it from within. For, the We’s self-
understanding never catches up with whatever it is with which it identifies. 
Fractured, unstable, marked by a constitutive ‘not yet’ that cannot be cleared away, 
the We falls apart and never coincides with its identity. Never fully present to itself, 
it is never a sure thing that the We is. The anticipation of its own absence – that, 
recall, already lingers within its concerns out of which it understands itself – is, 
therefore, a throwback upon itself. But this time the We cannot hide itself behind 
what it is doing, and comfort itself with its concerns. If, in its everyday concerns, 
the We projects itself as the ultimate for-the-sake-of which of its concerns, in the 
anticipation of its own absence, this very ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ begins to rumble. 
Whatever the We is, collapses, has nothing to say to it, whereas that it is, is all of the 
sudden put in question. No wonder, then, that the exposure to its own absence is 
not painless but, instead, comes with a radical sense of insecurity. Note that what 
causes this experience of insecurity is not something ‘outside’ the We. What is 
‘outside’ does not induce insecurity because the world no longer has anything to say 
to the We. Rather, insecurity arises from within. 208  As Heidegger argues with 
respect to Dasein and death: ‘In anticipating [zum] the indefinite certainty of death, 
Dasein opens itself to a constant threat arising out of its own Da […] Being-
towards-death is essentially Angst.’209 In Angst the nothing of Dasein’s own end 
announces itself, and the nowhere presses. Angst, Heidegger describes, does not 
see a here or a there.210 Angst, in a sense, is the experience of the loss of borders, 
and, hence, of the self. In Angst, Dasein is radically insecure. 
If what is out-of-order obstructs us, frustrates our concern, spurring us to make 
it right again, in Angst, we wouldn’t even know where to begin to make it right 
again, as there is no where from where to begin. In Angst, Dasein is lost in its world. 
It is, indeed, no where. Not the meaningful network of references and assignments is 
interrupted (and confirmed) by what is out-of-order or what is disorderly. Instead, 
our concern for and with order is suspended as a whole, throwing us as the 
ultimate for-the-sake-of-which into the abyss, while rendering conspicuous that we 
are.211   
Insecurity is the We’s experience of being lost within its world, of being 
absolutely nowhere. The We is lost in the twofold sense that it can no longer find 
 
208 In Communitas. The Origin and Destiny of Community,  Esposito argues, on the basis of the complex semantic 
of ‘communitas’, that what human beings have in common and what subsequently constitutes community is 
their ‘own proper lack’ that interrupts every closure and that prevents them from finding a principle of 
identification around which they can unite themselves. The exposure to one’s own proper lack, Esposito 
submits, pushes one ‘into contact with what he is not, which his ‘nothing’’, which, to be sure, ‘is the most 
extreme of its possibilities, but also the riskiest of threats.’ Esposito then continues the argument: ‘Seen from 
this point of view, the community isn’t only to be identified with the res publica, with the common ‘thing’, but 
rather, is the hole into which the common thing continually risks falling, a sort of landslide produced laterally 
and within … [I]t is communitas itself that causes the landslide.’ (Esposito 2010, p. 8).  
209 BT, p. 310 (translation slightly altered). 
210 Cf., BT, p. 230.  
211 Compare BT, p. 231: ‘Nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions as 
that in the face of which anxiety is anxious. Here, the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the 
present-at-hand discovered within the world is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world 
has the character of completely lacking significance. In anxiety, one does not encounter this thing or that 
thing which, as something threatening, must have an involvement. Accordingly, when something threatening 
brings itself close, anxiety does not ‘see’ any definite ‘here’ or ‘yonder’ from which it comes. That in the face 
of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is nowhere.’  
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itself, can no longer understand itself from its concerns, and is, for that very reason, 
no longer able to relate to its place as its own place. This is not to say that 
everything the We is by virtue of its concern disappears. On the contrary, the 
problem is, rather, that it does not disappear, but insists while having nothing to 
say. Insecurity arises because what is normally so important, self-evident and familiar 
to the We, now stands before it in all its meaninglessness and idleness.212 The We 
feels insecure, is ill at ease, not at home and uprooted amidst what is most familiar 
to it.213  
When what is normally so important to us slips through our fingers, we are, no 
doubt, inclined to defend what is ours. Angst and insecurity surely trigger the reflex 
to insist on what we are, and defend it by all means necessary But Angst, recall, 
attunes Dasein’s understanding from within, does not reveal or illuminate what 
Dasein really is, does not quite inform us what there is to defend. Rather, Angst 
reveals the slipping away of the self. In the preceding pages, I have shown that concern 
and everyday familiarity make Dasein feel at home in its world and enable it to 
express itself as a We. But if familiarity collapses, if there is no here and there to 
which things and persons are assigned, Dasein is, even though for the slightest 
moment, no longer able to say ‘We.’ Indeed, ‘in Angst one feels uncanny’ [In der 
Angst ist es einem unheimlich].’ 214  In Was ist Metaphysik?, Heidegger perceptively 
describes what happens in Angst: ‘We ‘hover’ in Angst. More precisely, Angst 
leaves us hanging, because it induces the slipping away of beings as a whole. This 
implies that we ourselves … in the midst of beings slip away from ourselves. At 
bottom therefore it is not as though ‘you’ or ‘I’ feel uncanny; rather, it is this way 
for some ‘one.’ In the altogether unsettling experience of this hovering where there 
is nothing to hold onto, pure Da-sein is all that is still there. Angst robs us of 
speech. Because beings as a whole slip away, so that precisely the nothing crowds 
around, all utterance of the ‘is’ falls silent in the face of the nothing.’215 
So the We’s proper understanding that arises from within, fundamentally disowns 
it. This disowning shows that the throwback upon the self involved in the riskiest 
of possibilities (death, the end) is a throwback all the way down the origin. Angst 
links the nothingness of the end to the nothingness of the origin. ‘The pure ‘that it 
is’’, Heidegger writes, ‘shows itself, but the whence and ‘whither’ remain in 
darkness.’216 Proper understanding, that comes along with a sense of insecurity, 
does not draw on a principle of identification around which the polity can unify, 
nor does it reveal an origin or a true self. Rather, insecurity is the experience of 
facticity. As the We falls silent, insecurity reminds it that the first word, the first 
decision, does not belong to it. Indeed, recall that facticity denotes that ‘Dasein has 
been thrown; it has been brought into its Da, but not of its own accord. As being, it 
is determined as potentiality-for-being that belongs to its self even though it did not 
give its self beforehand.’217 But if the We is opened to its self and its world on 
                                                 
212 Compare PM, p. 88: ‘All things and we ourselves sink into indifference. This, however, not in the sense of 
mere disappearance. Rather, in their very receding, things turn towards us. The receding of beings as a whole, 
closing in on us in Angst, oppresses us. We can get no hold on things.’ 
213 Cf., BT, p. 321. 
214 BT, p. 233/SZ, p. 188.  
215 PM, pp. 88, 89.  
216 BT, p. 173.  
217 BT, pp. 329, 330 (translation altered). 
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account of its facticity, this implies that its existence which, to be sure, it does not 
owe to itself, is marked by an original impropriety.218  Insecurity brings the We 
before its facticity, reveals that it is a self by virtue of being delivered over to 
possibilities out of which it understands its self. But, it also reveals that what 
enables the We to be a self and exist in the mode of the possible is, at the same 
time, what escapes its possibilities, what resists its potentiality-for-being. Put more 
strongly: What enables the We to exist as a self, and gives it the power of its finite 
freedom, is the powerlessness of being delivered over to itself. 219  What escapes 
Dasein’s projections into thrown possibilities by virtue of which it is a self is that 
Dasein is a self by virtue of the possibilities to which it is delivered over. Facticity 
enables the We to be. At the same time, it renders the We irreparably powerless. 
Indeed, in The Essence of Ground, facticity is revealed as Dasein’s impotence: ‘Dasein 
… is, as free potentiality, thrown among beings. The fact that it has the possibility of 
being a self, and has this possibility factically in keeping with its freedom in each 
case … does not stand in the power of this freedom itself. Yet, such impotence 
(thrownness) is not first the result of beings forcing themselves upon Dasein, but 
rather, determines Dasein’s being, as such.’ 220  Angst, or insecurity, in short, 
exposes the We to the ‘powerlessness of abandonment.’221  
The ontology of selfhood, as I have elaborated in this chapter, frames the 
sovereign’s concern for its own being. This concern came into view as a care for, 
and the power to be, a self. The power to be a self has little to do with a blown-up 
identity, arrogance, or selfishness, and even less with the violence of impatience, 
with which we insist upon ourselves, and defend what is ours. On the contrary, a 
people’s concern for its own being demands that the power to be a self be weighted 
in the light of the background possibility of the not-being, which is always the 
people’s own possibility. Because the nothing holds sway over its existence, the 
people determines itself in modesty and diffidence. Indeed, if being a self is about 
how a people relates to its identity, and if this relation ‘makes’ the self, we should 
not, Agamben says ‘treat existence as a property’, but instead, ‘think of it as a 
habitus, an ethos.’222 Ethos, as Heidegger reminds us in Über den Humanismus, is the 
dwelling place of human being from where he relates to itself, and is open to what 
arrives unexpectedly.223 What is unexpected is precisely what is not here nor there 
but, instead, comes from elsewhere. And, instead of violently repressing it, 
intercepting it and diverting it, ethos requires that we experience our own not-being; 
experience, that is, that our place is never entirely our own place. ‘Fleeing our own 
impotence’, as Agamben beautifully says, ‘or rather trying to adopt it as a weapon, 
we construct the malevolent power that oppresses those who show us their 
weakness.’224 
The next chapter argues that the arrival of the refugee is unexpected in the 
above sense, as the refugee is not yet here, but neither belongs there. Instead, he is 
 
218 Cf., Agamben 1999, p. 197.  
219 Cf. BT, p. 436.  
220 PM, p. 134, 135.   
221 BT, p. 436. 
222 Agamben, G. The Coming Community, Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press 1993, p. 29.  
223 Compare Wegmarken p. 357: èthos anthropoi daimôn, sagt Heraklit selbst: ‘Der (geheure) Aufenthalt ist dem 
Menschen das Offene für die Anwesung des Gottes (des Un-geheuren).’ 
224 Agamben 1993, p. 32.  
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nowhere, which is exactly why he claims asylum. To cast his arrival as illegal, and to 
deflect or refuse him for that very reason, is to misinterpret what is at stake. The 
challenge inherent in the arrival of the refugee does, indeed, induce insecurity, but, 
not because the refugee would be out-of-joint here or be misplaced. The refugee, it 
will be argued, exposes a polity to its own facticity. Facticity puts doubt on a 
people’s right to determine itself. Indeed, if the first word, the first decision isn’t 
ours, whence this right? And, whence the right to reign over the borders that 
separate an inside from an outside? Whence the right, indeed, to select and exclude 
non-nationals at the borders of a polity? The next chapter elaborates these 
questions, and draws the implications of facticity with respect to the right to (seek) 
asylum, arguing that a people’s concern for its own being makes it care for those 
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What makes a people sovereign is the concern for its own existence. The ontology 
of selfhood as elaborated in the previous chapter has sought to make this concern 
intelligible. Concern, it was argued, enables us to determine and declare ourselves 
as ‘We, the people’. Joint concern, in short, enables us to exist as a plural self. At 
the same time, however, concern renders us irreparably powerless. Indeed, the 
ontology of selfhood demonstrates that every determination of the self is ridden 
with elusiveness, signaling the possibility of the absence of the self. So, if we, as a 
polity, remain concerned for our own being, it is because the self incessantly slips 
away, eludes the very concern by means of which we determine ourselves. 
Therefore, whenever we determine ourselves we not only relate to possibilities we 
did not choose and which have been repressed and marginalized, but we are also 
always exposed to the innermost possibility of our not-being. Hence the finitude of 
the We not only signals that this We remains forever cut off from what was once 
possible, but also, and above all, highlights its own impotence in the face of 
potentiality. 
What does this ontology of selfhood and finitude imply for the right a 
democratic We claims to manage and control its borders with a view to securing 
the inside of democratic legal order? Does this altered ontology provide us the cues 
to rethink the right to seek asylum which, of necessity, entails the unauthorized 
border crossing of the potential refugee? Does our own finite existence, our own 
(im)potentiality cast light upon the content and meaning of a right to (seek) asylum?  
This chapter first argues that the concern for one’s own being decisively 
changes the meaning of the well-known paradox of sovereignty, according to which 
the sovereign is at the same time both inside and outside the legal order. This is to 
explain, secondly, why the right to have rights, which is neither politically nor 
morally grounded, exposes a polity to its own facticity, revealing its fragile and 
vulnerable existential collective self-care. As the right to have rights plays on our 
own facticity, it certainly is a limit concept. Indeed, as will be argued, the right to 
have rights translates, first and foremost, as the right to seek asylum. But as will be 
subsequently argued, the right to have rights cannot be limited to the right to seek 
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asylum. As the right to have rights only makes sense within the context of 
displacement, it illuminates exactly what the refugee is asking for in claiming 
asylum. As it is the right of those who belong nowhere, it highlights that the 
refugee in claiming asylum claims a place of his or her own where he or she can be 
at home again. It will, therefore, be argued that the right to seek asylum does not 
exhaust the concept of asylum. The final sections of this chapter will show the 
relevance of the argument developed within the concrete practice of asylum policy 
and legislation.  
 
 
5.1 The Abyss of Sovereignty 
 
This section links up with the exposition of the self as given in the preceding 
chapter, and draws the consequences thereof with respect to sovereignty. Recall 
that concern makes our world familiar as it is geared towards order. Our world is 
familiar as things and persons are where they are supposed to be, informing our 
expectations that direct our actions. Concern assures that business will always be 
business as usual. Of course, things can be out of joint, appear in places where they 
do not belong or don’t do the job they are supposed to do. But something can only 
be out of place or misplaced against the backdrop of the place assigned to it. 
Therefore, concern, it was argued, thrives on a binary logic, as it sets the 
boundaries between places where things and persons ought or ought not to be. 
Within order, things are either emplaced or misplaced. Indeed, concern came into 
view as the everyday ordering of space, by assigning a place to things and persons 
suitable to each. Concern, in short, is what gives and ensures order. Being reassured 
and feeling secure is the mood, so to speak, of our everyday and normal existence. 
Our joint concern is, therefore, nothing other than the first appearance of the 
sovereign reigning over the boundaries that separate an inside from an outside so 
as to secure that very inside as a familiar place in which we can move around freely.  
Also, recall that the We establishes itself by virtue of its concern. More precisely 
still: The We understands and determines itself by means of this ordering of space, 
as it projects itself as the ultimate-for-the-sake-of-which of its concern. In The 
Essence of Ground Heidegger coins this determining or establishing [Stiften] as the 
‘first’ sense of grounding: ‘This ‘first’ form of grounding is nothing other than the 
projection of the ‘for the sake of’.’ 1  This ‘first’ form of grounding, Heidegger says, is 
coeval with grounding in the sense of taking up a place or ‘gaining ground’ 
[Bodennehmen]. Grounding, as establishing oneself by means of circumscribing 
oneself to a place, constitutes and guarantees the We’s freedom. It is, in fact, what 
makes sovereignty a sustained concern. The polity cannot be concerned for its own 
being, i.e., it cannot act as a sovereign without ground(-ing) in this primary sense.2 
But does not sovereignty, thus understood, i.e., as the concern for our own 
being by virtue of which we determine ourselves and take the land, ultimately give 
the leeway to violence? Is violence not the realm to which we would resort in order 
                                                 
1 PM, p. 217.  
2 Compare Lindahl (2004), p. 656: ‘Taking up a relation to an own place necessarily engages a community in a 
relation to itself; conversely, no relation of a community to itself--hence no community--is possible unless 
mediated by the claim to an own place.’ 
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to repress what is unfamiliar and what falls beyond the ambit of our concern? To 
deflect what is out of place and has no right to be here? Does not sovereignty as 
concern undergird the right to defend what is ours by all means necessary? Does 
not, in other words, the sovereign concern for our own being culminate in the 
infamous paradox of sovereignty in which the sovereign is both inside and outside 
the law on account of having the power to suspend the law in order to avert what is 
threatening, opening the space in which violence can derail3? 
Arguably, it does not. For, joint concern puts what is most our own and what 
properly belongs to us into a wholly different perspective. Indeed, grasping the We 
as a self, constitutes the passage from a sovereign control and dominion that 
violently acts on emergencies, to a sovereign care for and holding sway over what is 
in need of ordering. Grasping the We as a self makes the We appear as inherently 
and existentially insecure, and spaces out an openness for the outside. 
Consider, once again, the ‘first’ form of grounding in which the We understands 
and determines itself as the ultimate aim of its concern and order. The snag is, of 
course, that this ‘first’ form of grounding does not precede the polity, but comes 
after. As argued both in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, the We does not 
establish itself as a sudden burst outside of time. Rather, it draws on what has 
already been established as meaningful. This is why self-understanding takes the 
form of a projection: The We projects itself into the possibilities into which it is 
thrown, it mirrors itself in and identifies with what already appears as meaningful. 
To determine oneself as a polity, to exist as a self in common, means: to jointly 
make one’s own what is given. We do not claim what is given and turn it into an 
irrefutable fact. It is, rather, the other way around: We are claimed by what is given, 
and we try to make sense of it. 
The sovereign act of self-determination thus draws on facticity and circularity. 
Facticity and circularity explain why self-determination does not result in the 
closure of an achievement but, rather, constitutes the openness which being a self 
amounts to. For it is on account of our facticity that we can only anticipate 
ourselves without ever having the possibility of catching up. The We anticipates 
itself by way of identifying itself with what it is not (yet). We are familiar with the 
following example: The Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union, 
claimed a future (anticipatory projection) by way of referring back to a past 
(Europe, thrown possibility) which gradually acquires its relevant sense and 
meaning with this very projection, representation and identification.  
As the sovereign act of self-determination is imbued with circularity, it is 
implied that the self is not some sort of term that is prior to the relation to the We. 
Rather, the self rises forth from this anticipatory projection, is engendered by the 
exposure to its qualities. The sovereign We is exactly the being of which Agamben, 
in the Coming Community, says that it ‘does not remain below itself … does not 
presuppose itself as a hidden essence that chance or destiny would then condemn to 
the torment of qualifications, but rather exposes itself in its qualifications …’4 That 
the self is not the presupposition of reflexive identity but, rather, rises forth from 
reflexivity, is another way of saying that the self is not the ground of sovereignty. 
So, even though self-determination is the ‘first’ form of founding that constitutes 
                                                 
3 The paradox of sovereignty was briefly discussed in Chapter Three, section  3.7.1. 
4 Agamben 1993, p. 28. 
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our freedom, the self is not the ground of it: ‘As this ground, however, freedom is 
the abyss [Ab-grund] of Dasein.’ 5  Put differently, even though the self is the 
‘ground’ of order, it ‘can never get that ground in its power.’6 
The collective self which is the essential mark of sovereignty thus signals the 
fundamental lack of ground of order. This is not to say, it should be clear, that the 
We is without identity, that no qualities can be ascribed to it. The point of the 
matter is, rather, that the We is not a subject on whose ground an identity can be 
ascribed. In this respect, it should not have come as a surprise that the European 
Union, in preparation of a European Constitution, when trying to pinpoint its 
identity in terms of properties under the Convention chaired by Giscard 
d’Estaingit, sadly failed. The We (the European Union) understands itself by 
assuming an image it is not yet (a future Europe) and that is not exclusively its own 
(other constituencies, to be sure, can claim a different future for Europe). As the 
We anticipates itself, there always remains a hiatus between itself and the identity it 
claims and adopts. Every projection, representation and identification comes too 
early, and the self, which comes after, is always lagging behind, and, ultimately, 
lacking. Every representation, every identification is, therefore, ridden with this lack 
of presence of the We to itself, is ridden, that is, with the We’s own absence. 
Absence or not-being inheres in the We as a fundamental possibility as long as it 
exists, and from the very moment it started to live as a people. And because of that 
the We can never get itself within its own power, which is precisely why it is 
concerned for its own being. Put differently: To be concerned for its own being 
means that the relation of the We to its identity is never settled but is, rather, as 
Nancy would say, infinite. Nancy, thus, argues that sovereignty essentially eludes 
the sovereign -- and this very elusion is what makes us sovereign, enables us to 
exist as sovereign.7 
Where does this leave us? How does the elusion of the self affect the polity’s 
concern as the ordering of space by virtue of which the We determines itself? What 
it means is this: Even though the We is the ultimate aim of concern and order, it is 
itself never wholly included within the meaningful whole of assignments and 
references that make up order. As the self is what eludes at the moment it is 
articulated, the We is itself always, to some extent, excepted from the distribution 
of places for which it is concerned and by means of which it determines itself. To 
be very specific, each and every polity, whether national, supra-national or infra-
national, acknowledges that its borders are a concern, not only in the sense that 
they are probed from outside, but also, and more importantly, that they are 
questionable from the inside. That is, it is never entirely sure where they are.  For 
instance, not too long ago, even Italy did not consider Lampedusa as its cape, while 
at the time of this writing the whole of Europe does so now. Or, states remain 
deeply divided over where their fishing grounds begin and end, not to mention 
their claims to air space, or to oil fields. Emplacing itself [Bodemnehmen], taking up a 
place as its own, the We is always already displaced. It can never, once and for all, 
take up a place. It can never, that is, take the land and be fixed and rooted in place.  
                                                 
5 PM, p. 134. 
6 BT, p. 330 (translation slightly altered). 
7 Compare Nancy 2007, p.103: ‘Sovereignty essentially eludes the sovereign. If sovereignty did not elude it, 
the sovereign would in no way be sovereign.’ 
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To the We’s own being for which it is concerned, no definite place can be 
assigned. 8  Indeed, if, as argued in Chapter Four, the We can be said to be 
Unheimlich in the experience of insecurity, it is because it is itself excepted from 
order, and is never fully at home within its own place. 
 It is important to stress that the We’s displacement does not equal the refugee’s 
displacement. Whereas the We’s displacement is bound up with its very 
emplacement by way of which it establishes itself and expresses itself as a We, the 
refugee, recall, is the one who can no longer say ‘We.’ And whereas the latter’s 
displacement signals that there is no place the refugee can call its own, the We, by 
contrast, is displaced within its own place. 
So the relevance of the ontology of selfhood for the question of the refugee, 
and the issue of asylum, is not that ‘we are all refugees.’ The crux is different. The 
corollary of the We’s displacement, i.e., of the fact that the We is itself excepted 
from what it orders, is that the We is both within and without order. Therefore, 
what the altered ontology of selfhood implies for popular sovereignty is this: In the 
very moment of self-determination and self-ordering which comes about as the 
finite moment of identification and fixation in the endless exposure to its qualities, 
the self cannot but slip away, disappear from the stage, so to speak, and make the 
We move outside itself. Taking my cue from Van Roermund, this decisively alters 
the meaning of the paradox of sovereignty. As Van Roermund rephrases the 
paradox: ‘There is nothing outside the law – say ‘we’, who are all outside the law.’9  
This rephrasing of the paradox fully brings to light what it means for a We to 
exist finite. For, that We are outside the law implies that the position from where 
the law is made is itself never fully law-made. The paradox of sovereignty, 
therefore, points to our facticity as a people, reminding us that we are forsaken and 
left to ourselves, delivered over to the world in which we find ourselves. It reminds 
us, that is, that the first decision in the sense of an initial once and for all decision 
isn’t ours. Finitude, as said, enables us to exist as a self. But it also renders us 
powerless with respect to the fact that we are delivered over. In his reflections on 
sovereignty from the viewpoint of the self, Nancy demonstrates the power and 
powerlessness of a sovereign people: ‘The same condition that ensures that 
sovereignty receive its concept, also deprives it of its power: that is, the absence of 
superior or foundational authority … In a rigorous sense, the sovereign foundation 
is infinite, or rather, sovereignty is never founded. It would, rather, be defined by 
the absence of foundation or presupposition.’10 
The refugee, who is neither inside nor outside, is the inverted image of the 
people who is both inside and outside at the same time. Recall from Chapter Three 
that the right to have rights reflects the inevitable asymmetry between the refugee 
and the receiving state. This asymmetry, it was argued, precludes the possibility of a 
political reciprocity on the basis of which asylum can be claimed, and causes the 
appeal to a moral universalism to be of little avail to the refugee. The asymmetry 
reflects, in a way, that the refugee has no right to be here.  
 
                                                 
8 So, Dasein takes up a place of its own, - and is bound to lose it again. This is how Heidegger, in Introduction 
to Metaphysics, reads the first choral ode of Sophocles’ Antigone. Cf., IM, p. 157.  As to the impossibility of 
definitely rooting Dasein into place see also Lacoue-Labarthe 1997, pp. 55-86. 
9 Van Roermund (2006), p. 540.  
10 Nancy 2007, p. 103.  
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5.2 The Right to Seek Asylum 
 
This section argues that the unexpected arrival of refugees drags our own facticity 
out of inconspicuousness. The experience of facticity is a limit experience that 
highlights our own impotence with respect to our own being. Indeed, as will be 
argued, the refugee calls into question the right to determine ourselves, as he brings 
to awareness that our existence relies upon something we cannot appropriate. As 
the unexpected arrival brings our own limit into view, I will argue that the right to 
have rights is a limit concept, as well, and, therefore, first translates as the right to 
seek asylum. 
In this respect, it is important to keep in mind that (1) the right to have rights 
attaches to those who belong nowhere and (2) that it displays the unavoidable 
asymmetry between the refugee and the receiving polity. The right to have rights, 
therefore, reflects that the refugee is neither inside (hence the asymmetry) nor 
outside (he belongs nowhere). Otherwise still, upon his arrival, the refugee cannot 
be immediately incorporated inside (he has no right to be here), nor can he be 
properly located outside (he has no where to go). If, therefore, the right to have 
rights is to make sense, it is because it translates as the right to seek asylum. To 
grant a right to seek asylum is precisely to acknowledge that the refugee cannot be 
ignored and diverted back (the prohibition of refoulement) and to suspend the 
decision, whether or not he has a right to be here. It is to acknowledge, in other 
words, that the refugee’s physical presence upon the territory does not in itself give 
rise to a legal right to be within which, however, does not imply that he has no right 
to be here. Therefore, to grant a right to seek asylum reflects, again, that the 
refugee is neither inside nor outside. 
Neither inside nor outside, the refugee does not, properly speaking, arrive at the 
borders of a state that close off a polity and limit an inside over against an outside. 
Rather, the refugee appears at the threshold, which is exactly the place where the 
inside and outside of the polity intertwine. Even if this threshold is transformed 
into a geometrical line without width by virtue of a legal order, the political concept 
of a border remains this threshold, and, when push comes to shove, law reverts to 
it. At the threshold, the separation of what belongs inside and what outside 
becomes possible, but the threshold itself is excepted from this binary opposition. 
Rather, the threshold is the outside that intimately belongs to the inside and, 
therefore, intimates an outside in a heightened sense. Here is how Agamben 
understands the threshold: ‘It is important to note that the notion of the “outside” 
is expressed in many European languages by a word that means “at the door” (fores 
in Latin is the door of the house, thyraten in Greek literally means “at the 
threshold”) … The threshold is not, in this sense, another thing with respect to the 
limit; it is, so to speak, the experience of the limit itself, the experience of being-
within an outside.’11 
Being-within an outside is precisely the ambiguous experience of being a self. 
The self, as  the essential marks of sovereignty, recall, marks that the We is never 
wholly within, but also always without order. Importantly, the We’s outside is 
irreducible. ‘The outside’, Agamben says, ‘is not another space that resides beyond 
                                                 
11 Agamben 1993, p. 68. 
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a determinate space.’ The outside is much more like the abyss. The experience of 
being-within an outside is, therefore, the experience of a groundless being. 
It is in this irreducible outside that we meet, so to speak. The refugee is the 
mirror image of the polity’s own being-within an outside, as he suffers from the 
desperate experience of being-without an inside. This signals that the refugee 
cannot be pushed back beyond the border, as his outside cannot be reduced to a 
determined and qualified ‘there’, that is, a foreign state where he supposedly 
belongs. That is, of course, exactly why he claims asylum. The claim to asylum plays 
on a people’s own ambiguous self. The groundlessness of the people’s own being, 
which puts doubt on the right to determine itself and control its borders, makes the 
people concerned for the one who has no right to be here, but who is suddenly 
here. Hence, if the We approaches him with benevolence and in good faith, it is the 
We’s own precarious being that attunes it to these moods of modesty.  
Malevolence, distrust and hostility, by contrast, erase the We’s own ambiguous self 
by turning the threshold into a frontier. I will return to that below. 
All of this is not just a matter of good taste and manners. What is at issue is 
thoroughly political. Indeed, the right to seek asylum does not simply constitute a 
humanitarian exception to a sovereign rule, as is commonly assumed. What is at 
stake is much more fundamental than that.12 For the refugee exposes us to our 
facticity, makes our groundlessness appear, even if only for the slightest moment. 
The refugee, who has lost a place of his own, knows better than anyone else, so to 
speak, that the enjoyment of freedom and rights requires spatial limitation. The 
refugee does not, therefore, reproach the receiving polity for its ‘original sin’ of 
drawing boundaries. But that boundaries need to be drawn so as to assign to each 
its due does not justify these boundaries in terms of law. Therefore, what the 
refugee does call into question is the right a polity claims to control its borders with 
a view to preserve the inside and secure it as its own place. Still otherwise, the 
refugee exposes that a people’s concern for its own being by virtue of which it 
determines itself is much more de facto than it is de jure. And if the refugee’s arrival is 
experienced to be threatening, if it makes a polity insecure, it is because his arrival 
reveals that self-concern draws on something the people can never fully make its 
own and that can never be fully brought into the fold of law. It is for this very 
reason, as Van Roermund argues, that the people while ‘[c]omitting its original sin 
(self-delineation) as it must do … may hold back from its most drastic 
implications.’13 
Standing at the threshold, the refugee reveals that the inside/outside divide 
cannot be perfectly mapped onto the difference between a here and a there, is not 
exhausted by the separation of the own from the foreign, and cannot be reduced to 
the binary opposition between the legal and illegal. The refugee challenges the 
inside/outside divide, as his arrival is, strictly speaking, not legal. We did not grant 
him permission to enter our territory (or jurisdiction). He crossed our border 
without our prior consent. Though not legal, neither can his arrival be cast as 
illegal, precisely, insofar as he claims asylum. Neither simply legal nor fully illegal, 
his arrival and physical presence upon the territory is, rather, a-legal. According to 
                                                 
12 To develop this argument, I greatly benefited from Hans Lindahl’s fundamental inquiry into the spatiality 
of law and reflexive identity which he elaborated within the context of immigration.  
13 Van Roermund (2006), p. 536. 
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Lindahl, a-legal acts or behavior do not fall tidily on either side of the terms of the 
binary opposition between the legal and illegal. ‘Spatially speaking’, he argues, ‘a-
legality manifests itself in forms of behavior that intimate a place that has no place 
within the distribution of legal places a collective calls its own, yet ought to, in 
some way.’ 14  A-legal acts or a-legal behavior, therefore, challenge the 
inside/outside divide as it calls for an ordering anew of the polity, i.e., for a 
redistribution of places so that a place is made available for what is currently not 
included. Among the many examples put forward by Lindahl is the example of a 
group of homeless persons who occupy a privately- owned apartment. Though 
they entered illegally and occupied the building, their act is not simply an illegal act 
of trespassing. It can also be constructed as a demand that the government alleviate 
their plight, ‘inveighing against the established distinction between legality and 
illegality as concerns who ought to be where. In particular, their transgression of a 
spatial boundary renders conspicuous a distribution of places as a region that 
makes no place for them – although it ought to, in some way.’15 By engaging in 
what can be constructed as a-legal behavior, and hence as contestation, the group 
of homeless persons expose the contingency of the current distribution of places that 
make up order, challenging that the We is the ultimate- for- the- sake- of- which of 
order and concern, as they are excluded from the We. The group of homeless 
persons, therefore, intimate the possibility of Another We. Indeed, according to 
Lindahl, a-legal behavior plays on the tensions between the actual and possible: 
‘These examples of a-legality bring into play, additionally, the tension between law 
as an actual or posited distribution of ought places, and possible law – an alternative 
ordering of legal space. A-legality marks the experience in which possibility, in the 
form of alternative ways of drawing legal boundaries, announces itself to a 
collective. Precisely to the extent that it succeeds in intimating a place as a possible 
ought-place, a-legality depletes, as it were, the ‘ought’-character of a posited 
distribution of legal places, revealing this distribution as contingent.’16 
A-legality, as said, serves as a good name to capture the unexpected arrival of 
the refugee. But the depletion involved therewith is more excessive, so to speak, 
than revealing the contingency that brings into experience that the Self at issue in 
sovereign self-determination is never fixed but always remains within the realm of 
the possible. The challenge and intrusion inherent in the arrival of the refugee also 
brings into experience that the possibility of our existence as a people is intimately 
bound up with the possibility of our being-without-possibilities, i.e., our not-being 
at all. The arrival of the refugee, I submit, reveals a second manifestation of a-
legality that plays on the tension between being a Self, and the elusion of the Self, 
between being and not-being, between the possible and impossible. Indeed, the 
fundamental lack of ground of order, the abyss, not only, as Lindahl argues, 
‘renders possible all forms of legal openness and closure’,17 but also exposes us to 
our own absence, the contingency of our own (not) being. 
The arrival of the refugee, for whom the absence of a We is a living reality, 
reminds the polity of the possibility of not-being which is also always its own 
                                                 
14 Lindahl (2010),  p. 31.  
15 Ibid., p. 41.  
16 Ibid., p. 43.  
17 Ibid., p. 56.  
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possibility. The refugee, by claiming asylum – which, according to Rigsby signifies 
the absence of legal and political order18 -- reminds us of our own absence as a 
polity. He or she exposes the We to its own facticity and groundlessness, revealing 
what Michelman calls ‘our own precariously existential collective self-care.’19 This is 
the care, as Nancy argues with respect to sovereignty, ‘of that which carries in itself, 
of necessity, its own emptying.’20 By granting asylum we respond to this necessity 
of our own emptying. Asylum, I submit, is the institution of the awareness of our 
own groundlessness and nothingness. 
 Therefore, there always comes a moment, however short, when we experience 
our own impotence in the face of the arrival of the refugee. And if we abstain from 
pushing him back, if we refrain from repression and violence, it is because we 
know that violence is only our inability to face our own impotence. And so we 
empty ourselves, experience our own powerlessness, dwell in the groundlessness of 
our facticity. We do not insist upon anything, least of all upon ourselves, because 
there is nothing to insist on. The arrival of the refugee makes us ‘pause and be 
humble’ and thus we respond with diffidence. 
At the threshold, there is no law to enforce, - which is why the refugee is not 
penalized for his illegal entry. At the threshold, we do not exercise our right to 
include and exclude,  - so, without imposing any requirements, without asking for 
any proof, the prohibition of refoulement enters into force as soon as asylum is 
claimed, or even if we suspect a person to be in need of protection without any 
declaration on his part that he does. At the threshold, we lack the power to demand 
anything, - and, therefore, access to the asylum procedure is granted without 
subjecting the refugee to requirements that have to be fulfilled prior to lodging an 
asylum claim, without a summary hearing which would decide whether or not a 
person is entitled to claim asylum in the first place. 
Indeed, non-penalization of illegal entry (article 31 Refugee Convention), non-
refoulement (article 33 Refugee Convention), and access to the asylum procedure are 
the key elements in the right to seek asylum. From a legal point of view, these basic 
elements follow from the fact that recognition of refugee status is considered to be 
a declaratory act, as is stipulated in UNHCR’s Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status. Consideration 28 of Part One reads: ‘A person is a refugee 
within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfills the criteria 
contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which 
his refugee status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does not 
therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a 
refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee.’ This 
implies, first of all, that certain provisions and rights of the Refugee Convention 
have to be respected, not just upon recognition, but until a negative decision has 
been made. 21  Secondly, and most importantly, as conferral of refugee status is 
                                                 
18  Rigsby, Asylia. Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World, Berkeley: University of California Press 1996, p. 
10.  
19 Michelman (1996), p. 207. 
20 Nancy 2007, p. 107.  
21 Compare Hathaway 2005 p. 278: ‘[Since] refugee rights are defined to inhere by virtue of refugee status 
alone, they must be respected by state parties until and unless a negative determination of the refugee’s  claim 
to protection is rendered. This is because refugee status under the Convention arises from the nature of one’s 
predicament, rather than from a formal determination of status.’ At page 279, Hathaway enumerates the 
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considered to be a declaratory act on the basis of the refugee’s predicament, a 
thorough examination of the refugee’s individual situation is required. In other 
words, good decision- making in good faith on the merits of every asylum claim is 
required.22  Non-penalization and non-refoulement, as well as decision making on the 
merits of the asylum claim, testify to a benevolence and good faith vis-à-vis the 
potential refugee. Indeed, with benevolence and good faith we respond to those 
who have no right to be here and who, thereby, reflect our own facticity. And this 
saves the right to have rights from the cynicism to which the lack of a moral and 
political ground would otherwise condemn it. 
 However, from a political point of view, the right to have rights cannot be 
limited to the right to seek asylum. Above all, it goes to the claim that asylum is a 
claim to an own place at the behest of those who have been deprived of a place in 
this world. While the next section will unfold this idea in full, the present section 
purported to explain why such a claim can register at all in the polity; it registers 
because of the polity’s concern for its boundaries which become elusive in the very 
act they are set, and the abyss of not-being that is its ultimate perspective. 
 
 
5.3 A Right to Asylum 
 
The right to have rights not only translates as the right to seek asylum but also casts 
light on what the refugee is claiming in claiming asylum. With respect to asylum 
beyond the right to seek asylum, it is worth noting that in the past decade, 
international legal instruments established a right to asylum. In consideration 10 of its 
recital, the EU Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) claims to ‘ensure full respect 
for human dignity and the right to asylum of applicants for asylum and their 
accompanying family members.’ Additionally, in its article 18, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union stipulates a right to asylum. 
The inclusion of a right to asylum is generally considered to be a decisive 
turning point in refugee law, as it meets the criticism, as old as the 1951 
Convention, that failures in refugee protection are due to the lack of an individual 
right to asylum. This lack is rooted in the longstanding tradition of asylum which, 
instead of being a claim-right of the individual, pertained to power-right of states to 
grant asylum to those aliens whom it refused to extradite at the request of their 
state of origin.23 The right to asylum thus corresponded to a rightful refusal of 
extradition24 and was based on the consideration that to extradite an individual to a 
                                                                                                                   
rights that have to be respected, independent from formal recognition, including the right to be protected 
against refoulement.  
22 Cf. Guild (2006) p. 650.  
23 One of the oldest testimonies of a state declaring to another state that it refuses to extradite its nationals 
can be traced to the 14th Century BC.  In a treaty between Muwattalisch and Alakschadusch, we read: 
‘Betreffs eines Flüchtlings aber habe ich folgendes unter Eid gelegt: Wenn ein  Flüchtling aus deinem Land 
ins Land Hatti kommt, so gibt man ihn dir nicht zurück; aus dem Lande Hatti einen Flüchtling 
zurückzugeben ist nicht Rechtens.’( Cited in: Kimminich, O. Asylrecht, Berlin: Luchterhand, 1968, p. 11.  
24 The close connection between asylum and extradition was echoed in the 1977 (unsuccessful) Conference 
on Territorial Asylum. As is evidenced by the draft text of the Convention on Territorial Asylum, asylum is 
not necessarily limited to refugees. As a matter of fact, the participants to the 1977 Conference expressed the 
hope that the Convention, if adopted, would also apply to refugees. Cf. Grahl-Madsen, A. Territorial Asylum, 
Stockholm/London: Almqvist &Wiksell International 1980, p. 63 and p. 83.  
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state who wants him back for punishment runs counter to natural feelings of 
morality and humanity. 25  As the right to asylum could not be claimed by an 
individual or enforced upon his request, it qualifies as an imperfect right by means 
of which states seek to do justice to the moral demands of humanity, but are in no 
way obliged to do so.26 
 Though the criticism that the right to asylum pertains to states, not individuals, 
appears to be somewhat outdated,27 it was still echoed in the critique that there was 
no right to asylum, as it remained within state discretion to grant asylum. States may 
grant asylum upon refugee recognition, but were not obliged to do so. What 
constituted a great difficulty in refugee law until recently was that, even though the 
right to seek asylum was considered to be a universal human right according to 
article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 28  there consisted no 
corresponding duty on states to actually grant asylum. Absent this duty, asylum for 
a long period of time remained within state discretion. 
With the inclusion of a right to asylum in EU legislation which, for the first 
time in history, established an individual right to asylum, asylum is no longer a 
matter of state discretion. Articles 13 and 18 of the EU Qualification Directive 
stipulate, respectively, that EU member states shall grant refugee status and 
subsidiary protection status to persons in need of international protection. 
 However, the averment with respect to a right to asylum as recently expressed, 
can only be properly weighed if there is clarity on the terms involved. The question 
to be asked, therefore, is what asylum means and what it entails. Strikingly, there is 
a persistent propensity to equate asylum to protection. Insofar as the international 
refugee protection regime responds to the situation that befalls refugees upon 
fleeing, and which is characterized by the lack of state protection, it is only fair to 
assume – or so it seems – that the refugee, in claiming asylum, is seeking 
protection. Additionally, protection is further understood to be protection against 
refoulement. Indeed, the prohibition of refoulement appears to be so fundamental for 
refugee protection that it is generally considered to be the corner stone of the 
refugee protection system. In its Introductory Note added to the 1951 Convention in 
2006, UNHCR, therefore, explicates: ‘Certain provisions of the Convention are 
considered so fundamental that no reservations may be made to them. These 
include the definition of the term “refugee,” and the so- called principle of non-
refoulement, i.e., that no contracting state shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee 
against his or her will, in any manner whatsoever, to a territory where he or she 
fears persecution.’29 Castillo and Hathaway lay bare the political ground for this 
limitation of protection to non-refoulement: ‘While willing to provide protection 
against return to persecution, states insisted that they be allowed to decide who 
should be admitted to their territory, who should be allowed to remain there, and 
                                                 
25 Cf., Kimminich 1968, p. 15.  
26 In general see Cavallar, G. The Rights of Strangers. Theories of International Hospitality, the Global Community and 
Political Justice since Vittori, Ashgate: Aldershot 2002. 
27 Cf., Grahl-Madsen 1980, p. 2.  
28 Grahl-Madsen explains that the inclusion of a right to seek asylum in the Universal Declaration was 
considered to be perilous. After all, The Universal Declaration envisioned an ideal for all the members of the 
human community that would be undermined by the existence of persecution. To include a right to seek 
asylum would be to admit that this ideal world was not conceivable. Cf., Grahl-Madsen, A. Territorial Asylum, 
Almqvist &Wiksell International, Stockholm/London, 1980, p. vii.  
29 Available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf. 
184 Asylum 
ultimately, who should be permanently resettled. This position, argued as a 
necessary incident of sovereignty, is at the root of the failure to include any duty to 
grant asylum, either in the Refugee Convention, or its companion 1967 Protocol.’30 
Admittedly, the etymology of the word apparently legitimizes the restriction to 
protection against refoulement, as asylum means ‘sacred and inviolable, ‘freedom 
from seizure.’31 Indeed, in the previous section, reference was made to Rigsby, who 
argues that asylum is a negative adjective denoting the absence of legal and political 
order. 
In this respect, Arendt’s observation with respect to the spatiality of law, 
politics and worldliness becomes relevant. According to her, the absence of legal 
and political order is tantamount to the absence of a world. As she considers in 
Was ist Politik?: ‘Jedes Gesetz schafft vorerst einen Raum, in dem es gilt, und dieser 
Raum ist die Welt, in der wir uns in Freiheit bewegen können. Was Auβerhalb 
dieses Raum ist, ist ohne Gesetz und genau gesprochen ohne Welt.’32  To limit 
asylum to non-refoulement is virtually to deny the refugee a place of his own where he 
can appear and inhabit a world. If asylum is nothing else than mere protection, the 
possibility of a positive aspect to asylum that would enable refugees to continue 
their lives would be precluded. 
To be sure, protection against refoulement is certainly the first exigency to be met 
when it comes to the protection of refugees. But, it would be wholly reductive to 
limit asylum in toto to non-refoulement. Mere protection against non-refoulement is by no 
means capable of protecting against the idleness of being excluded from the 
enjoyment of basic human rights. Indeed, should asylum be limited to this, the 
protection offered would ultimately boil down to securing the physical safety of the 
refugee and providing emergency humanitarian assistance. This is no wild guess, as 
is evidenced by UNHCR’s statement on the cover of Refugee Magazine, on the 
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Refugee Convention. To celebrate, UNHCR 
apparently wanted to explain the meaning and purpose of the Convention, 
adopting the slogan: The Wall Behind which Refugees can Shelter.33 Indeed, if asylum 
were to be limited to non-refoulement, sheltering refugees in camps will do, provided 
that camps are safe places (which, in fact, they are not). 
Equaling asylum to protection ultimately achieves the separation of the naked 
life of the refugee from its human possibilities. Asylum would be like a waiting 
room where the lives of people are put on hold, where one merely stays and serves 
time. Were asylum only to be protection, precluding a positive aspect that enables 
refugees to rebuild their lives, the world – according to the beautiful phrase of 
Jean-Luc Nancy – would not be a world, as it would not give place to everyone, 
setting large numbers of people aside from the normal order of things. The world 
would stop being a world as a space of exception would be erected upon its 
                                                 
30 Hathaway & Castillo, (1997), p. 2. Note that the authors here intimate that asylum extends beyond non-
refoulement.  
31 Grahl-Madsen (1980), p. 1.  
32 Arendt, H. Was ist Politik. Fragmente aus dem Nachlaβ, München/Zürich: Piper 2003, p. 122.  
33 See UNHCR, Refugees Magazine, issue 123: “The Wall Behind Which Refugees Can Shelter – the 1951 
Geneva Convention 50th Anniversary’, (July 2001). Available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3b5e90ea0.pdf. 
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surface. The world would gradually become camp-like. It would not be a world, but 
rather, as Nancy puts it, a ‘globe or a glome, a land of exile and a vale of tears.’34 
But felicitously, the notion of asylum is ambiguous. As Kimminich explains in 
Asylrecht (1968), asylum either refers to protection or to the place where protection 
is offered.35 As he further shows, the first meaning came to predominate over the 
latter:  ‘Eine erste Unklarheit in der Sprache des Vökerrechts betrifft die Frage,  ob 
das Wort “Asyl” eine Lokalität bezeichnet oder den Rechtsschutz, der dort gewährt 
wird. Die Völkerrechtslehre hat sich nach anfänglichem Schwanken dazu bekannt, 
unter Asyl nicht eine Ort, sondern den Schutz zu verstehen …’.36 Understanding 
asylum only to denote protection is, of course, motivated by a strategic interest, as 
Castillo and Hathaway, cited above, already intimated. For then it can easily be 
argued that refugees are allowed to stay for the time necessary for the purpose of 
fleeing protection. Once the facts and circumstances that compelled protection no 
longer prevail, protection is to be withdrawn and refugees are supposed to return 
home. 
 However, the abortive effort to draft a Convention on Territorial Asylum in 
1977 put the importance of place back on the table. Indeed, perhaps the 
importance of the failed conference was that it intimated, by referring to territorial 
asylum in its title, that the protection offered with asylum is contingent upon the 
place where it is offered. To limit asylum to protection, ultimately counteracts the 
explicit purpose of the Refugee Convention. Indeed, the restoration of the legal 
person of the refugee, so as to assure him the widest possible exercise of his rights 
and freedom, is contingent upon the refugee’s legal emplacement within the host 
community. By taking place into account in the concept of asylum, the possibility 
that refugees become rooted again is anticipated. To be sure, asylum is an interim 
measure that, in itself, remains silent on a right to integration, or an obligation to 
return. But insofar as asylum not only signifies protection but also expresses that 
protection is contingent upon place, it designates the possibility that people 
become rooted again. Grahl-Madsen, who participated in the drafting process of 
the Convention on Territorial Asylum, seemed to have had something similar in 
mind. Breeding on the meaning of asylum, he argues: ‘[Once] a refugee has stayed 
in a given territory for a number of years and thus has grown roots there, he is 
regularly given a right of indefinite (or permanent) residence. But such a right is not 
inherent in the concept of asylum ... As ‘asylum’ is used in the draft conventions as 
a notion different from non-refoulement and non-extradition, it would seem that it 
must have something to do with residence. In my opinion, this ought to be 
reflected in the text of the Convention.’37 Residence, he further explains, amounts 
to allowing refugees to live in the territory, instead of merely remaining and 
lingering there. ‘The word ‘live’ has not been chosen at random. It is, of course, of 
little value for a person to be allowed to ‘stay’ or ‘remain’ in a territory, if one gets 
no chance of finding a livelihood.’38 
                                                 
34 Compare Nancy 2007, p. 42: ‘A world is precisely that in which there is room for everyone: but a genuine 
place, one in which things can genuinely take place (in this world). Otherwise, this is not a “world”: it is a 
“globe” or a “glome”, it is a “land of exile” and “a vale of tears”.’ 
35 Cf., Kimminich 1968, p. 7.  
36 Ibid., p. 33.  
37 Grahl-Madsen 1980, p. 52. 
38 Ibid., p. 52.  
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 Sadly, however, the Convention, as said, was not adopted. The final draft was 
submitted to a conference of plenipotentiaries in 1977. The 1977 conference was 
the final act of a long-term effort, which started in the 1950’s, ‘to elaborate upon 
article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.’39 The main aim was to 
come to an understanding that states not only have a right to grant asylum, but 
also, in some cases, are obliged to do so. In order to formulate and establish an 
individual right to asylum, there was a general feeling that attention should be paid 
to the notion of asylum. But as it turned out, twenty years proved to be too short a 
time to come up with anything other than the idea that asylum entails ‘something 
more’ than non-refoulement, though it was not clear exactly what. The failure of the 
1977 conference was, to a large part, due to unresolved haziness of the concept of 
asylum.40 As Grahl-Madsen, who participated in the drafting process, summarizes: 
‘The term ‘asylum’ has no clear or agreed meaning. However, as used in the draft 
conventions before us, the term ‘asylum’ must clearly mean something more, or 
something different, from both non-refoulement and non-extradition.’41 
 So, we are now left with a pivotal concept of refugee law, to wit asylum, of 
which we are uncertain as to its exact meaning, except for the fact that it entails 
‘something more’ than non-refoulement. The lack of a clear comprehension is no 
doubt due to the political sting in the concept of asylum as it foreshadows 
permanent settlement.42 However, the lack of agreement on the concept of asylum 
– and the concomitant favoring of repatriation as a durable solution to the problem 
– cannot only be blamed on reluctant states that, true, have shown themselves to 
be stubbornly unwilling to take refugees in. If, to this very day, the content and 
meaning of asylum remains unresolved, it is due to some of the most fundamental 
presuppositions that shape our understanding of the refugee problem, and that 
motivate the international legal response thereto. The concept of de facto 
statelessness is at the root of the perplexities that pertain to the concept of asylum. 
In the section below, I will critically take issue with the concept of de facto 
statelessness, and put doubt on the sharp delineation thereof from the concept of de 
jure statelessness. If, I will argue, the distinction between the two is not as clear cut 
as is commonly believed, we will arrive at a more profound understanding of the 
fundamental dilemma the refugee is facing. Consequently, an adequate 
understanding of the refugee’s plight sheds light on exactly what he is seeking by 
claiming asylum.  
 
 
                                                 
39 Ibid., p.14. 
40 Another reason for its failure was that it proved to be impossible to formulate an individual right to asylum. 
In the draft Convention, asylum remained within the discretion of state power. (Cf., Hathaway 1991, p. 14). 
Nonetheless, Grahl-Madsen is right when he argues that ‘[a]s a matter of fact, in many countries, there are 
provisions of municipal law laying down a more or less perfect right of asylum for individuals.’ However, this 
does not solve the issue of a definition of asylum beyond non-refoulement. Grahl-Madsen continues to explicate 
what this right to asylum entails: ‘It may be a matter of non-extradition, of non-refoulement, or a matter of 
asylum in more general terms, which normally includes a right to stay in the country of question for such a 
time as may be necessary for the purpose of escaping persecution or other forms of pursuit by a foreign 
state.’ (Grahl-Madsen 1980, p. 24).  
41 Ibid., p. 50.  
42 So, when Grahl-Madsen judges asylum to refer to residence and finding a livelihood, he is keen to add that 
perhaps it is best not to mention the word asylum, at all. (Cf., Ibid., p.52).  
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5.4 Asylum Beyond non-refoulement 
 
In order to demonstrate why the master frames that shape the current 
understanding of the refugee problem cause the concept of asylum to be in 
complete disarray, let me briefly return to Chapter Two, where de facto statelessness 
was discussed. 
As shown in Chapter Two, de facto statelessness serves as the conceptual tool for 
understanding the dire predicament that befalls refugees upon fleeing and as such 
directs the legal response to the problem. Arguably, de facto statelessness has one 
clear advantage: It clears away any misunderstanding as to the international 
community’s legal responsibilities towards refugees. This is worth stressing, since 
states – as has been repeatedly argued throughout this book – increasingly wriggle 
out of their responsibilities to protect refugees, the apex of which seems to be the 
adoption of a proactive human rights strategy that seeks to secure a right to stay in 
one’s own country by preventing human rights violations that would otherwise 
cause refugee movements. In this line of reasoning, as explicitly put forward by the 
Dutch government in its 2004 note Naar een Menswaardig Bestaan, the right to leave 
and seek asylum simply disappears from view.43 Sweden actually implemented such 
a proactive strategy in the case of the Sudan, in order to prevent and contain 
refugee movements. As Harell-Bond & Verdirame observe: ‘[T]he Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA) admitted that it was ‘prioritizing 
activities inside the Sudan to make refugees to return [sic] or for the inhabitants of 
the Sudan to stay back.’ To the extent that these activities had the effect of making 
flight more difficult for the people, donors and NGO’s were interfering with the 
very right to seek asylum.’44 But de facto statelessness informs, precisely, that the 
international community is to address the situation that befalls refugees after they 
flee their home countries. It conveys that the chief characteristic of the situation 
that comes into being after fleeing is the lack of legal protection. The purpose of 
the international refugee protection regime, therefore, is to offer international 
(surrogate) protection to this specific class of unprotected persons, instead of 
attacking the root causes that cause people to flee in the first place or engage in the 
creation of safe conditions that enable people to stay.  
At the same time, however, de facto statelessness blurs what is at stake. Even 
though it rightly informs that the refugee is suffering from a lack of protection due 
to an ineffective nationality, it eclipses the fundamental dilemma the refugee is 
facing because of this lack. The sharp delineation of the refugee problem from the 
issue of statelessness accounts for this eclipse.  
Recall from Chapter Two, that in the mid of the Twentieth Century, a sharp 
conceptual line was drawn within the group of unprotected persons that 
distinguished those who are stateless de facto from those who are stateless de jure. 
This difference between the refugee and the stateless person was legally sealed with 
the adoption in 1954 and 1961 of the two Stateless Conventions that are both 
materially and formally different from the 1951 Refugee Convention. Though it 
proved to be a difficult task to draw the line between the refugee and the stateless 
person – as is evidenced by the drafting history of the 1954 Convention as 
                                                 
43 Refer to Chapter One. 
44 Verdirame & Harell-Bond 2005, p. 278.  
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discussed in Chapter Two – it was decided that the latter are stateless de jure, 
whereas the refugee was considered to be only de facto stateless. So, the difference 
between both classes of unprotected persons consists in the formal lack of state 
protection the stateless person is suffering due to the absence of nationality, 
whereas the lack of protection the refugee is suffering is the factual result of 
circumstances in his home country that compelled him to flee. The stateless 
person, in other words, is destitute of protection as a matter of law; the refugee as a 
matter of fact. De facto statelessness thus reflects that the lack of protection is the 
symptom of which persecution is the disease. It reflects, that is, that the absence of 
legal protection is due to a degenerated or perverted relation between the individual 
and the state responsible for his protection. The refugee, in short, is suffering from 
an ineffective bond of nationality; the stateless person has no nationality at all, and 
is left unclaimed by any and every state. As de jure statelessness is what is commonly 
understood by statelessness, it is argued that statelessness is not ingredient to the 
refugee problem. 
The conceptual difference between the lack of protection due to the absence of 
nationality and as the result of an ineffective nationality, has been recently 
reaffirmed during an expert meeting on statelessness in Prato, organized by the 
UNHCR in 2010: ‘Although there may sometimes be a fine line between being 
recognized as a national but not being treated as such, and not being recognized as 
national at all, the two problems are nevertheless conceptually distinct: the former 
is connected with the rights attached to nationality, whereas the latter problem is 
connected with the right to nationality itself.’45 It is noteworthy that during the 
Prato meeting, the view was expressed that ‘[w]hile refugees who formally possess a 
nationality are de facto stateless, participants indicated that it was not useful to refer 
to them as such because this would create confusion.’ 46  But, what creates the 
confusion, I submit, is the very conceptual difference between refugees and 
stateless persons.  
There is a clear presumption, widely held until recently, that the falling apart of 
the refugee and the stateless person with different independent Conventions has 
been beneficial to refugees, but disadvantageous to the stateless. This is no doubt 
due to the continuing reluctance of states to view nationality as a matter of 
international concern, which explains why a large number of states abstain from 
ratifying the Statelessness Conventions. States’ disinterest in the problem of 
statelessness is further evidenced by the imbalance of research attention paid to the 
respective problems, and the allocation of funds within UNHCR to refugees, at the 
cost of those who are stateless. As Van Waas observes: ‘For many years following 
the formulation of the Statelessness Conventions, while existing cases of 
statelessness remained unresolved and new cases continued to surface, it was not 
an issue with which the international community actively engaged. Instead, mass 
displacement and the battle to deal with ever-increasing numbers of refugees took 
priority.’47 
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Admittedly, if we just look at the facts and numbers, it can hardly be denied that 
the issue of statelessness is (or was) a changeling, causing the stateless to be left 
unprotected and forgotten (though things are changing today, given the amount of 
research effort paid to the issue by both academics and UNHCR). But if we take 
matters to a conceptual level, the picture changes. As counter-intuitive as it might 
appear at first glance, the hard-boiled conceptual distinction between the de facto 
and de jure statelessness ultimately comes at the detriment of the refugee. I am not 
saying that the legal position of the stateless person is favourable over that of the 
refugee, or that statelessness, as Arendt said, is a relatively innocent problem. 
Arguably, it is not. But the conceptual understanding of the problem of 
statelessness is at least perceptive to the fundamental dilemma involved. As was 
argued during the Prato meeting, the problem of statelessness is connected with the 
right to nationality. The ultimate consequence of having no nationality is that the 
stateless person has no right to live anywhere. What is at stake with statelessness is 
the very right to have rights. 
 True, neither the 1954 Stateless Convention, nor the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness, create a right to nationality. But there is no question as 
to what is to resolve the predicament of the stateless. As UNHCR explained in its 
recent strategy note, ‘Action to Address Statelessness’: ‘In fact, grant of a status [of 
statelessness, NO] can be a stepping-stone to acquisition of nationality.’48 Equally 
true is that article 34 of the Refugee Convention calls upon states to facilitate the 
integration and naturalization of refugees present in their country. But if return 
takes priority, almost up to the point that integration becomes a forgotten solution, 
the blame is not only on reluctant sovereign states. It also follows from the 
identification of the refugee problem as a problem of de facto statelessness that 
effectively denies that the refugee, like the stateless person, is facing the 
fundamental dilemma: where to live? The denial of this fundamental dilemma with 
respect to refugees was thrown into relief during the Prato meeting. The aim of the 
meeting was to draft guidelines on the concept of de facto statelessness. In fact, it 
even appears that a general feeling took hold at the meeting that there is no 
conclusive difference between de jure and de facto statelessness. It was argued, for 
example, that ‘some categories of persons hitherto regarded as de facto stateless are 
actually de jure stateless, and therefore that particular care should be taken before 
concluding that a person is de facto stateless rather than de jure stateless.’ 49 But most 
importantly, agreement was reached that de facto statelessness should be defined on 
the basis of the functions of nationality in international law.50 One of the functions 
of nationality, it was stressed, is the right to return to the state of nationality. If a 
person is outside his or her country of nationality, and the state of nationality 
refuses him or her a right to re-enter the country, he or she has to be considered as 
de facto stateless. As de facto statelessness arises from the inability to return, the 
dilemma a de facto stateless person is facing is: where to live? I fully agree with this. 
Indeed, from the perspective of the right to have rights, the dilemma that is at issue 
with de jure statelessness is the same as the problem that is at issue with de facto 
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statelessness. But, why was it admitted during the Prato meeting that refugees are, 
indeed, stateless de facto, but that it is not useful to refer to them as such? It is not 
useful because of the current political state of affairs in which the temporary nature 
of refugee protection is stressed with the effect that the return home of refugees 
takes priority. It is not useful, because this predominance of return presupposes an 
ongoing relation between the refugee and his own country. Because of a shift today 
that establishes a proximity between de jure and de facto, while excluding the refugee 
problem from the ambit of statelessness altogether, it is necessary to closely 
consider the role of nationality within international law. 
It is important to note that the Prato meeting seems driven to establish de facto 
statelessness as a legal category. In what follows, however, I continue to make use 
of de facto statelessness as a concept that identifies the refugee problem. 
So, let me repeat: Albeit currently broken or ineffective for reasons of a well-
founded fear of persecution, the concept of de facto statelessness within the context 
of refugee protection upholds the relation between the refugee and the state of 
which he is a national. Or, in more adequate terms that capture both the state of 
nationality and of habitual residence as is referred to in the refugee definition of the 
1951 Refugee Convention: It assumes a continuing relation between the refugee 
and his own country. 
True, this relation is crucial for establishing a protection need which requires 
that the actors of persecution be identified. But the point of the matter is that de 
facto statelessness does not make the refugee’s nationality or own country irrelevant 
upon recognition.  
In Chapter Two, it was argued that nationality is the precondition of the 
enjoyment of rights and freedom, as it establishes the relation between the 
individual and the state responsible for granting and protecting these rights. In 
Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (1971), Weis therefore depicts 
nationality as an element of order, as it allocates individuals to a state.51 Nationality, 
in short, emplaces the individual. As de facto statelessness relies upon the refugee’s 
nationality (or his particularistic attachments to the country of habitual residence) it, 
presupposes that the refugee, at the end of the day, ought to be there where he, on 
account of his legal emplacement, ought to be, not here, where he does not belong. 
However, there is another meaning of nationality implicit in the formal 
understanding thereof. This additional meaning gradually comes to the fore in Van 
Waas’ explication of the importance of nationality. The right to freedom of 
movement, she argues, is a function of nationality as the latter entails (1) the right 
to re-enter one’s own country, (2) the right to remain and, (3) the right to leave. 
Echoing Arendt, who cautions that refugees and the stateless are only in 
appearance free to move, as their ‘free’ movement ‘gives them no right to 
residence’,52 Van Waas reveals the impact of the lack of nationality for stateless 
persons (to which she, contra Arendt, limits her argument): ‘This fact signals a 
grave potential difficulty for the stateless: no nationality so no automatic right to 
(re)enter or reside anywhere. With this observation in mind, the right to 
international free movement for the stateless is not only relevant to the ability to 
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“vote with one’s feet” … but indeed reveals a core basic dilemma: where do they 
have a right to live?’53 
But to live somewhere clearly entails more than just to reside. Indeed, this is 
what the very expression ‘his or her own country’ reflects. It expresses that to live 
somewhere entails, first and foremost, to have a place of one’s own. To have a 
place of one’s own means to be embedded within a meaningful network of 
relations upon which one relies and for which one is concerned. To have a place of 
one’s own is to inhabit a world. Indeed, because human beings engage with their 
world, they acquire a sense of usefulness, worthiness and belonging. This is what 
the existential analytic of Dasein, discussed in Chapter Four, revealed: By means of 
their concern, by means of engaging with the world, human beings acquire an 
identity. We humans understand who we are from where we are and what we are 
doing.54 The expression ‘his or her own country’ expresses, precisely, that identity is 
intimately bound with the place where one finds oneself.  
The existential significance of our everyday life, in which we inhabit a world 
which is familiar to us and gives us a sense of identity, belonging and worthiness, 
painfully comes to the fore in Bertolt Brecht’s Flüchtlingsgespräche (1940). The two 
refugees Ziffel and Kalle, who figure in the play, understand by default that to live 
somewhere, to have a place of one’s own is key to who they are. In their 
conversations, they picture to each other the countries they went to or came across 
in their escape from Der Wieheiβterdochgleich, but where they were unable to take up a 
place. Ziffel tells Kalle that Switzerland is famous for its freedom, but that to 
experience Swiss freedom, one must go there as a tourist. Kalle confirms that, 
telling him that he was in Switzerland, but didn’t feel free, as he was not a 
temporary visitor with the prospect of going home, but was a refugee. Ziffel 
conjectures that Kalle didn’t stay in a hotel, for if he did, he would have been free 
to go wherever he pleased. Denmark is famous, the two agree, for its humor. But, 
as Kalle remembers, his mother used to spread his bread with humor when they 
were out of butter. It tasted good, but wasn’t really satisfying. They both heard of a 
man, also a refugee from Der Wieheiβterdochgleich, who went to Norway, famous for 
its neighborly love. But, neighborly love isn’t really satisfying, either, if one is out of 
place. 
Wherever the refugees went, whatever country they came across, they saw 
freedom, humor, neighborly love which, however, were of no avail to them, as they 
didn’t find a place (nor were granted such a place) where they could be at home 
again. Absent such a place, they seemed to have lost themselves. Ziffel, a great 
physician in Germany before the outbreak of the war who made an important 
discovery in his scientific field, is working on his memoirs. One day he tells his 
friend that he decided to quit his writings, as his life, which is no life, is not worth 
being told. Kalle tries to cheer him up, encourages him to write about minor 
experiences if there is no great success story to tell. In his response, Ziffel implicitly 
draws upon the difference between residing, and living somewhere: ‘Das ist die 
Theorie, daβ jeder ein Leben hat, aber sie ist eine Erschleichung, denn das gilt nur 
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logisch, indem man siebzig Jahre Vegetieren eben Leben nennen kann, aber auch 
drei Jahre … Natürlich kann man von allem interessant reden, aber nicht alles 
verdient Interesse. Jedenfalls bin ich schon fertig mit meinen Memoiren, das ist 
traurig genug.’55 
The loss of a world is tantamount to the loss of identity. That is why the 
refugee, according to Améry, is the one who can no longer say We, nor for that 
matter, I. Améry who, as Finkelkraut puts it, ‘has also had the radical and desperate 
experience of being absolutely nowhere in the world’,56 therefore, yearns to belong 
again somewhere. From the experience of his own displacement, of being 
absolutely nowhere, he became aware of the human need to have a place of one’s 
own, to have a Heimat. He, therefore, ends his reflections upon his own loss of a 
place in the world with the down- to- earth statement: It is not good not to have a 
Heimat. 
The loss of an own-place, to belong nowhere in the world, is the sad and 
desperate experience of the refugee. But the notion of de facto statelessness fails to 
grasp the refugee’s predicament in full. Indeed, the sharp-edged distinction between 
de facto and de jure statelessness implies that the most pressing problem for human 
beings, both in a legal and an existential sense, is kept in reserve for the stateless. 
This is most clear in the argument developed by Van Waas. According to her, the 
stateless (but not refugees) face the fundamental dilemma of having no right to live 
anywhere because they lack a nationality. They are, she says, subjected to a harsh 
game of human ping-pong, driven away everywhere. They are, she thus argues, at 
risk of becoming refugees. Van Waas equally acknowledges that refugees, on their 
turn, are at risk of becoming stateless. Nevertheless, on the basis of the very 
distinction between de facto and de jure statelessness, she holds the fundamental 
problem of lacking an own-place in reserve for the stateless. This problem becomes 
clear, among others, in her discussion of the proclaimed universality of human 
rights in relation to the existence of statelessness. ‘As long as every individual holds 
a nationality’, Van Waas writes, ‘the universality of these documents remains intact: 
everyone can enjoy these rights in relation to at least one country, so no one is 
excluded ... In practice then, the existence of statelessness interferes with the 
universal ambition of the human rights regime.’57 Van Waas is perceptive to the 
fact that the position of asylum seekers and refugees is also detrimental to this 
universal ambition. Still, she argues: ‘However, their position can be resolved by 
their return to their state of nationality – admittedly an unfeasible option in the case 
of forced migrants and refugees – whereas that of the stateless requires the 
(re)instatement of citizenship.’58 
But if it is admitted that return ‘home’ is an unfeasible option for refugees, why 
not also admit that they face the fundamental dilemma: where to live. The quandary 
is as severe for them as it is for the stateless, and fully comes to the fore if we take 
‘state of nationality’ to also denote the individual’s own country. Indeed, the double 
meaning of nationality that finds expression in ‘his or her own country’ puts doubt 
on the sharp distinction between de facto and de jure statelessness. 
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In his early study on statelessness, Weis has made some important observations 
in this respect. Next to its formal and technical role of allocating an individual to a 
state, nationality, he argues, also carries an ethical or spiritual meaning. Nationality, 
he holds, ‘means, in a spiritual sense, a certain community of interests, habits and 
thoughts derived from residence, upbringing and common conditions of life within 
the community of a state.’ 59  States that strip their nationals of their legal and 
political status, either in law or in fact, sever this spiritual relation as well. People 
with no nationality, or people who can no longer rely on their nationality, are 
therefore not only a legal anomaly. They are an absurdity as well, as if they are 
devoid of any such specific human relationships. Weis draws the conclusion that 
‘[t]hese fundamental facts of loyalty and affection must not be overlooked when 
questions of nationality have to be decided; once a conflict arises between spiritual 
and formal facts, the former may even claim preponderance before outward facts 
and appearances such as residence or former nationality.’60 In The Rôle of Nationality 
in International Law: an Outline, (1959) Van Panhuys makes a similar point as he 
argues that in matters of nationality it is equally worth considering whether the 
individual still regards his country of origin as his true fatherland.61 
It is important to note that Weis developed his argument at a time when the 
national-socialist regime was beginning to waver and its eventual defeat a prospect 
in view. He therefore anticipated the possibility that the discriminatory laws of 
Nazi-Germany were to be abolished. This would grant refugees from the war the 
opportunity to return ‘home’ to Germany and acquire their former nationality. But 
Weis empathically considers ‘that many Jews … will be unwilling to return to their 
countries where they have suffered indescribable hardship, where their brothers 
and sisters have been persecuted and murdered. They have severed the spiritual 
links with their homeland and have dissociated themselves from it.’ 62  Their 
repatriation was, therefore, out of the question, according to Weis.  
Indeed, the spiritual link Weis discerns with respect to nationality, which 
ensures that a person regards his state of nationality as his own country, constitutes 
the very reason why refugees, according to Weis, are to be considered as stateless. 
They are, to borrow from the French, apatride, without a fatherland. Thus Weis, at 
the beginning of his study on statelessness which he completed in 1944, expressed 
the opinion that his reflections on statelessness equally apply to refugees: ‘It would 
be outside the scope of this paper to deal with the refugee problem, but some of 
the considerations, and in particular, the suggestions made in this paper for the 
protection of stateless persons, apply equally to refugees.’ 63   Weis’ reasoning 
intimates that the distinction between de facto and de jure statelessness, which began 
to take hold in the period of his early writings, is not as trenchant as it might appear 
at first glance. 
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Indeed, the dual aspect of nationality renders conspicuous the failure of de facto 
statelessness to capture the plight of refugees. Nationality allocates the individual to 
a state which he considers as his own country, where he inhabits a world, is at 
home and can be himself. Nationality, that is, emplaces the individual, allowing for 
each to have a place of his own. Hence, Lindahl, with respect to emplacement, 
argues: ‘Remember, in this context, the two meanings of the compound adjective 
ennomos, namely ‘keeping within the law’ or ‘law-abiding’, and ‘quartered’ or 
‘dwelling in a country.’64 With respect to refugees, the place where they ought to be 
and supposedly belong no longer necessarily coincides with their dwelling place. 
Hence the eternal complaint of refugees who face return to their country of origin, 
that it is no longer their homeland. Over the past few years, Dutch media covered 
some of the most hurtful stories of refugees facing removal. Upon the very first 
question, ‘How do you feel about going home?’, refugees always and unanimously 
responded, ‘Holland is my homeland.’ Ugresic’s novel, Ministry of Pain, puts the 
fracture in the spotlight. The protagonists of the novel – all immigrant, – and 
refugee students from the former Yugoslavia living in Amsterdam – decry during a 
course on ‘their’ language, ‘their’ literature and ‘their’ culture:  What fucking 
fatherland?!  
Here, we run counter to the obvious, yet inevitable, fact that law does not 
exhaust the question of life, - or for that matter, what it means to be a refugee. Law 
defines a refugee as a person who escaped his country of origin. But, in everyday 
language we say: The refugee has lost his home. Refugee law understands refugees 
to have lost state protection. But, in everyday language we say: Refugees have lost 
everything. The one who flees does not put his life in two large suit cases. He who 
manages to flee leaves everything and everyone behind.  
Perhaps Arendt’s reflection on the refugee problem in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, is as shrewd as it is because of her own experience of being a 
refugee. Her account of her own flight certainly is informative. In 1933, Arendt and 
her husband escaped from the hardships Jews had to suffer in Germany, and which 
were likely to be intensified after Hitler’s rise to power. On May 5, 1940, France, in 
which they took refuge, started to detain refugees from Germany, issuing that all 
men and women were to report to the French authorities to be transferred to 
internment camps. Arendt, too, was detained, first in the Vélodrome refugee camp, 
then in Gurs, where one year later Améry was also detained. There, the only 
relevant, meaningful and serious question for Arendt was whether to take her own 
life.65 Fortunately, Arendt did manage to escape. In 1941, she arrived in New York, 
where she wrote down her experience of being a refugee – a new class of people, 
she believed, who ‘are put in concentration camps by their foes, and into 
internment camps by their friends’.66  ‘We lost our homes’, Arendt writes, ‘which 
means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our occupation, which means the 
confidence that we are of some use in this world. We lost our language, which 
means the naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected 
expression of feelings. We left our relatives in the Polish ghettos, and our best 
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friends have been killed in concentration camps, and that means the rupture of our 
private lives.’67 
Arendt, however, makes painfully clear that what refugees lose upon fleeing, 
they had already lost. That’s why the students in Ugresic’s novel exclaim, What 
fucking fatherland?! All they can remember from their fatherland is that it claimed 
their lives and compelled them to kill their neighbors and friends.  
In her account of the refugee experience, Arendt enlists everything she lost 
upon fleeing. But what had she lost before her flight? She speaks of that in the 
famous interview with Gaus from 1964, which was published in 1965, under the 
title ‘Was bleibt? Es bleibt die Muttersprache.’ In response to the question, what 
shocked her about 1933, Arendt explains that it was not Hitler’s rise to power: 
‘People often think today that German Jews were shocked in 1933 because Hitler 
assumed power. As far as I and people of my generation are concerned, I can say 
that this is a curious misunderstanding. Naturally, Hitler’s rise was very bad … 
[But] we did not need Hitler’s assumption of power to know that the Nazi’s were 
our enemies! That had been completely evident for at least four years to everyone 
who wasn’t feebleminded. We also knew that a large number of the German people 
were behind them. That could not shock or surprise us in 1933. …The problem, 
the personal problem, was not what our enemies did, but what our friends did. In 
the wave of Gleichschaltung, which was relatively voluntary – in any case, not yet 
under the pressure of terror – it was as if an empty space formed around one.’68 A 
refugee, Arendt intimates, does not flee his or her homeland where one moves 
around freely and in a familiar way, - where one is at ease and inscribed in a 
network of narrations and relations that gives one a sense of belonging and identity. 
One flees, instead, from a country that is no longer familiar. One flees from a place, 
not where one is at home, but from an empty space. Brecht’s play also alludes to 
this. When Ziffel asks Kalle what constituted the reason for his flight from 
Germany, Ziffel’s response seems to imply that Germany was no longer his 
country. He was not civilized enough, he says, ‘als daβ ich in dem ganzen Dreck 
hätt menschwürdig weiter existeren können. Nennen Sies Schwäche, aber ich bin 
nicht so human, daβ ich angesichts von zuviel Unmenschlichkeit ein Mensch 
bleiben kann.’69 
The concept of de facto statelessness blurs all of this. Presupposing that refugees, 
at the end of the day, ought to be there, i.e., in their ‘home’ country where they 
supposedly naturally belong, not here, it fails to see that the refugee flees from an 
empty space. It fails to see, in other words, that the refugee is neither here nor 
there, but is, instead, nowhere. The refugee, upon his arrival here, is not emplaced, 
i.e., is not where he, on account of his nationality, ought to be. But neither is the 
refugee simply misplaced by virtue of being where he ought not to be. Neither 
emplaced nor misplaced, the refugee is, rather, lacking a place of his own. He is, 
that is, displaced in the exact sense that Lindahl understands the term: ‘[I]ndividuals 
who are not in-legal-place … are not simply misplaced in virtue of not being where 
they ought to be; instead they are displaced, that is to say, they claim a legal place of 
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their own for which there is no place within the distribution of places made 
available by a region.’70 
It is time, therefore, to acknowledge that the refugee and stateless problem not 
only converge on the ground, -- with stateless persons being (at risk of becoming) 
refugees, and refugees at risk of becoming stateless – but that the strict division 
between them on a conceptual level is unattainable as well. If we accept that 
statelessness not only amounts to the absence of nationality in the formal legal 
sense, but also refers to the lack of an own country, that is, to the experience of 
lacking a place of one’s own, it can be argued that statelessness (though not 
essential to the refugee definition that directs the procedure to establish a 
protection need) is the fundamental dilemma the refugee is experiencing. And if we 
are prepared to accept that the loss of state protection that befalls the refugee upon 
fleeing equals the loss of a homeland, a Heimat, the legal response to the refugee 
problem can be patterned accordingly. To consider the lack of an own place to be 
ingredient to the refugee dilemma would at least resolve some of the perplexities 
that pertain to the content and meaning of asylum, and which resurfaced with the 
recently proclaimed right to asylum. For it would enable us to see that asylum not 
only amounts to protection, but also, and above all, refers to the place of 
protection. Indeed, if asylum refers to ‘something more’ than non-refoulement, as was 
argued during the failed conference on Territorial Asylum, this ‘something more’ 
reflects the fact that the restoration of the legal person of the refugee so as to 
assure him the widest possible exercise of his rights and freedoms is contingent 
upon assigning a legal place to refugees. Asylum, in short, grants refugees protection 
by virtue of emplacing them in host societies. By taking the notion of place back 
into the account of asylum, the possibility that refugees become rooted again is 
anticipated. Indeed, being displaced, the refugee, by claiming asylum, seeks a new 
place of his own where he can inhabit a world again.71 Asylum, therefore, entails 
the anticipated possibility of becoming rooted again.  
That said, it is important to stress the aspect of anticipation that appertains to 
the concept of asylum I have elaborated. As the anticipated possibility of becoming 
rooted again, asylum is not a monochromatic and rigid right, but is, rather, a pliable 
one. The grant of asylum does not of necessity result in permanent settlement. 
There will always be refugees who continue to regard the escaped country as the 
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her rights, Noll argues that Heidegger’s move to dwelling as the basic tenet of human existence, casts new 
light on the appearance of the immigrant. Dwelling, which is close to being-in-the world and concern, 
‘unconditionally presences those undocumented migrants who have found a home, however precarious, on 
the territory of a host state.’ Noll contrast Heidegger’s account of space with that of others (Schmitt, Arendt), 
arguing: ‘All other accounts of space, territory and jurisdiction end in the conclusion that the undocumented 
migrant is incapable of appearing jurisdictionally as anything else than a detainable and removable person.’ 
(Noll 2010, p. 253).  
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homeland for which they keep longing. There will always be refugees who, upon 
their own decision, will return home. Their wish to return (or to stay) may change 
over time, and will be motivated by a penumbra of facts that are, for a large part, 
unpredictable due to the jagged course a human life takes.  
But the decision to say farewell to the asylum country does not refute the 
argument that the claim to asylum is a claim to an own place. Refugees who will 
eventually return, and refugees who can or will never return, should be treated on 
equal footing, if only because it cannot be decided beforehand who returns and 
who doesn’t. But, apart from that, refugees who do eventually return want to have 
a normal life for as long as they stay in the country that offered them asylum. No 
human being should be subjected to the torment of a life that is suspended 
between arrival and departure. No human being can live his life in the waiting zone 
between the country of asylum and the homeland. In this respect, it is important to 
keep in mind that the rights the Refugee Convention provides for – such as the 
right to freedom of movement and religion, and the right to work, education and 
property – are, indeed, the rights of refugees, not of prospective citizens. Refugees 
should be granted these rights during the time of protection. And if refugees do 
decide to return, they leave a country where they have been safe and have felt 
confident, and which, if not a home, at least has been a breathing place for them. 
Through the looking- glass of the anticipated possibility of becoming rooted, 
the right to asylum beckons governments to develop and embrace asylum policies 
that better serve the aim of the Refugee Convention. Asylum, taking in the twofold 
sense of ‘protection’ and ‘place of protection’, denounces overblown claims that 
return will always be a prospect in view for each and every individual that bolsters 
the current fixation on return. But, it also tempers the baleful view that protecting 
refugees opens up the floodgates.  
In the sections that follow, I will demonstrate the relevance and pertinence of 




5.5 Benevolence versus Hostility: on RABIT’s and Refugees 
 
The preceding pages demonstrated that the right to have rights not only captures 
the problem of statelessness, but also is relevant within the refugee context,  - 
perhaps even more so, because the refugee is outside his or her own country. Note 
that the right to have rights not only attaches to refugees who are also stateless, in a 
formal sense. It throws the predicament of refugees as such into relief. So, if the 
international community concerns itself with the protection of those who are 
suffering from a lack of protection, it might do better to focus on the shared 
aspects of statelessness and the refugee problem, instead of holding onto the 
differences between them. I do agree there is a difference between the failure to 
protect the rights that attach to nationality, and the lack of protection as it is 
connected to the right to nationality. But there is no definitive or solid reason to 
equate the latter with the problem of statelessness and limit the former to the 
refugee issue. Instead, the focus should be on the lack of protection within the 
context of displacement, which I take, in the strongest sense, as the lack of an own 
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place which is legally sealed and guaranteed. The right to have rights is the right of 
those who belong nowhere. It becomes relevant, therefore, whenever people are 
forced out of their own country. 
The argument I elaborated with respect to the right to (seek) asylum would be 
of little positive value if it were unable to prove its worth and relevance within the 
concrete context of asylum practice and legislation. The pages that follow will 
therefore be dedicated to the question whether the current practice of asylum can 
be attuned to this refounded concept of asylum. 
I will start with the right to seek asylum. The basic elements that constitute the 
reality and effectiveness thereof are of no great surprise to anyone familiar with 
refugee law. They are, recall, non-penalization of illegal entry, the prohibition of 
non-refoulement, and access to a fair and equal asylum procedure that calls for good 
decision- making on the merits of every asylum claim. 
 As argued before, these key elements testify to, or express, a benevolence and 
treatment in good faith of refugees. Moreover, with benevolence and treatment in 
good faith of those who unexpectedly appear at our threshold, we also deal with 
the ambiguities at the origins of our own existence as a people. Sadly, however, 
benevolence and good faith came to be subjected to the destructive force of the 
logic of abuse that took hold of our asylum policies, as has been discussed in 
Chapter One. Inevitably, the fall into destruction of benevolence inflicted damage 
upon the key elements that ensure the right to seek asylum, undermining the 
asylum system as a whole. As Guild argues in her critical analysis of how European 
enlargement and integration affected upon EU Member States’ obligations to 
refugee protection, refugees have become ‘the objects of increasing efforts to 
render them invisible in practice by ensuring they are not physically present.’ 72  
Consequently, the EU, according to Guild, ‘constitutes a territorial integration 
project which is hostile to refugees.’73 
Hostility certainly accompanied the logic of abuse that disproportionally grew 
out of the legitimate interest states have in an effective return policy of rejected 
asylum seekers. Without any return policies in place, there is, admittedly, really no 
point in having an asylum procedure at all. The failure to return damages the 
credibility of the asylum system, and creates the additional difficulty that it becomes 
liable to abuse by immigrants who enter the asylum procedure with a view to de 
facto immigration. As demonstrated in Chapter One, however, a distasteful sequel 
developed from ‘return of rejected asylum seekers’, to ‘abusive claimants’, ending in 
the prevention of illegal entry that affected both asylum seekers and other 
immigrants.  
Indeed, the loss of benevolence and good faith unavoidably caused the downfall 
of the key elements that guarantee the right to seek asylum. As distrust and hostility 
took over, the examples of the disintegration of the refugee’s legal position are 
abundant, and I will not discuss them all. In particular, the demise of benevolence 
hits hard on the refugee’s opportunity to construct a credible asylum account and 
to convince the authorities that he is in need of international protection. Illegal 
entry, in and of itself, seems to be a reasonable ground to deem the account 
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73 Ibid., p. 634.  
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incredible beforehand. Indeed, proper documentation that state identity and 
nationality of the claimant and that used to play an important role in establishing a 
protection need, now seems only relevant with a view to the claimant’s removal. 
Fulfillment of immigration formalities seem to be secretively added to the public 
applicable criteria for refugee recognition. As Moreno Lax explains: ‘Article 31 [of 
the Refugee Convention, NO.] does not deal in any way with qualification criteria 
for refugee status. Its field of application is circumscribed to the possibility to 
impose penalties on ‘refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge’, on account of 
illegal entry or presence. Reading in Article 31, that legal admission constitutes a 
prerequisite for qualification, adjoins an extra condition to the refugee definition.’74 
The repercussions of hostility and distrust upon reception and procedure 
conditions, is also evidenced by the increased use of the accelerated procedure 
which traditionally was used as an exceptional tool in clearly unfounded cases. As a 
speed-up of the asylum procedure reduces the amount of time an asylum seeker 
spends on the territory, the accelerated procedure is communicated as a tool to 
improve the chances of returning rejected asylum seekers. But clearly, the 
assumption is that the majority of claims will fail, and can be cast as manifestly 
unfounded. The accelerated procedure, however, undercuts good decision- making 
on the merits of the asylum claim, as the claimant is given little or no opportunity 
to provide an account, document his claim, receive meaningful legal advice and 
repair errors through meaningful judicial review. 75  According to Hathaway and 
Neve, the accelerated procedure is, therefore, at risk of constituting a breach of non-
refoulement.76 Concerns are compounded by the increased standard use of exclusion 
orders, declaring a failed claimant to be an undesirable alien. Exclusion orders, 
according to Amnesty International, amount to a de facto penalization of illegal 
presence. 77  As Amnesty International observes, exclusion orders ‘may impact 
heavily on rejected asylum seekers who are genuinely considering a subsequent 
asylum application. Amnesty International’s experience over the years has shown 
that the current accelerated asylum procedure does not always allow asylum seekers 
… to present a coherent detailed account of their experiences of persecution.’78 
As to the crumbling away of the key elements that emasculate the refugee in 
seeking asylum, two developments deserve special attention. The first concerns the 
EU Return Directive (2008/115/EC); the second relates to the first deployment in 
the fall of 2010, of a Rapid Border Intervention Team under the coordination of 
Frontex to the Greece-Turkey land border.  
Let me start with the former. The EU Return Directive regulates the position of 
immigrants illegally staying in one of the EU member states and who face removal. 
As the Directive aims to set out common standards and procedures for the return 
of immigrants illegally present within the Union, it functions as a tool for internal 
                                                 
74 Moreno Lax (2008), p. 348.  See also Amnesty International, Letter to the Members of the Permanent 
Justice Committee of Parliament, available at: www.amnesty.nl/documentenalgemeeen 101200.pdf.  
75 See Human Rights Watch, Fleeting Refuge: The Triumph of Efficiency over Protection in Dutch Asylum Policy, April 
2003, available at: http://www.hrw.org, (last accessed April 2009).   
76 Cf. Hathaway & Neve (1997) p. 122. 
77 Amnesty International, The Netherlands: The Detention of Irregular Migrants and Asylum-Seekers, doc. EUR 
35/02/2008, p. 27. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library (accessed April 2009).  
78 Ibid., p. 29.  
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immigration control.79 According to its article 1, the Directive aims to set these 
standards and procedures ‘in accordance with fundamental rights as general 
principles of Community law as well as international law, including refugee 
protection and human rights obligations.’ Fundamental rights as general principles 
of community law include the right to defence80 and hence the Directive includes a 
limited number of procedural safeguards, such as the right to appeal or seek review 
of decisions related to return.81 It also grants persons time to arrange their own 
return before measures to carry out forced return are taken. 
Disquieting, though, is that the Return Directive only applies to persons who 
legally entered the EU but who, for one reason or another, managed to illegally stay 
there. Article 2(A) grants member states the discretion not to apply the minimum 
standards for removal to those third- country nationals who were refused entry, or 
who are apprehended and intercepted as they tried to illegally cross one of the EU’s 
external borders. 82  The upshot of this exception is that the Directive, though 
intended as a tool for internal immigration control, effectively applies as an 
instrument of external control, by virtue of granting member states the discretion 
not to apply its provisions at the border. As ECRE argues in its Information Note 
on the Directive: ‘The inclusion of such exception indicates that the Directive, 
which in principle was intended to regulate the situation of those third- country 
nationals staying irregularly in the Member States, has been developed into a non-
entry tool to complement EU border management instruments.’83 
Though article 2(A) of the Return Directive refers to article 13 of the Schengen 
Borders Code that excepts refugees from the category of persons who are to be 
refused entry,84 the possibility not to apply the Directive constitutes a potential 
difficulty for refugees who are often forced to enter illegally. Potentially excluded 
from the minimum standards of the Return Directive, they are at risk of being 
removed from the EU, or prevented entry without the safeguards that would have 
applied had they lawfully entered the Union. This creates the potential risk that they 
are being refouled. According to ECRE: ‘It is not uncommon for persons to be 
detained after apprehension, and then returned expeditiously at the external border 
of the EU, without their identity being recorded and/or any protection needs 
ascertained. Another obstacle concerns the practical difficulties faced by third- 
country nationals refused entry in application of the Schengen Border Code to 
appeal decisions on non-admission to the territory, due inter alia to lack of access to 
                                                 
79 For the discussion of internal and external immigration, see Chapter One. 
80  Cf. Bast, J. ‘Of General Principles and Trojan Horses – Procedural Due Process in Immigration 
Proceedings Under EU Law’, German Law Journal. Review of Developments in German, European and International 
Jurisprudence, vol. 11 (2010) n. 9, pp. 1006-1024. 
81 2008/115/EC, Chapter III, articles 12, 13, 14.  
82 Article 2(a) reads in full: Member States may decide not to apply this Directive to third-country nationals 
who (a) are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with Article 13 of the Schengen Borders Code, or who 
are apprehended or intercepted by the competent authorities in connection with the irregular crossing by land, 
sea or air of the external border of a Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation 
or a right to stay in that Member State.’  
83 ECRE CO7/1/2009/Ext/MDM, p. 4. 
84 Regulation EC No. 562/2006 article 13 (1): A third-country national who does not fulfill all the entry 
conditions laid down in Article 5(1) and does not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Article 5(4) 
shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States. This shall be without prejudice to the 
application of special provisions concerning the right of asylum and to international protection or the issue of 
long-stay visas. 
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the legal assistance offered by lawyers and human rights organizations. This means 
that, while formally reaffirming the obligation to respect the principle of non-
refoulement, the Directive actually allows national authorities not to put in place the 
very mechanisms that are key to ensure that the persons excluded from the scope 
of the Directive are not refouled in practice.’85 
 The risk is by no means imaginary, as is evidenced by reports of human rights 
organizations on the practice of border control. 86  The non-admission policy of 
Greece, for example, clearly profits from the lack of legal remedies as well as from 
the absence of sufficient safeguards with regard to judicial oversight of detention of 
immigrants stopped at the border. In its 2008 report Stuck in a Revolving Door 
Human Rights Watch reports of massive human rights violations by Greek 
authorities in detention centers and violations of the prohibition of refoulement. 
According to the report, Greece has recorded to have arrested 112,396 immigrants 
in 2007. The immigrants mainly came from Iraq. They were detained upon arrival 
and/or deported to Turkey. Turkish authorities subsequently subjected the 
deportees to a treatment in breach of article 3 EDHR, or immediately deported 
them to Iraq. Besides rejection at the border, detention and refoulement, Greece tries 
to prevent the arrival of immigrants by intercepting them at sea, allegedly even 
puncturing their inflatable boats.87  
The strategy of prevention effectively penalizes illegal entrance and potentially 
infringes upon the prohibition of refoulement. This strategy of prevention that bars 
access to the asylum procedure is also put into practice by Frontex. In this respect, 
the first deployment of a Rapid Border Intervention Team (RABIT) in the fall of 
2010, under the coordination of Frontex to the Greece-Turkey land border, is 
particularly revealing. 
 RABIT is composed of border guard experts and officials from different EU 
member states, who offer assistance to another member state facing a mass influx 
of illegal immigrants at an EU external border. According the recital of RABIT 
Regulation (EC) No. 863/2007, a situation of ‘urgent and exceptional pressure’ 
activates RABIT upon the request of the state in crisis. Frontex decides upon the 
request and subsequently draws up an operational plan that coordinates the actions 
of the different actors involved (i.e., guest officers from other member states, 
officers from the host state in crisis and Frontex officials). Border experts and 
officers coming from a member state other than the state in crisis, are required to 
perform their tasks under the instruction from, and in the presence of, the border 
guards of the host state.88  Upon the request of Greece, FRONTEX Executive 
Director, Ilkka Laitinen, stated: ‘The situation in Greece is very serious. I have 
decided that Frontex will provide assistance to the Greek border authorities by 
deploying an adequate number and composition of Rapid Border Intervention 
                                                 
85 ECRE CO7/1/2009/Ext/MDM, p. 9.  See also Dikeç, M. ‘The “where” of asylum’, Environment and 
Planning: Society and Space, vol.27 (2009) pp. 186, 187. 
86 Cf. Amnesty International, Spain and Morocco: Failure to Protect the Rights of the Migrants – Ceuta and Melilla One 
Year On, 26 October 2006. 
87  Cf. Human Rights Watch, Stuck in a Revolving Door. Iraqis and other asylum Seekers and Migrants at the 
Greece/Turkey Entrance to the EU November 26, 2008.  
88 Regulation (EC) No. 863/2007 Article 5 (3): ‘Members of the teams may only perform tasks and exercise 
powers under instructions from, and, as a general rule, in the presence of, border guards of the host Member 
State.’ 
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Teams. Once deployed, they will be operating under the command and control of 
the Greek authorities.  We will decide how many officers and what kind of 
technical means will be needed to effectively assist the Greek authorities in 
strengthening this external EU border and act swiftly to provide the assistance that 
this Member State has requested.’89  
According to the Frontex Regulation90 , consideration 1, Frontex acts upon the 
assumption that border control and management ‘is a necessary corollary to the 
free movement of persons within the European Union and a fundamental 
component of an area of freedom, security and justice.’  Article 1(2) explicates the 
aim of Frontex which is to ‘facilitate and render more effective the application of 
existing and future Community measures relating to the management of external 
borders.’ In a joint briefing, Amnesty International and the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles point out that, ‘[i]n theory, “management” of operational 
cooperation in border control should be targeted at checking whether persons meet 
the entry requirements established by EU law, or are otherwise to be admitted to 
EU territory as international protection seekers. In practice, the coordination and 
facilitation role of Frontex is primarily concerned with Member States’ objective to 
prevent migrants from reaching the EU’s territory by irregular means.’91 
In this context, it is worth considering that RABIT actually operates as a police 
force since in the majority of European countries the law enforcement authorities 
in charge of border controls are the police and/or military.92 According to RABIT 
regulation article 5 (5-7) as amended, border guard officials who make up an 
intervention team ‘may carry service weapons, ammunition and equipment’ which 
‘may be used in legitimate self-defence and in legitimate defence.’ As guest officers 
operate under the command and control of authorities who requested their 
assistance, it is important, as Carrera and Guild stress, to take the practices of 
border control by these authorities into account. With respect to Greece, it should 
be noted that the first instance asylum procedure is in the hands of police 
authorities who, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, ‘lack the 
necessary capacities and expertise in accepting the large number of applications.’93 
The inhumane detainment of asylum seekers as documented by Human Rights 
Watch as referred above, substantiate this claim. Noteworthy, Greece’s refusal to 
improve reception conditions for irregular immigrants in the light of 
recommendations the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) 
has made from 1997 onwards, has led the CPT to resort to the exceptional measure 
of issuing a public statement on Greece. On March 15 2011 the CPT stated that 
the detention of irregular immigrants in Greece ‘is unacceptable and could even 
                                                 
89 Ilkka Laitinen as cited in Carrera, S. & Guild, E. ‘Joint Operation RABIT 2010 – FRONTEX assistance to 
Greece’s border with Turkey: revealing the Deficiencies of Europe’s Dublin Asylum System’, CEPS Paper in 
Liberty and Security in Europe, (November 2010) p. 4.  
90  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of 
Operational  Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 
91  Amnesty International and European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ‘Briefing on the Commission 
proposal for a regulation amending Council regulation (EC) 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union (FRONTEX) (September 2010), p. 9.  
92 Cf. Carrera & Guild (2010), p. 6. 
93 Ibid., p.13.  
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amount to inhuman or degrading behavior.’94 To this should be added UNHCR’s 
repeated criticism of the absence of functional and proper asylum procedures, with 
the result that refugee recognition rates in Greece are close to nil.95 As to RABIT, 
concerns are compounded by the fact that Frontex, in deciding upon an urgent 
request, collects data so as to substantiate the request without, however, including 
information on the nationalities of immigrants who are prevented entry to EU 
territory. According to both the UNHCR and the Special Rapporteur on Torture, 
immigrants who attempt to illegally cross the Greece-Turkey border mainly come 
from countries on the top list of refugee- producing countries such as Iraq, Somalia, 
Iran and Afghanistan. Though Frontex agreed to include UNHCR in its decisions 
and operations, UNHCR was brushed aside in the first set- up of a Rapid Border 
Intervention Team.96 By ignoring the nationalities and the concomitant potential 
protection need of immigrants, Frontex displays a glaring indifference to ensuring a 
proper procedure for those in need of international protection. This strongly 
increases the risk of violating the prohibition of refoulement. The picture colors even 
darker because of the fact that a critical assessment of Frontex’s operations with 
respect to guaranteeing a right to seek asylum is virtually impossible, since Frontex 
can claim, as it has done before, ‘that it is ignorant of whether any asylum 
applications were submitted during the operations as it does not collect data in this 
respect.’97 
The coordination and operations of Frontex appear to be foggy, to say the least. 
And things even get worse. The legal framework of Frontex ensures that the 
decision- making power with regard to refusal of entry and/or return, is retained by 
the state who requested the activation of RABIT. In his clarification of Frontex’s 
mission on the eve of the adoption of the RABIT regulation, Ilkka Laitinen 
stressed that the responsibility for the control of EU external borders lies with the 
member states, and that Frontex ‘doesn’t have any monopoly on border protection 
and is not omnipotent.’ 98  At the same time, however, the amended Frontex 
Regulation increasingly extended the executive powers of the agency.99 According 
to Amnesty International and ECRE, this ‘creates a degree of ambiguity as to who 
                                                 
94 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Public Statement Concerning Greece, Strasbourg, 15 March 2011, doc. CPT/Inf (2011) 10.  
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the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
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98 Ilkka Laitinen, Frontex- Facts and Myths June 11, 2007.  
99 Cf. Amnesty International and European Council on  Refugees and Exiles, Briefing on the Commission 
proposal for a regulation amending Council regulation (EC) 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
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bears responsibility for the active border checks and surveillance tasks 
performed.’100  
In this respect, it is important to note that Frontex operates in a grey zone 
beyond mere law enforcement as it is in practice mainly concerned with the 
prevention of the illegal entry of immigrants. For, the actions necessary for 
strengthening the EU external border clearly involve refusal or prevention of entry, 
forced return, and disembarking of immigrants upon interception. But since 
Frontex does not have the legal power to decide on this matters, the resulting 
ambiguity over responsibility makes it well-nigh impossible to challenge any such 
decisions. 101  Hence, Amnesty International and ECRE expressed their serious 
concerns that these legal ambiguities create ‘a gap in accountability and potentially 
permit Member States to engage in border management with impunity.’102    
Indeed, with the strengthening of the EU external border under the control of 
Frontex, the European Union faces a thorny dilemma: In the same blow as Frontex 
claims to strengthen the EU external border with a view to securing the EU 
democratic legal order, it runs the risk of deeply compromising that very order. For 
it is misleading to assume – despite Ilkka Laitinen’s reassurances to the contrary103-
- that Frontex merely engages in border enforcement. Though formally not given 
the legal power of decision- making, Frontex’s decisions, instructions and actions in 
emergency situations do, in fact, produce legal effects.104 Acting on discretion to 
avert an indiscriminate threat of illegal immigration, Frontex preserves and secures 
EU democratic legal order by means of suspending the values valid within that 
order and exempting itself from it. 
 In Chapter Four, it was argued that the constitution of democratic legal order 
comes about in the legal void that arises from the renunciation or suspension of 
existing law. The founding act, it was argued, anticipates the legal framework it 
seeks to bring into being, and that retroactively is to give the founding act its 
legitimacy. If successful, that is, the constitution of order is reliant upon what is 
constituted in order for it to be legitimate. To the extent that this is a legitimation 
in retrospect there always remains an element of factuality that sinks in the further 
existence of order, and which, recall, makes order fundamentally questionable and 
subjects it to an ongoing contestation.  
But with Frontex mere factuality resurfaces. That Frontex acts beyond law and 
border enforcement does not turn it into an agency of lawmaking that engages in 
border constitution. The frontiers Frontex erects do not acquire legitimacy in 
retrospect, if only because Frontex is exempted from political and legal 
accountability before the European Parliament and the European Courts. 105  
Neither enforcing nor constituting borders,106 Frontex instead exerts a naked force 
that is devoid of law. 
                                                 
100 Amnesty International and European Council on Refugees and Exiles (2010), p. 11. 
101 Cf. Ibid., p. 12.  
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Frontex proves the assumption that democracy renounces violence to be false. 
Calling upon a police and/or military force to avert the threat of illegal 
immigration, the EU shows that democracy keeps violence in reserve as an option 
of last resort, whenever it faces an emergency situation that potentially damages 
democratic legal order. 107  The Rapid Border Intervention Teams under the 
coordination of Frontex, play on the infamous paradox of sovereignty. Exempting 
itself from the validity of the law so as to resort to all means necessary to avert the 
threat in order to secure the freedom of EU citizens, it is both inside and outside 
the legal order at the same time. 
But the paradox of sovereignty, which results from the sovereign having the 
power to suspend the law, understands the sovereign’s concern for its own being to 
be an unquestionable right. But precisely in securing this right by way of acting on 
the exception to the law, it deprives the sovereign’s concern of its lawfulness, 
turning it into a mere factuality protected by a naked force. 
Indeed, if, as said, Frontex runs the risk of deeply compromising the EU, it is 
because it turns it into a mere factuality that is to be strengthened and secured by 
an uncontrolled naked force that is exempted from legal and political 
accountability. In their critical assessment of the first RABIT deployment at the 
Greece-Turkey land border, Carrera and Guild, therefore, argue: ‘Each person 
apprehended crossing the external border in Operation RABIT 2010, who indicates 
a claim for international protection, must be safeguarded from refoulement, provided 
with adequate reception conditions and have access to a fair and equal asylum 
procedure including a right to appeal if necessary. If Operation RABIT 2010 has 
the effect of short-circuiting these EU obligations and subjects people to refoulement 
sauvage, the EU will be shamed before the whole of the international community.’108 
Importantly, Carrera and Guild implicitly draw attention to the tension between 
Frontex’s objective (more security) and the values of the EU as expressed in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Indeed, the indiscriminate exclusion of, and the 
force exerted over, immigrants ultimately part ways with law. Frontex is the 
inverted and perverted image of law. Operating in an exceptional situation of high 
pressure, aiming to prevent the illegal entry of immigrants, Frontex’s actions are 
immediate, impatience, do not tolerate delay or distance, nor, for that matter, 
reflection, consideration, appraisal or deliberation. The more Frontex excepts and 
emancipates itself from law, the more an essential element of law comes to the fore. 
Frontex, that is, shows by default, that decision is essential to law.109 
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107 The report The Truth is Bitter But It Must be Told by Pro-Asyl documents the use of violence exercised by the 
Greek coast Guard against asylum seekers and includes testimonies of severe human rights violations and 
torture (such as suffocating and drowning). As one victim of violence and abuse relates: ‘When I arrived in 
Greece and the police beat me I thought, the police are the same everywhere. They did not respect us as 
humans, I don’t know why. The police here are like in Africa, they know only violence, nothing else. That 
really got to me.’(Pro-Asyl, The Truth is Bitter But it Must be Told. The Situation of Refugees in the Aegan and the 
practice of Greek Coast Guard, October 2007, p. 10). 
108 Carrera & Guild (2010), pp. 15, 16.  
109 Indeed, according to Walter Benjamin law and violence, despite the essential and close relations between 
them, in the end crucially differ from each other as law, in contradistinction to violence, acknowledges the 
metaphysical category of the decision. Cf., Benjamin 1996, p. 243. 
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Decision takes and gives time. It takes time because law, as extensively argued 
in Chapter Four, does not foresee all possible future cases, does not contain 
information about its application, and does not inform how and when it is to be 
applied. We don’t just enforce the law in the face of the potential refugee because 
at the very moment of his arrival we do not know whether his claim to protection 
is just or not; because we do not know beforehand whether his case constitutes a 
case of law, or should be excepted. Hence we give him time to lodge a claim by way 
of suspending the possible repercussions of his illegal entry. Hence we give him 
time to subsequently express his view, and relate all the relevant facts that are to 
substantiate his claim to protection. And if we decide upon his claim, we decide 
that he is in need of protection and shall be granted asylum, or should be excepted 
thereof. He either falls within the law or not, so if we decide his claim, we set the 
limits of law again and anew. And law, that didn’t foresee in this particular case, this 
specific claim to protection, falls upon the case and folds back upon itself, asserting 
itself. 
On account of the decision, boundary enforcement cannot be irreducibly 
derived from the norm; instead, there is time to redraw and reposit the border. But 
neither do we insist on our right to manage and control our border as we please, 
erecting frontiers without the support of existing law. By virtue of the decision, we 
enforce the border by making it, strengthen our borders by positing them again and 
anew. By virtue of the decision we give the refugee time and space while expressing 
our concern for our own being. Our sovereign concern, recall, stems from the fact 
that our being is never certain, never fully legitimate. The boundaries we draw, by 
reason of which we understand and determine our self, are not, for that reason, 
grounded in what and who we are; are not, that is, ever fully legitimated by that self 
that thus rises forth. Hence the need to refound our self, time and again, to draw 
the line again and anew.  
The patient, well-informed, prudent decision constitutes the openness to the 
refugee who stands at the door, who appears at the threshold, and of whom we are 
not certain if he has a right to be here, while at the same time, it expresses the 
concern for our own being. The reception of refugees who come unexpectedly and 
are not invited, is as ambiguous as this. Distrust, hostility, indiscriminate exclusion, 
repression and violence without decision erase this ambiguity and replace it with 
the humbug logic in which it is either us or them who are going to drown.  
 
 
5.6 Emplacing Refugees 
 
The present section seeks to answer the question what happens once an asylum 
claim has been lodged and the procedure been decided in the refugee’s favor.  
An adequate understanding of the trying situation that ensues from the refugee’s 
flight brings to awareness, I argued, what exactly he is searching for in claiming 
asylum. Clearly, the refugee flees because he fears for his life and freedom and is, 
therefore, no doubt seeking protection. Still, it would be reductive to limit asylum 
to protection against the threat to which the refugee is exposed. The legal 
understanding of the refugee is much more informative than that, providing the 
cues as to what asylum should entail, as it proceeds from the assumption that the 
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refugee lacks legal protection as a consequence of the flight from his homeland. 
According to Petra Catz, this sets the terms for international protection: ‘Refugees 
are people who are on the move because of threats to their freedom or security. 
But moreover they are people, citizens, who have lost the full set of basic and 
political rights, and in most cases, also their social and economic rights. They lost 
their state, the institution which should provide protection, the legal structure 
which should bear responsibility for its citizens. Their lives are disrupted, and they 
should, at a certain moment, be enabled to rebuild and regain power over their own 
lives, with the prospect of ‘a normal future’ for themselves and their children. And 
if return to the country of origin is not feasible, then another state should provide 
them with their basic human rights. That, in the long run, is what protection should 
entail.’110 
Indeed, the loss the refugee suffers is twofold: He has lost legal protection from 
his home government in the same blow that he has lost his own country. The claim to 
asylum should, therefore, be understood against the backdrop of the refugee’s 
displacement. In claiming asylum, the refugee claims a new place that he can call his 
own again. Asylum, therefore, entails the anticipated possibility of becoming rooted 
again. Indeed, implicit in the explicit purpose of the Refugee Convention to restore 
the legal person of the refugee, is that asylum entails both protection and the place 
of protection. Otherwise still, protection requires the emplacement of the refugee. 
This challenges a prevailing and well-documented assumption about the refugee 
experience. In her extensive studies on the construction and understanding of the 
refugee experience, Liisa Malkki demonstrated the general assumption that being a 
refugee involves an irreparable loss of tradition, culture, a sense of belonging and 
identity.  Strikingly, though, the conclusion attached to this inverts the argument I 
have developed, as it is generally assumed that the refugee’s uprootedness makes 
him experience the host country as unfamiliar, at times even threatening, but in any 
case, as a place where he is ill at ease and does not belong. Hence, Malkki argues: 
‘The “making strange” of the asylum country often corresponds to the assumption 
that the homeland or country of origin is not only the normal but the ideal habitat 
for any person, the place where one fits it, lives in peace, and has an unproblematic 
culture and identity.’111  
Of course, this general assumption fits the very concept of de facto statelessness 
which is believed to identify the refugee problem, and presupposes that refugees, at 
the end of the day, ought to be there where they supposedly belong, and not here 
where they are out of place.112 Hence, Nevzat Soğuk argues:  ‘The refugee is given 
a name only to be deprived of his ability to participate fully in the polity in which 
he finds himself … ‘To exist again in more than a name’, to have ‘work’, ‘home’, 
                                                 
110 Catz (2003), p. 51.  
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and Boundaries.’ Geopolitics, vol. 10 (2005), p. 676. 
112 Cf. Malkki (1995), p. 509.  
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and ‘decisions to take’, the refugee must return ‘home’, that is, he must have his 
territorial ties reestablished …’.113 
Indeed, the veiling of the refugee’s displacement as achieved by de facto 
statelessness, and substantiated by the presumed coincidence between ‘home’ and 
country of origin and/or nationality, no doubt caused return to take priority. In 
their critical study of the effects of (Western) states abdicating their responsibility 
to protect to the UNHCR, Harell-Bond and Verdirame demonstrate that among 
the three durable solutions of integration, resettlement and repatriation, the latter 
came to predominate, causing the other two to fall out of favor. They argue: ‘The 
issue of repatriation came to dominate refugee policy at every level and had an 
impact on refugee protection. Since the 1980s, UNHCR has regarded repatriation 
as the preferred solution, an approach crystallized later with the high 
commissioner’s announcement that the 1990s be ‘the decade of repatriation.’ The 
call for repatriation has permeated UNHCR’s work since then, and repatriating 
large numbers is regarded as an institutional achievement … Repatriation is 
premised on the notion that refugees have an eternal and visceral tie with the 
country of origin – ‘home’-- the place to which they will always belong.’114 
The priority of repatriation strongly impacted upon the temporary nature of 
protection and asylum, turning countries of asylum into ‘waiting rooms before 
repatriation’, while virtually giving up on integration, as Harell-Bond and Verdirame 
also argue. Indeed, the current debate on a different regime of (humanitarian) 
Temporary Protection with a view to return, no doubt took its inspiration from the 
already established practice and institutionalization of repatriation as the preferred 
durable solution to the refugee problem. As argued in Chapter Two, Temporary 
(Regional) Protection with a view to return fully brings to light the consequence of 
the identification of the refugee problem as a problem of de facto statelessness. 
 Admittedly, research, debate and proposals on Temporary Protection remain 
moving targets, as the debate is still in its initial phase, and no agreement has been 
reached on the role and function of Temporary (Regional) Protection within the 
international legal framework of refugee protection. Still, it is safe to assume that 
the defense of Temporary (Regional) Protection, with a view to the refugee’s return 
‘home’, exceeds the limited definition thereof in the EU Temporary Protection 
Directive (2001/55/EC), that views Temporary Protection as a regional tool to 
respond to a sudden mass-influx of refugees. The Directive, no doubt, considers 
Temporary Protection to be complementary to Convention-based protection. But, 
according to Hathaway, Temporary Protection neither complements nor replaces 
the Convention, but rather, constitutes a ‘new paradigm in refugee law’, and should 
be considered to be a way of implementing the 1951 refugee Convention.115  
I strongly disagree with Hathaway, and believe that, even though Temporary 
Protection at certain moments can take priority for all sorts of practical reasons (as 
intended with the EU Temporary Protection Directive), this priority should not 
spill over to the theoretical level of  thinking about refugee law and protection. 
Repatriation or return is what it is: a durable solution among the others, not the way 
to implement the Refugee Convention. In fact, I believe that if Convention- based 
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115 Refer back to Chapter One.  
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protection is contingent upon the refugee’s emplacement, implying that asylum 
anticipates the possibility that the refugee becomes rooted again, the integration of 
refugees in host societies should be given serious attention, once again. 
 Granting refugees asylum, understood in the aforementioned sense, therefore, 
bears upon the wider issue of the political and legal integration of non-nationals 
within the EU, and should find its way to the EU Long Term Residents Directive 
(2003/109/EC). The LTR Directive aims to ensure a fair treatment of third-
country nationals legally staying within the EU and lays down that their status 
should approximate to that of member-state nationals. In its Proposal for a LTR 
Directive of March 2001, 116  refugees were included, whereas beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection were not. Eventually, however, it was decided that persons 
afforded international protection be removed altogether from the scope of the 
Directive. Importantly though, in June, 2007, the EC published a Proposal to 
amend the LTR Directive with a view to include refugees within its scope, aiming 
to offer them legal certainty about their residence within the EU, and granting them 
rights comparable to EU citizens’ rights after five years of legal residence, 
calculated from the moment of the application for protection. The inclusion of 
refugees within the scope of the LTR Directive, which is presently being 
negotiated117, responds to the concept of asylum I have developed, and reevaluates 
integration as a durable solution. Moreover, it would prove that EU member states 
not only pay lip service to the 1951 Refugee Convention, but actually and 
effectively take seriously their own repeated declared commitment to the 
Convention. 
But the anticipated possibility of an own place that inheres in the grant of 
asylum, does not just pertain to Convention refugees. It is valid, as well, for persons 
granted subsidiary protection resulting from the prohibition of refoulement, or from 
the existence of a serious threat to their life because of indiscriminate violence in 
situations of internal or international armed conflict.118 As to the current state of 
affairs, however, subsidiary protection is inferior to Convention-based protection. 
The existence of two separate protection statuses is not self-evident, as is evidenced 
by the EC Communication Towards a Common Asylum Procedure and a Uniform 
Status of November 2001,119 which recommends that the rights of those granted 
subsidiary protection should equal the rights of the Refugee Convention. It is not 
suspiring, therefore, that the inequality between different persons afforded 
international protection has been subjected to debate, and has been heavily 
criticized for a variety of reasons. Scholars in refugee law, such as Durieux, Noll 
and Spijkerboer, are of the opinion that the need for a regime of subsidiary 
protection arises from the restrictive interpretation of the refugee definition, and its 
strict focus on the criterion of single-out (something the above- mentioned EC 
Communication explicitly denies). Consequently, they argue that persons now 
offered subsidiary protection are to be considered as refugees according to the 
                                                 
116 2001/C 240 E/13. 
117  Cf., Peers, S. ‘Legislative Update EU Immigration and Asylum Law 2010: Extension of Long-term 
Residence Rights and Amending the Law on Trafficking in Human Beings’, European Journal of Migration and 
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1951 Refugee Convention. 120  As Spijkerboer argues: ‘The necessity of drafting 
separate legal texts for subsidiary protection is one created by the restrictive 
interpretation of the term refugee. In fact, we are reinventing the wheel. The 
necessity of drafting separate legal texts for subsidiary protection is a political one, 
not a legal one.’ 121  Noll seems to share in this view, arguing that: ‘Subsidiary 
protection is what happens to states that manipulate obligations under the Geneva 
Convention.’122 
ECRE takes its concern with respect to two different and unequal protection 
statuses into a different direction, arguing that both groups of persons in need of 
international protection share in the same needs: ‘It is hard to find an objective 
justification for the situation established by the current text of the Qualification 
Directive, where a person fleeing serious harm can be afforded with fewer 
entitlements than a refugee fleeing persecution. This approach enshrines a vision of 
subsidiary protection as a lesser, temporary form of protection, which is clearly not 
its purpose. As stressed by the European Parliament in the Explanatory Statement 
included in its 2002 report on the Commission proposal, both statuses are meant to 
be “complementary rather than hierarchical”. There is no indication whatsoever 
that a well-founded fear of being persecuted will last longer than a risk of serious 
harm. The needs of all international protection beneficiaries are equally compelling 
and, therefore, should be met with the same rights.’ 123  Consequently, ECRE 
welcomes the EC Proposal to Recast the EU Qualification Directive.124 The Recast 
Proposal, also presently under negotiation, introduces the concept of ‘beneficiaries 
of international protection’, which substitutes one legal status for the existing two. 
The alignment of the rights granted to refugees and persons granted subsidiary 
protection de facto results in one uniform status.125 
Importantly, the EC proposal to amend the LTR Directive, as discussed above, 
aims to include in its scope ‘beneficiaries of international protection’, thus granting 
legal residence rights for both refugees and subsidiary protected persons. If both 
Proposals to amend the LTR Directive and Qualification Directive are accepted, 
the legal position of refugees would certainly be improved. Refugees would see 
their legal person be restored, hence, the amended Directives would implement the 
Refugee Convention by granting refugees a legal place, enabling them to enjoy their 
rights and freedom, and rebuild their lives. Importantly, it will give effect to the 
right to asylum as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union.  
 
120 Cf. Durieux, ‘Salah Sheekh is a Refugee. New Insights into Primary and Subsidiary Forms of Protection’, 
Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper no. 49, October 2008; Boeles & Fernhout in NJB, aflevering 20, 
(1999). 
121 Spijkerboer, T. ‘Full Circle? The Personal Scope of International Protection in the Geneva Convention 
and the Draft Directive on Qualification’ in Constanca Dias Urbano De Sousa, Ph. De Bruycker (eds.) The 
Emergence of a European Asylum Policy, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2004 p. 175.  
122 Noll, G. ‘International Protection Obligations and the Definition of Subsidiary Protection in the EU 
Qualification Directive’ in Constanca Dias Urbano De Sousa, Ph. De Bruycker (eds.), The Emergence of A 
European Asylum Policy Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2004 p. 193.  
123 Comments from the European Council of Refugees and Exiles on the European Commission Proposal to 
recast the Qualification Directive (March 2010)  p. 12.  
124 COD/2009/0164. 
125 Comments from the European Council of Refugees and Exiles on the European Commission Proposal to 
recast the Qualification Directive (March 2010)   p. 4. 
 
      
 




     






This book has been devoted to critically assessing the international response to the 
refugee question. It took as its starting point the tension between the international 
community’s proclaimed commitment to protect refugees and the actual practice of 
protection. Somewhere between the lofty aspirations to assure refugees the exercise 
of their rights and freedoms and current asylum policies, the system of refugee 
protection is falling apart. I have tried to trace down the origins of this breakdown. 
I deemed it necessary to refresh our understanding of the stakes involved in 
refugee protection. The first question of this thesis, i.e., what asylum is and 
amounts to, has shed a new light on the refugee problem. This conclusive summary 
recaps some of the most important findings. 
I somehow feel that in the closing pages of this inquiry into asylum we should 
leave refugees the last word. I will therefore introduce two refugees whom I met 
during my job as a volunteer at a local department of the Dutch Refugee Council 
some years ago. My experience with these two refugees carried the germs of this 
academic study.  
First, let me briefly recount my experience with a young girl from Somalia who 
belonged to the minority group of the Reer Hamar. She applied for asylum in the 
Netherlands as an unaccompanied minor. Her misery is surely a story about the 
trickery of time. She had to wait six years before a first decision was taken on her 
application. At that time, the Dutch government, aware of the fact that long and 
overdue procedures harm people, decided to grant a general amnesty to asylum 
seekers whose procedure already took six years, and who had not yet received a 
first decision. Had this girl applied for asylum two days earlier than she actually did, 
the amnesty would have applied to her. When she was finally rejected as a refugee, 
the decision came too soon. A few days later, the European Court of Human 
Rights decided on the well-known Salah Sheekh case and ruled that membership of 
the Reer Hamar was, in itself, a sufficient reason to be granted protection under 
article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. By that time, however, the 
girl had already disappeared. Her boyfriend, whom I came across in her apartment, 
told me that she had made herself invisible out of fear of being returned to 
Somalia.  
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To this very day, I am certain that if she had lodged an appeal, the court would 
have ruled in her favour. But I also have to admit that the question, whether or not 
she qualified for protection, was not the sole reason why I spent a considerable 
amount of time on her case. I just happened to like her. She was not allowed to go 
to school nor given the opportunity to learn the Dutch language. As the bigmouth 
that she was, she found this incredibly stupid. So she bought a dictionary and 
started working as a volunteer in an old people’s home. Caring for the aged, she 
learned the language. I really admired her for her strength and swagger and the 
determinacy with which she, just like that, started to live among us and participated 
in Dutch society. Besides, apart from her scarf, we happened to like the same kind 
of clothing, so we shared information where to buy the fanciest dresses in town 
and we always had a good laugh together. I just thought she deserved to be here 
simply because of who she was. 
I also really liked the young boy from Ethiopia. He also applied for asylum as an 
unaccompanied minor. But his story made me aware of the complexity of the 
refugee question. Or more precisely still, he made me realize that I did not 
understand it. At a very young age he had lost his mother. Her death was unrelated 
to the enmities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. But, when he was an adolescent, his 
father was arrested as he was originally from Eritrea. After the arrest, the place of 
detention was kept secret (if he was detained at all) and the boy never saw his 
father again. The immigration authorities deemed this to be incredible and were of 
the opinion that the boy just made up the story of his father’s Eritrean origins, as 
this would suit him in his procedure, given the fact of the recent war between the 
two countries. But cynically, when the boy, meanwhile a young man, received the 
return decision, he was informed that he should go to both the Eritrean and 
Ethiopian embassies so as to improve the chances for his actual removal from 
Dutch territory. After all, he grew up in Ethiopia but claimed to have family ties in 
Eritrea. However, it was a well-known fact, confirmed by UNHCR, that people 
from Ethiopia with Eritrean origins, upon return to Eritrea would be detained in 
camps from where they would be deported to Ethiopia. In its turn, Ethiopia would 
contain these people in camps from where they were deported back to Eritrea, and 
so on. Those people, UNHCR declared, should be considered to be de facto 
stateless. If this young man returned to wherever it was he was supposed to return 
to, he would be subjected to an inhuman game of human Ping-Pong. It struck me 
dumb that even though this was a well-known fact, it did not constitute a reason to 
offer this man a leave to stay. The only way out for him was to prove that neither 
Ethiopia nor Eritrea was willing to take him back. If he could prove that he could 
not be removed for reason beyond his control, the authorities might decide to 
grant him a leave to remain for that reason. Until then, however, only a few 
Palestinian stateless persons actually succeeded in demonstrating that there was no 
single state on earth which would be willing to take them in. 
Fortunately, the general amnesty did apply to him. But by that time he was only 
a shadow of the boy he was before, when full of energy, highly motivated to work 
and learn and with a contagious joy in life.  
Writing this book, this girl and boy were constantly at the back of my mind. 
And it turned out that my experiences with them were more closely connected then 
I could possibly foresee at that time. With the girl, I had the unsettling (and 
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embarrassing) experience that I thought she was deserving of protection because 
she liked me and was a bit like me. The boy made me aware of the difference 
between de facto and de jure statelessness, between refugees and stateless persons. 
And the one experience is not without relation to the other. 
Drawing on empirical analyses by Thomas Spijkerboer and Jan Blommaert, I 
argued that the refugee’s affirmation of the receiving polity’s identity is a 
precondition for the conferral of refugee status. The asylum seeker has to live up to 
the expectations and normative views that preponderate in the hosting community 
in order for her account to be deemed credible and a claim to protection thus to be 
successful. The ‘real’ refugee does not challenge the identity of his hosts. As the 
terms under which an asylum seeker is recognized as a refugee are set up in 
advance, and the asylum seeker has to know how to play these terms, he rather 
seems to affirm the receiving polity. He or she has to like us and be a bit like us. 
Affirming the hosts’ identity, however, unavoidably entails a neutralization of 
the challenge inherent in a claim to asylum and a repression of the strangeness of 
the refugee. With respect to this strangeness, recall from Chapter Two that the 
years preceding the 1951 Refugee Convention came close to grasping it. When, in 
1921, the Social and Economic Council was called upon to define the refugee 
problem it took notice of a Communication of the International Refugee 
Organization (IRO) which stated that the refugee was an alien in each and every 
country. Worse still, he was not even an alien as the alien’s option of last resort, i.e., 
return home, was not open to the refugee. The refugee was therefore considered to 
be an anomaly in international law.  
The Communication of the IRO expressed that the refugee is not simply a 
foreigner belonging to another state. Instead, it intimated that the refugee was a 
stranger on account of his displacement, taken in the strong sense of the lack of an 
own place. If the refugee is a stranger, he is the stranger par excellence. Driven out 
of his homeland and forced to live outside the bonds of nationality, the refugee, as 
Arendt would say, belongs nowhere in this world. 
But as demonstrated in both Chapter Two and Chapter Five, the refugee’s 
displacement gradually receded in the background and was eventually pretermitted 
altogether, as the lack of an own place exclusively came to be understood in terms 
of the formal absence of nationality. The fundamental dilemma of an individual’s 
right to live somewhere was shifted from the refugee problem to the problem of 
statelessness.  
This lack of regard for the refugee’s displacement is reaffirmed and resurfaces 
whenever a people’s identity serves as a point of departure for decisions in matters 
of asylum. By virtue of confirming and reinvigorating a people’s identity, the real 
refugee is a good refugee. Being the good refugee that he is, he is in no position to 
demand anything, as he must cleanse himself from the suspicion that he takes 
advantage of the people’s hospitality. But from the outset, it is feared that the 
refugee is taking advantage, that he is deceiving his hosts, as they sense there is 
some ulterior motive on the part of the refugee. This ulterior motive is, of course, 
the refugee’s intention and determinacy to take up a place of his own within the 
hosting society.  
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In this respect, a short story by the French novelist and philosopher Maurice 
Blanchot called The Idyll1 (1935) is worth mentioning. The Idyll marvellously depicts 
the laborious relation between the stranger (indeed the stranger par excellence) and 
his hosts, by showing that the very simple question of the stranger, ‘Let me become 
the man I was before’, is experienced as a sardonic threat by his hosts. For the 
stranger’s request would only be met if he regained his freedom and were allowed 
to settle as a free man in the city where he would be living among his hosts.  In The 
Idyll the stranger is received in the hospitable home which is the place of welcome 
for strangers. The hospitable home is located at the skirts of the city which has 
banned words such as ‘waiting zone’, ‘prison’, and ‘seclusion’ from its lofty 
language. The people of the city are proud to have this home as it allows them to 
be good to strangers. And the stranger has to affirm their justness, their kindness, 
has to believe in their idyll without being in a position to demand anything, not 
even his freedom. Upon his arrival the stranger is welcomed by the lovely, 
charming young woman Louise who is married to Pierre. Together they run the 
hospitable home. Immediately Louise introduces the stranger to her husband, 
flattering her love by proudly saying: ‘He’s good; You’ll like him, everyone does.’2 
But as the story unfolds it becomes clear that Louise’s words are not describing a 
warm atmosphere of respect and friendship but instead function more like a 
warning: like us or you will upset the order of the home. The stranger understands 
the warning and is constantly toadying to his hosts. He only says what they 
desperately want him to say, namely that their life is a happy one. He has to like 
them, has to believe in their happiness so that they themselves can believe in it 
again. Still the hosts cannot but distrust the stranger as they fear that he is secretly 
planning his escape to the city. Because of this much-dreaded abuse of the stranger, 
the hosts keep after him. The Idyll perfectly sketches the stranger’s dilemma: the 
stranger has to affirm his hosts, he has to like them and be like them while is under 
the constant suspicion that he is deceiving them.3 The stranger from The Idyll very 
well captures the dilemma: ‘You’ll learn that in this house it’s hard to be a stranger. 
You’ll also learn that it’s not easy stop being one.’4 
The stranger has to be compliant, has to be grateful and is barred from speaking 
the forbidden words that would expose what the hospitable home truly is: a penal 
institution, a waiting zone where the stranger is suffering as he is not free and 
where his life is put on hold. Apparently, the home is the only ‘place’ the people of 
the city are willing to offer to strangers. Eventually the stranger speaks the 
forbidden words: ‘You have treated me brutally … A dog, a swine has the right to 
spitality.’more respect. I’ll remember your ho
                                                       
5 These words give the initial impetus 
 
1 Blanchot, M. Vicious Circles. Two Fictions and ‘After the Fact’ (translated from the French), Barrytown, New 
York: Station Hill Press 1985. 
2 Ibid., p. 3.  
3 The dilemma also becomes clear from the name Louise gives to the stranger: Alexander Akim. In her 
perspicuous reading of The Idyll Sarah Kofman reveals the meaning of this name by drawing on etymology: 
‘Alexander: the man of the outside whose coming disrupts the harmony of the community; the trouble maker, 
the breaker of laws, the violator of treaties who cannot keep his words…Alexander Akim: the exile, the wretch, 
the vagabond whom the laws want to arrest, immobilize – to turn away from the outside – though it can only 
fail since Alexander is, and will remain, the man of the outside.’ (Kofman, S. Smothered Words (translated from 
the French), Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1998, pp. 20, 21).  
4 Blanchot 1985, pp. 25, 26.  
5 Ibid., p. 9. 
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to hosts’ certainty that the stranger is ungrateful and is abusing their system of 
hospitality. When the hosts finally know for sure that the stranger was planning his 
escape to the city, they punish him for this criminal act. The stranger is sentenced 
to the inhuman ordeal of flogging. After the death of the stranger all is quite as well 
as it was before in this beautiful land.  
The stranger’s dilemma from The Idyll is the refugee’s dilemma as well: he has to 
conform to the values, norms, expectations and beliefs of the receiving polity while 
it is almost impossible to skirt the suspicion that he is abusing the system. Today, 
the fear that refugees might take up a place of their own among us is fostered by 
increasing numbers of immigrants who enter and settle in our communities without 
our prior consent. Seemingly willing to take refugees in, we mistrustfully haunt 
down the traces of their intrusion and abuse, eventually trying to repress these by 
keeping refugees at a distance, either by secluding them from the normal order of 
things or trying to prevent them from arriving at all. Indeed, driven to the limit, the 
real and good refugee is a refugee who has to be protected elsewhere. 
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that a regime of temporary regional 
protection, which I discussed in Chapter One, gained so much attention from both 
politicians and academics. Under the pretext of preventing abuse and embanking 
illegal immigration while being good to refugees, it tries to make work of protecting 
refugees elsewhere. But as argued in Chapter Two, there is another reason as well 
why the exploration of temporary protection deserves special attention: It fully 
brings to light the consequences of the lack of regard for the refugee’s 
displacement. This lack of regard has caused the identification of the refugee 
problem as a problem of de facto statelessness. The concept of de facto statelessness 
effaces the strangeness of the refugee, veils his displacement and levels down the 
challenge inherent in a claim to asylum. Ultimately, it justifies the claim that 
refugees, at the end of the day, belong ‘there’, not here. To be sure, this stubborn 
presupposition is not only expressed in the exploration of a regime of temporary 
protection; it is also reflected by the exclusion of refugees from the EU Long 
Terms Residents Directive. 
But the disruptive force of the refugee’s displacement, which calls into question 
that we live in a common world, is bound to recur. It resurfaces every time return 
‘home’ proves to be infeasible. Then it becomes clear that the ‘there’ where the 
refugee supposedly belongs is no longer a qualified somewhere determined over 
against a particular here. The ‘there’ instead loses its determinacy and turns into a 
‘no matter where as long as it is not here.’ Put even more strongly, the ‘there’, 
which is a ‘no matter where’, collapses the non-existent homeland of the refugee 
into the absolute non-place of the refugee camp. The refugee camp, I argued, 
marks the recurrence of the refugee’s strangeness, as it gives a spatial arrangement 
to his or her displacement.  
Note however, that strangeness hits back on us, as well. And it hits back hard. 
For refugee camps do not even come close to restoring the legal person of the 
refugee. Refugee camps seriously put doubt on our proclaimed belief in human 
rights and our commitment, rehearsed in both the EU Qualification Directive and 
the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, to protection obligations under the 
Refugee Convention. 
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I repeat once more my agreement with Harell-Bond. While she acknowledges 
that mistakes will, sadly, always be made when we respond to refugee crises, the 
refugee camp is a mistake we cannot afford: ‘[S]ome mistakes are inevitable. Others 
are not. And of these, the most dangerous is our blind reliance on camps and our 
fixation on repatriation.’6 
Establishing a link between refugee camps and the fixation on repatriation, 
Harell-Bond intimates that there is a pressing need to rethink the basis of our 
asylum policies. To my mind, a prerequisite thereto is a refreshing of our 
understanding of the plight that befalls refugees upon fleeing. Taking my cue from 
Arendt, I argued in Chapter Three that the cardinal point of having lost state 
protection is the loss of a place in this world from where one relates to oneself and 
others. Indeed, the sticky situation in which the refugee finds himself is that he 
belongs nowhere in this world. The experience of being nowhere in this world is 
the experience of the apatride, the one without a fatherland. And it is this 
experience, Améry reminds us, that brings to awareness that the human being 
needs a fatherland, a country of his own: ‘Denn der Mensch braucht Heimat. 
Wieviel? … Er braucht viel Heimat, mehr jedenfalls, als eine Welt von 
Beheimateten, deren ganzer Stolz ein kosmopolitischer Ferienspaß ist, sich träumen 
läßt … Was bleibt, ist die nüchternste Feststellung: Es ist nicht gut, keine Heimat 
zu haben.’7 
Indeed, with respect to rethinking the refugee problem, the most important 
finding of this thesis is that the strict division between refugees and stateless 
persons is untenable on a conceptual level. Statelessness is not merely a technical 
issue. As Van Waas stresses, it also and above all reflects a severe human dilemma 
for the person concerned: Where does he have a right to live? But if it is accepted 
that statelessness entails more than the formal absence of nationality but also 
amounts to the desperate experience of lacking an own place, it can be argued that 
the quandary of statelessness is not, by definition, excluded from the refugee 
problem. And if we accept this, we are better equipped to clear the haziness that 
surrounds the concept of asylum. The notion of asylum, I have argued in Chapter 
Five, acquires its sense against the backdrop of the refugee’s displacement. Coming 
from elsewhere, the refugee, in claiming asylum, claims a place of his own where 
he, not unlike the stranger of Blanchot’s parable, can be the man he was before. 
Indeed, if, as was argued during the failed Conference on Territorial Asylum, 
asylum entails ‘something more’ than protection against refoulement, it is because 
asylum not only refers to protection but also to the place where protection is 
offered. If the Refugee Convention is still relevant today it is because the 
protection and the rights it affords to refugees are contingent upon the legal 
emplacement of refugees within hosting societies. In the same vein that the grant 
of a status of a stateless person is a stepping-stone to nationality, as UNHCR 
recently claimed, so also can the grant of refugee status be a stepping-stone towards 
naturalization and integration. Secluding refugees from the normal order of things, 
setting them aside from our societies on the assumption that return will always be a 
don the Convention and its aspirations. Asylum 
becoming rooted again, which would be given a 
prospect in view, is virtually to aban
entails the anticipated possibility of 
                                                        
6 Harell-Bond (1994), p. 20.  
7 Améry 1970, p. 76.  
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a different body, a new sense.  
                                                       
practical meaning if refugees were to be included in the EU Long Term Resident 
Directive. It would deprive repatriation and/or return from its predominance 
which is taken for granted today, and assign the place proper to it, i.e., as a durable 
solution next to integration. It is important to keep in mind that this argument is 
not only relevant for refugees who also happen to be stateless. It holds for all 
refugees. The recommendation of the Council of Europe ‘to treat de facto stateless 
refugees as though they were stateless de jure’8 supports this view. 
This refounding of the concept of asylum set the scene for the second question 
of this academic study: Why would we, as members of democratic polities, care? 
Whence the political will to treat refugees in good faith and comply with 
international obligations to grant asylum? 
In Chapter Three, I embarked upon this question. I proceeded from Arendt’s 
invocation of the right to have rights, which is not so much an easy solution to the 
refugee question but, rather, expresses the fundamental dilemma refugees and 
democracies face in facing each other. This dilemma derives from the unavoidable 
asymmetry between refugees and the members of receiving polities, raising the 
question how, if at all, refugees can claim a right to have rights and why, if at all, 
this claim would register. The right to have rights is a claim at the behest of the 
displaced person who has been deprived of his legal and political identity and is 
suffering from the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human. People who are 
‘forced to live outside the common world’, Arendt says, ‘are thrown back, in the 
midst of civilization, on their natural givenness.’9 Forced to live outside the 
common world in which each individual has a place of his own, the right to have 
rights is a claim to belong to a political community and to live among equals who 
mutually grant themselves rights. But if, in modern democracies, rights are the 
outcome of the joint political action between the members of a polity, how can the 
refugee, as a non-member, claim a right to belong? It’s important to bear in mind 
that the dilemma works two ways. For the refugee radically calls into question ‘the 
assumption that we can produce equality through organization, because man can 
act in and change and build a common world, together with his equals.’10 Arendt’s 
trenchant insight into the refugee dilemma is that the refugee ‘breaks into the 
political scene as the alien which in its all too obvious difference reminds us of the 
limitations of human activity – which are identical with the limitations of human 
equality.’11 
To scrape off some of the sharp edges of this dilemma, I turned to Benhabib 
who elaborates the notion of a right to have rights within the broader context of 
immigration. I demonstrated that Benhabib seeks to mitigate what Arendt cast as a 
threat to our political life by arguing that the fracture between a universal humanity 
and the common world of equals is constitutive of democracy itself. This fracture 
warrants democracy’s openness to ‘the others’ who bring with them foreign 
contents of experience that show that the ‘universal’ and the ‘human’ can be given 
 
8 Council of Europe Recommendation 564 (1969).  
9 OT, p. 302.  
10 Ibid., p. 301.  
11 Ibid., p. 301.  
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I took issue with Benhabib for two reasons. First, I argued that Benhabib makes 
a people’s identity, in the sense of idem-identity, the starting point for her theory 
on the right to membership. But in doing so, she does not tackle the issue of the 
right to membership, but offers an account of the cultural integration of already 
settled immigrants. She thus fails to see that the position from where the refugee 
challenges a receiving polity crucially differs from the position of the settled 
immigrant. Secondly, Benhabib’s recourse to a moral universalism, which is the 
driving force behind democracy’s openness and which establishes a moral 
reciprocity between ‘the others’ and a receiving polity’, does not solve the 
quandary. In fact, it makes it even worse. For the assumed moral reciprocity hides 
from view that the decision to include and/or exclude is always taken from within 
with the effect that ‘the other’, at the end of the day, faces a decision with which he 
may not agree. Benhabib does not come to terms with the dilemma the right to 
have rights reflects. Instead, she spirits it away. And because of that, her theory 
does not offer a compelling argument to grant asylum. 
Chapter Three ended with a discussion of Honig. What attracted me in her 
argument, and what continues to attract me, is that it adumbrates a wholly different 
and radical democratic response to the ever- increasing numbers of displaced and 
uprooted people who, as Arendt says, ‘threaten our political life.’12 Honig’s tart 
response dovetails into a political care for the collective self of democracy and the 
right to have rights of displaced, uprooted, excluded, marginalized and irregular 
people. This political care for the people itself dissuades from taking repressive and 
violent action and deploy undemocratic means to turn the threat and stem the 
flows. It might incite a hyper-legalistic critique of current practices of exclusion, but 
also calls for radical political action that claims new rights for different groups of 
people. Either way, it projects a people into the future where it has to clean up the 
mess it made in fighting emergencies and containing security threats, playing the 
paradox of politics as it imagines a new world which it seeks to bring into being 
while acting as if this world already existed. This was exactly what the lawyers did 
who defended the rights of the Haitian refugees at Guantanamo Bay which was 
discussed at length in the third chapter. They knew their clients would not profit 
from existing aliens law. The lawyers, thus, defended the rights of the refugees 
which they both pursued and presupposed. The catchword in their success – the 
refugees were released from the detention centre and granted access to the United 
States – is no doubt proximity. Numerous US Citizens ranged themselves on the 
side of the detained refugees, not on the balmy assumption that they ‘are all 
humans’, but because of the shared commonalities between them and the refugees. 
They made a stance for the refugees’ rights because the Haitians were in one way or 
another close and near to them. And, in doing so, they brought a different We to 
the democratic scene; a different and other We that refuses the harsh, inhuman and 
unjust regime to which people are subjected if they try to access the United States 
and file for asylum, simply because, as Honing would say, they are there. 
Obviously, however, they can be as near as they can be in a geographical sense, 
yet not register in a political sense. Therefore, in Chapter Four, I continued my 
 why we would care for refugees? To answer it, 
opular sovereignty. I joined the argument made 
quest for an answer to the question
I sought to rethink the concept of p
                                                        
12 Ibid., p. 302.  
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by Van Roermund that popular sovereignty hinges as much on the reflexivity of the 
We (articulated as a plural self) as on the much more received view that it entails 
the identity of the rulers and the ruled. Therefore, the relevant question with 
respect to popular sovereignty was: What does it mean for a We to exist as a self? 
Taking my cue from Heidegger’s exposition of human being as Dasein, it was 
argued that to be a self means to make one’s own what is given (facticity). 
Consequently, the plural self, which is the hallmark of the sovereign right of a 
people to determine itself, is not an a priori. Rather, the self emerges from the 
exposure to, and identification with, the world in which the We always already finds 
itself. Hence the plural self is not the ground of sovereignty. Rather, sovereignty is 
grounded in a fundamental lack of ground, as the plural self is essentially elusive, 
slips away from every representation, every identification by virtue of which the We 
determines and establishes itself. To be a self is the radical experience of one’s own 
absence, one’s own not-being. It is this possibility of absence and not-being - which 
inheres in the We from the moment it started to live together as a people - which 
makes a people concerned for its own existence. From the viewpoint of reflexivity, 
popular sovereignty thus came into view as a people’s concern for its own being. 
Then, I argued in Chapter Five that, given this concern, the appearance of the 
refugee carries a meaning for the polity which is crucially different from the 
meaning the immigrant brings to it. Whereas the appearance of the latter plays on 
the tensions between the actual We and a possible We, the refugee exposes the 
polity to the possibility of its non-existence. Immigrants lay bare the possibility of a 
different order; refugees confront the polity with the possibility of no order at all. 
I am not saying that the polity needs refugees to be aware of its own finite 
existence. To say that the polity needs the refugee in this way is to misinterpret the 
appearance of the refugee in calculable terms, and draws it within the ambit of a 
people’s concern. The point is, rather, that the very arrival of the refugee is critical 
towards this concern in the most radical way, as it exposes that this concern is 
much more de facto than it is de jure. The more the status of the refugee as ‘wherever’ 
is confirmed, the more this factuality becomes real. Countering the refugee’s 
‘wherever’ by granting asylum, the people takes seriously the concern for its own 
being by dealing with the ambiguities at the origins of its own existence. Indeed, 
malevolence, distrust and hostility towards refugees erase a people’s own 
ambiguous self and turn its identity, as well as the ‘right’ to set up this identity, into 
an irresistible fact. By contrast, a people’s concern for its own precarious and 
vulnerable being, attunes it to the moods of modesty in which it approaches 
refugees with benevolence and good faith. 
Throughout this book, a distinction was made between refugees and 
immigrants. However, I do believe that a polity’s response to the issue of irregular 
immigration can benefit, as well, from the argument I have developed. Indeed, it is 
time to rethink the basis of our migration policies, not only because the grant of 
asylum is always preceded by the unauthorized border crossings of potential 
refugees, but also because refugee protection always takes place within a certain 
climate, and the current mood that has taken hold on immigration has certainly 
proven to be detrimental to refugees. This study on refugees might be seen as a 
kick- off of a broader analysis of the interrelations between refugees, irregular 
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On the day of writing the final touch of this thesis it is exactly sixty years ago that 
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted. To the present day, 
the 1951 Refugee Convention is the bedrock for protecting persons who are 
vulnerable in every aspect of their lives as they no longer enjoy any form of legal 
protection. This lack of protection befalls a person upon fleeing his own country; 
as soon as the refugee crosses the territorial borders of his own state he is driven 
outside the legal bonds of protection that connect him to the home government. 
The Refugee Convention addresses this lack of protection the refugee is suffering 
outside his own country. The key element of the international refugee protection 
regime is constituted by the prohibition of refoulement which prohibits states to 
return a refugee to a territory where he risks persecution or other serious harm. But 
Convention-based protection is not merely negatively determined. Given the 
purpose of the Refugee Convention to assure refugees the widest possible exercise 
of their rights and freedoms, protection also clearly has a positive aspect that 
enables refugees to continue their lives in safety and dignity. This positive aspect is 
warranted by the basic rights the Convention affords to refugees, including the 
right to work and education and the right to freedom of movement and religion. 
However, somewhere between the humanitarian ideal of restoring the legal 
person of the refugee and the actual practices of asylum, the system of refugee 
protection is falling apart (Chapter One). Haunted by the specter of the refugee 
who comes today and stays tomorrow, states have indisputable factored in the 
negative when it comes to protection. Favoring ‘return home’ as the durable 
solution to the problem, while virtually giving up on integration as a means to end 
the plight of refugees, states have invariably sought ways to limit their protection 
obligations to the prohibition of refoulement. Detaching non-refoulement from any 
positive aspect of protection irredeemably undresses refugee protection. At the 
same time, states increasingly seek to circumvent their obligations by employing 
non-arrival and non-admission policies. Efforts to prevent asylum seekers from 
reaching the territories of targeted host states seriously obstruct the individual’s 
right to seek asylum.  
This thesis tries to trace down the origins of this breakdown. It is not enough to 
point out the lack of political will on the part of states to comply with obligations 
they voluntarily accepted. The theoretical problem at issue is constituted by the 
hazy concept of asylum. Indeed, what presses the theoretical debate about refugee 
protection is that the international community appears to be in complete disarray 
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about the concept of asylum. As Goodwin-Gill and McAdam put the quandary: ‘In 
regard to asylum … the argument for obligation fails, both on account of the 
vagueness of the institution and of the continuing reluctance of States formally to 
accept such obligation and to accord a right of asylum enforceable at the instance 
of the individual.’ 1  Although the argument for obligation fails, the question of 
asylum should not, for that reason, be dodged.  
In this thesis I approach the issue of asylum from a philosophical perspective. 
Two questions underlie this academic study. First, given what refugeeship amounts 
to, what is asylum? And, second why would we, as members of democratic polities, 
care? Through the looking glass of ‘the right to have rights’, as coined by Hannah 
Arendt, both questions interrelate. The right to have rights which is claimed at the 
behest of those who exist outside the pale of law, reflects the plight that befalls 
refugees and for which they seek international redress. The situation in which the 
right to have rights insists, therefore illuminates what, exactly, the refugee is 
claiming in claiming asylum. But the right to have rights is far from a solution to 
the problem. In fact, Arendt invoked the right to have rights to bring to awareness 
the complex relation between refugees and potential host states. Proceeding from 
the assumption that in modern democracies rights, equality and freedom are the 
outcome of the joint political action between the members of the polity, the 
dilemma is this: how can the refugee, who does not belong, claim a right to have 
rights? This lack of political reciprocity signals the unavoidable asymmetry between 
the refugee and the receiving polity. What makes matters so complex is that the 
asymmetry cannot be solved by legal formalism, nor be eased by universal 
principles of humanity. Hence the question: if a people determines and unites itself 
around a common interest, why would it care to protect refugees? 
As said, the Refugee Convention responds to a situation that comes into being 
whenever people cross an international border out of fear of persecution. Likewise, 
the question of asylum is to be informed by a conceptual understanding of the 
calamity refugees are facing. This thesis therefore proceeds from an inquiry into the 
concept of the refugee (Chapter Two). At the time of drafting the 1951 Convention, 
refugees were perceived to constitute a class of unprotected persons. Intellectual 
debate further qualified this by identifying the refugee problem as a problem of de 
facto statelessness. The predicate de facto statelessness was meant to express that 
refugees are destitute of protection as a matter fact, whereas persons stateless de jure 
suffer from a legal lack of protection due to the absence of nationality. This thesis 
puts doubt on de facto statelessness as an adequate concept to identify the refugee 
dilemma. It is argued that the very concept of de facto statelessness holds the 
concept of asylum out of sight. The main objection formulated in this book against 
de facto statelessness is that it understands the lack of protection refugees are 
suffering as a brute fact. It thereby fails to see that this lack of protection is 
tantamount to the loss of an own place which is legally warranted. Taking the role 
and function of nationality in international law into account, it is argued that the 
refugee, who is driven outside the legal bonds of protection that connect him to a 
state, forfeits a legal place where he can enjoy and exercise his rights and freedoms. 
Indeed, on the understanding that law emplaces human beings in terms of rights 
 
1 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, p. 358. 
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and duties, the refugee loses his abode. That is, he loses the place where he abides by 
the law and where he is properly dwelling. One of the most important findings of 
this thesis is that the distinction between de facto and de jure statelessness, between 
refugees and stateless persons is not as trenchant as is currently believed (Chapter 
Two and Five). Through the looking glass of the right to have rights both the 
refugee and the stateless person share in the same fundamental dilemma: where do 
they have a right to live? On the understanding that rights and duties do not simply 
befall a human being but require the legal emplacement of the individual within an 
organized political community, the claim to asylum is cast as the claim to an own 
place which is legally warranted. Indeed, asylum not only refers to protection as is 
commonly assumed, but also to the place where protection is offered, which was 
the common understanding of asylum before the Twentieth Century. By taking the 
notion of place back in into the account of asylum, asylum comes into view as the 
anticipated possibility (hence not necessity) of becoming rooted again. The 
understanding of asylum this thesis provides aims to balance durable solutions to 
the plight of refugees, by bringing into view again the integration of refugees in 
host societies and deprive repatriation of its longstanding predominance.  
This raises the second question of the thesis: why would we, as members of 
democratic polities, care to protect refugees and grant them asylum among 
ourselves? To answer this question I turn to contemporary interpretations of the 
right to have rights (Chapter Three). It will be argued that Seyla Benhabib’s attempt 
to carve out a common moral ground between the ‘rights of others’ and the rights 
of states, is inconclusive. Within the theoretical framework of her agonistic 
cosmopolitanism, Bonnie Honig draws on proximity, targeting a presumed moral 
reciprocity between those who belong and those who do not belong. Though 
proximity remains much closer to the dilemma refugees and democracies face in 
facing each other, it fails to explain why a claim to asylum would register in a polity, 
if at all. 
To pursue an answer to that question, the argument returns to the asymmetry as 
reflected by the right to have rights. Keeping in mind that the asymmetry derives 
from a basic insight in modern democracy, i.e. that those who rule and those who 
are being ruled are the same, the relevant question is: how to understand and make 
sense of the sovereign right of a people to determine itself? On close reading, 
popular sovereignty raises the question what it means for a people to exist as a self. 
To elaborate a theory of collective identity that aims at the self at issue in the 
sovereign right to self-determination, I turn to the work of Martin Heidegger 
(Chapter Four). To grasp selfhood-in-the-plural this thesis offers a reading of the 
existential exposition of Dasein (Sein und Zeit) from the perspective of the first 
person plural. From the viewpoint of selfhood sovereignty appears a people’s 
concern for its own existence. Finitude (death) is the ultimate perspective of this 
concern. Indeed, what makes a people concerned for its own being is that its self is 
essentially elusive, incessantly slips away from the identifications and 
representations by means of which a people determines, exactly, itself. To be more 
specific: a people understands and determines itself by means of inclusion and 
exclusion. But the boundaries that are drawn, by virtue of which a people 
determines itself, are not grounded in who and what a people is. Boundaries, that is, 
are never fully legitimated by the plural self that rises forth from this act of 
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positioning boundaries. Hence the need of a people to refound itself time and again, 
and to draw its boundaries again and anew.  
The upshot of the existential exposition of We-Dasein is that the self – which is 
the hallmark of sovereignty – is fundamentally lacking. To exist as a self means to 
be exposed to one’s own absence. The arrival of the refugee, who has experienced 
the absence (death) of a We, exposes a people to its own radical contingency, its 
own not-being (Chapter Five). The relevant argument in this respect is not that 
finitude (death) mitigates the asymmetry between the refugee and the receiving 
polity (‘we are all dying’), nor ‘that we are all refugees.’ The point is rather that the 
arrival of the refugee carries a very specific meaning for the targeted polity. For the 
refugee, who appears at the doorstep of the polity, is critical towards a people’s 
concern in the most radical way. The refugee knows better than anyone else that 
the enjoyment of rights, duties and freedom require spatial limitation. Which, recall, 
is exactly why he claims asylum. The refugee does not, therefore, reproach the 
receiving polity for its original sin of drawing boundaries. But that boundaries need 
to be drawn to assign to each its due, does not justify these boundaries in terms of 
law. By exposing a people to its own radical contingency (making a people, indeed, 
feel insecure), the refugee calls into question the right a people claims to determine 
itself and, in the wake of that, the right to select and exclude non-members at its 
borders. If the refugee is critical towards a people’s concern, it is because this 
concern is not grounded in the plural self, but rather in the slipping away of the 
people itself. Still otherwise, the self which, recall, is the hallmark of sovereignty, is 
not the ground of sovereignty. Rather, sovereignty is grounded in a fundamental 
lack of ground, which is precisely why sovereignty expresses the concern of a 
people for its own being. Grounded in a fundamental lack of ground, a people’s 
concern for its own being is much more de facto than it is de jure. 
The right to have rights attaches to those who have lost a legal place of their 
own and who, therefore, belong nowhere in this world. At the same time the right 
to have rights displays the unavoidable asymmetry between the refugee and the 
receiving polity. Therefore, the right to have rights reflects that the refugee is 
neither inside (hence the asymmetry) nor outside (he belongs nowhere). Still 
otherwise, upon his arrival the refugee cannot be immediately incorporated (he has 
no right to be here), nor can he be properly located outside (he has no where to go). 
Neither inside nor outside, the refugee does not, properly speaking, arrive at the 
borders of a state that close off an inside over against an outside. Rather, the 
refugee appears at the threshold, which is exactly the place where the inside and 
outside of a polity intertwine. Taking my cue from Agamben, it is argued that the 
threshold is the experience of being-within an outside, - which is exactly the 
ambiguous experience of being a plural self. Whenever the refugee arrives, it is 
never certain that he has a right to be here. But if he is approached with 
benevolence and in good faith, it is a people’s own precarious being that attunes it 
to these moods of modesty. Indeed, benevolence and good faith take the refugee 
serious, while at the same time express a concern for a people’s own uncertain and 
vulnerable being. The reception of refugees is as ambiguous as this. Malevolence, 
distrust and hostility, by contrast, fail a people’s own finite existence. They turn the 
threshold into a frontier, erase a people’s own ambiguous self and replace it with 
the hum-bug logic in which it is either ‘us’ or ‘them’ who are going to drown.  
 










I am in between the philosopher and the lawyer. Literally, my house in Tilburg is 
located midway between those of my supervisors, Bert van Roermund and Anton 
van Kalmthout. Although at times I was afraid to be crushed by the rigour of their 
respective disciplines, the geographic coincidence turned out to provide the perfect 
metaphor for a buffer zone.  
I first met Bert as a student, when I took a course in philosophy of law. It was 
the only course during my study I did not understand, and, consequently, did not 
like. Besides, I thought Van Roermund was really too demanding of his students. 
But as I learned quickly after the course had finished, my vexation really was about 
my own impatience to learn things too quickly. I wanted to ‘do’ philosophy. But 
Bert teaches one to think, - and think again. Among the many things I learned from 
him, perhaps the most valuable one is how to turn indignation and anger into a 
genuine academic interest worthy of reflection. Ever since I volunteered at the 
Dutch Refugee Council, Anton has been, to me, the embodiment of the academic 
who understands law’s concern with the world we live in and with those who are 
excluded from it. His knowledge of law and insight into politics is amazing and I 
am proud that he agreed to supervise this thesis.  
Special thanks go to Hans Lindahl. It is a sure thing I would not have been able 
to develop my argument without his pertinacious and refreshing work on 
immigration and the boundaries of law. Though one may not find all references to 
his work where it would have been appropriate, I am highly indebted him. 
Thanks also go to the other members of the research group I participated in. 
Comments of David Janssens, often larded with reference to Greek tragedy, never 
failed to inspire me. To Daniel Augenstein I promise that I will never say to anyone 
ever again that ‘Daniel said that …’. Though Sander Voerman and I seem to clash 
when it comes to philosophy, I have to grant him that he at least watches Twin 
Peaks over and over again. Michiel Besters came in when I got out, but I certainly 
benefited from his natural disposition to share insights and thoughts. And of 
course Luigi Corrias, who left the research group some years ago. If anyone was 
confident in me, and was able to convince me of his confidence, it most certainly 
was Luigi. 
Of all my colleagues, Ivana Ivkovic deserves special mention. She has been my 
friend for a long time. If I were to give a definition of friendship, I would say that 
friends challenge each other intellectually, share a world together and just be there 
when you need them. Though one of the elements of this definition is pinched 
from Arendt, I am actually describing Ivana here. I thank her for hosting my 
 
246                                                                          Acknowledgments 
 
 
thoughts and doubts, - and then kicking my ass. Though she is among the most 
sovereign people I know (and, if you have read the whole of this thesis, you know 
that on my account sovereignty is closely related to care), I cannot mention her 
without mentioning Leon Heuts. For years, the three of us have discussed the issue 
of immigration and asylum. While the political climate got ever more inclement, 
our late night discussions were always enjoyable. 
Summers are good in Tilburg, now that Simon Critchley comes to our 
university every year. In a 2009 master class, Simon made valuable comments on a 
very early draft of the first chapter of this thesis and encouraged me to pursue 
working on Heidegger. A few years later he read the almost-final-draft of the 
fourth chapter and pinned down the holes in my exposition of We-Dasein. What 
certainly pulled the trick to finish this thesis, was his reassurance that every book is 
a failure. I would also like to thank Samuel IJsseling for reading my work on 
Heidegger. I am also grateful to the other members of the committee for carefully 
reading and critically commenting on my manuscript. The manuscript as a whole 
profited from Phyllis Lewis’ painstaking efforts to correct many linguistic errors. I 
am responsible, of course, for errors and omissions that remain. 
Finishing your thesis takes you back in time and makes you think of how it all 
started. I would like to thank Gido Berns for encouraging me to embark upon the 
project of writing a dissertation. 
My parents supported me in an obvious way, although not every PhD. student 
can hope for such a support. Simply speaking, they provided me the means to 
finish this thesis, but it is difficult to find the words that express my gratitude. They 
enabled me to do what I like to do most. 
There should be a protocol that dissuades PhD. students from falling in love. 
One cannot make money with philosophy, so it is difficult to build a live; and, 
while doing research, one just wants to be left alone. It is still hard for me to 
believe that Dirk manages to put up with it. Our living room, our kitchen, half of 
the first floor and even our bedroom is stuffed with books, articles and notes, - and 
that’s not only true but also a metaphor for living with me. While Dirk is swimming 
in the lake of Van, he laughs at me because I’m trying to figure out why people 
travel the world while forgetting to swim. But I could not imagine seeing the world 
without him. Because Roman and Halina are in our lives we can see the world 
again and anew. I have written this book for the most part at home. Dirk, Roman 
and Halina have given me this home. They remind me everyday how blessed I am 
to have a place I can all my own. 
I dedicate this book to my son Roman, who likes to play by ordering the world 
around him. And to my daughter Halina, who playfully disrupts everything her 
brother has just brought to order.  
 
 
 
